Buck v. Young et al

Filing 83

ORDER ADOPTING 81 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 71 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Jacob Weatherford, Courtney Meyer, Melissa Pappas, Brandy Tripp. The 71 motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 3/16/2018. (ceh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WILLIAM BUCK,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 17-CV-270-DRH-RJD

DENNIS YOUNG, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
(“the Report”) issued by Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly on February 26, 2018
(doc. 81). The Report recommends that the Court deny the motion for summary
judgment filed by defendants Courtney Meyer, Brandy Tripp, Melissa Pappas, and
Jacob Weatherford (“defendants”) (doc. 71). Defendants have filed no objections
to the Report, however plaintiff Buck field a response to the Report seeking clarity
on his request for sanctions against defendants (doc. 82).

Based on the

applicable law, the record, and the following, the Court ADOPTS the Report (doc.
81) in its entirety and DENIES the motion for summary judgment (doc. 71).
Plaintiff Buck brought this pro se action for deprivation of his
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court screened Buck’s
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and five claims were allowed to
proceed, two of which are applicable here:

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Count 1 – Defendants Withoff, Pappas, Meyers, and Weatherford
subjected Plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions of confinement while he
was on suicide watch between October 27, 2016 and December 12, 2016,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and
Count 4 – Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim to serious
medical needs against Defendants Young, Slavens, Callais, Pam, Tripp, Jill,
and Meyers for refusing to treat and/or inadequately treating Plaintiff’s
injuries related to the excessive force incidents [occurring on or about
November 20, 2016 and November 21, 2016].
Thereafter, on August 31, 2017, defendants filed the pending motion for summary
judgment (doc. 71) in which they argue for the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims
against them due to plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies as is required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1997(e).

Specifically, defendants argue that plaintiff didn’t exhaust all

administrative channels per his emergency grievances filed on December 9, 2016
(doc. 72-2) and December 11, 2016 (doc. 72-2).

Thus, plaintiff’s suit against

them is premature. See Perez v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th
Cir. 1999) (“[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies have been
exhausted must be dismissed[.]”).
In response, plaintiff argues that he did exhaust all his administrative
remedies prior to filing suit (doc. 78). Per Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690 (7th
Cir. 2005), plaintiff submits that because he received the relief he was seeking in
his emergency grievances, there were no issues left to appeal to the Administrative
Review Board, as defendants suggest. Id. at 3. Additionally, in his response to
the summary judgment motion, plaintiff sought sanctions in the amount of $150
and “whatever else the court deems appropriate” for defendants filing a “meritless
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motion.” Id. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Judge Daly submitted the
Report on February 26, 2018 (doc. 81). The Report recommends the Court deny
defendants’ motion for summary judgment as plaintiff did exhaust his
administrative remedies as to the December 9 and December 11, 2016
grievances. Id. at 7. The Report does not address the request for sanctions. The
Report was sent to the parties with a notice informing them of their rights to
appeal by way of filing “objections” within 14 days of service of the Report.
Plaintiff timely filed an objection on March 3, 2018 (doc. 82) seeking a “definite
ruling on his request for sanctions.” Id. at 1.
ANALYSIS
The Court's review of the Report is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C),
which provides in part:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings
or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court
may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may
also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.
Id.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) also directs that the Court must only make a de
novo determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to which
specific written objection has been made. Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d
734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). If no objection or only a partial objection is made, the
Court reviews those unobjected portions for clear error. Id. In addition, failure
to file objections with the district court “waives appellate review of both factual
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and legal questions.” Id. Under the clear error standard, the Court can only
overturn a Magistrate Judge's ruling if the Court is left with “the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co.,
Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997).
Here, no objections were filed by either party. The objection regarding the
request for sanctions filed by plaintiff addresses a matter not part of the Report
and thus will be reviewed for clear error.

In his objection, plaintiff states he

desires a ruling on his request for sanctions in that defendants filed a frivolous
motion discussing individuals not named as parties to the case: Dr. Shah and
Wexford. Doc. 78 at 3. Specifically, plaintiff’s sanction request in his response to
the motion for summary judgment noted:
It is very important to note in their motion Defendants never claim
Plaintiff didn’t exhaust as to the actuall [sic] named defendants, just to
Dr. Shah and Wexford.
Id.
As the Report makes clear in footnote 1, it is obvious defendants make an
error, albeit a confusing one, in misnaming parties in this case. Doc. 81, fn. 1
(“As Plaintiff explains, neither Dr. Shah nor Wexford are defendants in this
lawsuit. The Court finds that although any reference to Dr. Shah or Wexford is
confusing (and may evidence some haste in the filing of the motion), it does not
bear on the issue before the Court[.]”. A review of the memo in support of the
motion for summary judgment demonstrates that Dr. Shah and Wexford are
erroneously named twice, alongside the properly named defendants in the case.

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See doc. 72, pgs. 1; 6.

It is clear that defendants did not purposefully file a

motion making arguments for improperly named parties or make purposeful
“false declarations” as plaintiff claims. See doc. 82 at 1. It is also clear that
Judge Daly did not excuse defendants’ “falsehood” in the Report, rather
acknowledged a simple mistake. Id. At worst, defendants committed a sloppy
error.

Accordingly, Judge Daly acted within her discretion to refrain from

imposing sanctions on defendants and thus her decision is not clearly erroneous,
if not to plaintiff’s liking.
As to the substantive merits of the Report, the Court agrees with Magistrate
Judge Daly’s analysis in the Report and finds that defendants are not entitled to
summary judgment. The Court finds that Magistrate Judge Daly’s February 26,
2018 Report is well written and clearly sets out the reasoning for denying
defendants’ motion in that plaintiff did exhaust his administrative remedies prior
to filing suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e). Therefore, the Court ADOPTS the
Report in its entirety (doc. 81) and DENIES defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (doc. 71).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Judge Herndon
2018.03.16
13:59:24 -05'00'
United States District Judge

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