Adamczyk v. Baldwin et al

Filing 15

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 3/27/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LAWRENCE ADAMCZYK,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 17 cv–0166 DRH

STEVE BALDWIN,
DR. HOLT, and
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Plaintiff Lawrence Adamczyk, a sexually dangerous person (SDP) in Big
Muddy

Correctional

Center,

brings

this

action

for

deprivations

of

his

constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on his confinement as
an SDP.

Plaintiff requests declarative relief, immediate release and monetary

damages. SDPs are subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915

et seq.; See Kalinwoski v. Bond, 358 F.3d 978, 978-79 (7th Cir. 2004).
Therefore, the Court will conduct a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible
or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a
civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity.

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(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

Frivolousness is an

objective standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable person would find
meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross
“the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the
factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed.

See

Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the complaint and any supporting exhibits, the
Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A; portions of this
action are subject to summary dismissal.
The Complaint
Plaintiff was declared a sexually dangerous person in or about 2014 and
committed to the custody of the Director of Corrections.

(Doc. 7-1, p. 3). He

alleges that to secure his commitment, he was charged with a made-up crime, and
the charges were later dismissed. (Doc. 1-1, p. 1). He denies that he ever needed

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treatment.

(Doc. 1, p. 6).

Plaintiff alleges that Baldwin, the Director of the

Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), and Dr. Holt, the administrator of the
SDP program at Big Muddy, violated his constitutional rights because they knew
that his confinement without trial was improper but accepted custody over him
anyway. (Doc. 1, p. 5).

Plaintiff further alleges that despite the fact that he is a

ward of the state confined for treatment, and not a convicted felon, he is treated
as a prisoner and not given appropriate care or treatment to ensure his recovery.
(Doc. 1, pp. 6-7). Plaintiff also has inadequate clothing and inadequate access to
the courts. (Doc. 1-1, p. 6). He is subject to inhumane conditions of confinement,
including excessive heat and poor ventilation.

Id.

He is forced to come into

contact with other state prisoners. (Doc. 1, p. 9).
Discussion
Based on the allegations of the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to
divide the pro se action into 4 counts. The parties and the Court will use these
designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a
judicial officer of this Court. The following claims survive threshold review:
Count 1 – Baldwin and Holt violated plaintiff’s right to receive treatment as
an SDP;
Count 2 – Baldwin and Holt violated plaintiff’s liberty interest under
the Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting him to a punitive
environment.
Plaintiff has also attempted to bring other counts, but for the reasons
elucidated below, these claims do not survive threshold review:

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Count 3 – Big Muddy’s SDP program does not comply with the
Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 725 ILCS 205/1.01 et. seq.;
Count 4 – Baldwin and Holt breached a duty to plaintiff when they
accepted him as their ward, knowing that the SDP statutory scheme
violated the Constitution.
As to plaintiff’s Count 1, plaintiff is not an ordinary prisoner. The Seventh
Circuit described the contours of the SDP program in Allison v. Snyder:
“[p]ersons charged with sex offenses in Illinois may be diverted before trial to civil
confinement, if a mental illness of at least one year’s duration led to the criminal
conduct.

Those who complete treatment successfully are released and the

criminal charges dismissed.” 332 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2003). Previously,
this Court has recognized a claim for failure to treat SDPs, see Howe v. Godinez,
No. 14-cv-844-SMY, 2014 WL 4947245 at *3-4 (S.D. Ill. 2014).

The Court

reasoned that “due process requires that the conditions and duration of
confinement . . . bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons
are committed.” Id. (citing Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001)); see also

Allison, 332 F.3d at 1079. Although plaintiff has alleged that his confinement is
wrongful, and that he does not need treatment, 1 he has also inconsistently alleged
that he is not receiving treatment.

If he is not receiving any treatment, the

purpose of his incarceration is not being met, and his due process rights may be
violated. At this stage, the Court will permit this claim to proceed.

Based on Plaintiff’s representation that he did not need treatment, the Court did not
construe the Complaint as having stated an Eighth Amendment claim for medical deliberate
indifference.
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In Count 2, plaintiff has alleged that he has been subjected to a punitive
environment, like a convicted prisoner.

He is subjected to excessive heat and

poor ventilation. He is not given more than a standard clothing allowance, which
he alleges is inadequate. He also takes issue with the amount of state pay he
receives, given the need to purchase clothing and other essentials at the
commissary. He comes into contact with convicted felons.

As a general rule,

confinement of pretrial detainees may not be punitive because “under the Due
Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt.”

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).

Thus conditions of pretrial

confinement must be “reasonably related to a legitimate government objective.”

Id. at 539; Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1995); Brownell v.
Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1289 (7th Cir. 1991). The complaint suggests that the
conditions fall short of this standard because they do not reasonably relate or
serve a legitimate government purpose. Accordingly, the Court cannot dismiss
Count 2 against Baldwin and Holt at this time.
But Count 3 must be dismissed. The United States Supreme Court and
the Seventh Circuit have long held that “the Constitution does not compel states to
follow their own laws. . . .Nor does it permit a federal court to enforce state law
directly.” Allison, 332 F.3d at 1078-79 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t

of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989)); see also Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1,
11 (1944); Archie v. Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1215-18 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)

cert. denied 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

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465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984); Pasiewicz v. Lake Cnty Forest Preserve Dist., 270 F.3d
520, 526 (7th Cir. 2001).

Although Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)

authorizes prospective relief against a state official to guarantee compliance with
the Constitution, this method does not apply to state law claims.

James v.

Madigan, 373 F. App’x 619, 621 (7th Cir. 2010). Courts are not authorized to
create new law at the request of a plaintiff; that is more properly the province of
the state legislature. Accordingly, Count 3 will be dismissed with prejudice.
Count 4 will be dismissed as well. The Court cannot find any authority for
the proposition that a breach of fiduciary duty claim arises under § 1983. The
basis for such a claim must therefore arise under Illinois state law, not federal
law. However, Federal Courts have discretionary jurisdiction over related state
law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

In order to succeed on a claim of breach of

fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must show that 1) a fiduciary duty existed between the
parties, 2) the defendant breached that duty, 3) and that breach damaged the
plaintiff. Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois, 983 N.E.2d 414, 433 (Ill.
2013). First, the court notes that that it is highly questionable whether plaintiff
can claim that the establishment of a ward/guardian relationship also constitutes
a breach of that relationship. But more to the point, the Court cannot reach this
argument because plaintiff’s request for immediate release is not cognizable in
this action, and any claim for damages stemming from his confinement and/or
status as a ward would be barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

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Plaintiff repeatedly requests release from Big Muddy in this action, but
release is not one of the available remedies in a civil rights action. A petition for a
writ of habeas corpus is the proper action “[i]f the prisoner is seeking what can
fairly be described as a quantum change in the level of custody-whether outright
freedom, or freedom subject to the limited reporting and financial constraints of
bond or parole or probation.” Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir.
1991). Additionally, a person committed under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act, 725 Illinois Compiled Statutes 205/0.01 et seq., may seek release
from the state court where the person was committed. Thus, a § 1983 claim
brought in federal court is not the correct avenue for plaintiff to take in order to
gain his release. Bramlett v. Big Muddy River Corr. Ctr., No. Civ. 11-97-GPM,
2011 WL 4916427, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2011), aff'd sub nom. Bramlett v.

Carich, 590 F. App'x 625 (7th Cir. 2014).
Additionally, any claims for damages that would imply the invalidity of
plaintiff’s commitment would be barred by Heck v. Humphrey. Heck stands for
the proposition that
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction
or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed
on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called
into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)

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The Seventh Circuit has found that Heck applies to those confined under civil
commitment statutes as well. Thomas v. Schmitt, 380 F. App’x 549, 550 (7th Cir.
2010). Plaintiff cannot bring claims for damages regarding his civil commitment
until that commitment has been overturned in another proceeding. Count 4 will
be dismissed without prejudice. This claim may or may not be cognizable in state
court proceedings.
The Court will also dismiss Defendant IDOC at this time because it is a
state government agency. The Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor
its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v.

Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See also Wynn v. Southward,
251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states
in federal court for money damages); Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785,
788 (7th Cir. 1995) (state Department of Corrections is immune from suit by
virtue of Eleventh Amendment); Hughes v. Joliet Corr. Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 427
(7th Cir. 1991) (same); Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 219, 220 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1990)
(same). IDOC is DISMISSED with prejudice as to plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.
Pending Motions
Since initiating this action, plaintiff has continually filed other pleadings
with the Court. In particular, plaintiff has filed two motions entitled “Motion: No
jurisdiction to sequester ward request immediate release,” (Doc. 7) (Doc. 8), as
well as a motion requesting a status of those motions (Doc. 10), and an
“Additional Support for Motion/Memorandum in Support re Motion No

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Jurisdiction to Sequester Ward Request Immediate Release.”

(Doc. 14).

The

Court notes that plaintiff should attempt to confine himself to one request for
relief at a time; it is improper and a drain on the Court’s resources for plaintiff to
file multiple motions requesting the same relief. As those motions request an
immediate release, which is not a proper request for relief in a § 1983 action as
discussed above, they are DENIED.

(Doc. 7) (Doc. 8).

Plaintiff’s motion for

status is DENIED as MOOT. (Doc. 10).
Plaintiff has also attempted to amend the complaint. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff
alleges that he would like to add Jessica Stover, a social worker at Big Muddy, as
well as claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation
Act. (Doc. 11). Local Rule 15.1 requires a plaintiff who wishes to amend his or
her complaint to file a proposed amended complaint, including original claims
and new claims, with all new material underlined. Plaintiff has not submitted a
proposed amended complaint here, and the Court does not accept piecemeal
amendments like the one submitted by plaintiff. The Court therefore DENIES
plaintiff’s motion to amend. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff may file another motion to amend
the complaint, if necessary, in compliance with the local rules.
As the Court has determined that some of plaintiff’s claims survive
threshold review, and because plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP), the Court will order service on the defendants. Plaintiff’s motion
for service of process is DENIED as MOOT. (Doc. 3).
Disposition

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Counts 1 and 2 survive threshold review
against Baldwin and Holt. Count 3 is DISMISSED with prejudice. Count 4 is
DISMISSED without prejudice.

Defendant IDOC is DISMISSED with

prejudice. The Court DENIES plaintiff’s motions for immediate release. (Doc. 7)
(Doc. 8).

Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint is DENIED without

prejudice.

(Doc. 11).

Plaintiff’s motion for service of process at government

expense and motion for status are DENIED as MOOT. (Doc. 3) (Doc. 10).
IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for defendants
Baldwin and Holt: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service
of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum
and Order to each defendant’s place of employment as identified by plaintiff. If a
defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to
the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take
appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and the Court will
require that defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to a defendant who no
longer can be found at the work address provided by plaintiff, the employer shall
furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the
defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation
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of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not
be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall serve upon defendants (or
upon defense counsel once an appearance is entered), a copy of every pleading or
other document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include
with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a true and
correct copy of the document was served on defendants or counsel. Any paper
received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the
Clerk or that fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the
Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading
to the complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United
States Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter is REFERRED to a United States Magistrate
Judge for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. §
636(c), should all the parties consent to such a referral.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if judgment is rendered against plaintiff,
and the judgment includes the payment of costs under Section 1915, plaintiff will
be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that his

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application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay
fees and costs or give security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney
were deemed to have entered into a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured
in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court, who shall pay therefrom all
unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff. Local Rule
3.1(c)(1)
Finally, plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to
keep the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his
address; the Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall
be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in
address occurs.

Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in the

transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for
want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Digitally signed by
Judge David R. Herndon
Date: 2017.03.27
11:12:58 -05'00'

DATED: March 27, 2017

United States District Judge

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