Jones v. Baldwin et al

Filing 10

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall PROCEED against DOE and BROWN. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 3 shall PROCEED against WEXFORD, BALDWIN, LASHBROOK, BROWN, and LOVE. COUNT 3 is DISMISSED without prejudice as against DOE. With respect to COUNTS 1 and 3, the Clerk of the Court shall prepare for defen dants BALDWIN, LASHBROOK, WEXFORD, LOVE, BROWN, and DOE (once identified) (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Recruitment of Coun sel (Doc. 3), which is REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for a decision. Plaintiff's Motion for Service of Process at Government Expense (Doc. 4) is DENIED as moot. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 6/13/2017. (tkm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JAMAL JONES, M43295,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN BALDWIN,
CHRISTINE BROWN,
JACQUELINE LASHBROOK,
LARUE LOVE,
JANE DOE,
WEXFORD MEDICAL SOURCES,
Defendants.

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Case No. 17−cv–162−MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
Plaintiff Jamal Jones, an inmate a Pinckneyville Correctional Center, brings this action
for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Complaint,
Plaintiff claims the defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.

(Doc. 1).

This case is now before the Court for a

preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
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An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 102627 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds it
appropriate to allow this case to proceed past the threshold stage.
The Complaint
In his Complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff makes the following allegations: on October 25,
2016, Plaintiff was kicked in the face, causing severe injuries to his eye sockets. (Doc. 1, p. 6).
He began to experience vision loss. Id. He was taken to the Health Care Unit (“HCU”) where
he was given a “minimal” examination by Defendant Jane Doe. Id. When Plaintiff complained
to Doe of “severe headaches,” she told him to “stop bitching and crying like a baby.” Id. She
also refused to take notes regarding his complaints. Id. Doe told Plaintiff that he would not
receive an x-ray because there was “no visible reason” to have one taken. (Doc. 1, p. 7).
Plaintiff requested ice for his injury to relieve the swelling, but it was refused. Id. Plaintiff was
instead given a low dose of Tylenol, and later Ibuprofen. Id.
Because Plaintiff was sent back to his cell after his first visit to the HCU after his injury
without having been given an x-ray, the fracture in his face began to heal unevenly, leaving
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Plaintiff’s face disfigured. Id. Both of Plaintiff’s eyes were black, and one of them was shut
completely. Id. Even now, Plaintiff’s eyes “show a dark shadow to them.” Id. The Tylenol and
Ibuprofen Plaintiff was given did not stop or slow the pain Plaintiff was experiencing – which
Plaintiff classifies as a 10 on a scale of 1 to 10. Id. Plaintiff visited the HCU several times, only
to be rushed out without sufficient care. Id. “For a very long time, [Plaintiff] was denied an xray by [Defendant Christine] Brown.” Id. “In fact, Brown, Lashbrook, Love, and Baldwin
instructed staff to not even consider treating such an ‘expensive procedure,’” as is evidenced by a
memorandum in the HCU with a list of over a dozen treatments and conditions that Wexford
instructs its employees not to provide and/or treat, as “‘expensive’ care is not Wexford’s
obligation.” Id.
Plaintiff “still has periods of 10-12 hours of severe headaches.” Id. In fact, once when
Plaintiff was trying to tie his shoes, he became so dizzy he almost fell over. Id. Plaintiff
believes he needs an MRI, but MRIs are listed on the memorandum as a service that Wexford
does not allow. Id. Plaintiff has instead suffered from daily headaches and severe depression.
Id. Plaintiff sent a letter to Baldwin about this “expensive care” memo of Wexford’s, but it went
unanswered. (Doc. 1, p. 8). Plaintiff also filed an emergency grievance, which was received by
the grievance officer on November 15, 2016 and forwarded to Baldwin on December 1, 2016.
Id. This grievance was denied. Id.
On November 3, 2016, Plaintiff was ready to have x-rays taken, but the corrections
officer on his wing told him his pass had been cancelled. Id. Plaintiff claims “[e]very cry out
he’s sent to Lashbrook, Love, Brown, and Baldwin went unanswered except” his emergency
grievance that Baldwin expedited as an emergency but ultimately denied. (Doc. 1, p. 8); (Doc.
1-1, pp. 1-4).

Notably, the emergency grievance response from Debbie Knauer of the

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Administrative Review Board and Baldwin indicates that Plaintiff “was to come to x-ray
November 3, 2016 but chose to go to commissary” and Plaintiff’s “facial bones x-rayed [sic] on
November 9, 2016.” (Doc. 1-1, p. 4).
Plaintiff claims he “suffers from severe 10-12 hour headaches, severe vision loss, severe
depression, neck pain, and other mental injuries[.]” (Doc. 1, p. 8). Plaintiff seeks monetary
damages from the defendants. (Doc. 1, p. 10).
Discussion
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into 3 counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion regarding their merit.
Count 1 –

Doe and Brown showed deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious
medical needs involving injuries to his face and pain associated therewith
by failing to provide him with effective treatment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.

Count 2 –

Baldwin, Lashbrook, Brown, and Love showed deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s serious medical needs involving injuries to his face and pain
associated therewith in violation of the Eighth Amendment by failing to
take action to ensure Plaintiff received adequate care when they received
grievances and/or complaints regarding his lack of treatment.

Count 3 –

Defendants created and perpetuated a policy at Pinckneyville favoring
inexpensive medical care over effective medical care in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.

As discussed in more detail below, Counts 1 and 3 will be allowed to proceed past
threshold. Any other intended claim that has not been recognized by the Court is considered
dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pleaded under the Twombly pleading standard.
Count 1 – Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
A prisoner raising a claim for deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s serious medical
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needs must satisfy two requirements. The first requirement compels the prisoner to satisfy an
objective standard: “[T]he deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious[.]’”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298
(1991)). The Seventh Circuit considers the following to be indications of a serious medical
need: (1) where failure to treat the condition could “result in further significant injury or the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain;” (2) “[e]xistence of an injury that a reasonable doctor
or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment;” (3) “presence of a
medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities;” or (4) “the existence
of chronic and substantial pain.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997).
The second requirement involves a subjective standard: “[A] prison official must have a
‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’” one that amounts to “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate
health or safety.”

Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).

Liability under the deliberate-

indifference standard requires more than negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness;
rather, it is satisfied only by conduct that approaches intentional wrongdoing, i.e., “something
less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm
will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
Plaintiff has described an adequately serious condition with respect to his face injury, and
the pain and suffering he has endured from it, to meet the objective prong of the medical
indifference standard. Plaintiff also alleges that Doe more or less downplayed his injury when he
came to the HCU after sustaining it, despite the visible severity of it, and even refused to give
Plaintiff ice, much less an x-ray. Plaintiff also claims Doe gave Plaintiff’s injury only a minimal
inspection and told him to stop complaining. Brown also allegedly specifically denied Plaintiff
an x-ray for a long period of time. At this early stage, these allegations satisfy the subjective

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component of the deliberate indifference standard.
Count 1 against Doe and Brown will therefore be allowed to proceed.
Count 2 – Grievance Officials
It is well established that “[f]or constitutional violations under § 1983 ... a government
official is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” E.g., Locke v. Haessig, 788 F.3d 662, 669
(7th Cir. June 5, 2015). “This means that to recover damages against a prison official acting in a
supervisory role, a § 1983 plaintiff may not rely on a theory of respondeat superior and must
instead allege that the defendant, through his or her own conduct, has violated the Constitution.”
Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
(2009). “An inmate's correspondence to a prison administrator may . . . establish a basis for
personal liability under § 1983 where that correspondence provides sufficient knowledge of a
constitutional deprivation.” Perez, 792 F.3d at 781-82 (citing Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993
(7th Cir. 1996)) (“[A] prison official's knowledge of prison conditions learned from an inmate's
communications can, under some circumstances, constitute sufficient knowledge of the
conditions to require the officer to exercise his or her authority and to take the needed action to
investigate and, if necessary, to rectify the offending condition.”). “In other words, prisoner
requests for relief that fall on ‘deaf ears’ may evidence deliberate indifference.” Perez, 792 F.3d
at 782.
Plaintiff has alleged that he somehow informed many of the defendants about his medical
issues. He claims that “every cry out” he sent to Baldwin, Lashbrook, Brown, and Love went
unanswered.

He does not provide any information as to what these “cry outs” may have

consisted of, or how many there may have been, or whether they even reached any of the
defendants, other than his having attached to the Complaint a single grievance and the response

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thereto to support his claim against Baldwin. In fact, it appears that Plaintiff’s grievance was
given emergency expedited review by Baldwin, and after an investigation was conducted into the
situation, the grievance was denied as it was discovered that Plaintiff received an x-ray of his
facial bones, which was the “medical treatment deemed necessary by facility medical staff.”
(Doc. 1-1, p. 4). This x-ray appears to have taken place soon after Plaintiff submitted the
grievance but before it was reviewed by the grievance officer or Baldwin. Plaintiff therefore
cannot claim that Baldwin ignored his complaint or that his request for relief from Baldwin fell
“on deaf ears.” See Perez, 792 F.3d at 782. On the contrary, it appears that Plaintiff’s grievance
to Baldwin inspired Baldwin to act upon and investigate Plaintiff’s complaints.
Baldwin’s apparent action in response to Plaintiff’s grievance, and reliance on his
medical staff’s judgment once he conducted an investigation into Plaintiff’s care, belies
Plaintiff’s allegation that Baldwin should be held liable for his lack of medical care based on the
grievance he sent to him. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Nonmedical defendants . . . can rely on the expertise of medical personnel.”). Further, given the
complete lack of information regarding what, if any, complaints Plaintiff might have sent or
made to Lashbrook, Brown, and Love, this Court does not consider Plaintiff to have met the
relevant pleading standard as to these defendants with respect to Count 2. Count 2 will therefore
be dismissed without prejudice.
Count 3 – Medical Care Policy
Plaintiff cannot rely on a theory of respondeat superior, or supervisory liability, when
bringing a claim under § 1983 against Wexford, a private corporation that provides medical
staffing and services in IDOC facilities. Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corr., 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir.
2014). See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. A private corporation will generally only be held liable

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under § 1983 for an unconstitutional policy or custom that results in a constitutional deprivation.
Perez, 792 F.3d at 780 (citing Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th
Cir. 2014)). See Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff
points to Wexford's policy of denying all costly forms of testing and treatment, regardless of
need, as the driving force behind the denial of proper medical care (including an MRI) for his
face injury. Count 3 shall receive further review against Wexford, based on this policy.
Plaintiff further alleges that Baldwin, Brown, Lashbrook, and Love are liable for this
policy because they “instructed staff to not even consider treating . . . ‘expensive’ procedure[s] . .
. . as the ‘expensive’ care is not Wexford’s obligation.” (Doc. 1, p. 7). Plaintiff also allegedly
sent a letter to Baldwin complaining about the policy. These allegations are enough, at this
stage, to state a claim against Baldwin, Brown, Lashbrook, and Love for perpetuating a costover-efficacy healthcare policy at Pinckneyville.
Count 3 shall therefore proceed against Wexford, Baldwin, Brown, Lashbrook, and Love.
Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient information to implicate Doe in this count, so she will be
dismissed from Count 3 without prejudice.
Identification of Unknown Defendants
Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with Count 1 against Doe. However, this defendant
must be identified with particularity before service of the Complaint can be made on her. Where
a prisoner’s Complaint states specific allegations describing conduct of individual prison staff
members sufficient to raise a constitutional claim, but the names of those defendants are not
known, the prisoner should have the opportunity to engage in limited discovery to ascertain the
identity of those defendants. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 832 (7th
Cir. 2009).

In this case, Lashbrook, the warden of Pinckneyville, is already named as a

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defendant and shall be responsible for responding to discovery aimed at identifying this
unknown defendant. Guidelines for discovery will be set by the United States Magistrate Judge.
Once the name of Doe is discovered, Plaintiff shall file a motion to substitute the newly
identified defendant in place of the generic designation in the case caption and throughout the
Complaint.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3), which is REFERRED
to United States Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for a decision.
Plaintiff's Motion for Service of Process at Government Expense (Doc. 4) is DENIED as
moot. Waivers of service of summons will be issued and served on the remaining defendants as
ordered below. Plaintiff is advised that it is not necessary for a litigant proceeding in forma
pauperis to file a motion requesting service of process by the United States Marshal Service or
other process server. The Clerk will issue summons and the Court will direct service for any
Complaint that passes preliminary review.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall PROCEED against DOE and
BROWN.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 3 shall PROCEED against WEXFORD,
BALDWIN, LASHBROOK, BROWN, and LOVE.

COUNT 3 is DISMISSED without

prejudice as against DOE.
With respect to COUNTS 1 and 3, the Clerk of the Court shall prepare for defendants

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BALDWIN, LASHBROOK, WEXFORD, LOVE, BROWN, and DOE (once identified) (1)
Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6
(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the
complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each defendant's place of employment as
identified by Plaintiff. If a defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons
(Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take
appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and the Court will require that
defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
With respect to a defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant's current work address, or, if
not known, the defendant's last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Service shall not be made on DOE until such time as Plaintiff has identified her by name
in a properly filed motion for substitution of parties. Plaintiff is ADVISED that it is his
responsibility to provide the Court with the name and service address for this individual.
Plaintiff shall serve upon defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to

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include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2),

this action is REFERRED to United States

Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for further pre-trial proceedings, including a decision
on Plaintiff's Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3) and a plan for discovery aimed at
identifying the unknown defendant with particularity.

Further, this entire matter shall be

REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Williams for disposition, pursuant to Local
Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, regardless of the fact
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted.

See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want
of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 13, 2017
s/ Michael J. Reagan
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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