Williams v. Duncan et al

Filing 7

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 5/10/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
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RONALD WILLIAMS,
#N-54017,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STEVE DUNCAN,
PHIL MARTIN,
MRS. L. CUNNINGHAM,
and JOHN COE,
Defendants.

Case No. 17 cv–00376 NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Ronald Williams, an inmate who is currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional
Center (“Lawrence”), brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). In the
Complaint, Plaintiff claims that he was denied adequate medical care for glaucoma and a bunion at
Lawrence in 2015. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-6). Plaintiff asserts claims under the Eighth Amendment for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs against the following defendants: Steve Duncan
(warden), Phil Martin (medical director), L. Cunningham (healthcare administrator), and John Coe
(doctor). Id. He seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief against them. 1 (Doc. 1, p. 6).
The Complaint is now subject to preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which
provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in
any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
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Plaintiff did not file a motion requesting any sort of interim relief, such as a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”) or a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He also did
not include a request for emergency relief in the Complaint. If he deems it necessary, Plaintiff may file a
motion requesting a TRO or a preliminary injunction while this action is pending.

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(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim that
any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000).
An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.”
Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally
construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The
Complaint survives screening under this standard and is subject to further review.
Complaint
Plaintiff complains that he was denied adequate medical care for two medical conditions at
Lawrence in 2015. (Doc. 1). First, he suffered from glaucoma in his right eye that caused painful
pressure and vision loss. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-6). Second, he suffered from a bunion on his foot that
necessitated the use of special shoes. Id. Plaintiff claims that the defendants delayed or denied
treatment for both conditions. Id.
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Glaucoma
On May 26, 2015, Plaintiff was allegedly examined by a prison optometrist, Doctor

Brummel. (Doc. 1, p. 4). The optometrist noted “extremely high pressure” in his right eye and
referred him to Marion Eye Center. Id. He recommended a “surgical approach.” Id.
While still waiting for approval of the referral and/or eye surgery on June 4, 2015, Plaintiff
filed an emergency grievance. (Doc. 1, pp. 4, 10). In it, he complained of high pressure in his right
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eye and blurry vision. Id. Plaintiff also requested more eye drops. Id. The grievance was deemed a
non-emergency on June 9, 2015. (Doc. 1, p. 10). A counselor’s note dated June 15, 2015, indicates
that Plaintiff was approved for a medical furlough and would receive eye drops in the “med line.” Id.
The grievance was formally denied on August 14, 2015. (Doc. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff appealed the
decision to the “director” on September 9, 2015. Id.
On June 29 and July 6, 2015, Plaintiff was seen by Doctor Coe for “severe uncontrolled
glaucoma.” (Doc. 1, pp. 4, 14). A medical referral and report prepared by Doctor Coe on each of
those dates indicates that the situation was urgent. (Doc. 1, pp. 4, 13). The doctor recommended a
consultation with a glaucoma specialist at Marion Eye Center. (Doc. 1, pp. 13-14).
In the weeks that followed, Plaintiff sent multiple requests for medical care to Warden
Treadway, “[h]ealthcare,” and “[m]ental [h]ealth [s]ervices.” (Doc. 1, pp. 5, 15). He did not receive a
response. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Warden Duncan, Medical Director Martin, Administrator
Cunningham, and Doctor Coe would not approve the recommendation for surgery. (Doc. 1, p. 5).
Plaintiff did not undergo surgery at Marion Eye Center until July 28, 2015. Id. He claims that the
two-month delay caused him to suffer from a “cocked” right eye, vision loss, and unnecessary pain.
Id.
2.

Shoes
Plaintiff also claims that Doctor Coe ordered him special shoes because he has a painful

bunion on his foot. (Doc. 1, pp. 5, 16). The doctor initially agreed that Plaintiff needed these shoes.
Id. Unfortunately, however, the ones he ordered were too big for Plaintiff. Id.
On June 30, 2015, Plaintiff was called to the prison health care unit to pick out a pair of shoes
that fit him. (Doc. 1, p. 16). When he selected a replacement pair, Nurse Collins refused to give them
to Plaintiff. Id. The nurse indicated that she needed to speak with Doctor Coe about special insoles
for the shoes. Id. Weeks passed, and Nurse Collins never gave Plaintiff the shoes or followed up with
him. Id.
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On July 30 and August 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed grievances to complain about the denial of
shoes. (Doc. 1, p. 16). In one grievance, Plaintiff explained that he saw a shoebox with his name on it
while making his way through the med line, but his name was marked out and replaced with another
inmate’s name. (Doc. 1, p. 17). In the same grievance, Plaintiff also indicates that he wrote to Nurse
Collins, Director Martin, and Nancy Pageant about getting new shoes but did not attach copies of the
written requests. (Doc. 1, p. 16). A response to the initial grievance dated July 31, 2015, indicates
that Doctor Coe met with Plaintiff to discuss his request for new gym shoes in April 2015 and the
doctor recommended that Plaintiff buy his own pair of shoes. Id.
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Other
In the final sentence of his statement of claim, Plaintiff also alleges that he went to the health

care unit to pick up insulin and medication, but the nurse did not know where the “bottle” was. (Doc.
1, p. 6). A grievance submitted along with the Complaint indicates that Nurse Welty misplaced his
empty bottle of eye drops on July 29, 2015. (Doc. 1, pp. 18-19).
Discussion
To facilitate the orderly management of future proceedings in this case, and in accordance
with the objectives of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(e) and 10(b), the Court deems it appropriate
to organize the claims in Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (Doc. 1) into the following counts:
Count 1 -

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim
against the defendants for delaying Plaintiff’s referral to Marion Eye
Center and/or delaying approval of right eye surgery for two months
in 2015.

Count 2 -

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim
against the defendants for denying Plaintiff special shoes for his
bunion in 2015.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designations do not constitute an opinion
regarding the merits of each claim. Any claims that Plaintiff intended to raise in the Complaint
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that are not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice from
this action.
Counts 1 and 2
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST.,
amend. VIII. Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2006) (per curiam); Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2010). A prisoner who asserts an
Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care must satisfy two requirements. First, the
prisoner must show that the medical need at issue was sufficiently serious (i.e., an objective
standard). Second, the prisoner must demonstrate that state officials acted with deliberate
indifference to his or her health or safety (i.e., a subjective standard). Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834 (1994); Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001).
Both medical conditions described in the Complaint satisfy the objective component of this
claim for screening purposes. A medical need is objectively “serious” where it has either “been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment” or where the need is “so obvious that even a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d
1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997). The Seventh Circuit has recognized that vision loss associated with
glaucoma can give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595
(7th Cir. 2009). Doctor Coe, a physician, allegedly diagnosed Plaintiff with a bunion and at least
initially recommended special shoes. (Doc. 1, pp. 5, 16). See Jones v. Drew, 221 F. App’x 450 (7th
Cir. 2007) (no dispute that bunions were serious medical need). In addition, Plaintiff claims that both
conditions caused pain. When the failure to treat a condition could “result in further significant injury
or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” the condition is also considered sufficiently
“serious” to support an Eighth Amendment claim. Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1373 (internal quotations

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and citations omitted). Plaintiff’s glaucoma and bunion are sufficiently serious to satisfy the
objective component of his Eighth Amendment claims at screening.
To satisfy the subjective component, the Complaint must “demonstrate that prison officials
acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir.
2005) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). This state of mind is deliberate
indifference, which is established when prison officials “know of and disregard an excessive risk to
inmate health” by being “‘aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists’” and “‘draw[ing] the inference.’” Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653 (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The Eighth Amendment does not entitle prisoners to “demand specific
care” or “the best care possible,” but only requires “reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). Inadvertent error, negligence,
gross negligence, and even ordinary malpractice do not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim
against a defendant. Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008); accord Berry, 604 F.3d
at 440 (“Deliberate indifference is intentional or reckless conduct, not mere negligence.”); McGowan
v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[N]egligence, even gross negligence, does not violate
the Constitution.”). Against this backdrop, the Court will consider whether the allegations support a
claim of deliberate indifference against each defendant.
Doctor Coe
The Complaint supports a claim of deliberate indifference against Doctor Coe in Counts 1
and 2. The doctor was directly involved in Plaintiff’s diagnosis and treatment for glaucoma and
bunions. Doctor Coe allegedly agreed that Plaintiff needed urgent treatment at Marion Eye Center,
but he failed to take steps to ensure that Plaintiff received the referral and approval for surgery
without delay. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-6, 13-14). Plaintiff maintains that the two-month delay resulted in
further vision loss, permanent eye damage, and pain. (Doc. 1, p. 5).

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Similarly, Doctor Coe allegedly diagnosed Plaintiff’s bunion and initially agreed that special
shoes were medically necessary. (Doc. 1, pp. 5-6). He ordered Plaintiff a pair and, for reasons that
are not clear, instructed Plaintiff to purchase his own shoes when the first pair did not fit. (Doc. 1, p.
16). Although the Court takes no position regarding the ultimate merits of either claim, Counts 1 and
2 shall proceed against Doctor Coe at this time.
Warden Duncan
The Complaint also states a colorable deliberate indifference claim against Warden Duncan
in Count 1. The allegations against this defendant in Plaintiff’s statement of claim are thin. (Doc. 1,
p. 5). Plaintiff alleges that Warden Duncan, along with the other defendants, “fail[ed] to sign off on
pla[i]ntiff [sic] serious need of surgery,” and this resulted in further injury, pain, and suffering. Id.
Standing alone, this allegation is too conclusory and threadbare to support a claim of deliberate
indifference against any of the defendants. Id.
However, Plaintiff also offers grievances and letters that appear to be signed by Warden
Duncan in support of Count 1. (Doc. 1, pp. 10-11, 20-21). The grievances make it clear that
Plaintiff’s eye surgery was necessary, urgent, and delayed. Id. Under the circumstances, the Court
will allow Count 1 to proceed against Warden Duncan in his individual capacity.
But the individual capacity claim in Count 2 shall be dismissed without prejudice against the
warden. No allegations suggest that Warden Duncan was personally involved in any deprivation of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights in connection with his request for special shoes. Absent any personal
involvement in a constitutional deprivation, Plaintiff cannot proceed with a § 1983 claim against the
defendant. Colbert v. City of Chi., 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017).
With that said, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of a pair of shoes. The warden
shall remain named as a defendant in this action in connection with Count 2, but only in his official
capacity for the sole purpose of carrying out any injunctive relief that is ordered. See Gonzalez v.
Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011).
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Martin and Cunningham
The Complaint does not support a colorable claim against Medical Director Martin or
Administrator Cunningham. Although both individuals are named as defendants in this action,
Plaintiff includes virtually no allegations against either one of them in the statement of claim. (Doc.
1, pp. 4-6). He mentions them once in connection with the following assertion: “As a direct result of
Defendant’s Steve Duncan, Phil Martin, L. Cunningham and Doctor John Coe failure to sign off on
pla[i]ntiff serious need of surgery resulted in pla[i]ntiff’s right eye remaining cocked and loss of
vision in right eye periphial [sic] view constitutes deliberate indifference. . . .” (Doc. 1, p. 5). Beyond
this, Plaintiff develops no factual basis for a claim against either defendant. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570 (a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”);
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (sketchy or implausible allegations do not provide
sufficient notice of a claim). In addition, he has not attached any exhibits that establish the
involvement of either individual in a constitutional deprivation. Counts 1 and 2 shall therefore be
dismissed without prejudice against both of these defendants.
Claims Against Non-Parties
Plaintiff referred to numerous individuals in his statement of claim who are not named as
defendants in the case caption, including Warden Treadway, Doctor Brummel, Nurse Kimmel, Nurse
Welty, and Nurse Pageant, among others. This Court will not treat these individuals as defendants
because they are not named in the caption of the Complaint or in the list of defendants. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 10(a) (title of Complaint “must name all the parties”); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551,
551-52 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that to be properly considered a party, a defendant must be
“specif[ied] in the caption”). Any claims that Plaintiff intended to bring against non-parties are
considered dismissed without prejudice from this action.

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Pending Motions
1.

Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”) (Doc. 2)
Plaintiff’s IFP Motion shall be addressed in a separate court order.

2.

Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 3)
Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate

Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for a decision.
3.

Motion for Service of Process at Government Expense (Doc. 4)
Plaintiff’s Motion for Service of Process at Government Expense is DENIED. The Court will

order service as a matter of course upon all defendants who remain in this action pursuant to this
screening order because Plaintiff is a prisoner who has also requested permission to proceed in this
action as a poor person.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 is subject to further review against Defendants
STEVE DUNCAN and JOHN COE in their individual capacities only. This claim is DISMISSED
without prejudice against Defendants STEVE DUNCAN and JOHN COE, in their official
capacities, and against Defendants PHIL MARTIN and L. CUNNINGHAM, in their individual and
official capacities, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS ORDERED that COUNT 2 is subject to further review against Defendant JOHN
COE, in his individual capacity only, and against Defendant STEVE DUNCAN, in his official
capacity only for the sole purpose of carrying out any injunctive relief that is ordered. This claim is
DISMISSED without prejudice against Defendant STEVE DUNCAN, in his individual capacity,
and against Defendants PHIL MARTIN and L. CUNNINGHAM, in their individual and official
capacities, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
As to COUNTS 1 and 2, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants STEVE DUNCAN
and JOHN COE: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons),
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and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a
copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of
employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of
Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall
take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that
Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not
known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the
forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be
retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed
by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a true
and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received by a
district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to include a
certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for further pre-trial proceedings, including a decision on Plaintiff’s
Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 3).
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
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Wilkerson for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties
consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, regardless of whether his
application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give security
for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a stipulation that
the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court, who shall pay
therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff. Local Rule
3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of
Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay
in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 10, 2017
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NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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