Johnson v. Lashbrooke et al

Filing 8

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 4/4/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TREMAINE ARRON JOHNSON,
R-15625,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACKIE LASHBROOKE,
C/O CARTER,
C/O BUMP,
C/O DRABES,
JOHN DOE 1,
JOHN DOE 2,
and JOHN DOE 3,
Defendants.

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Case No. 17−cv–00193−MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
Plaintiff, an inmate who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center
(“Menard”), brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that he was attacked and injured by a former cellmate at Menard. (Doc. 1, pp. 110). He now suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder. (Doc. 1, p. 8). Plaintiff claims that
prison officials at Menard failed to protect him from an obvious risk of harm and also denied him
adequate medical care and mental health treatment for his resulting injuries. (Doc. 1, pp. 1-10).
He names four known defendants (Warden Jackie Lashbrooke, C/O Carter, C/O Bump, and C/O
Drabes) and three unknown defendants (John Doe ##1-3) in connection with several federal
constitutional and state law claims. Id. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.
(Doc. 1, pp. 10-11).
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
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(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim
that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th
Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The Complaint survives preliminary review under this standard.
The Complaint
On December 27, 2016, Plaintiff was moved into a new cell with an inmate who is
classified as an “elevated security risk” (“ESR”). (Doc. 1, pp. 3-4). ESR inmates are considered
highly dangerous and often have a cellmate restriction because of their classification.

Id.

Warden Lashbrooke, C/O Carter, and John Doe 1 (placement officer) are responsible for
reviewing and updating the ESR chart on a daily basis and distributing the list to staff and
facility personnel. (Doc. 1, p. 3). They are also responsible for the review and approval of every
cell assignment or inmate movement at Menard. (Doc. 1, pp. 3-4).

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Against this backdrop, Plaintiff was approached by an unknown correctional officer and
informed that he would be moved from Cell 832 to Cell 239 in Menard’s North-2 Cell House.
(Doc. 1, p. 4). After Plaintiff packed his belongings, the correctional officer cuffed him and
escorted him to his new cell. Id. James Wallace, Jr. (B74589), an “ESR committed person,”
already occupied Cell 239. Id.
C/O Spiller and another unknown correctional officer ordered Inmate Wallace to cuff up
and step outside of the cell so that Plaintiff could enter. Id. While doing so, Inmate Wallace told
them, “I should not have a celly and ya’ll [meaning the c/o’s] know this.” (Doc. 1, p. 4). C/O
Spiller responded, “We’re just doing what we are told.” Id. Inmate Wallace then stepped away
from the cell as C/O Spiller and the unknown officer allowed Plaintiff to enter. Id. When
Inmate Wallace stepped back into the cell, both inmates were uncuffed and left alone. Id.
Plaintiff unpacked his belongings and went to take a shower. (Doc. 1, p. 4). After
returning to the cell, he fell asleep. Id. When he awoke, Plaintiff was on the floor in cuffs,
asking, “what happened . . . why am I on the floor?” Id. A correctional officer explained that
Inmate Wallace tried to kill Plaintiff by choking him as he slept. Id. The correctional officer
then stated, “[T]hey should not have put you in there with him, like he [Wallace] told them.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Warden Lashbrooke, Major Carter, and C/O Doe 1 should not have
approved the cell assignment, in light of Inmate Wallace’s ESR status and cellmate restriction.
(Doc. 1, p. 5). Further, John Doe 2 (first shift lieutenant), John Doe 3 (first shift sergeant), and
C/O Bump knew that Inmate Wallace was classified as an ESR with a cellmate restriction. Id.
Nevertheless, they took no steps to protect Plaintiff from the “high risk” of a “physical
encounter” between the two inmates. Id. All lower ranking officers should have reviewed the

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ESR chart and consulted with C/O Bump or another superior about Plaintiff’s placement with
Inmate Wallace. Id.
As a result of the attack, Plaintiff suffered injuries to his left rib cage, right foot and
ankle, and the back of his head. (Doc. 1, p. 5). C/O Bump and two unknown correctional
officers accompanied him to Menard’s Health Care Unit for medical treatment following the
attack. (Doc. 1, p. 6). Although Plaintiff cannot recall who treated him, he recalls C/O Bump
describing the reason for his injuries as being a seizure. Id. For this reason, Plaintiff was placed
in an overnight cell for observation. Id.
The doctor did “nothing” to treat Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, p. 6). He was given Tylenol and
some other form of pain medication. Id. However, neither medication stopped the pain. Id.
Plaintiff was also questioned by the Illinois State Police during his overnight stay. (Doc.
1, p. 6). At the time, he could not walk without assistance because his gait was unsteady. Id. He
required an escort from the overnight cell to the interview room. Id.
Plaintiff was then placed in a wheelchair and taken to Cell 221 in North-2 Cell House.
(Doc. 1, p. 6). He was given no sheets or a blanket the first night. Id. Plaintiff also could not
stand. Id.
He began having a panic attack and requested help from C/O Drabes. (Doc. 1, p. 6).
Plaintiff told the officer that he could not breathe, and the walls felt like they were “closing in.”
Id. He informed the officer that he had passed out twice, and felt like his head was “spinning.”
Id. In response, C/O Drabes told him to “tough it out.” Id. The officer went on to explain that a
call for help would only result in Plaintiff’s placement in a cell “with nothing,” including no
clothing or underwear. Id. He would be treated the same as if he was on suicide watch. Id.

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Plaintiff pleaded with C/O Drabes to contact someone who could help him understand why he
was feeling this way. Id. The officer just walked away and did not return. Id.
An unknown officer apparently wrote a letter to Lieutenant Doe 2 and Sergeant Doe 3
about Plaintiff’s request for mental health treatment. (Doc. 1, p. 7). In response, they told
Plaintiff that no one was around because of the upcoming holiday. Id. For “days,” Plaintiff
continued requesting help. Id. He did not eat and regularly passed out. Id. Each time, he woke
up feeling as though he was being choked in his sleep. Id. He felt like he was dying. Id. He
could not trust the prison officials to protect him. Id.
On January 2, 2017, Plaintiff was seen by Jacob Weatherfur who works in mental health.
(Doc. 1, p. 7). Plaintiff described his symptoms to Weatherfur and explained that he felt like
taking his own life rather than suffer from them. (Doc. 1, p. 8). He wanted to understand why
he was feeling this way. Id.
Weatherfur told Plaintiff that he was experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder. (Doc.
1, p. 8). He recommended a counseling referral. Id. Plaintiff then met with Ms. Mayer, who
worked in mental health, “shortly thereafter.” Id.
Plaintiff filed emergency grievances with Warden Lashbrooke and others to complain
about the delay in medical and mental health treatment. (Doc. 1, pp. 8-10). The grievances were
dated January 1st, January 16th, and February 1st. Id. The warden did not respond to the
grievances in a timely manner. Id.
As of the date he filed this action, Plaintiff still suffered from chest and rib pain when
sneezing, coughing, or laughing.

(Doc. 1, p. 8).

His foot has allegedly shown “minimal

improvement.” Id. It often loses feeling or gives him the sensation of being pricked with

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needles.

Id.

For some time after the attack, Plaintiff also had trouble speaking fluently,

remembering his name, and remembering his prison identification number. (Doc. 1, p. 5).
Plaintiff now claims that the defendants failed to protect him from a known risk of harm,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 1, p. 9). They allegedly denied him adequate
medical care for his physical injuries and mental health treatment for his psychological injuries,
also in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Id.

Further, they delayed responses to his

grievances, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment and monetary damages. (Doc. 1, p. 10). He also
requests preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, in the form of an Order requiring prison
officials to continue housing him in a single cell until his discharge from custody and/or to
transfer him to another prison due to the defendants’ “wanton infliction of mental illness.” Id.
Discussion
To facilitate the orderly management of future proceedings in this case, and in
accordance with the objectives of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(e) and 10(b), the Court
deems it appropriate to organize the claims in Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (Doc. 1) into the
following counts:
Count 1 -

Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants for failing to protect
Plaintiff from a known risk of physical harm by Inmate Wallace on
December 27, 2016.

Count 2 -

Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants for exhibiting deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff’s medical and mental health needs following the
attack by Inmate Wallace on December 27, 2016.

Count 3 -

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendants for ignoring
or disregarding Plaintiff’s grievances regarding the denial of medical and
mental health care following the attack on December 27, 2016.

Count 4 -

Miscellaneous state law claims against Defendants.

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As discussed in more detail below, Count 1 survives preliminary review against all of the
defendants, except C/O Drabes. Count 2 survives screening against Warden Lashbrooke, C/O
Drabes, John Doe 2 (first shift lieutenant), and John Doe 3 (first shift sergeant), but no one else.
Counts 3 and 4 do not survive review and shall be dismissed.
Claims Subject to Further Review
Count 1
Prison officials “have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (internal citations omitted); Pinkston
v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff seeking to bring a failure-to-protect
claim against a prison official must show that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm, and that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” to
that danger. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Pinkston, 440 F.3d at 889.
To establish deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that prison officials were
aware of a specific, impending, and substantial threat to his safety and failed to take action.
Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 480 (2015); Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996).
The prison official’s knowledge of the risk must be “actual” and “not merely constructive.”
Gevas, 798 F.3d at 481. At the same time, a prisoner is not required to present “direct evidence”
of the official’s state of mind, which can be shown through circumstantial evidence instead. Id.
Generally, a plaintiff proves “actual knowledge of impending harm by showing that he
complained to prison officials about a specific threat to his safety.” Gevas, 798 F.3d at 481
(Pope, 86 F.3d at 92)). Plaintiff makes no such assertion. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Inmate
Wallace complained directly to C/O Spiller and an unknown correctional officer about the fact
that he was assigned a cellmate despite his classification as an ESR inmate and his cellmate

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restriction. Both individuals said they were doing what they were told and allowed Plaintiff to
move into the same cell. Plaintiff did not name C/O Spiller or the unknown correctional officer
as a defendant in this action.
He instead named those officials who were allegedly responsible for making inmate
placement and movement decisions (i.e., Warden Lashbrooke, C/O Carter, and John Doe 1) and
those officials who worked in the area on the date of his relocation (i.e., C/O Bump, John Doe 2,
and John Doe 3). When construed liberally, the allegations in the Complaint suggest that these
defendants knew about the placement decision and the risk it posed to Plaintiff.
The Court cannot dismiss Count 1 against Warden Lashbrooke, C/O Carter, C/O Bump,
John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and John Doe 3, and this claim shall receive further review against all
of them. C/O Drabes is not named in connection with the claim, either directly or indirectly. See
Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (“[T]o be
liable under [Section] 1983, an individual defendant must have caused or participated in a
constitutional deprivation.”). Absent any suggestion that C/O Drabes caused or participated in a
constitutional deprivation, Count 1 shall be dismissed without prejudice against him.
Count 2
Prison officials and medical personnel violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with
deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical or mental health needs. Rasho v. Elyea, -F.3d --, 2017 WL 892500 (7th Cir. March 7, 2017) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976); Chatham v. Davis, 839 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2016)). In order to state a claim, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered from a serious medical or mental health need (i.e.,
objective standard) and the prison official responded with deliberate indifference (i.e., subjective

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standard). Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at
834; Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010)).
Plaintiff’s physical and mental health problems satisfy the objective component of this
claim for screening purposes. As for his physical injuries, Plaintiff describes damage to his ribs,
right foot, and head that caused persistent pain, difficulty walking, and other lingering
symptoms. As for his mental health needs, Plaintiff describes symptoms that were diagnosed as
post-traumatic stress disorder by a mental health professional.
Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that C/O Drabes, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and Warden
Lashbrooke responded to Plaintiff’s complaints regarding a lack of medical and mental health
care with deliberate indifference. Plaintiff complained directly to C/O Drabes about untreated
physical and psychological injuries in the days after the attack. C/O Drabes simply told him to
“tough it out.” (Doc. 1, p. 6). Lieutenant Doe 2 and Sergeant Doe 3 received a note regarding
Plaintiff’s request for mental health treatment but offered him no assistance because of staffing
issues associated with the upcoming holiday. Warden Lashbrooke allegedly received three
emergency grievances addressing Plaintiff’s complaints about the denial of medical and mental
health care and ignored them. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 782 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing
Dixon v. Gonzalez, 114 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[P]risoner requests for relief that fall on
‘deaf ears’ may evidence deliberate indifference.”)).

Given these allegations of deliberate

indifference, Count 2 shall receive further review against C/O Drabes, John Doe 2, John Doe 3,
and Warden Lashbrooke.
However, this claim shall be dismissed against all other defendants, including C/O Bump,
C/O Carter, and John Doe 1. According to the Complaint, C/O Bump took Plaintiff to the
prison’s health care unit for treatment immediately after Inmate Wallace attacked him, but told

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the health care providers that Plaintiff suffered a seizure. This error amounts to negligence at
most, which is not actionable under § 1983. Pinkston, 440 F.3d at 889 (discussing Watts v.
Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 172 (7th Cir. 1985)). Plaintiff does not mention John Doe 1 or C/O
Carter in connection with Count 2, and, for this reason, no claim is stated against either
defendant.
In summary, Count 2 shall receive further review against C/O Drabes, John Doe 2, John
Doe 3, and Warden Lashbrooke. However, this claim shall be dismissed without prejudice
against all other defendants, including C/O Bump, C/O Carter, and John Doe 1.
Claims Subject to Dismissal
Count 3
The fact that the defendants may have ignored or disregarded Plaintiff’s grievances gives
rise to no independent claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). It is well-settled
that the mishandling of grievances “by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the
underlying conduct states no claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011);
Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2008); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605,
609 (7th Cir. 2007); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). This is because
“a state’s inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause.” Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1430. The Constitution requires no procedure. Id. For
this reason, the failure of state prison officials to follow their own procedures does not, by itself,
violate the Constitution. Maust v. Headley, 959 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1992); Shango v. Jurich,
681 F.2d 1091, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1982). On this basis, Count 3 shall be dismissed with prejudice
against all of the defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

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Count 4
The Complaint also supports no claim under Illinois state law against the defendants. 1
Plaintiff vaguely refers to claims under Illinois state law. (Doc. 1, pp. 1-2). However, he does
not explain why. (Doc. 1, pp. 1-10). Plaintiff’s state law claims, like his federal claims, must
cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 557 (2007). To cross this threshold, Plaintiff cannot rely on “conclusory legal statements.”
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). He also cannot rely of vague assertions of a
general “breach of statutory duty.” (Doc. 1, p. 1). More is required to articulate a claim under
Twombly and Iqbal, even in an action brought by a pro se plaintiff. Count 4 shall be dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Claims Against Non-Parties
Plaintiff referred to a number of individuals in the Complaint who are not named as
defendants in the case caption, including C/O Spiller, Jacob Weatherfur, Ms. Mayer, a prison
doctor, and several unidentified officers, among others. (Doc. 1, pp. 1-10). This Court will not
treat individuals who are not included in the caption of the Complaint as defendants, and any
claims against them should be considered dismissed without prejudice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a)
(title of the Complaint “must name all the parties”); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551-52
(7th Cir. 2005) (holding that to be properly considered a party, a defendant must be “specif[ied]
in the caption”). Any claim that Plaintiff intended to bring against an individual who is not
named as a defendant is considered dismissed without prejudice from this action.

1

Where a district court has original jurisdiction over a § 1983 claim, as here, it also has supplemental
jurisdiction over related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), so long as the state claims
“derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” with the original federal claims. Wisconsin v. HoChunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008). With that said, Plaintiff is still required to develop a
factual basis for said claims, which he has failed to do in the Complaint.

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Identification of Unknown Defendants
Although Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with Counts 1 and/or 2 against John Doe 1
(placement officer), John Doe 2 (first shift lieutenant), and John Doe 3 (first shift sergeant), these
individuals must be identified with particularity before service of the Complaint can be made on
them. Where a prisoner’s complaint states specific allegations describing conduct of individual
prison staff members sufficient to raise a constitutional claim, but the names of those defendants
are not known, the prisoner should have the opportunity to engage in limited discovery to
ascertain the identity of those defendants. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d
816, 832 (7th Cir. 2009). Jackie Lashbrooke, the Warden of Menard Correctional Center, is
already named as a defendant in this action, and this defendant shall respond to discovery aimed
at identifying these unknown defendants. 2

Guidelines for discovery will be set by the United

States Magistrate Judge. Once the names of the unknown defendants are discovered, Plaintiff
shall file a Motion for Substitution of each newly identified defendant in place of the generic
designations in the case caption and throughout the Complaint.
Pending Motion
Although Plaintiff did not file a separate Motion for Preliminary Injunction Pursuant to
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he has requested this relief in the Complaint
(Doc. 1, p. 10). He specifically seeks a preliminary injunction, in the form of an Order requiring
him to remain in single-cell placement until his discharge from custody and/or a prison transfer
“due to the wanton infliction of mental illness” by the defendants.

Id.

This Motion for

Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) has been separately docketed in CM/ECF and shall be

2

The prison warden would also be responsible for carrying out any injunctive relief that is ultimately
ordered. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (warden of state prison
appropriate defendant in action seeking injunctive relief because the warden is responsible for ensuring
the any injunctive relief ordered by the court is carried out).

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REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for further consideration. If Plaintiff seeks
any other form of additional relief, such as medical care or mental health treatment, he must file
an Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction indicating the exact form of relief he seeks and
the basis for his request.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 is subject to further review against
Defendants JACKIE LASHBROOKE, C/O CARTER, C/O BUMP, JOHN DOE 1
(placement officer), JOHN DOE 2 (first shift lieutenant), and JOHN DOE 3 (first shift
sergeant).

However, this claim is DISMISSED without prejudice against Defendant C/O

DRABES for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS ORDERED that COUNT 2 is subject to further review against Defendants
JACKIE LASHBROOKE, C/O DRABES, JOHN DOE 2 (first shift lieutenant), and JOHN
DOE 3 (first shift sergeant). However, this claim is DISMISSED without prejudice against
Defendants C/O CARTER, C/O BUMP, and JOHN DOE 1 (placement officer) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS ORDERED that COUNT 3 is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS ORDERED that COUNT 4 is DIMISSSED without prejudice for failure to state a
claim.
With regard to COUNTS 1 and 2, the Clerk shall prepare for Defendants WARDEN
JACKIE LASHBROOKE, C/O CARTER, C/O BUMP, C/O DRABES, and, once identified,
JOHN DOE 1 (placement officer), JOHN DOE 2 (first shift lieutenant), and JOHN DOE 3
(first shift sergeant): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a

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Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail
these forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this Memorandum and Order to each
Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and
return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the
forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant,
and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that service shall not be made on Defendants JOHN
DOE ##1-3 until such time as Plaintiff has identified each defendant by name in a properly filed
Motion for Substitution. Plaintiff is ADVISED that it is his responsibility to provide the Court
with the names and service addresses for these individuals.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.

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Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint (Doc. 1) and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Stephen C. Williams for further pre-trial proceedings, including a plan for discovery
aimed at identifying John Doe ##1-3 and consideration of Plaintiff’s request in the Complaint
(Doc. 1) for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 1, p. 10), pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and
28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
Williams for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties
consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, regardless of the fact
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will

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cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 4, 2017
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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