Jones et al v. Mooney et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8(a) and (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should he wish to proceed with this case, Jones shall file his First Amended Complaint within 28 days of the entry of this order (on or before July 10,2017). (Amended Pleadings due by 7/10/2017.) Denying 3 MOTION for Recruitment of Counsel filed by Corbin D. Jones, Lekedrieon Russell, 7 MOTION to Appoint Counsel filed by Corbin D. Jones. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 6/12/2017. (jaj)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CORBIN D. JONES, # 01-30-1989-46,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NEILL MOONEY,
MT. VERNON JUSTICE CENTER
COUNTY JAIL,
C. GREENWOOD,
JENNIFER ROBERTS,
A. BLANDFORD,
J. CARLTON,
B. HUFF,
A. MEYERS,
LT. HAYNES,
LT. BONNIE MAY,
C/O SPARTEGUES,
CAPT. MOUNT,
C/O JEFF CLARK,
NURSE SHIRLEY,
DR. PAULIUS,
C/O FORTAG,
C/O EDWARDS,
DEPUTY TRAVIS SCOTT,
C/O NANCY,
C/O CONWAY,
and C/O McKENNETH,
Defendants.

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Case No. 17-cv-349-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
This matter is now before the Court for a merits review of Plaintiff Jones’ claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Jones and former co-Plaintiff Lekedreion Russell jointly filed
this pro se action on April 6, 2017. On May 31, 2017, the Court severed Russell’s claims
(designated as Counts 1-4) into a separate action (Russell v. Mooney, et al., Case No. 17-cv-5701

JPG). (Doc. 10). The only claims remaining in the present case are those brought by Jones,
designated by the Court as Counts 5-11. Most of Jones’ claims involve events and conditions at
the Jefferson County Justice Center (“the jail”), where Jones is currently incarcerated. He also
includes an excessive force claim that arose during his arrest. The Complaint consists of 90
pages, 70 of which pertain only to Jones’ claims. Jones names 20 individuals as Defendants, in
addition to naming the Mt. Vernon Justice Center County Jail.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion of the
complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must
cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is
plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true,
see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so
sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v.

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Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate
abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At
the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally
construed. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth
Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
In addition to the screening requirements of § 1915A, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
sets rules for preparing an acceptable pleading.

Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 8(d)(1) further states:
“Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” The purpose of these provisions is to
giver fair notice of the claims:
Under Rule 8, a complaint “must be presented with intelligibility sufficient for a
court or opposing party to understand whether a valid claim is alleged and if so
what it is.” Wade v. Hopper, 993 F.2d 1246, 1249 (7th Cir.) (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 868, 114 S. Ct. 193, 126 L. Ed. 2d 151 (1993); see also
Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that a complaint
“must be presented with clarity sufficient to avoid requiring a district court or
opposing party to forever sift through its pages in search” of what it is the plaintiff
asserts). A complaint that is prolix and/or confusing makes it difficult for the
defendant to file a responsive pleading and makes it difficult for the trial court to
conduct orderly litigation.
Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merch. Serv., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 775-76 (7th Cir. 1994). See also
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1430 (7th Cir. 1994).
The disjointed, piecemeal presentation of Jones’ Complaint, as well as its length, results
in a pleading that is largely unintelligible, and forces the Court to “forever sift through its pages”
in order to parse out the claims that Jones apparently seeks to assert. For these reasons, the
Complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice. However, Jones shall have an opportunity to
amend his pleading in order to correct these problems.

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The Complaint
The Complaint was submitted in two parts. The first section (filed as Doc. 1) consists of
20 pages. On separate pages, the Complaint lists both Jones and his former co-Plaintiff Russell
as Plaintiffs; Jones and Russell each include overlapping lists of Defendants. (Jones: Doc. 1, pp.
2-3, 5-6; Russell: Doc. 1, pp. 9). Both Jones and Russell signed the Complaint below the prayer
for relief on page 7, which states that they seek monetary damages. Two pages in Doc. 1 contain
cursory references to Jones’ claims for deliberate indifference to a medical condition,
interference with legal mail, and denial of recreation (Doc. 1, pp. 5, 7), but the remainder of this
section does not contain any factual allegations set forth by Jones. (Doc. 1, pp. 10-20). The
entire factual narrative beginning on page 10 of Doc. 1 is identified with former co-Plaintiff
Russell’s name, for example: “I as Lekedrieon Russell pressed the intercom multiple times to get
a C/O in my as Lekedrieon Russell[’s] room to help a[n] inmate that tried to commit suicide[.]”
(Doc. 1, p. 10). Russell’s only mention of Jones is on page 14, where Russell states that he asked
for himself, Jones, and another cellmate to be allowed out of the cell for recreation, and mentions
that Jones requested cleaning supplies for the cell they shared. (Doc. 1, p. 14). Other than those
references, Jones’ name does not appear in the statement of claim contained in Doc. 1. (Doc. 1,
pp. 10-20).
As background information to some of Jones’ potential claims, Russell’s section of the
Complaint (Doc. 1) explains that another inmate (Joshua Heart) who shared the jail cell with
Russell and Jones attempted to commit suicide by cutting his wrists on March 29, 2017. (Doc. 1,
pp. 13, 16, 18). Heart was an admitted drug user. The cell was contaminated with Heart’s blood,
which was not cleaned up for 4 days, during which time Russell and presumably Jones were
exposed to it. (Doc. 1, pp. 5, 16). For several days after that incident, Russell asked to be

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allowed out of the cell for recreation, but was refused. (Doc. 1, pp. 14, 18).
The second section of the Complaint (filed as Doc. 1-1) contains 70 pages, starting with a
cover page bearing Jones’ name and address. The remainder of this second document relates
only to Jones’ claims. The second page of Doc. 1-1 consists of a copy of a photograph of
purported drug evidence seized from Jones’ home, with handwritten commentary and allegations
surrounding the photo (such as “false report,” “cruel and unusual punishments,” and claims that
officers lied about the testing of the substance). (Doc. 1-1, p. 2). This page is identical to a page
contained in another Complaint filed by Jones in a different action pending in this Court, Jones v.
Mooney, Case No. 17-cv-337-JPG (filed April 3, 2017) (Doc. 1, p. 6 in that case).1 Jones
continues on pages 3-4 with a narrative describing the search of his room by Officers Mooney
and Greenwood on February 13, 2017, which culminated in his arrest. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 3-4).
Many of these allegations overlap with matters raised in Case No. 17-337. However, in the
present case, Jones raises a new and distinct allegation that after Mooney ordered another
unidentified officer to put Jones in handcuffs, that officer applied the handcuffs so tightly that
Jones’ hands became badly swollen, preventing jail officials from taking his fingerprints for 3
days after the arrest. (Doc. 1-1, p. 4). Jones also includes another list of the Defendants. (Doc.
1-1, p. 7).
The remainder of the 70 pages in Doc. 1-1 consists of many piecemeal handwritten
statements, presented in no discernible order, interspersed with copies of documents such as
police reports from Jones’ arrest, excerpts from the Illinois Constitution, receipts from purchases
at the jail, jail menus, the state court order setting bond after Jones’ arrest, and pages from a

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In Jones v. Mooney, Case No. 17-cv-337-JPG, the undersigned Judge determined that Jones stated two
potential civil rights claims, but ruled that those claims must be stayed pursuant to the abstention doctrine
of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), as explained in Gakuba v. O’Brien, 711 F.3d 751, 753 (7th Cir.
2013), until Jones’ state criminal case is concluded. (Doc. 12 in No. 17-337, entered May 24, 2017).

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motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Jones’ narrative portions include some description of Jones being exposed to blood from
the cellmate’s suicide attempt and his inability to get cleaning supplies from unidentified jail
staff. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 9, 12, 70). Jones also alleges that Edwards, McKensley,2 Jeff, Spartegues,
and/or Roberts opened his incoming legal mail and read his outgoing legal mail, and/or
mishandled forms relating to Jones’ legal work and his attempts to sign over mail to his mother
or receive mail from her. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 11, 14, 20-21, 44-45, 59). He claims that jail officials
(possibly Scott, Mount, Haynes, and/or Shirley) delayed and denied medical care for acid burns
Jones had sustained before his arrest. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 23, 25, 42-43, 47, 50-51, 63). He asserts
that he was denied out-of-cell recreation by Roberts, and possibly by Haynes and/or other
unidentified officers, a denial that may have lasted as long as 40 days. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 13, 22, 61).
Jones mentions a number of other complaints about the jail conditions, such as Roberts
turning the TV off; not receiving adequate clothing; being exposed to cold temperatures and
blinking lights in the cell; being housed in Block F which had black mold in the showers, rusty
drinking water, and insect infestation; and being served spoiled milk and a wet sandwich. (Doc.
1-1, pp. 13, 16, 18, 43, 48, 55, 59, 63). In 3 different places, Jones includes a narrative about
another inmate’s confrontation with Haynes. Jones witnessed their interaction, but does not
assert a violation of his own constitutional rights in connection with the incident. (Doc. 1-1, pp.
20-21; 46; 67).
Discussion
As explained in the order severing former co-Plaintiff Russell’s claims into a separate
action (Doc. 10), the Court finds it convenient to characterize Jones’ claims which remain in this
pro se action into the following counts. Counts 1-4 were the claims raised by Russell which
2

There is no “McKensley” listed as a Defendant, however, Jones includes a C/O McKenneth as a party.

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have been severed into a separate case. The original numbering of Jones’ claims below (Counts
5-11) shall be retained for purposes of clarity.

The parties and the Court will use these

designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of
this Court. The designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit. Any
other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be
considered dismissed without prejudice.
Count 5: Excessive force claim against the unidentified officers who arrested
Jones on February 13 or 14, 2017, for applying handcuffs to Jones’ wrists so
tightly that his hands were swollen for several days;
Count 6: Deliberate indifference claim against unidentified jail staff for the
failure to provide Jones with medical testing for communicable diseases following
his exposure to a cellmate’s blood after the cellmate’s suicide attempt;
Count 7: Deliberate indifference claim against unidentified jail staff for the
failure to provide Jones with cleaning supplies or to clean the areas in and near his
cell that were contaminated with blood;
Count 8: Deliberate indifference claim against Scott, Mount, Haynes, and Nurse
Shirley for failing to provide Jones with medical treatment for burns and cuts on
his arms sustained before his arrest;
Count 9: First Amendment claim for the improper opening and destruction/loss
of Jones’ legal mail, against Edwards, Spartegues, Jeff, and Roberts;
Count 10: Deliberate indifference claim against Haynes and Roberts for the
failure to permit Jones to leave the cell for recreation;
Count 11: Deliberate indifference claim against unidentified jail staff for placing
Jones in a cell with insufficient heat, bedding, or clothing; exposing him to black
mold, rusty drinking water, and insects; and serving him spoiled milk and soggy
food.
The Court has attempted to identify Jones’ potential claims listed above with as much
clarity as possible given the disjointed, repetitive, piecemeal, non-chronological, and confusing
manner in which Jones presented his lengthy pleading. However, the Court shall not inflict this
Complaint on the Defendants, because it flagrantly violates the pleading requirements of Federal
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Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 8(d)(1). This pleading is the opposite of “a short and plain
statement of the claim,” and is anything but “simple, concise, and direct.” FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2); (d)(1). To the contrary, the Complaint as currently pled would require the Defendants to
endlessly sift through the more than 70 pages of documents in order to discern which claims are
asserted against them and which facts support those claims. This will present great difficulty for
the Defendants to prepare a responsive pleading, and for the Court to conduct orderly litigation.
See Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merch. Serv., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 775-76 (7th Cir. 1994); see also
U.S. ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 8(a)
requires parties to make their pleadings straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties need
not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.”).
Because of these problems, the Complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure
to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jones shall be allowed an
opportunity to submit an amended complaint, to correct the deficiencies in his pleading. If the
amended complaint does not comply with Rule 8 or with the instructions below, if it fails to state
a claim, or if Jones does not submit an amended complaint, the entire case shall be dismissed
with prejudice. Such a dismissal may count as a strike pursuant to § 1915(g). The amended
complaint shall be subject to review under § 1915A.
Furthermore, Jones is ADVISED that unrelated claims against different Defendants are
subject to severance into separate cases (where a new filing fee shall be imposed) if the Court
determines that they were improperly joined in the same action. The Seventh Circuit directs that
such unrelated claims belong in separate lawsuits, “not only to prevent the sort of morass”
produced by multi-claim, multi-defendant suits “but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required
filing fees” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th

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Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), (g)). It appears at this juncture that the claim designated
as Count 5 above may be severable from the other claims under the George rule, because Count
5 arose during Jones’ February 2017 arrest at the hands of officers who appear to have had no
later contact with him. The other claims (Counts 6-11) arose later, after Jones was incarcerated
at the jail. Some of the jail-related claims may also be severable from one another. In his
amended complaint, Jones may choose to omit one or more claims if he does not wish to incur a
new filing fee as a result of this severance requirement.
Pending Motions
Jones’ motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) shall be addressed in a
separate order, after he submits his inmate trust fund statement in accordance with the order at
Doc. 13.
Jones has filed two motions for recruitment of counsel (Docs. 3 and 7). The dismissal of
the Complaint without prejudice raises the question of whether Jones is capable of drafting a
viable amended complaint without the assistance of counsel.
There is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in federal civil cases. Romanelli v.
Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1006
(7th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, the district court has discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) to
recruit counsel for an indigent litigant. Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 706 F.3d 864, 86667 (7th Cir. 2013).
When a pro se litigant submits a request for assistance of counsel, the Court must first
consider whether the indigent plaintiff has made reasonable attempts to secure counsel on his
own. Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647,
654 (7th Cir. 2007)). If so, the Court must examine “whether the difficulty of the case—

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factually and legally—exceeds the particular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to coherently
present it.” Navejar, 718 F.3d at 696 (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). “The question . . . is
whether the plaintiff appears competent to litigate his own claims, given their degree of
difficulty, and this includes the tasks that normally attend litigation: evidence gathering,
preparing and responding to motions and other court filings, and trial.” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655.
The Court also considers such factors as the plaintiff’s “literacy, communication skills, education
level, and litigation experience.” Id.
The first motion (Doc. 3) was filed jointly by Jones and former co-Plaintiff Russell. It
discloses that Jones has made no efforts to secure counsel on his own. It is impossible to tell
from the motion whether the answers regarding educational level and psychiatric medications
pertain to Jones or Russell. (Doc. 3, p. 2). Jones’ individual motion for counsel (Doc. 7)
similarly reveals no attempts whatsoever on his part to obtain legal representation. He points to
his limited education (which he does not detail) and matters that might require expert testimony,
as grounds for the recruitment of counsel. (Doc. 7, pp. 1-2).
Based on these motions, the Court concludes that Jones has failed to make reasonable
efforts to obtain counsel on his own, which is sufficient reason to deny the motions. Further,
despite Jones’ limited education, his documents reflect that he is articulate and capable of stating
the relevant facts and his legal claims. At this stage, Jones merely needs to organize his
amended complaint in a coherent manner, state the facts that support each claim he wishes to
pursue, clearly identify which Defendants are connected with each distinct claim, and state what
each individual Defendant did (or failed to do) that violated his rights.

Only Jones has

knowledge of these facts, and no legal training is required to set them down on paper. Therefore,
the recruitment of counsel is not warranted at this time. Both motions (Docs. 3 and 7) are

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DENIED without prejudice. The Court will remain open to appointing counsel as the case
progresses.
The Court reserves ruling on the motion for service of process at government expense
(Doc. 4) until such time as Jones submits an amended complaint.
Disposition
The Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to comply with
Rule 8(a) and (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should he wish to proceed with this case, Jones shall
file his First Amended Complaint within 28 days of the entry of this order (on or before July 10,
2017). It is strongly recommended that Jones use the form designed for use in this District for
civil rights actions. He should label the pleading “First Amended Complaint” and include Case
Number 17-cv-349-JPG. The amended complaint shall present each claim in a separate count,
using the numbers as designated by the Court above. In each count, Jones shall specify, by
name,3 each Defendant alleged to be liable under the count, as well as the actions alleged to have
been taken by that Defendant. New individual Defendants may be added if they were personally
involved in the constitutional violations. Jones should attempt to include the facts of his case in
chronological order, inserting Defendants’ names where necessary to identify the actors and the
dates of any material acts or omissions. As noted above, if Jones does not wish to pursue any of
the claims designated above as Counts 5-11, he may omit the claim(s) from the amended
complaint.
An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original Complaint, rendering the
original Complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1

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Plaintiff may designate an unknown Defendant as John or Jane Doe, but should include descriptive
information (such as job title, shift worked, or location) to assist in the person’s eventual identification.

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(7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to the original Complaint.
Thus, the First Amended Complaint must contain all the relevant allegations in support of Jones’
claims and must stand on its own, without reference to any other pleading. Should the First
Amended Complaint not conform to these requirements, it shall be stricken. Jones must also refile any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along with the First Amended Complaint.
If Jones fails to file an amended complaint in accordance with the instructions set forth in
this Order, this case shall be subject to dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply with an
order of the Court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). Jones may also incur a “strike” within the
meaning of § 1915(g) if his complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. No service shall be ordered on any Defendant until after the Court
completes its § 1915A review of the First Amended Complaint.
In order to assist Jones in preparing his amended complaint, the Clerk is DIRECTED to
mail Jones a blank civil rights complaint form.
Finally, Jones is REMINDED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 12, 2017

s/J. Phil Gilbert
United States District Judge

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