Buck v. Young et al
Filing
330
ORDER denying 322 Motion for New Trial. Signed by Judge Stephen P. McGlynn on 6/3/2022. (jrj)
Case 3:17-cv-00270-SPM Document 330 Filed 06/03/22 Page 1 of 6 Page ID #2837
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WILLIAM BUCK,
#R21689,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 17-cv-00270-SPM
v.
DENNIS YOUNG, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MCGLYNN, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on a motion for new trial filed by pro se Plaintiff William
Buck. (Doc. 322). For the following reasons, the motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
Following summary judgment, Buck was recruited counsel. After several months of further
discovery, recruited counsel informed the Court that there was a fundamental disagreement about
the actions that should be taken in prosecuting this case between he and Buck. The Court allowed
counsel to withdraw, and Buck proceeded to trial representing himself. A jury trial was set for
February 22, 2022, on the following claims:
Count 1:
Defendants Witthoft, Pappas, Meyer and Weatherford subjected
Buck to unconstitutional conditions of confinement while he was on
suicide watch between October 27, 2016 and December 12, 2016, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. This claim is limited to the
unsanitary conditions allegedly present in the cells and excludes
issues concerning lights and the provision of hygiene items.
Count 2:
Eighth Amendment claim against Slavens and Callais for using
excessive force against Buck on or about November 20, 2016
Count 3:
Eighth Amendment claim against Young for using excessive force
against Buck on or about November 21, 2016.
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Count 4:
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim to serious medical
needs against Defendants Young, Slavens, Tripp, Hanna, Crane for
refusing to treat and/or inadequately treating Buck’s injuries related
to excessive force incidents.
On the first day of trial, Buck reached a settlement agreement with Defendants Slavens, Callais,
Young, Hanna, Crane, and Witthoft (“IDOC Defendants”), and the trial was conducted on Counts
1 and 4 against Defendants Pappas, Meyer, Weatherford, and Tripp (“Wexford Defendants”).
(Doc. 307).
On day four of trial, after the close of Buck’s case and hearing testimony from Defendants
Pappas and Weatherford, the Court heard arguments on the oral motion for judgment as a matter
of law made by Defendants Pappas, Meyers, Tripp, and Weatherford pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 50(a). The Court granted the motion as to Count 4 against Defendant Tripp and
reserved ruling on the motion as to Count 1 against Defendants Meyers, Pappas, and Weatherford.
After the close of evidence, Defense Counsel renewed the motion for a directed verdict as to the
remaining Defendants. The Court heard arguments from the parties and granted the motion as to
Defendants Meyer, Pappas, and Weatherford. No counts were presented to the jury for
deliberation.
Buck has filed a motion asking the Court to reconsider the directed verdict issued in favor
of Defendants and for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. (Doc. 322). Buck
argues that he presented direct and circumstantial evidence demonstrating that Defendants violated
his constitutional rights. The Court misapplied the law and should have allowed the jury to
determine whether his testimony should be believed. Specifically, as to Defendant Tripp, he argues
the Court erred in determining he did not have a serious medical need. Buck claims that due to
excessive force, his hand was injured and because of a delay in medical care, his hand healed
incorrectly and is now deformed. He states the Court ignored Seventh Circuit precedent in reaching
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its conclusion and cites to Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F. 3d 768 (7th Cir. 2015) and Edwards v. Snyder,
478 F. 3d 827 (7th Cir. 2007). He further states Tripp acted with deliberate indifference when she
failed to alleviate his excruciating pain and properly exam his hand. Buck contends that the jury
should have been allowed to determine whether he had made his case.
As to Defendants Weatherford, Meyers, and Pappas, Buck asserts that the evidence showed
that they came to his cells multiple times while the cells were filthy with feces, blood, and saliva.
Buck argues his own testimony and the testimony of his witness regarding his cell conditions
contradicts that of Defendants, who testified that they did not see that his cell was covered in bodily
fluids. He states his testimony and other circumstantial evidence presented was enough for a jury
to determine that his cell conditions were filthy, and Defendants failed to act in rectifying the
conditions.
ANALYSIS
The Court may “reconsider non-final orders, as justice requires, before entry of judgment.”
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1044 (C.D. Ill. 2017)
(citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Sims v. EGA
Prods., Inc., 475 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir. 2007)). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). Motions to
reconsider whether filed pursuant to Rule 54(b) or Rule 59(e) are judged largely by the same
standard. Under either rule, the purpose is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present
newly discovered evidence. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v. CSX Transp. Inc., 20-cv-0795SPM, 2022 WL 1525243, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2022). However, appropriate issues for
reconsideration “rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be equally rare.” Bank of
Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990).
Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) provides that “[t]he court may, on motion,
grant a new trial on all or some of the issues—and to any party—... after a jury trial, for any reason
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for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court[.]” FED. R.
CIV. P. 59(a). A new trial should be granted “if the verdict is against the weight of the evidence,
the damages are excessive, or if for other reasons the trial was not fair to the moving party.” Emmel
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chi., 95 F. 3d 627, 636 (7th Cir. 1996) (omitting citations). It should
be noted that “civil litigants are entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one, and . . . a new trial will not
be ordered unless there was an error that caused some prejudice to the substantial rights of the
parties.” Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354, 357 (7th Cir. 1993).
Buck has not demonstrated that the Court made an error of law in granting judgment as a
matter of law or that a new trial is warranted in this case. As for Count 4 against Defendant Tripp,
the cases Buck cites to in support of his contention that he had a serious medical condition
regarding his hand injury do not apply here. In Perez and Edwards, the issue before the Seventh
Circuit was whether the plaintiffs had sufficiently pled Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate
indifference regarding finger injuries. At the pleading stage, the court is to accept as true the facts
as stated by the plaintiff. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is not so when ruling
on a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a). At that point in the case, the
standard is whether the evidence, viewed in the non-moving party’s favor, could support a verdict
in his favor. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-151 (2000). The
evidence as presented by Buck could not.
Buck did not offer evidence that his hand injury had been “diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment” or was “so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attentions.” Wynn v. Southward, 251 F. 3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001). The
medical records he offered from his appointment with a nurse practitioner the day following his
appointment with Nurse Tripp showed his wrist did not have any swelling, deformity, or
discoloration. Buck further testified that over the counter pain medication given to him that day by
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the nurse practitioner effectively treated his pain. An x-ray taken in December 2016, after his
appointment with Tripp, showed a “mild irregularity at the right distal 5th metacarpal shaft” that
“could represent an old fracture deformity.” However, Buck did not present testimony from a
medical expert stating that this mild irregularity was attributed to the excessive force incident in
November 2016 and not some previous injury, that medical treatment was mandated for the hand
injury, or that the one day delay in treatment caused his hand to heal incorrectly and become
deformed. As Buck was informed during the pretrial conference, he was not permitted to offer
testimony that required specialized knowledge, including a medical diagnosis. (See Doc. 289, p.
6). Accordingly, he failed to present evidence that he suffered from a serious medical condition.
The Court did not misapply the law and will not reconsider the directed verdict or order a new trial
as to Count 4.
Likewise, Buck has not shown that the Court misapplied the law in granting the motion for
judgment as a matter of law as to Count 1 against Defendants Pappas, Meyers, and Weatherford.
Construing the evidence in his favor and assuming that his cell was in fact dirty, the Court still
found that Buck:
[F]ailed to put forth evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendants
Pappas, Weatherford, and Meyers were aware of the filthy and unsanitary
conditions of his cells and had knowledge that such conditions exposed him to a
strong likelihood of harm.
(Doc. 319, p. 9). It is not enough that Defendants “should have known about the risk,” because
they came to his cell “multiple times.” (Doc. 322, p. 3). See Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F. 3d 765,
773 (7th Cir. 2008). Buck must present evidence that Defendants “received information from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk existed, and that [they] actually drew
the inference.” Id. He did not present any evidence, including his own testimony, that Defendants
had actual knowledge and were informed of his cell conditions. Nor did he offer evidence that the
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risk was “so obvious that a jury may reasonably infer actual knowledge on the part of the
defendants.” Hall v. Bennett, 379 F.3d 462, 464 (7th Cir. 2004). It was not obvious from the
pictures offered by Buck, which according to his testimony showed the cells in basically the same
condition as when he was housed in them in 2016, that the conditions of the cells rose to the level
of obvious filth and posed a substantial risk of harm to him as he claimed. (Doc. 319, p. 9-10).
Additionally, as the Court previously noted, Defendants could not have inferred the filthy state of
the cells from the smell, as Buck testified the galleries where he was housed had an odor, not just
his cells. (Id. at p. 10). Because Buck did not present any evidence demonstrating deliberate
indifference on the part of Defendants, no reasonable juror could reach a verdict in his favor as to
Count 1.
Accordingly, the Court properly granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Tripp,
Weatherford, Pappas, and Meyers. The Court will not reconsider it’s Order and a new trial is not
required in this case.
DISPOSITION
The Motion Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Orc. #59 filed by Plaintiff Buck is DENIED. (Doc.
322).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 3, 2022
s/Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge
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