Renth v. True

Filing 3

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 5/26/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANTHONY RENTH,
#04435-025
Petitioner,

Case No. 17 cv–377 DRH

vs.
B. TRUE,
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Petitioner Anthony Renth, who is currently incarcerated in the Federal
Correctional Institution in Marion, Illinois, filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). In the petition, he argues that
under the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Mathis v. United States, 136
S. Ct. 2243 (2016), his enhanced career-offender sentence is unconstitutional.
(Doc. 1).
Without commenting on the merits of petitioner’s claims, the Court
concludes that the Petition survives preliminary review under Rule 4 and Rule
1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts.
The Petition
In his criminal case in the Southern District of Illinois, United States v.
Renth, Case No. 13-cr-40024-JPG (S.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2014), petitioner was found
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guilty of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
846. (Doc. 1, p. 11). He was sentenced to 204 months imprisonment. Id. The
career-offender enhancement was imposed pursuant to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”) at § 4B1.1, based on prior convictions for
manufacture of methamphetamine and participation in methamphetamine
manufacturing. (Doc. 1, p. 11). As a result of the career-offender determination,
Petitioner’s criminal history category was determined to be VI. (Doc. 1, p. 17).
The Court is not aware of any § 2255 petitions previously brought by Petitioner.
Petitioner now argues that pursuant to Mathis, he should be resentenced
without enhancement because only one of his underlying convictions constitutes a
controlled substance offense under the reasoning in Mathis, as the elements of
petitioner’s underlying participation in methamphetamine manufacturing offense
criminalizes a greater swath of conduct than the elements of the guidelines
offense. (Doc. 1, pp. 11-15).
Discussion
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases in United States District
Courts provides that upon preliminary consideration by the district court judge,
“[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the
petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” Rule 1(b) of those Rules
gives this Court the authority to apply the rules to other habeas cases.
Petitioner should bear in mind the following cautionary note.

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“Federal

prisoners who seek to bring collateral attacks on their conviction or sentences
must ordinarily bring an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ‘the federal prisoner’s
substitute for habeas corpus.’” Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir.
2013) (quoting Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012)). A § 2241
petition by a federal prisoner is generally limited to challenges to the execution of
the sentence.

Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998);

Atehortua v. Kindt, 951 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1991). Federal prisoners may
utilize § 2241, however, to challenge the legality of a conviction or sentence in
cases under the “savings clause” of § 2255(e).

The savings clause allows a

petitioner to bring a claim under § 2241, where he can show that a remedy under
§ 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Id. See
also United States v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792, 798-99 (7th Cir. 2002).
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that § 2255 is only
inadequate or ineffective when three requirements are satisfied: 1) the petitioner
relies on a new case of statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional
decision; 2) the case was decided after his first § 2255 motion but is retroactive;
and 3) the alleged error results in a miscarriage of justice.

See Brown v.

Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013); Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640
(7th Cir. 2012). “‘Inadequate or ineffective’ means that ‘a legal theory that could
not have been presented under § 2255 establishes the petitioner’s actual
innocence.’” Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Taylor v.
Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2002)); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 608

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(7th Cir. 1998)).
The instant petition meets the first requirement as Mathis is clearly a case
of statutory interpretation. See Dawkins v. United States, 829 F.3d 549, 551
(7th Cir. 2016) (Mathis “is a case of statutory interpretation”); Jenkins v. United
States, No. 16–3441 (7th Cir. Sept. 20, 2016) (“Mathis is not amenable to
analysis under § 2244(b) because it announced a substantive rule, not a
constitutional one.”).
Whether the petition meets the second requirement is not entirely clear. As
noted above, the Seventh Circuit has indicated that Mathis is a substantive rule.
Jenkins v. United States, No. 16–3441 (7th Cir. Sept. 20, 2016).
precedent

indicates

that

substantive

Supreme

Court

rules

Controlling
are

applied

retroactively. See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 2011);
Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2016). However, it is possible
that petitioner may be able to raise the claims brought in this action in “his first §
2255 motion,” since he does not appear to have filed one previously. See Holt v.
United States, 843 F.3d 720, 722 (7th Cir 2016) (government conceded
petitioner citing Mathis “would prevail in an initial collateral attack” while arguing
he was not entitled to relief in second § 2255 proceeding). The 1-year period of
limitation that applies to motions under § 2255 resets on “the date on which the
right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Petitioner is still within one

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year of June 23, 2016, the date Mathis was entered, so he is not yet foreclosed
from attempting to bring an action citing Mathis under § 2255.

Therefore,

Petitioner may ultimately fail at showing his remedy under § 2255 is inadequate.
Notably, however, the Seventh Circuit has suggested cases seeking to invoke
Mathis fall under the savings clause and belong in actions under § 2241.
Dawkins v. United States, 829 F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 2016) (“An independent
claim based on Mathis must be brought, if at all, in a petition under 28 U.S.C. §
2241.”).

All that being said, the Petition pending before this Court was filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and cannot be re-characterized as a § 2255 motion.
In Collins v. Holinka, 510 F.3d 666, 667 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh Circuit held
that “judges must respect the plaintiff's choice of statute to invoke – whether §
2241, § 2255, or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – and give the action the treatment appropriate
under that law.”
The Court also cannot ascertain whether the third requirement for invoking
the savings clause is met. In Mathis, the Supreme Court held that Iowa’s burglary
statute did not qualify as a predicate violent felony under the Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA”) because it was broader than the “generic” offense of
burglary in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Thus, Mathis focused on what constitutes a prior
violent felony under the ACCA.

Notably, “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in

Mathis dealt with the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), not the federal
sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569, 574 (5th Cir.
2016). However, Mathis is likely also applicable to the career offender guidelines,

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in that the “decision in Mathis clarified when and how the modified categorical
approach is applied in the context of federal sentencing,” and did not necessarily
limit itself to cases involving the ACCA. Id.
Petitioner argues that Mathis applies to his case and enables this Court to
review

the

determination

that

his

participation

in

methamphetamine

manufacturing conviction could act as a predicate for the career offender
enhancement.

He argues that the statute underlying this offense, 720 ILCS

646/15, is broader than the “controlled substance offense” definition under §
4B1.2 of the Guidelines. (Doc. 1, p. 15).
The Court is without sufficient information to determine whether there is
grave error constituting a miscarriage of justice that stems from petitioner’s
sentencing as a career offender, or, more generally, whether a § 2255 motion is
inadequate or ineffective.

However, at this stage in the litigation, and because

Mathis has broken ground in an area with little precedent, the Court finds it
prudent to allow petitioner’s claim to proceed. That is, during its initial review,
the Court declines to find that Petitioner’s Mathis claim is without merit.
Therefore, the Court ORDERS respondent True of Marion USP to file a response
to the petition.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent TRUE shall answer the
petition or otherwise plead within thirty (30) days of the date this Order is
entered. This preliminary Order to respond does not, of course, preclude the
government from raising any objection or defense it may wish to present. Service

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upon the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois, 750 Missouri
Avenue, East St. Louis, Illinois, shall constitute sufficient service.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this
cause is referred to United States Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud for further
pre-trial proceedings.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this entire matter be REFERRED to
United States Magistrate Judge Proud for disposition, as contemplated by Local
Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the parties consent to such a
referral.
Petitioner is ADVISED of his continuing obligation to keep the Clerk (and
each opposing party) informed of any change in his whereabouts during the
pendency of this action. This notification shall be done in writing and not later
than seven days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to
provide such notice may result in dismissal of this action. See FED. R. CIV. P.
41(b).

Judge Herndon
2017.05.26
11:25:04 -05'00'

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 26, 2017

United States District Judge

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