Adamczyk v. Baldwin et al

Filing 41

ORDER adopting 39 Report and Recommendations; denying 24 Motion for TRO denying 30 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying 30 Motion for TRO; denying 32 Motion for Hearing; denying 33 Motion to Strike; and denying 38 Motion for Hearing. See Order for details. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 11/15/2017. (klh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LAWRENCE ADAMCZYK,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 17-0166-DRH

STEVE BALDWIN and
DR. HOLT,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

HERNDON, District Judge:
Introduction and Background
Pending

before

the

Court

is

a

November

1,

2017

Report

and

Recommendation (“the Report”) issued by Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly (Doc.
39). Magistrate Judge Daly recommends that the Court deny Adamczyk’s motions
for preliminary injunctive relief (Docs. 24 & 30), deny the motions for hearing
(Docs. 32, 33 & 34) and deny defendants’ motion to strike (Doc. 33). The parties
were allowed time to filed objections to the Report.

On November 9, 2017,

Adamczyk filed an objection to the Report (Doc. 40). Based on the applicable law,
the record and the following, the Court ADOPTS the Report in its entirety.
On February 16, 2017, plaintiff Lawrence Adamczyk, a sexually dangerous
person (“SPD”), filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for deprivations of his constitutional
rights based on his confinement as a SPD in the Big Muddy Correctional Center
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(“Big Muddy”) (Doc. 1). Adamczyk seeks declarative relief, immediate release and
monetary damages.

On March 23, 2017, the Court conducted a preliminary

review of Adamczyk’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (Doc. 15). Based
on the allegations in the complaint, the Court divided his complaint into four
counts:
Count 1- against Baldwin and Holt for violations of his right to
receive treatment as a SDP;
Count 2- against Baldwin and Holt for violations of his liberty
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting him to a
punitive environment;
Count 3- alleging that Big Muddy’s SDP program does not comply
with the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 725 ILCS 205/1.01;
and
Count 4- against Baldwin and Holt for breaching a duty to plaintiff
when they accepted him as their ward, knowing that the SDP statutory
scheme violated the Constitution.
(Doc. 15, ps. 3-4). After reviewing the claims, the Court allowed Counts 1 and 2 to
proceed and dismissed with prejudice Count 3 and dismissed without prejudice
Count 4 (Doc. 15, ps. 5-8). In dismissing Count 4, the Court held as to Adamczyk’s
repeated claims for immediate release:
“But more to the point, the Court cannot reach this argument because
plaintiff’s request for immediate release is not cognizable in this action,
and any claim for damages stemming from his confinement and/or status
as a ward would be barred by Heck v. Humphrey.
Plaintiff repeatedly requests release from Big Muddy in this action, but
release is not one of the available remedies in a civil rights action. A
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper action ‘[i]f the prisoner
is seeking what can be fairly described as a quantum change in the level
of custody-whether outright freedom, or freedom subject to the limited
reporting and financial constraints of bond or parole or probation.’
Graham v. Broglin, 992 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991). Additionally, a
person committed under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act,
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725 Illinois Compiled Statutes 205/0.01 et seq., may seek a release from
the state court where the person was committed.”
(Doc. 15, ps. 6-7)(emphasis in original). Further, the Court noted that Adamczyk
filed multiple pleadings requesting the same relief:
“The Court notes that plaintiff should attempt to confine himself to one
request for relief at a time; it is improper and a drain on the Court’s
resources for plaintiff to file multiple motions requesting the same relief.”
(Doc. 15, p. 9).
Despite the Court’s Order warning/finding his claims for immediate relief not
proper in this section 1983 case and warning/finding his filing multiple motions
requesting the same relief not proper, Adamczyk continued the same course of
conduct by peppering the Court with those types of motions: he filed two motions
seeking preliminary injunctive relief (Docs. 24 & 30) and three motions seeking a
hearing on his motion for preliminary injunctive relief for immediate relief (Docs.
32, 34 & 38). Defendants oppose the motions for preliminary injunctive relief and
filed a motion to strike (Docs. 26, 27 & 33, respectively). Thereafter, Magistrate
Judge Daly issued the Report (Doc. 39) and Adamczyk filed objections (Doc. 40).
Analysis
The Court's review of the Report is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), which
provides in part:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions
of
the report or
specified
proposed
findings
or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the
court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may
also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate
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judge with instructions.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) also directs that the Court must only make a de
novo determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to
which specific written objection has been made. Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp.,
170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). If no objection or only a partial objection is
made, the Court reviews those unobjected portions for clear error.

Id.

In

addition, failure to file objections with the district court “waives appellate review
of both factual and legal questions.” Id. Under the clear error standard, the Court
can only overturn a Magistrate Judge's ruling if the Court is left with “the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Weeks v. Samsung Heavy
Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997).
Specifically, the Report found:
Adamczyk’s request for a preliminary injunction is premised on his
assertions that the proceedings used to deem him an SDP violated his
constitutional rights. Therefore, he should be immediately released from
the BMRCC SDP program. However, such claims are outside the scope of
this lawsuit. Adamczyk’s two count complaint includes claims that the
Defendants are providing inadequate treatment for his condition and the
Defendants are subjecting him to a punitive environment. Any claim
arising out of the constitutionality of the Illinois court proceedings
deeming Adamczyk an SDP would be outside the scope of the claims in
this case. Moreover, a § 1983 lawsuit is not the proper legal method to
seek release from confinement. If Adamczyk would like to challenge the
fact that he is subject to involuntary civil commitment, he must file a
habeas corpus petition. See Ambrose v. Roeckeman, 749 F.3d 615, 616
(7th Cir.2014); Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 603 (7th Cir. 2010).
(Doc. 39, p. 3).
Here, the Court agrees with Judge Daly’s analysis in the Report and still
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finds as it did in its March 27, 2017 initial screening Order that Adamczyk is not
entitled to the immediate relief from confinement in this section 1983 case.
Adamczyk’s objection merely takes umbrage with the Report and rehashes old
arguments that previously have been rejected/addressed by this Court.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report in its entirety (Doc. 39). The
Court DENIES Adamczyk’s motions for preliminary injunctive relief (Docs. 24 &
30), DENIES the Adamczyk’s motions for hearing (Docs. 32, 34 & 38) and deny
defendants’ motion to strike (Doc. 33). The Court again ADMONISHES Adamczyk
to stop filing multiple motions seeking the same relief. If he continues to do so, the
Court will strike any redundant motions as soon as those motions are reviewed for
content.

Judge Herndon
2017.11.15
14:21:43 -06'00'

IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge

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