Maggard v. True

Filing 24

ORDER denying 21 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 10/5/2018. (jer)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TIMOTHY MAGGARD,
Petitioner

vs.
No. 17-cv-335-DRH
B. TRUE,
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

HERNDON, District Judge:
I. Introduction
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc.
21) submitted by Petitioner Timothy Maggard (“Petitioner”) on July 10, 2018.
Respondent B. True (“Respondent”) offered on July 11, 2018 a response in
opposition of said motion (Doc. 22). For the reasons set forth below, the Court
DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
II. Background
Petitioner, who is currently incarcerated in the Federal Correctional
Institution in Marion, Illinois, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc.1). In the Petition, he argues that under the recent decision
of the Supreme Court in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), his
enhanced career offender sentence is unconstitutional. Id.
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In his criminal case in the Western District of Missouri, United States v.
Maggard, No. 6:96-cr-3049-DW (W.D. Mo. July 25, 1997), Petitioner was found
guilty of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
846. (Doc. 1, p. 10). He was sentenced to 360 months imprisonment. (Doc. 1, p.
10). The career-offender enhancement was imposed pursuant to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”) at § 4B1.1, based on two prior convictions for
second degree burglary and second degree assault. (Doc. 1, p. 13). As a result of
the career-offender determination, Petitioner’s total offense level was determined to
be 38. (Doc. 1, p. 13). Petitioner appealed his conviction in 1998 and filed a § 2255
petition in 1999. (Doc. 1, p. 11). Both of these efforts failed. Id. Petitioner also filed
a motion to file a second or successive § 2255 petition in 2016 under Johnson v.
United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), but his claim was dismissed. Id. Petitioner
now argues that pursuant to Mathis, he should be resentenced without
enhancement because his underlying burglary conviction does not constitute a
crime of violence under the reasoning in Mathis, as the elements of Petitioner’s
underlying offense criminalize a greater swath of conduct than the elements of the
guidelines offense. (Doc. 1, pp. 11-14).
On July 10, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(Doc. 21) arguing that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the ground
that both parties agree he is no longer a career offender. On July 11, 2018,
Respondent filed a response in opposition of said motion arguing that Petitioner’s
claim is not cognizable under Seventh Circuit precedent because his alleged harm

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– a lawful, within-Guidelines sentence – does not qualify as “a fundamental defect
. . . that is grave enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice.” Hawkins v.
United States, 724 F.3d 915, 917 (7th Cir. 2013).
III. Applicable Law
A party is permitted under Rule 12(c) to move for judgment on the pleadings
after the parties have the complaint and the answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); Brunt v.
Serv. Employeees Int’l Union, 284 F.3d 715. 718 (7h Cir. 2002); Northern Indiana
Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir.
1998). A motion for judgment on the pleadings “under Rule 12(c) is reviewed under
the same standard as a motion to dismiss under 12(b); the motion is not granted
unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no facts sufficient to
support his claim for relief, and the facts in the complaint are viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party.” Flenner v. Sheahan, 107 F.3d 459, 461
(7th Cir. 1997); Moss v. Martin, 473 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2007). The court, in
ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, must “accept as true all wellpleaded allegations.” Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 364 (7th Cir.
2000); Thomas v. Guardsmark, Inc., 381 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2004). A court
may rule on a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) based on a review of the
pleadings alone, which include the complaint, the answer, and any written
instruments attached as exhibits. Id. at 452–453.
To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.

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v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “[A]
plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at
1949, 1965 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949. The
court does not take “legal conclusion[s] couched as factual allegation[s]” as true. Id.
at 1950.
IV. Analysis
Here, Petitioner first argues that, pursuant to Mathis, his misclassification
as a career offender under USSG § 4B1.1(a) requires resentencing. Respondent
concedes – under Mathis – Petitioner no longer qualifies as a career offender,
however, despite that, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable
under Seventh Circuit precedent because his alleged harm – a lawful, withinguidelines sentence – does not qualify as “a fundamental defect . . . that is grave
enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice.” (Hawkins v. United States, 724
F.3d 915, 917 (7th Cir. 2013).

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Petitioner’s first argument fails because, under Hawkins, a court’s
misapplication of the career offender label – which ultimately results in a legally
authorized sentence – is not a miscarriage of justice. Likewise, Petitioner’s second
argument must fail because a subsequent change in the USSG does not constitute
a miscarriage of justice. As previously discussed, the Seventh Circuit has held that
a “period of incarceration exceed[ing] that [which is] permitted by law . . .
constitutes a miscarriage of justice. See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621,
623 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Hawkins v. United States, 724 F.3d 915, 917 (7th
Cir. 2013) (“Postconviction review is therefore proper when for example the judge
imposes a sentence that he had no authority to impose, as in Narvaez.”) Navarez
and Hawkins, when read together, demonstrate a clear rule adopted by the Seventh
Circuit: a miscarriage of justice only occurs in this context when a sentence exceeds
that which is authorized by law.
V. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Doc. 21).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Judge Herndon
2018.10.05
15:38:13 -05'00'
United States District Judge

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