Chambers v. Butler et al

Filing 15

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 6/5/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
NOLEN CHAMBERS, N64570,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KIMBERLY BUTLER,
JOHN TROST,
NURSE WALTERS,
JACKIE STUEVE,
DOCTOR FUENTES,
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES,
NURSE SMITH,
VICKI PAYNE,
ANGELA CRAIN,
and UNKNOWN PARTIES,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 17-cv-00279-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
Plaintiff

Nolen

Chambers,

an

inmate

who

is

currently

incarcerated

at

Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. In his First Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff claims that he has been denied adequate medical care for a heart condition since 2015.
(Doc. 12). He seeks monetary relief. (Doc. 12, p. 11).
The First Amended Complaint is now subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which
provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in
any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee
of a governmental entity.

1

(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim
that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th
Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.,
577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The First Amended Complaint survives screening under this
standard.
First Amended Complaint
Plaintiff claims that Menard officials have denied him adequate medical care for a heart
condition for two years. (Doc. 12). Since April 9, 2015, Plaintiff has allegedly been “left to
intentionally suffer and nearly die several times.” (Doc. 12, p. 4). On that date, Plaintiff
collapsed in his cell at Menard and was rushed to St. Elizabeth Hospital. (Doc. 12, p. 5). He
underwent a heart catheterization, which revealed arterial blockage. (Doc. 12, pp. 4-5). One
artery was ninety percent obstructed, requiring the immediate placement of a stint. Id. Another
was thirty or forty percent blocked. Id.

2

Plaintiff was sent back to Menard with orders to take his prescription medication. (Doc.
12, p. 5). He spent “days” “begging and pleading” with the head warden, 1 medical director, 2
medical staff, and security staff before he was given his medication. Id.
Plaintiff allegedly spent the next two years complaining about various medical issues to
Menard’s security staff, medical staff, counselors, medical director, and wardens. (Doc. 12, p.
5). He requested treatment for dizziness, headaches, fatigue, sweats, body sores, rashes, a hernia,
back problems, chest pain, and numbness in his extremities. (Doc. 12, p. 4). Plaintiff made
these complaints in person and in grievances. Id. However, the staff “d[e]liberately tried to kill .
. . Plaintiff by ignoring intentionally” his healthcare needs. (Doc. 12, p. 6).
Instead of improving during this two-year time period, Plaintiff’s health declined. (Doc.
12, p. 3). In February 2017, he met with Doctor Satwoni about his heart condition in Sparta,
Illinois. (Doc. 12, pp. 3, 5). Plaintiff was referred to St. Elizabeth Hospital for another heart
catheterization on February 23, 2017. (Doc. 12, p. 3). He was diagnosed with four blocked
arteries. (Doc. 12, p. 7). Plaintiff underwent quadruple bypass surgery on February 27, 2017.
Id. He maintains that the surgery could have been avoided if he had received adequate medical
care during the preceding two years.
Following surgery, Plaintiff returned to Menard on March 7, 2017. (Doc. 12, p. 7). At
the time, he suffered from pain and stress. Id. Even so, Plaintiff was placed into a “cold naked
room” with two beds that were three feet off the floor. Id. He was issued a “totally worn out

1
2

The only warden named as a defendant in the First Amended Complaint is Warden Kimberly Butler.
The only medical director named as a defendant is Doctor John Trost.
3

mattress” that smelled of urine and feces. Id. He was denied pain medication, therapy, and a
kosher diet. 3 Id. He was subjected to “hostile” treatment by medical staff. Id.
On March 13, 2017, Doctor Trost and Nurse Walters entered the room around 8:00 a.m.
(Doc. 12, pp. 7-8). In an attempt to wake Plaintiff, the doctor “kick[ed] things around [while]
cursing.” (Doc. 12, p. 7). Nurse Walters checked Plaintiff’s blood pressure, while stating that he
“shouldn’t be up here.” (Doc. 12, p. 8). In response, Doctor Trost said, “[W]e will get him out
of here with good ridd[a]nce.” Id.
Within two hours, Plaintiff was ordered to gather his belongings and prepare to move.
(Doc. 12, p. 8). Plaintiff protested, stating that he should not be forced to return to the general
prison population until he was well enough to function and defend himself. Id. He asked to
return to the hospital instead, but Doctor Trost and Nurse Walters ignored his request. Id.
As Plaintiff exited the infirmary, a security staff sergeant confiscated his “breathing
exercise machine” and a pillow that was used to prevent pain while coughing. (Doc. 12, p. 8).
When Plaintiff questioned the sergeant, he was threatened with disciplinary action. Id. He
returned to his old cell with a cellmate, where he was left “weak and vulnerable.” Id.
Plaintiff could not walk to the chow hall during this time period. (Doc. 12, p. 9). When
he asked to have a kosher tray delivered to his cell, correctional officers denied his requests. Id.
He was subjected to cell shakedowns, in retaliation for his requests for food service. Id. Plaintiff
asked the medical director and Doctor Trost to issue him a permit for a temporary lay in, a low
bunk, and feeding assistance. Id. They laughed at the request and told Plaintiff he did not need
the permits. Id.

3

Plaintiff names no defendant in connection with a claim that he was subjected to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement during this time period. Any claim arising from this incident should therefore
be considered dismissed without prejudice from this action.
4

Between March 7 and April 8, 2017, Plaintiff was also denied pain medication for his
chest and heart pain by “every nurse and med-tech he stopped and asked” even though he was
prescribed the medication. (Doc. 12, p. 9). The pain was so bad that Plaintiff eventually
convinced an inmate trustee to speak with a member of the nursing staff on his behalf. Id. He
was rushed to Chester Memorial Hospital and treated for pain before being sent back to the
prison. (Doc. 12, p. 10). The outside treatment did little to control his pain. Id.
Plaintiff claims that the conduct of defendants caused his health to deteriorate over a twoyear period. He suffered unnecessarily. He seeks only monetary relief against the defendants.
(Doc. 12, p. 11).
Discussion
To facilitate the orderly management of future proceedings in this case, and in
accordance with the objectives of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(e) and 10(b), the Court
deems it appropriate to organize the claims in Plaintiff’s pro se First Amended Complaint into
the following counts:
Count 1 -

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against
the defendants for failing to timely and adequately treat Plaintiff’s heart
condition and associated pain at Menard from 2015-17.

Count 2 -

First Amendment retaliation claim against the defendants for subjecting
Plaintiff to cell shakedowns when he requested that his meals be delivered
to his cell.

Count 3 -

Illinois medical negligence claim against the defendants for failing to
adequately treat Plaintiff’s heart condition and associated pain at Menard
from 2015-17.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designations do not constitute an
opinion regarding the merits of each claim. Any claims that Plaintiff intended to raise in the

5

Complaint that are not addressed herein should be considered dismissed without prejudice
from this action.
Claim Subject to Further Review
Count 1
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution safeguards prisoners against a
denial of medical care which may result in pain and suffering that serves no penological purpose.
See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted); Berry v. Peterman,
604 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2010). A prisoner asserting an Eighth Amendment claim must show that
his medical condition was sufficiently serious (i.e., an objective standard) and that officials acted
with deliberate indifference to his health or safety (i.e., a subjective standard).

Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001).
The allegations suggest that Plaintiff’s heart condition and associated pain was
objectively serious. Plaintiff refers to other conditions, like a rash and a hernia, in passing and
without sufficient detail to independently support an Eighth Amendment claim against the
defendants. The Eighth Amendment claim in this case therefore focuses only on the heart
condition, associated pain, and corresponding denial of medical care.
To satisfy the subjective component of this claim, Plaintiff must “demonstrate that prison
officials acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653
(7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). This state of mind is
deliberate indifference, which is shown when prison officials “know of and disregard an
excessive risk to inmate health” by being “‘aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists’” and “‘draw[ing] the inference.’” Greeno,

6

414 F.3d at 653 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Negligence does not support a claim of
deliberate indifference. Id.
The First Amended Complaint includes sufficient allegations of deliberate indifference
against Warden Butler, Doctor Trost, and Nurse Walters. All three defendants were allegedly
aware of Plaintiff’s serious medical condition and his need for ongoing treatment that included
prescription pain medication. The warden allegedly took no action when Plaintiff informed her
that he was denied his prescription medication for pain and other heart-related issues. See Diaz
v. Godinez, No. 16-2639 (7th Cir. May 15, 2017) (turning a blind eye to prisoner’s complaints of
readily treatable pain can constitute deliberate indifference). The Court cannot dismiss Count 1
against this individual.
Doctor Trost and Nurse Walters made the decision to transfer Plaintiff out of the
infirmary only one week after he returned to the prison from undergoing quadruple bypass
surgery. He complained of continue pain and weakness at the time and asked to return to the
hospital. He was instead stripped of medical devices and transferred to his old cell with a
cellmate. Plaintiff describes himself as weak and vulnerable during this time period. These
defendants nevertheless denied his subsequent requests for special permits for a lay-in, low bunk,
and feeding assistance. The allegations suggest that Doctor Trost and Nurse Walters may have
exhibited deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See id.
Count 1 is subject to further review against Warden Butler, Doctor Trost, and Nurse
Walters. This claim is dismissed without prejudice against all other defendants for the reasons
discussed below.
Claims Subject to Dismissal
Count 2

7

A prisoner who seeks to bring a First Amendment retaliation claim must show that: (1) he
engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would
likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was “at
least a motivating factor” in the defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action. Bridges v.
Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006)).
In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff refers to acts of retaliation by various
defendants during his recovery period following quadruple bypass surgery. He claims that
“security staff” subjected him to one or more cell shakedowns in response to his request for
delivery of a kosher food tray to his cell and complaints regarding the denial of food. The
Seventh Circuit has explained:
[N]ot every claim of retaliation by a disciplined prisoner, who either has had
contact with, or has filed a lawsuit against prison officials, will state a cause of
action for retaliatory treatment. Rather, the prisoner must allege a chronology of
events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred. Murphy v. Lane, 833
F.2d 106, 108-09 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the plaintiff's complaint “set forth a
chronology of events from which retaliatory animus on the part of defendants
could arguably be inferred” sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss). See also
Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 342 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that “alleging merely
the ultimate fact of retaliation is insufficient”). Barring such a chronology,
dismissal may be appropriate in cases alleging retaliatory discipline.
Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1988). Here, Plaintiff has not set forth a
chronology of events that supports an inference of retaliation. He does not indicate when or to
whom he directed his request for a kosher food tray and when or by whom his cell was searched.
Plaintiff offers no statements of security staff members, which suggest that they were motivated
to search his cell by some retaliatory motive that related to his request for food delivery or
complaints regarding the denial of this request. He does little more than allude to the act of
retaliation in his First Amended Complaint. This bald assertion is not enough to support a
8

retaliation claim. Accordingly, Count 2 shall be dismissed without prejudice against all of the
defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Count 3
Allegations of negligence do not support a claim under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 1995). Negligence claims
arise under Illinois state law. However, where a district court has original jurisdiction over a
civil action such as a § 1983 claim, it also has supplemental jurisdiction over related state law
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), so long as the state claims “derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact” with the original federal claims. Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation,
512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008).

“A loose factual connection is generally sufficient.”

Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 495 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Baer v. First Options of Chicago,
Inc., 72 F.3d 1294, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995)). Although this Court has supplemental jurisdiction
pursuant to § 1367(a) over the state law negligence claim, this is not the end of the Court’s
analysis.
Under Illinois law, a plaintiff “[i]n any action, whether in tort, contract or otherwise, in
which the plaintiff seeks damages for injuries or death by reason of medical, hospital, or other
healing art malpractice,” must file an affidavit along with the complaint, declaring one of the
following: (1) that the affiant has consulted and reviewed the facts of the case with a qualified
health professional who has reviewed the claim and made a written report that the claim is
reasonable and meritorious (and the written report must be attached to the affidavit); (2) that the
affiant was unable to obtain such a consultation before the expiration of the statute of limitations,
and affiant has not previously voluntarily dismissed an action based on the same claim (and in
this case, the required written report shall be filed within 90 days after the filing of the

9

complaint); or (3) that the plaintiff has made a request for records but the respondent has not
complied within 60 days of receipt of the request (and in this case the written report shall be filed
within 90 days of receipt of the records). See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. §5/2-622(a). 1 A separate
affidavit and report shall be filed as to each defendant. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-622(b).
Failure to file the required certificate/affidavit is grounds for dismissal of the claim.
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-622(g); Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2000).
However, whether such dismissal should be with or without prejudice is up to the sound
discretion of the court. Sherrod, 223 F.3d at 614. “Illinois courts have held that when a plaintiff
fails to attach a certificate and report, then ‘a sound exercise of discretion mandates that [the
plaintiff] be at least afforded an opportunity to amend her complaint to comply with section 2622 before her action is dismissed with prejudice.’” Id.; see also Chapman v. Chandra, No. 06cv-651-MJR, 2007 WL 1655799, at *4-5 (S.D. Ill. June 5, 2007).
In the instant case, Plaintiff has failed to file the necessary affidavit/certificate and report.
Therefore, the claim in Count 3 shall be dismissed. However, the dismissal shall be without
prejudice at this time, and Plaintiff may revive the claim by filing the affidavit/certificate within
35 days (on or before July 10, 2017). Should Plaintiff fail to timely file the required affidavits,
the dismissal of Count 3 shall become a dismissal with prejudice upon the expiration of this
deadline. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
Claims Against Non-Parties

1

The August 25, 2005, amendments to a prior version of this statute were held to be unconstitutional in
2010. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem. Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010) (Holding P.A. 94-677 to be
unconstitutional in its entirety). After Lebron, the previous version of the statute continued in effect.
See Hahn v. Walsh, 686 F. Supp. 2d 829, 832 n.1 (C.D. Ill. 2010). The Illinois legislature re-enacted and
amended 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. §5/2-622 effective January 18, 2013 (P.A. 97-1145), to remove any
question as to the validity of this section. See notes on Validity of 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-622
(West 2013).
10

Plaintiff cannot proceed with any claims against individuals he did not name as
defendants in this action. He refers to “counselors,” “civil staff,” “medical staff,” “health care
unit staff,” and Doctor Satwoni, among others, in the First Amended Complaint. He also alleges
that “every nurse and med-tech he stopped and asked” for medication denied it to him in March
and April 2017. It is not clear whether Plaintiff intended to name any of these individuals or
groups as defendants because he did not identify them as such in the case caption or list of
defendants.

When parties are not listed in the caption, this Court will not treat them as

defendants. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (noting that the title of the complaint “must name all the
parties”); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551-52 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that to be
properly considered a party, a defendant must be “specif[ied] in the caption”). Any claims
against these individuals or groups should be considered dismissed without prejudice.
Defendants Subject to Dismissal
Plaintiff also cannot proceed with any claims against Defendants Angela Crain, Nurse
Smith, Vicki Payne, Jackie Stueve, Doctor Fuentes, East House Security Staff, or Wexford
Health Sources. He names each defendant in the caption of his First Amended Complaint and in
his list of defendants. However, Plaintiff does not mention these defendants in his statement of
claim. “For constitutional violations under § 1983[,] . . . a government official is only liable for
his or her own misconduct.” Perez, 792 F.3d at 781 (citation omitted). In order to recover
monetary damages against a supervisory official, a § 1983 plaintiff cannot rely on the doctrine of
respondeat superior, or supervisory liability. Id. Instead, the plaintiff must allege that each
defendant, through his or her own conduct, violated the Constitution. Id. (citing Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)).

11

Moreover, where a plaintiff has not included a defendant in his statement of the claim,
the defendant cannot be said to be adequately put on notice of which claims, if any, are directed
against him. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Merely invoking the name of a potential defendant
by listing him or her in the case caption is not sufficient to state a claim against that individual.
See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against
a defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.”). At this stage, all three claims
shall be dismissed without prejudice against Defendants Angela Crain, Nurse Smith, Vicki
Payne, Jackie Stueve, Doctor Fuentes, East House Security Staff, or Wexford Health Sources for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Request for Interim Relief
Although Plaintiff describes ongoing symptoms and/or untreated pain, he does not seek
any sort of injunctive relief in the First Amended Complaint. Should it become necessary,
Plaintiff may file a separate Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction pursuant to Rule 65(a) or (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3), which is hereby
REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for a decision.
Plaintiff’s second Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”) (Doc.
8) is hereby DENIED as MOOT. The Court already granted Plaintiff’s first IFP Motion on
March 31, 2017. (Doc. 7).
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 is subject to further review against
Defendants KIMBERLY BUTLER, JOHN TROST, and NURSE WALTERS. This claim is

12

DISMISSED without prejudice against all other defendants for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
IT IS ORDERED that COUNTS 2 and 3 are DISMISSED without prejudice against all
of the defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. If Plaintiff
wishes to revive the Illinois negligence claim in Count 3, he is hereby ORDERED to file the
required affidavits within 35 days (on or before July 10, 2017). Should Plaintiff fail to timely
file the required affidavits, the dismissal of Count 3 shall become a dismissal with prejudice. See
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-622; FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants JACKIE STUEVE, DOCTOR FUENTES, NURSE
SMITH, VICKI PAYNE, ANGELA CRAIN, WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, and
UNKNOWN PARTIES (i.e., EAST CELL HOUSE SECURITY STAFF) are DISMISSED
without prejudice from this action because the First Amended Complaint fails to state any claim
for relief against them.
As to COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants KIMBERLY
BUTLER, JOHN TROST, and NURSE WALTERS: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and
Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the First Amended Complaint, and this
Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a
Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk
within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect
formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of
formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is

13

entered), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the
Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on
which a true and correct copy of any document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper
received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails
to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the First
Amended Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Stephen C. Williams for further pre-trial proceedings, including a decision on Plaintiff’s
Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3).
Further, this entire matter is hereby REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
Williams for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
should all the parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against Plaintiff and remit the balance to Plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of Court

14

and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not independently
investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a
transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay
in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 5, 2017
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief Judge
United States District Court

15