Singleton v. Rains et al

Filing 7

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 5/17/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
AVERY SINGLETON, # R-29723,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 17-cv-323-DRH

DAVID RAINS,
PHIL MARTIN,
and DR. SHAH,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Plaintiff,

currently incarcerated

at

Jacksonville

Correctional

Center

(“Jacksonville”), has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983.

He filed the case while he was incarcerated at Robinson Correctional

Center (“Robinson”), where his claims arose.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants

were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical condition.

This case is now

before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A .
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter
out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss
any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a
defendant who by law is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
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An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an
objective standard that refers to a claim that “no reasonable person could
suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir.
2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does
not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement
to relief must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557.
Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v.
Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so
sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s
claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts
“should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of
action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual
allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed.

See Arnett v.

Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance
Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Applying these standards, the Court finds that some of Plaintiff’s claims
survive threshold review under § 1915A.

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The Complaint
On August 6, 2016, while waiting for an appointment with Dr. Shah on an
unrelated medical issue, Plaintiff advised the nurse that he was having pain in his
back, knee, and neck as a result of an accident while he was a passenger on the
Cook County Jail’s transportation bus. (Doc. 1, p. 6). The nurse promised to
schedule Plaintiff for another appointment with the doctor for this pain. During
the August 6 visit, Dr. Shah told Plaintiff that he could not examine Plaintiff on his
neck, back, and knee issues until he received Plaintiff’s medical records from the
Cook County Jail.
About a week later, Plaintiff requested another appointment with Dr. Shah
because he was having extremely sharp pains in his knee. At that time, Dr. Shah
had still not received the Cook County medical records, and refused to examine
Plaintiff’s knee. However, Dr. Shah gave Plaintiff Ibuprofen (400 mg) to treat the
pain. (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7).
Another week later, Plaintiff was called back to health care to see Dr. Shah.
The Cook County medical records had arrived, and Dr. Shah told Plaintiff that his
records stated that “no trauma was sustained from the bus accident.” 1 (Doc. 1, p.
7). In light of that information, Dr. Shah again refused to examine Plaintiff. Upon
learning Plaintiff’s age, Dr. Shah opined that Plaintiff’s pain was “probably
arthritis.” Id.
Plaintiff submitted a grievance to complain about Dr. Shah’s refusal to

Plaintiff notes that he has a grievance still pending over his injuries in the Cook County
Jail bus accident, and that the matter is “pending litigation.” (Doc. 1, p. 7).
1

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examine his knee. (The grievance, dated Oct. 7, 2016, is attached at Doc. 1, pp.
15-16).

In his grievance, Plaintiff stated that he was never examined for any

injuries while at Cook County Jail. (Doc. 1, p. 16). He acknowledged that Dr.
Shah prescribed him 400 mg Ibuprofen and issued him a low bunk permit for 4
months, but protested Dr. Shah’s decision not to treat or examine Plaintiff to find
out the cause of his pain. Id.
Plaintiff asserts that the counselor’s response to his grievance falsely stated
that he had received treatment including follow-up appointments from Dr. Shah.
(Doc. 1, pp. 8, 14-15). According to the Grievance Officer’s report, Martin (Health
Care Unit Administrator) stated that Plaintiff:
has been seen by the Medical Doctor, Dr. Shah for his complaints
and he has been treated accordingly per the Medical Doctor’s
findings. Offender will be referred back to be seen by the Medical
Doctor to follow up on his complaints regarding his complaints about
his neck, back, and knees. Offender is reminded to utilize Nurse
Sick Call protocols to address new or ongoing medical issues.
(Doc. 1, p. 14).
When Plaintiff received the counselor’s response to his grievance, he
resubmitted it for the chief administrative officer to review. Martin reviewed the
grievance and denied it. (Doc. 1, p. 9). Plaintiff asserts that because Martin could
have instructed Dr. Shah to examine Plaintiff but did not, Martin is accountable
for denying treatment to Plaintiff.
Warden Rains also reviewed Plaintiff’s grievance against Dr. Shah, but
concurred with Martin’s response and denied the grievance. (Doc. 1, p. 9).
Plaintiff later returned to sick call because of increasing severe pain in his
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back, and was scheduled to see Dr. Shah again. At that appointment, Dr. Shah
again advised Plaintiff that he would not examine him, but he would prescribe
600 mg of Ibuprofen.
Plaintiff continues to experience pain in his back, neck, and knees. (Doc. 1,
p. 9). He seeks compensatory damages. (Doc. 1, p. 10).
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to
divide the pro se action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will
use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise
directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designation of these counts does
not constitute an opinion as to their merit. Any other claim that is mentioned in
the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed
without prejudice.
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Dr. Shah, for refusing to examine Plaintiff’s knees, back, or neck
despite Plaintiff’s complaints of severe pain;
Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Martin, for failing to require Dr. Shah to examine Plaintiff after
Plaintiff filed a grievance against Dr. Shah;
Count 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Rains, for failing to require Dr. Shah to examine Plaintiff after
Plaintiff filed a grievance against Dr. Shah.
Count 1 shall proceed for further review in this action. However, Counts 2
and 3 shall be dismissed at this time without prejudice, for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.

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Count 1 – Deliberate Indifference – Dr. Shah
In order to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need, an inmate must show that he (1) suffered from an objectively serious
medical condition; and (2) that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to a risk
of serious harm from that condition. An objectively serious condition includes an
ailment that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities or which involves
chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir.
1997).
“Deliberate indifference is proven by demonstrating that a prison official
knows of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate and either acts or fails to act in
disregard of that risk. Delaying treatment may constitute deliberate indifference if
such delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain.”
Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994);
Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 777-78 (7th Cir. 2015). However, the Eighth
Amendment does not give prisoners entitlement to “demand specific care” or “the
best care possible,” but only requires “reasonable measures to meet a substantial
risk of serious harm.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). The
mere fact that a prescribed treatment has proven ineffective does not rise to the
level of deliberate indifference. Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 680 (7th
Cir. 2008). Further, a defendant’s inadvertent error, negligence or even ordinary

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malpractice is insufficient to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
constitutional violation. See Duckworth, 532 F.3d at 679.
Here, Plaintiff describes significant, persistent pain in several areas of his
body, that had developed after a vehicle accident prior to his arrival at Robinson.
The Complaint thus arguably satisfies the objective component of an Eighth
Amendment claim.

The remaining question is whether any of the Defendants

acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to a known risk of serious harm
to Plaintiff.
Dr. Shah had several encounters with Plaintiff in which Plaintiff explained
his symptoms and the connection to the accident. While Dr. Shah did provide
Plaintiff with some treatment in the form of pain medication and a low bunk
permit, the doctor consistently refused to perform any examination of Plaintiff’s
knees, back, or neck. Whether or not an examination would have revealed any
useful information that might assist in treating Plaintiff’s painful condition cannot
be known at this stage of the case. Further factual development will be necessary
in order to determine whether Dr. Shah’s handling of Plaintiff’s condition was
appropriate and consistent with reasonable medical judgment; demonstrated
unconstitutional deliberate indifference; or was merely negligent (which does not
violate the Constitution).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim in

Count 1 against Dr. Shah shall proceed for further review.

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Dismissal of Count 2 – Deliberate Indifference – Health Care Administrator
Martin
Martin, who was the supervisor of Dr. Shah, provided a response to
Plaintiff’s grievance which stated that Plaintiff had been seen by the doctor and
“treated accordingly to the M.D.’s findings.” (Doc. 1, p. 15). He indicated that
Plaintiff would be referred back to the doctor to follow up on his complaints of
pain, and noted that Plaintiff should follow the sick call procedure to address this
problem. (Doc. 1, pp. 14-15). Plaintiff disagrees with Martin’s handling of his
grievance, and seeks to hold Martin liable for damages because Martin did not
instruct Dr. Shah to examine Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, p. 9).
In a civil rights case, a supervisory official does not automatically incur
liability for the unconstitutional conduct of a prison staff member who reports to
him or her, because the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) is
not applicable to § 1983 actions. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740
(7th Cir. 2001) (liability does not attach unless a defendant was “personally
responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right”).

However, personal

involvement may be established if the supervisor knows that a subordinate’s
conduct violates the Constitution and the supervisor then “facilitate[s] it,
approve[s] it, condone[s] it, or turn[s] a blind eye.” Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d
555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995); Thomas v. Knight, 196 F. App’x 424, 428 (7th Cir.
2006).
In Plaintiff’s case, he submitted a single grievance after his second visit to

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Dr. Shah regarding the knee, back, and neck pain. 2 During the first encounter,
the doctor gave him pain medication and a low bunk permit, but refused to
perform a physical examination of the painful areas on Plaintiff’s body because
Plaintiff’s medical records had not yet come. At the second visit, Dr. Shah told
Plaintiff the Cook County records showed that Plaintiff had sustained no trauma
from the accident, so Dr. Shah did not examine Plaintiff.
Martin’s response to this grievance indicates that he anticipated Plaintiff
would continue to receive medical attention for his complaints, either through a
referral initiated by the health care unit, or by Plaintiff initiating another sick call
request. Plaintiff’s grievance itself reflected only 2 encounters with Dr. Shah to
deal with his pain, and did not reveal a pattern of non-treatment of Plaintiff’s pain
that clearly amounted to unconstitutional action or inaction by Shah. Based on
this single grievance, it cannot be said that Martin knew that Shah was violating
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, yet turned a blind eye to Shah’s conduct.

By

directing that further treatment would be available to Plaintiff, Martin’s handling
of Plaintiff’s grievance does not indicate deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s
condition.
For these reasons, the Complaint fails to state a deliberate indifference
claim against Martin upon which relief may be granted. Count 2 shall therefore
be dismissed without prejudice.

2

Plaintiff’s August 6, 2016, appointment regarding an unrelated health issue is not
counted here.
Page 9 of 14

Dismissal of Count 3 – Deliberate Indifference – Warden Rains
Plaintiff asserts that Warden Rains “is responsible for all inmates’ physical
and mental well being” at Robinson. (Doc. 1, p. 9). This statement suggests that
Plaintiff is attempting to hold Rains liable on a theory of supervisory liability,
which does not apply in a § 1983 case. See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d
724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff further sues Rains because he “concurred with the response of Phil
Martin, Health Care Administrator’s decision to refuse [Plaintiff] treatment” with
reference to Plaintiff’s grievance. (Doc. 1, p. 9). By all indications, Warden Rains
is not a medical professional.
If a prisoner is under the care of prison medical professionals, a nonmedical prison official “will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is
in capable hands.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)).

Nonetheless, even non-

medical officials may be found to be deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious
medical needs if “they have a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison
doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” Hayes v.
Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir. 2008). See also Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d
768, 782 (7th Cir. 2015) (prisoner could proceed with deliberate indifference
claim against non-medical prison officials who failed to intervene despite their
knowledge of his serious medical condition and inadequate medical care, as
explained

in

his

“coherent

and

highly

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detailed

grievances

and

other

correspondences”); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 854-56 (7th Cir. 1999)
(warden was required to act when prison officials repeatedly denied an inmate
life-sustaining medication and food).
Plaintiff’s case presents a contrast to the facts in Perez, where the prisoner
notified non-medical officials that he went for several days with no treatment for a
“gaping wound” despite the prison doctor’s determination that the prisoner
needed specialty care outside the prison. Here, Plaintiff’s grievance stated that he
had

received

some

treatment

for

his

complaints

of

pain,

despite

his

dissatisfaction with Dr. Shah’s refusal to examine him. Plaintiff never claimed
that the treatment he did receive was ineffective.

Martin’s response to the

grievance, as discussed above under Count 2, indicated that further treatment
would be offered to Plaintiff if he needed it.

And Plaintiff’s description of his

encounters with Dr. Shah did not point to a conclusion that Dr. Shah violated the
Constitution. Considering these facts, Plaintiff’s grievance and Martin’s response
to it would not give Rains reason to believe that Plaintiff had been mistreated by
the medical staff or that they were refusing to treat him.

The Complaint,

therefore, does not state a claim against Rains for deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s medical needs.
At this time, Count 3 against Rains shall be dismissed without prejudice
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Page 11 of 14

Pending Motion
The motion for service of process at government expense (Doc. 3) shall be
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Service shall be ordered below on
the Defendant who remains in the action.

No service shall be made on the

dismissed Defendants.
Disposition
COUNTS 2 and 3 are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendants RAINS and MARTIN are
DISMISSED from this action without prejudice.
With reference to COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendant
SHAH:

(1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a

Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons).

The Clerk is

DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum
and Order to Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff.

If

Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to
the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take
appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court will require
Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the Defendant cannot be found at the address provided by Plaintiff, the
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used
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only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any
documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk.

Address

information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant (or upon defense counsel once an
appearance is entered), a copy of every further pleading or other document
submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original
paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of
any document was served on Defendant or counsel.

Any paper received by a

district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that
fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to
the complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United
States Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to the United States
Magistrate Judge for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the
payment of costs under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of
the costs, notwithstanding that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has
been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to

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keep the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his
address; the Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall
be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in
address occurs.

Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in the

transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for
want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 17th day of May, 2017.

Judge
Herndon
2017.05.17
17:55:27
-05'00'
United States District Judge

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