Oliver v. Lashbrook et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 7/13/2017. (jaj)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MICHAEL OLIVER

Suing as King Michael Oliver,
# B-89925,

Plaintiff,
v.

No. 17-cv-00169-DRH

JACQUELINE LASHBROOK,
RICHARD E. SWINEY,
CHARLES HECK,
LESLIE McCARTY,
BART A. LIND,
CAROL A. McBRIDE,
PHILLIP O. BAKER,
MAILROOM CLERK(s),
and FOOD SERVICE SUPERVISOR(s),
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
On February 15, 2017, Plaintiff King Michael Oliver filed a civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois based on several alleged violations of his constitutional
rights at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”) and Pinckneyville Correctional
Center (“Pinckneyville”).

See Oliver v. Lashbrook, No. 17-cv-01076 (C.D. Ill.

2017). Both prisons are located in this federal judicial district. Therefore, the
case was transferred to the Southern District of Illinois the same month. (Doc. 5).

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This Court screened the Complaint on February 24, 2017. (Doc. 8). The
screening order identified at least 14 claims against 3 groups of defendants,
including a group of Menard defendants, Pinckneyville defendants, and State
defendants.

(Doc. 8, pp. 6-7).

The claims were largely undeveloped and

improperly joined. Counts 1-9 arose from events that occurred during Plaintiff’s
incarceration at Pinckneyville. Counts 10-13 arose from events that occurred at
Menard. Count 14 was a vicarious liability claim against two high-ranking state
officials for the conduct that occurred at both prisons.
The Court dismissed Count 14 with prejudice and severed the Menard
claims (i.e., Counts 10-13) into a separate suit. See Oliver v. Butler, No. 17-cv00206-DRH (S.D. Ill. 2017). The Pinckneyville claims (i.e., Counts 1-9) remained
in this action.

(Doc. 8, p. 10).

Before further review of these claims was

completed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court offered Plaintiff an opportunity to
file an amended complaint that focused only on his Pinckneyville claims. Id.
The Court had numerous reasons for deferring § 1915A review of the
Pinckneyville claims.

(Doc. 8, pp. 10-11).

exhibits that were not in the Complaint.

Plaintiff identified claims in his

Id.

The exhibits appeared to be

incomplete but were so poorly organized that the Court could not tell with
certainty. Id. Several claims lacked any factual basis. Id. Numerous others
lacked reference to any defendants. Id. Finally, further severance of the claims
appeared necessary, but this determination could not be made until Plaintiff

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named defendants in connection with each claim. Id. For these reasons, Plaintiff
was given an opportunity to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 8, p. 15).
The initial deadline for amending was March 28, 2017. (Doc. 8, p. 15).
The Court warned Plaintiff that failure to file an amended complaint by the
deadline would result in preliminary review of his Complaint. Id. On March 6,
2017, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Reconsideration.” (Doc. 12). In his Motion,
Plaintiff indicated that he intended to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 12, pp. 23).

He confirmed that one or more claims were omitted from his original

Complaint. Id. He also pointed out that five (5) exhibits were, in fact, missing
from the initial Complaint: Exhibit Y2, Exhibit 14, Exhibit O, Exhibit 6b2, and
Exhibit 6b3. (Doc. 12, p. 2). However, he asked to be excused from filing these
exhibits or re-filing any others because doing so placed him “at risk of injury” and
“at a huge disadvantage.” (Doc. 12, p. 3). He did not explain how or why. Id.
Plaintiff requested discharge of his filing fee obligation.

(Doc. 12).

He also

requested the appointment of counsel. (Doc. 13).
The Court construed Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration as a Motion for
Leave to File Amended Complaint and denied it as moot on March 14, 2017.
(Doc. 15). Plaintiff did not question any aspect of the Court’s initial Order in his
Motion. (Doc. 8). His concerns instead focused on the preparation and filing of
an amended complaint, which Plaintiff was previously granted leave to file. (Docs.
8, 15). Nonetheless, the Court granted Plaintiff additional time to prepare and file

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his amended complaint, while denying his request for counsel and discharge of
his filing fee obligation. (Doc. 15).
The deadline for filing the amended complaint was extended to April 27,
2017. (Doc. 15, pp. 1, 5). This time, the Court warned Plaintiff that failure to
comply with the extended deadline or instructions for amending the complaint
would result in dismissal of the action for noncompliance with a court order or
for failure to prosecute his claims. (Doc. 15, pp. 5-6) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b)).
Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint before the extended deadline
expired on April 27, 2017.

The Court has received no communication from

Plaintiff since March 16, 2017, when he renewed his request for discharge of his
filing fee obligation. 1 (Doc. 16). Although he expressed concern over his ability to
properly organize and file the exhibits to his amended complaint in the same
motion, Plaintiff mentioned nothing about the status of the amended complaint.

Id. He also did not request another extension of the deadline for filing it. Id. In
light of these developments, the Court will now screen Counts 1 through 9 in the
original Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and consider whether it is
appropriate to dismiss the Complaint and this action based on Plaintiff’s failure to
1

In the Motion, Plaintiff indicated that he did not seek a waiver of the obligation to pay
his filing fee, but rather “discharge” of the obligation. Id. In support of this request,
Plaintiff relied on a 1933 executive order. However, Plaintiff’s filing fee obligation arises
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, and 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b). These statutes require a prisoner to pay the full filing fee for each civil action or
appeal he files. An inmate who is unable to prepay the full fee may seek leave to proceed
in forma pauperis under § 1915(b), which authorizes the payment of the filing fee over
time in monthly installments. However, neither statute allows a prisoner to avoid the
obligation to pay the fee altogether or to discharge the debt once it is incurred. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998). Because the
PLRA and § 1915(b) control, Plaintiff’s Motion to Discharge Debt (Doc. 16) was DENIED.
(Doc. 17)
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comply with an Order (Doc. 15) of this Court and/or for failure to prosecute his
claims.
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Section 1915A provides:
(a)
Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if
feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a
complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b)
Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

Frivolousness is an

objective standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable person would find
meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross
“the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the
factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed.

Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

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See

Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the
Court deems it appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A to dismiss
Counts 1 through 9 and this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
Discussion
This case focuses on the following claims that arose during Plaintiff’s
incarceration at Pinckneyville:
Count 1 – Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against prison
officials who did not intervene on behalf of Plaintiff when he was
attacked by Inmate Logan in the lunch line at Pinckneyville on
December 7, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 2, “Count 1”).
Count 2 - Fourteenth Amendment claim against C/O Swiney,
Lieutenant Heck, and Warden Lashbrook for issuing Plaintiff a
disciplinary ticket and punishing him with 30 days in segregation
and 10 days of lost good conduct credit for the inmate attack that
occurred at Pinckneyville on December 7, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 2,
“Count 1”).
Count 3 - Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs claim against prison officials who denied Plaintiff
medical treatment for the injuries he sustained during the attack by
Inmate Logan at Pinckneyville on December 7, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 2,
“Count 1”).
Count 4 – Fourteenth Amendment claim against ARB Member
McCarty for ignoring Plaintiff’s grievances regarding the inmate
attack that occurred at Pinckneyville in order to prevent him from
exhausting his administrative remedies. (Doc. 1, p. 2, “Count 3”).
Count 5 – Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials who
served Plaintiff spoiled pulled chicken and caused him to suffer from
symptoms of food poisoning at Pinckneyville on or around October
14, 2016. (Doc. 1, pp. 3-4, “Count 4”).
Count 6 – Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials who
exhibited deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s symptoms of food
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poisoning after he ate spoiled pulled chicken at Pinckneyville on or
around October 14, 2016. (Doc. 1, pp. 3-4, “Count 4”).
Count 7 – Mail interference claims against Warden Lashbrook and
other prison officials who caused a delay in personal mail that was
sent to Plaintiff at Pinckneyville on November 18 and 19, 2016.
(Doc. 1, p. 4, “Count 5”).
Count 8 – Fourteenth Amendment claim against Warden Lashbrook
and other prison officials for punishing Plaintiff with segregation “for
illegitimate reasons” after he wrote a letter to the law library staff at
Pinckneyville on or around January 26, 2016. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5,
“Count 6”).
Count 9 – Fourteenth Amendment claim against prison officials for
depriving Plaintiff of a protected liberty interest without due process
of law by placing him in segregation for prolonged periods of time at
Pinckneyville (i.e., a total of 135 days in disciplinary segregation).
(Doc. 1, p. 5, “Count 7”).
(Doc. 8, pp. 6-7). Any other claims that arose at Pinckneyville and are not
identified above are considered dismissed without prejudice from this action.
Counts 1, 3, 5, 6, and 9
Plaintiff did not name a defendant in connection with Counts 1, 3, 5, 6, and
9 in the Complaint. Liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement in a
violation of the Constitution. Hamilton v. City of New Albany, Indiana, -- F. App’x
--, No. 16-3901, 2017 WL 2615453 (7th Cir., decided June 16, 2017) (citing

Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009)). Colbert v. City of Chi., 851
F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 833 (7th
Cir. 2010)). To establish personal participation, Plaintiff is generally required to
describe the conduct of each defendant that resulted in a constitutional
deprivation. By failing to name anyone in connection with these claims, Plaintiff

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has not demonstrated that a defendant was personally involved in the violation of
his constitutional rights. Counts 1, 3, 5, 6, and 9 shall therefore be dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Count 2
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding with his Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim in Count 2 by the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1994).

Plaintiff asserts the claim against

C/O Swiney, Lieutenant Heck, and Warden Lashbrook for punishing him with 30
days in segregation and 10 days of lost good conduct credit for a fight that
occurred at Pinckneyville on December 7, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Under Heck, a
prisoner cannot bring a civil rights claim for money damages based on an
allegedly unconstitutional disciplinary action that includes the revocation of good
conduct credit, unless the disciplinary decision has been overturned or expunged.

See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (emphasis in original).

See also Edwards v.

Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 649 (1997) (Heck bar means that a plaintiff has no claim
to pursue so long as the punishment imposed remains in force); Moore v.

Mahone, 652 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir. 2011); Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899, 900
(7th Cir. 2008).
By all indications, the disciplinary decision stands.

A judgment in

Plaintiff’s favor in Count 2 would “necessarily imply” that the disciplinary action is
invalid. Therefore, the due process claim in Count 2 is barred by Heck, and the
claim ripens only after the decision is reversed or otherwise invalidated.

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See

Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303, 306-07 (7th Cir. 2006). Count 2 shall therefore
be dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff reasserting the claim if and when the
disciplinary decision is overturned. 2
Count 4
The claim in Count 4 against Defendant McCarty shall also be dismissed.
Plaintiff alleges that this defendant ignored his grievances and appeals regarding
an inmate attack, in order to prevent Plaintiff from exhausting his administrative
remedies and filing suit. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Whether characterized as a due process
claim or a claim for the denial of access to courts, Count 4 does not survive
screening.
Prison grievance procedures are not constitutionally mandated and thus do
not implicate the Due Process Clause per se. As such, the alleged mishandling of
grievances “by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the
underlying conduct states no claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th
Cir. 2011).

See also Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 n.3 (7th Cir.

2008); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007); Antonelli v. Sheahan,
81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996).

Defendant McCarty’s disregard, whether

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Plaintiff may be able to challenge the disciplinary decision in a federal habeas corpus
case, after presenting all of his claims to the Illinois courts including the Illinois Appellate
Court and the Illinois Supreme Court. Illinois courts have recognized mandamus as an
appropriate remedy to compel prison officials to award sentence credit to a prisoner.
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14–101 et seq.; Turner-El v. West, 811 N.E.2d 728, 733 (Ill.
App. 2004) (citing Taylor v. Franzen, 417 N.E.2d 242, 247, aff’d on reh’g, 420 N.E.2d
1203 (Ill. App. 1981)). If Plaintiff successfully challenges the disciplinary action that
resulted in the loss of good conduct credit, he may re-file this civil rights claim for money
damages.
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intentional or not, of Plaintiff’s grievances and appeals does not give rise to an
independent due process claim against this defendant.
Further, the delay, loss, or mishandling of grievances and appeals by
Defendant McCarty does not support a claim against this defendant for impeding
Plaintiff’s access to the courts.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires

prisoners to exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit
in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). When prison officials fail to respond to
inmate grievances, however, administrative remedies are considered “unavailable”
under the PLRA. See Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002). A
plaintiff who can demonstrate that administrative remedies were unavailable is
relieved from the obligation to exhaust.

In light of this, a prison official’s

mishandling of grievances does not actually impede the prisoner’s ability to file a
lawsuit. Count 4 shall be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
Count 7
Plaintiff’s mail interference claim in Count 7 against Warden Lashbrook
and other prison officials shall be dismissed without prejudice. The Complaint
identifies two letters that were allegedly mailed to Plaintiff on November 18 and
19, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 4). He did not receive the first letter until December 9,
2016, or the second letter until November 22, 2016. Id. Plaintiff complained
about these delays to Warden Lashbrook, but the warden allegedly “support[ed]
the mishaps.” Id.

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The Supreme Court has recognized that inmates have a First Amendment
right to send and receive mail. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 685-86
(7th Cir. 2005) (citing Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999)
(citations omitted)). However, this right does not preclude prison officials from
inspecting mail to ensure that it does not contain contraband.

Kaufman, 419

F.3d at 685-86 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576
(1974)). An “isolated delay or some other relatively short-term . . . disruption in
the delivery of inmate reading materials will not support . . . a cause of action”
under the First Amendment.

Rowe, 196 F.3d at 782.

See also Sizemore v.

Wiliford, 829 F.2d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1987) (sporadic disruption of mail service
does not violate the Constitution). Further, the inadvertent or negligent opening
of an occasional letter is generally not actionable. See, e.g., Bryant v. Winston,
750 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Va. 1990).
Plaintiff describes an isolated delay with the first letter and a short-term
disruption with the second letter. The two delays in his receipt of personal mail
support no claim for mail interference against Warden Lashbrook or any other
prison officials. Count 7 shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
Count 8
Finally, Count 8 against Warden Lashbrook and others meets with the same
fate as Plaintiff’s above claims. Plaintiff asserts that Warden Lashbrook and other
prison officials harassed him and unfairly punished him with segregation “for

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illegitimate reasons,” after he wrote a letter to the law library staff on January 26,
2016. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5). His letter was allegedly “‘twisted and construed’ into
some kind of wicked plot” that resulted in his receipt of a disciplinary ticket for
bribery, extortion, insolence, unlawful attempt to transfer funds, and abuse of
privileges. (Doc. 1, p. 5).
Plaintiff names Warden Lashbrook and others in connection with this
claim.

However, he does not identify who was personally involved in the

deprivation of his constitutional rights. Hamilton v. City of New Albany, Indiana, - F. App’x --, No. 16-3901, 2017 WL 2615453 (7th Cir., decided June 16, 2017) (§
1983 liability requires personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation).
Plaintiff does not allege that the warden had any involvement in the decision to
issue him a ticket or punish him for the letter. (Doc. 1, p. 5). According to the
Complaint, the warden simply denied Plaintiff’s request for a copy of the letter for
later use as an exhibit. Id. Absent any suggestion that the warden was involved in
the underlying constitutional deprivation, however, the Complaint articulates no
claim against this defendant.
Vaguely referring to “law library staff” or others in connection with the
claim is also not enough to establish personal involvement, particularly where
they are not identified as defendants. When parties are not listed in the caption,
this Court will not treat them as defendants, and any claims against them should
be considered dismissed without prejudice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (noting that
the title of the complaint “must name all the parties”); Myles v. United States, 416

12

F.3d 551, 551-52 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that to be properly considered a party,
a defendant must be “specif[ied] in the caption”). For these reasons, Count 8
shall also be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
Conclusion
In summary, Counts 1 through 9 shall be dismissed. Further, this action
shall be dismissed without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with
the Order of this Court requiring him to file a First Amended Complaint on or
before the original deadline of March 28, 2017, or the extended deadline of April
27, 2017. (Docs. 8, 15). Although the original screening Order (Doc. 8) gave
Plaintiff the option of filing a First Amended Complaint, the subsequent Order
(Doc. 15) did not. After the Court issued the initial screening Order (Doc. 8),
Plaintiff made it clear that his original Complaint was incomplete and would be
replaced with an amended complaint.

Therefore, the Court entered an Order

extending the deadline for filing the amended complaint. (Doc. 15). At the same
time, the Court explicitly warned Plaintiff that failure to file his First Amended
Complaint on or before the extended deadline would result in dismissal of the
action for failure to comply with a court order and/or for want of prosecution
under Rule 41(b). (Doc. 15, pp. 5-6). Having failed to comply with the Court’s
Order (Doc. 15) and deadlines, dismissal of this action is now warranted.

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Further, Plaintiff shall receive a “strike” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g) because the Complaint failed to state any claim upon which relief may
be granted.
Although he is not precluded by this Order from filing one or more new
cases reasserting any claims that were dismissed without prejudice herein,
Plaintiff should remain mindful of Wheeler v. Johnson, -- F. App’x --, No. 15-3325,
2017 WL 2417889 (7th Cir., decided June 5, 2017), and Owens v. Godinez, -- F.
App’x --, No. 15-3892, 2017 WL 2655424 (7th Cir., decided June 20, 2017),
wherein the Seventh Circuit strongly encouraged district courts to sever misjoined
claims into separate suits and charge a filing fee for each newly severed case. Id.
(citing George v Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007)). Because no defendants are
named in connection with most of his claims, the Court was unable to determine
whether this case was subject to further severance.

If Plaintiff attempts to

reassert his claims in a new case, he stands warned that his claims remain
subject to severance.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Discharge Debt
(Doc. 16) is DENIED.
IT IS ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

This

includes COUNTS 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, which are DISMISSED without
prejudice against all of the defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief

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may

be

granted;

COUNT

2

against

Defendants

SWINEY,

HECK,

and

LASHBROOK, which is DISMISSED without prejudice because it is Heck-barred;
and COUNT 4 against Defendant McCARTY, which is DISMISSED with prejudice
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without
prejudice because the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted and Plaintiff failed to comply with an Order of this Court and prosecute
his claims. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). (Doc. 15, pp. 5-6) (warning Plaintiff that
“[f]ailure to comply with the extended deadline . . . or the instructions for
amending [his Complaint] in the initial Order (Doc. 8, pp. 15-16) will result in
dismissal of this action for failure to comply with a court order and/or for failure
to prosecute his claims.”)).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of his allotted
“strikes” under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff’s obligation to pay
the filing fee for this action was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the
filing fee of $350.00 remains due and payable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien

v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he may file a notice of appeal with
this Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. 4(A)(4). If
Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee
irrespective of the outcome of the appeal.

See FED. R. APP. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v.

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Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien, 133 F.3d at 467. Moreover,
if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may also incur another
“strike.”

A proper and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A
Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than twenty-eight (28) days after the
entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.
The Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 13th day of July, 2017.

Digitally signed by
Judge David R.
Herndon
Date: 2017.07.13
13:21:28 -05'00'
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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