Jackson v. Stolworthy et al

Filing 20

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 9/18/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
STEVIE JACKSON,
B63752,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 17-cv-420-DRH

vs.
DONALD STOLWORTHY, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Plaintiff Stevie Jackson, currently incarcerated in Menard Correctional
Center, brings this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional
deprivations that allegedly occurred when Plaintiff was housed at Centralia
Correctional Center (“Centralia”) in 2015. Plaintiff contends that he has been the
victim of retaliation and other abuses because he is a litigious inmate and/or
because he often files grievances against prison officials.1 In connection with his
claims, Plaintiff names 29 officials associated with the Illinois Department of
Corrections (IDOC) and/or Centralia. The named Defendants include 3 unknown

1

Plaintiff is no stranger to the federal courts, having filed several dozen lawsuits in the Northern
and Central Districts of Illinois.

1

parties: (1) John Doe # 1 (Psychiatrist); John Doe # 2 (Centralia’s cell placement
officer); and John Doe # 3 (all officers in East 4 House on August 7, 2015
working the 7:00 am to 3:00 pm shift and the 3:00 pm to 11:00 pm shift).2
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief (to the extent that the Court
finds injunctive relief is warranted).3
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible
or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint
in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an
objective standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable person would find
meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
2

To facilitate the orderly progress of this action going forward, the Clerk shall be directed to
rename Unknown Party # 1 and Unknown Party # 2 as follows: (1) John Doe # 1 (Psychiatrist);
John Doe # 2 (Centralia’s cell placement officer); and John Doe # 3 (all officers in East 4 House
on August 7, 2015 working the 7:00 am to 3:00 pm shift and the 3:00 pm to 11:00 pm shift). See
FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (“the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party”).
3
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is likely moot in light of Plaintiff’s
transfer to Menard Correctional Center.

2

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross
“the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the
factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Background
This case was opened on April 24, 2017 without payment of the filing fee or the filing of
a Motion and Affidavit to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs. (Docs. 1,
4). The preliminary screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint has been delayed until now due to
difficulties in locating Plaintiff’s filing fee. A brief history of the issues encountered is detailed
below.
On May 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed motions seeking to extend his deadline for paying the
filing fee. (Docs. 5 and 6). Plaintiff explained that he authorized Menard’s Trust Fund Account
Officer to submit a $400.00 filing fee to the Court in April 2017. However, the check appeared to
have been lost in the mail. Plaintiff also submitted paperwork supporting his claim. Specifically,
records indicated that $400.00 was withdrawn from Plaintiff’s account and mailed to the
Southern District of Illinois (check No. 149399). The Court granted Plaintiff’s request and
directed Plaintiff to work with Menard to have a new check issued. (Doc. 7). For the next 3
months, the Court addressed motions from Plaintiff regarding his lost filing fee check and
difficulties he was experiencing with Menard’s Trust Fund Account Officer. (Docs. 8-10, 12, 1519). At one point, Menard’s Trust Fund Officer confirmed that the check was mailed, appeared
to have been lost in the mail, and agreed to assist Plaintiff in canceling the lost check and
reissuing payment. (Docs. 14 and 15).

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On July 26, 2017, after Plaintiff continued to encounter difficulty with having a check
reissued, the Court directed Menard’s Trust Fund Account Officer to provide the Court with a
status update, stating as follows:
At this point, it is unclear whether responsibility for Plaintiff’s filing fee
difficulties rests with Plaintiff, Menard’s Trust Fund Account Office, or is simply
the result of bad luck. A review of the Court’s online PACER database establishes
that Plaintiff is a frequent and possibly abusive litigator in the federal courts,
having filed several dozen lawsuits in the Northern and Central Districts of
Illinois. Thus, Plaintiff is a veteran litigator and may be attempting to game the
system. On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has observed that there is an
inherent conflict of interest in the prison lawsuit system” “[T]he law requires the
payor (the prison) to process a drawer’s request for payment to permit the drawer
to sue the payor…[and] it is entirely predictable that the prison will prefer to
postpone [a plaintiff’s] ability to pursue litigation against itself.” Sultan v.
Fenoglio, 775 F.3d 888, 890 (7th Cir. 2015). The fact that Plaintiff is a frequent
litigator suggests that the potential conflict of interest in the instant case is
particularly strong.
(Doc. 17). With the above considerations in mind, the Court directed Menard’s trust fund
account officer to provide the Court with an update regarding the missing filing fee. Id. Further,
the Court indicated that failure to comply with the Court’s order would result in the Court setting
a show cause hearing with the Trust Fund Account Officer required to appear personally in
Court. Id. A check for Plaintiff’s filing fee appeared on August 2, 2017, without any additional
explanation.
The Complaint
Counts 1 and 2 – Harassment and Retaliation
Plaintiff arrived at Centralia on or about April 15, 2015. (Doc. 1, p. 12).
Upon arrival, Lt. Quarrie, Lt. Delgado, Lt Johnson, and C/O Robinson began
harassing Plaintiff, asking why he was transferred to Centralia. Id. For the next 30
days, the harassment continued. (Doc. 1, pp. 12-13). These individuals made
constant remarks about Plaintiff’s sexual preferences (“are you gay or not?”),
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called Plaintiff “all sorts of gay homosexual names,” laughed at Plaintiff, and made
comments regarding things that happened to Plaintiff at his prior prison. Id. They
also repeatedly came to Plaintiff’s cell (which was in the day room) in the
mornings, banged on his cell and shook the rails on his bed before beginning the
verbal harassment. Id. They told Plaintiff “this is the hell [you are] going to be
living for the complaints [you] filed” at previous institutions. (Doc. 1, p. 13).
Plaintiff contacted Aaron (described as a “psych” person) and Toennies
(described as a clinical services employee) for help regarding the harassment.
Aaron and Toennies indicated that Plaintiff would have to deal with the
repercussions of his prior conduct (presumably filing complaints and/or
grievances at his prior prison). Id. (claiming Aaron and Toennies both told
Plaintiff: “you made your bed, now lay in it;” “when you grieve or complain about
the little things this administration is going to chew you up and spit you out, then
retaliate every time;” “you’re the turd Dixon [Correctional Center] shit out and
landed on this administration;”). Toennies also called Plaintiff names such as
“dick sucker” and “black faggot.” Toennies directed these derisive terms at
Plaintiff “all the time” and told Plaintiff he should have been sent to a prison that
caters to homosexuals. Id.
Count 3 – Provoking Attacks
In April 2015, Plaintiff was moved to North 4. (Doc. 1, p. 13). While in
North 4, Plaintiff was harassed by Conrad and Bailey (both correctional officers).
Id. Conrad and Bailey banged and kicked Plaintiff’s door every morning and

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turned other inmates against Plaintiff by telling them he is a homosexual and a
snitch. As a result, Plaintiff was attacked by other inmates (inmates punched and
kicked him and spit in his face). Id. He complained to Conrad and Bailey but they
never intervened to help him. Id.
Plaintiff connects Macoby (a major), Phillips (a major), Schwartz (a major),
Quarrie (a lieutenant), Johnson (a lieutenant), and Delgado (a lieutenant) to these
allegations by stating that Conrad and Bailey would do anything these individuals
wanted them to do. Id.
Count 4 – Refusal to Honor Low Bunk Permit
Plaintiff suffers from serious arthritis and gout. (Doc. 1, p. 16). Plaintiff’s
back, legs, and shoulders are “bound” by arthritis. Id. At the time of the alleged
constitutional violation, Plaintiff had permission to use a cane and had bottom
bunk/slow walk permits. (Doc. 1, p. 13).
When Plaintiff was in North 4 House, Conrad and Bailey refused to honor
the permit. Id. They told Plaintiff that, as long as he is in their house, he will “be
climbing [his] black nigger ass up to the top bunk.” Id. Plaintiff contends he
injured his back and sprained his right knee as a result of this conduct. He also
contends he complained to every supervisory official listed in his Complaint about
the alleged deprivation, to no avail. Id.
Plaintiff was subsequently transferred to East 4 House. When Plaintiff was
in East 4 House, Kauling refused to honor Plaintiff’s bottom bunk permit. (Doc. 1,
p. 16). Kauling told Plaintiff that Delgado issued an order to leave Plaintiff on the

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top bunk. Id. Plaintiff complained to and showed Delgado, Quarrie, Burton,
Robinson, Campbell, and Aaron his bottom bunk permit, but they refused to help.
Id. Campbell told Plaintiff to “stop whining like a little bitch” and said the permit
did not mean “shit” to her. Id. Aaron told Plaintiff there was nothing that he could
do and then offered a solution, he told Plaintiff “stop coming to prison…you come
to prison, you get what comes with prison.” Id.
Plaintiff also complained to John Doe 3 (all officers in East 4 House on
August 7, 2015 working the 7:00 am to 3:00 pm shift and the 3:00 pm to 11:00
pm shift), but they refused to help. Id.
Count 5 – Gym/Yard Restrictions
When Plaintiff was in North 4 House, Bailey, Conrad, Foreman, and
Delgado often refused to allow Plaintiff access to the gym and yard. (Doc. 1, p.
14). These Defendants told Plaintiff he could not have access to the gym or yard
because he used a cane. Id. They provided Plaintiff various “excuses” for denying
gym/yard privileges, such as “it would break our hearts if you should slip and fall”
or “we believe you’re taking your cane in the yard/gym to use it as a weapon.” Id.
Plaintiff contends that “from the time he was brought to North 4 House,” he was
only allowed in the yard 4 times and in the gym 6 times. Id. The Complaint
indicates that Plaintiff was in the North 4 House from April 2015 through August
7, 2015, when he was transferred to East 4 house. (Doc. 1, pp. 13, 17). Unlike
some of Plaintiff’s other claims, Plaintiff does not allege that the deprivation was
in retaliation for his prior First Amendment activities. Plaintiff alerted “all the

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defendants listed in his complaint” about the alleged deprivation, but nothing was
done. Id. Because Plaintiff was often confined to his cell, he developed anxiety,
depression, and other physical symptoms. Id.
Counts 6 and 7 – harassment, cell shake downs, and threats to frame
When Plaintiff was in North 4 House, Bailey, Conrad, and Foreman shook
down Plaintiff’s cell almost every day, sometimes multiple times a day, for no
reason. Id. During these shake downs, Defendants would confiscate Plaintiff’s
property and verbally harass Plaintiff (Plaintiff alleges they called him “every
homosexual name in the book”). Id. On one occasion, Foreman told Plaintiff he
“looked like [he] suck[s] good cock and [he] act[s] like [he] got a big dick jammed
off in [his] ass.” Id. These Defendants threatened to plant contraband in Plaintiff’s
cell and threatened to file false disciplinary reports against the Plaintiff. Id. They
told Plaintiff the shake downs would stop when Plaintiff stopped filing grievances.
Id. Plaintiff contends he was terrified of these individuals and that they harassed
him almost every day. Id.
Count 8 – Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Condition
Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from serious arthritis and gout. (Doc. 1, p.
16). The arthritis restricts movement in his shoulders, back, and legs. Id. Plaintiff
contends that walking without a cane and certain activities, such as climbing to
the top bunk, cause him excruciating pain. Id. According to Plaintiff, despite being
aware of these issues and his associated pain, Defendants Santas (a prison

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physician) and Keebs (a healthcare supervisor) rescinded Plaintiff’s permit to use
a cane, as well as his low bunk/slow walk permit. (Doc. 1, pp. 4, 15-16).
According to the Complaint, both Santas and Keebs opined that Plaintiff
did not really need the permits. (Doc. 1, pp. 15-16). For instance, Santas told
Plaintiff various correctional officers reported that Plaintiff was lazy and did not
really need his cane. (Doc. 1, p. 15). Keebs told Plaintiff his pain was all in his
mind. Id. Plaintiff insisted he was in extreme pain and absolutely needed the cane
and the low bunk/slow walk permits. (Doc. 1, pp. 15-16). Plaintiff also told Santas
and Keebs that the correctional officers were lying about Plaintiff in retaliation for
his complaints and grievances. (Doc. 1, pp. 15-16).
In response, Santas indicated the administration was pressuring him to
revoke the cane because prisoners who ingest “psych meds” are generally not
allowed to have canes. (Doc. 1, p. 15). Plaintiff repeated, in more detail, the
amount of pain and difficulty he experienced without a cane. Id. Santas indicated
he did not care because the administration and officers felt Santas should not
continue to allow Plaintiff to use a cane. Id. Plaintiff further contends that Keebs
disregarded his complaints and rescinded or supported the decision to rescind
his cane and low bunk/slow walk permits. (Doc. 1, pp. 15-16).
Counts 9, 10, 11- Failure to Protect and Retaliation (Inmate Barlow)
On or about August 7, 2015, Bailey and Conrad told Plaintiff they would be
moving his “black ass” to the place where he belongs – a new cell in the more
aggressive and dangerous East 4 House. (Doc. 1, p. 16). They stated they were

9

going to let Plaintiff’s new cell mate (an inmate identified as Barlow B42396) give
him what he deserved – “a good ass beating.” Id. They also told Plaintiff to “grieve
that” and stated if Plaintiff had “stopped grieving them” they would not be doing
this. Id. As Plaintiff was being escorted to his new cell, another inmate told him
that Barlow was extremely dangerous and sexually aggressive. Id.
John Doe # 2 (Centralia’s cell placement officer) assisted Bailey and
Conrad by assigning Plaintiff to Barlow’s cell. (Doc. 1, p. 19).4
Plaintiff asked Aaron, Dose, Delgado, Quarrie, Robinson, and Burton to
move him out of Barlow’s cell. (Doc. 1, p. 17). Plaintiff told these individuals that
Barlow repeatedly attempted to force sexual acts on Plaintiff and when Plaintiff
refused, Barlow beat him. Id. When Plaintiff told Aaron the things Barlow was
doing to him, including the fact that Barlow was masturbating in the cell and
throwing his sperm in Plaintiff’s face, Aaron only laughed at Plaintiff Id. Kauling
told Plaintiff to “give Barlow some ass and he’ll calm down.” Id.
Plaintiff also sent several letters to Defendant Mueller (Centralia’s Warden)
detailing Barlow’s abuse. Id. In the letters, Plaintiff relayed that Barlow “always
tried to rape [Plaintiff]” after Plaintiff ingested his psych medications, when
Plaintiff was in a debilitated state (his psych meds left him in a “drunken state,”
making it difficult to defend himself). Id.

4

The Complaint alleges that John Doe # 2 (Centralia’s cell placement officer) “conspired” with
Bailey and Conrad to ensure that Plaintiff was housed with an aggressive cell mate. (Doc. 1, p. 19).
Because John Doe # 2 is the cell placement officer and is presumably responsible for housing
assignments, the Court views this as an allegation that John Doe # 2 participated in the alleged
constitutional violation by assigning Plaintiff to the subject cell.

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On or about August 24, 2015, Barlow let Plaintiff have the bottom bunk
because Defendant Macon (also described as Centralia’s Warden (Doc. 1, p. 3))
“got involved.” This enraged Barlow and he became even more aggressive with
Plaintiff, calling him a snitch.
On or about August 27, 2015, Barlow became extremely angry when
Plaintiff refused to engage in sexual activity. Id. Barlow physically assaulted
Plaintiff, calling him a “bitch” and a “snitch.” Id. Barlow then put his penis on
Plaintiff’s face, shoved Plaintiff to the ground, and attempted to rape him. Id. After
the attempted rape, Barlow left the cell. Id.
When Barlow left the cell, Plaintiff reported the assault to Kauling. Id. He
yelled loudly so all the officers in the area could hear what had just happened. Id.
Plaintiff was taken to Delgado. Id. Initially, Delgado refused to let Plaintiff speak to
mental health services. Delgado wanted Plaintiff to make the report in front of
other inmates. Id. Plaintiff refused.
Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that at some point Plaintiff
insisted on reporting the sexual assault. Id. Because Plaintiff reported the sexual
assault, Delgado, Quarrie, and Robinson took Plaintiff to segregation. Id.
Robinson filed a false report indicating that Plaintiff had lied. Id. Warden Mueller
also punished Plaintiff for reporting the sexual abuse. Id. Warden Mueller told
Plaintiff he would not be getting his television, radio, and other personal items. Id.
He also indicated that Plaintiff would have no yard or gym privileges and denied
him access to all other out-of-cell activities, including attending church services

11

and using the law library. Id. Johnson, Delgado, Robinson, Burton, and Quarrie
told Plaintiff he should have shut his mouth and he would not have been placed in
segregation. Id.
Count 12 – Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff remained in segregation for 26 days, locked in his cell 24-hours a
day, and was only allowed to shower on 3 occasions. Id. The cell was infested with
spiders, mice, and other bugs. Id. Plaintiff complained to Krebs, she told Plaintiff
an exterminator had been called. Id.
Counts 13 and 14 – Failure to Protect and Deliberate Indifference
(Unknown Officer)
While still in segregation, on September 15, 2015, Plaintiff was taken to the
shower. Id. On the way to the showers, Plaintiff encountered another inmate that
was a member of Barlow’s gang. Id. The inmate told Plaintiff he was going to “fuck
Plaintiff up” and did so in front of an unidentified officer. Id. At some point
thereafter, the inmate attacked Plaintiff. Id. He punched and kicked Plaintiff.
(Doc. 1, pp. 17-18). After the assault, the unidentified officer denied Plaintiff
medical care. (Doc. 1, p. 18).
Counts 15 and 16 - Retaliation and Access to the courts
Plaintiff contends that the correctional officer in charge of the law library,
Gooden, repeatedly refused to allow Plaintiff access to and/or provide Plaintiff
with legal materials. (Doc. 1, p. 18). For instance, Plaintiff contends he was often
denied access to the law library and other legal research he requested. Id. He also
claims he was denied access to his own personal legal materials. Id. According to
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the Complaint, Gooden was denying Plaintiff access in retaliation for Plaintiff’s
history of filing grievances against Gooden’s colleagues. Id. Gooden told Plaintiff
he was a “correctional officer at heart” and “when you have any of my partners in
your grievance, you’re shit out of luck from getting help from me.” Id.
Count 17 – Eighth Amendment Claim (Unknown Officers)
When Plaintiff was released from segregation, the “officers” told other
inmates that Plaintiff was a snitch and a homosexual. (Doc. 1, p. 18). As a result,
Plaintiff was physically and sexually assaulted on numerous occasions. Id.
Count 18 – Constitutional Claim (Mueller)
When Plaintiff was released from segregation, Warden Mueller kept Plaintiff
in a receiving cell for more than 30 days. (Doc. 1, p. 18). During this time,
Plaintiff was assigned many different cell mates. Id. Warden Mueller told Plaintiff
he was allowing Plaintiff to have as many different cell mates as Plaintiff wanted.
Id. Plaintiff had a new cell mate, soliciting him for sex or taking Plaintiff’s
commissary items, every other week. Id. According to the Complaint, Warden
Mueller knew this would “break” Plaintiff and it did. Id.
Merits Review Pursuant to § 1915(A)
Division of Counts
Based on the allegations of the Complaint and Plaintiff’s articulation of his
claims, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro se action into the following
counts. Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in

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this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately
pled under the Twombly pleading standard.
COUNT 1 –

Eighth
Amendment
cruel
and
unusual
punishment claim against Quarrie, Delgado,
Johnson, Robinson, Aaron, and Toennies for
harassing Plaintiff and/or failing to intervene in
the harassment of Plaintiff.

COUNT 2 –

First Amendment retaliation claim against
Quarrie, Delgado, Johnson, Robinson, Aaron, and
Toennies for retaliating against Plaintiff for filing
complaints and grievances at his previous prison
and/or for failing to intervene in ongoing
retaliation.

COUNT 3 –

Eighth Amendment claim against Conrad, Bailey,
Macoby, Phillips, Schwartz, Quarrie, Johnson,
and Delgado for provoking other inmates to attack
Plaintiff by labeling him a snitch and a
homosexual.

COUNT 4 –

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim
against Conrad, Bailey, Kauling, John Doe # 3,
Delgado, Quarrie, Burton, Robinson, Campbell,
and Aaron for failing to honor Plaintiff’s bottom
bunk permit.

COUNT 5 –

Eighth
Amendment
cruel
and
unusual
punishment claim against Bailey, Conrad,
Foreman, and Delgado for restricting Plaintiff’s
access to the gym and yard when Plaintiff was in
North 4 House.

COUNT 6 –

Eighth
Amendment
cruel
and
unusual
punishment claim against Bailey, Conrad, and
Foreman for harassing Plaintiff (unjustified cell
shake downs, verbal harassment, and threats
when Plaintiff was in North 4 House).

COUNT 7 –

First Amendment retaliation claim against Bailey,
Conrad, and Foreman for retaliating against
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Plaintiff (unjustified cell shake downs, verbal
harassment, and threats when Plaintiff was in
North 4 House) for filing grievances.
COUNT 8 –

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim
against Santas and Keebs for discontinuing/failing
to renew Plaintiff’s permission to use a cane, as
well as his low bunk/slow walk permits.

COUNT 9 –

First Amendment retaliation claim against Bailey,
Conrad, and John Doe # 2 for transferring
Plaintiff to East 4 House and placing Plaintiff in a
cell with Barlow as retaliation for filing grievances.

COUNT 10 –

Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against
Aaron, Dose, Delgado, Quarrie, Robinson, Burton,
Kauling, and Mueller, for failing to protect Plaintiff
from Barlow.

COUNT 11 –

First Amendment retaliation claim against
Delgado, Quarrie, Robinson, Mueller, Johnson,
and Burton for placing Plaintiff in segregation and
imposing other restrictions as retaliation for
reporting the assault by Barlow.

COUNT 12 –

Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
claim against Kreebs in relation to the insect
infestation in Plaintiff’s segregation cell.

COUNT 13 –

Eighth Amendment claim directed against an
unknown officer for failing to protect Plaintiff from
being assaulted by another inmate on September
15, 2015.

COUNT 14 –

Eighth Amendment claim directed against an
unknown officer for refusing to provide Plaintiff
with medical care after Plaintiff was assaulted by
another inmate on September 15, 2015.

COUNT 15 –

First and/or Fourteenth Amendment access to the
courts claim against Gooden.

15

COUNT 16 –

First Amendment retaliation claim against Gooden
for denying Plaintiff access to the law library and
other legal materials in retaliation for Plaintiff
filing grievances against other correctional
officers.

COUNT 17 –

Eighth Amendment claim for labeling Plaintiff a
homosexual and a snitch, after Plaintiff was
released from segregation, resulting in multiple
attacks.

COUNT 18 –

Unidentified constitutional claim against Mueller
for trying to “break” Plaintiff by repeatedly
assigning Plaintiff new cellmates after Plaintiff was
released from segregation, resulting in other
inmates taking advantage of Plaintiff and sexually
assaulting Plaintiff.

Discussion
Count 1
In DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000), the Seventh Circuit held
that “simple verbal harassment”, such as the use of racially derogatory language,
does not, standing alone, constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 612
(emphasis added). See also Dobbey v. Ill. Dep't of Corrections, 574 F.3d 443,
446 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[H]arassment, while regrettable, is not what comes to mind
when one thinks of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment.”); Patton v. Przbylski, 822
F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1987) (although unprofessional and inexcusable, racially
derogatory remarks did not support a constitutional claim).
The Seventh Circuit recently revisited DeWalt’s holding in Beal v. Foster,
803 F.3d 356 (7th Cir. 2015). In Beal, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a
16

sergeant, “‘made verbal sexual comments directed towards inmate Brian Anthony,
telling Ronald Beal to place his penis inside Brian Anthony,’ and that ‘on several
prior occasions’ [the defendant] had urinated in view of the plaintiff (by leaving the
bathroom door open) and of other inmates, looking at them ‘while smiling.’” Id. at
358. Plaintiff also claimed that other inmates were calling him derisive terms for
homosexuals; conduct that may have been “inspired or encouraged” by the
defendant’s comments and that he “experienced severe psychological harm” as a
result of the defendant’s harassment. Id. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim
pertaining to the defendant’s conduct was dismissed at screening.
The Appellate Court concluded that the dismissal was premature and in
doing so, clarified its prior holding in Dewalt. The Seventh Circuit explained that
“purely verbal” harassment can, under certain circumstances, amount to cruel
and unusual punishment. Id. at 357-58. To illustrate this point, the Appellate
Court discussed the following hypotheticals:
Suppose a prisoner is having severe headaches and he complains
about them to a prison doctor, who writes him a prescription for a
powerful drug. A malicious guard learns of this and tells the prisoner
the following lie: “the doctor didn't tell you, but he told me: you have
incurable brain cancer and will be dead in three months. Now let me
tell you what he told me are the symptoms you will be experiencing
as your cancer worsens.” Or the guard, again lying, tells another
prisoner: “I am sorry to have to inform you that your wife and
children have been killed in a car crash.”
Id. at 357. The Seventh Circuit noted that, despite being “purely verbal,” the
harassment in both examples was “as cruel” as cases involving “physical
brutalization.” Id. Accordingly, the Court reasoned, drawing “a categorical
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distinction between verbal and physical harassment is arbitrary.” In other words,
both physical and psychological pain can constitute cruel punishment. Id. at 35758. In reaching this decision, the Court clarified that “simple,” as used to describe
verbal harassment in DeWalt, was the wrong word:
[I]t is unclear what “simple” is intended to connote. In our
hypothetical examples, the verbal harassment is “simple” in the sense
of being brief, lucid, and syntactically simple. But what is simple can
also, as in our two examples, be devastating. In DeWalt the plaintiff
had alleged that a prison officer had “made a series of sexually
suggestive and racially derogatory comments to [the plaintiff]
regarding certain female teachers at the prison schools.” Id. at 610.
This verbal harassment was directed, to a significant degree, at the
female teachers rather than at DeWalt, and second-hand harassment
may be too “simple” to state a claim of cruel and unusual
punishment, whereas the lies in our two hypothetical cases were
aimed directly and hurtfully at the prisoner. But “simple” is the
wrong word; what is meant is “fleeting,” too limited to have an
impact.
Beal, 803 F.3d at 358.
With these principles in mind, the Appellate Court concluded the dismissal
of the harassment claim was premature. In reversing and remanding, the
Appellate Court specifically noted that the harassment allegedly resulted in severe
psychological trauma, was repetitive, was not purely verbal (urinating is not
verbal), may have endangered Plaintiff because it happened in front of other
inmates, and may have carried more weight because the defendant was a
sergeant.
In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges he was harassed by Quarrie, Delgado,
Johnson, and Robinson for “30 consecutive days.” Quarrie, Delgado, and
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Johnson are described as being lieutenants. (Doc. 1, p. 5). The harassment
included shaking Plaintiff’s cell (which was in the dayroom) and the rails on his
bed. These individuals made repeated derogatory remarks about Plaintiff’s sexual
orientation and accused him of being a homosexual; it is unclear whether this
harassment occurred in front of other inmates. Plaintiff contends that Toennies
repeatedly called him derisive terms for homosexuals and that this occurred “all
the time.” Plaintiff also contends that he reported the ongoing harassment to
Toennies and Aaron, but both Defendants refused to help Plaintiff.
Considering these allegations, further development of the record is needed
to determine if the alleged conduct amounts to cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment and, if it does, whether each Defendant was
personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or subject to liability for
failure to intervene in the ongoing constitutional deprivation. See Perez v.
Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, Count 1 shall receive
further review as to Quarrie, Delgado, Johnson, Robinson, Aaron, and
Toennies.
Count 2
The Complaint suggests that the verbal harassment described with respect
to Count 1 was retaliatory. Plaintiff alleges Defendants were retaliating for
complaints and/or grievances Plaintiff filed at prior institutions. Prison officials
may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances or otherwise complaining
about their conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859,
19

866 (7th Cir. 2012); Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002);
DeWalt, 224 F.3d 607; Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996); Cain v.
Lane, 857 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1988). To establish a § 1983 claim of First
Amendment retaliation, an inmate must allege “(1) he engaged in activity
protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely
deter First Amendment activity in the future”; and (3) a causal connection between
the two. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir.2009) (citation omitted).
The Complaint suggests that Plaintiff has a history of filing grievances and
complaints at other institutions. Plaintiff contends that Defendants stated Plaintiff
was being harassed because of his prior complaints and grievances. This is
sufficient to survive screening.
Accordingly, Count 2 shall receive further review as to Quarrie, Delgado,
Johnson, Robinson, Aaron, and Toennies on the theory that the Defendants
were either directly involved in the alleged retaliation or were aware of the same
but failed to intervene.
Count 3
The Eighth Amendment is violated when prison officials are deliberately
indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm, including violence at the hands of
other prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 831-33 (1994).
Allegations that a prison officer has provoked or persuaded other inmates to
cause harm to a plaintiff support an inference that the officer attempted to inflict
injury on the plaintiff in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Merritte v. Kessel,

20

561 Fed.Appx. 546, 548 (7th Cir. 2014); Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 570 (7th
Cir. 2009); see also Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2008)
(officer's attempt to have other inmates attack plaintiff may violate Eighth
Amendment, even where the plaintiff was not actually assaulted); Northington v.
Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1525 (10th Cir. 1992) (Eighth Amendment claim stated
where guard “intended to do harm to [a prisoner] by inciting inmates to beat
him[;]” guard told other inmates that plaintiff was a snitch).
Plaintiff contends he was repeatedly assaulted by prisoners because Conrad
and Bailey told prisoners that Plaintiff was a snitch and a homosexual. This is
sufficient, at the screening stage, to warrant further review as to Conrad and
Bailey. However, Plaintiff’s vague claim as to Macoby, Phillips, Schwartz, Quarrie,
Johnson, and Delgado (Conrad and Bailey did “anything” these individuals
wanted) is insufficient.
Accordingly, Count 3 shall receive further review as to Conrad and Bailey.
However, Count 3 shall be dismissed without prejudice as to Macoby, Phillips,
Schwartz, Quarrie, Johnson, and Delgado.
Count 4
A prisoner who wishes to bring a claim against state officials under the
Eighth Amendment must show that he suffered from a sufficiently serious medical
condition (i.e., an objective standard) and state officials exhibited deliberate
indifference to his medical needs (i.e., a subjective standard). Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir.

21

2001). Plaintiff has alleged that he suffers from serious arthritis and gout; the
arthritis is so serious, his shoulders, back, and legs are “bound” by it. (Doc. 1, p.
16). This is sufficient to qualify as a serious medical condition, at least at this
preliminary stage of the case. See Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392 394-95 (7th
Cir. 2006); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997); Gutierrez,
111 F.3d at 1372 n.7. Plaintiff’s Complaint also sufficiently alleges that Conrad,
Bailey, John Doe # 3, Kauling, Delgado, Quarrie, Burton, Robinson, Campbell,
and Aaron acted with deliberate indifference to his condition by failing to honor
his low-bunk permit. (Doc. 1, pp. 14, 16).
Accordingly, Count 4 shall receive further review as to Conrad, Bailey,
John Doe # 3, Kauling, Delgado, Quarrie, Burton, Robinson, Campbell, and
Aaron.
The Court notes Plaintiff claims he complained to every supervisory official
identified in the Complaint5 about Conrad and Bailey refusing to honor his lowbunk permit, to no avail. But, the Seventh Circuit has “rejected the notion that
‘everyone who knows about a prisoner’s problems’ will incur § 1983 liability.”
Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara, 2017 WL 2784561, *4 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Burks v.
Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). And, although a prison official may
be subject to liability for failure to act where his knowledge of prison conditions,
learned from a prisoner’s communications, triggers a duty to exercise his or

5

“I told all the majors, wardens, lieutenants (listed in my complaint), Barttoennis, Marc Aaron,
Mr. Burton, and c/o Robinson about Bailey and Conrad forcing me to climb and sleep the top
bunk…” (Doc. 1, p. 13).

22

authority to investigate and rectify the offending condition, see Perez v. Fenoglio,
792 F.3d 768, 781-82 (7th Cir. 2015), Plaintiff’s allegations do not sufficiently
allege a basis for such liability. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff intended to
pursue a claim against all of the supervisory Defendants identified in the
Complaint, with respect to Count 4, he should consider that claim dismissed
without prejudice.
Count 5
Plaintiff contends that, while he was in North 4 House, he was often denied
access to the Yard/Gym. As a result, he stayed in his cell most days. While Plaintiff
was in the North 4 House, he was only allowed access to the yard on 4 occasions
and to the gym on 6 occasions. As a result, Plaintiff’s body began to lock up and
he experienced high blood pressure, anxiety, and depression.
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
forbids unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and punishment grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). Two elements
are required to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual
punishments clause with regards to any conditions of confinement in prison.
First, an objective element requires a showing that the conditions deny the inmate
“the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,” creating an excessive risk to
the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The
objective conditions must have resulted in an unquestioned and serious

23

deprivation of basic human needs such as food, medical care, sanitation, or
physical safety. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The second
requirement is a subjective element—establishing a defendant's culpable state of
mind, which is deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the
inmate from those conditions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 842. The deliberate
indifference standard is satisfied if the plaintiff shows that the prison official acted
or failed to act despite the official's knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
harm from the conditions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. It is well-settled that mere
negligence is not enough. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48
(1986).
Restricting Plaintiff’s access to the gym and yard might raise a
constitutional issue if Plaintiff was deprived of the ability to exercise. The Seventh
Circuit has noted that a “[l]ack of exercise could rise to a constitutional violation
where movement is denied and muscles are allowed to atrophy, and the health of
the individual is threatened.” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1236 (7th Cir.
1988) (28-day denial of exercise not unconstitutional); French v. Owens, 777
F.2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 817 (1986). However,
“[u]nless extreme and prolonged, lack of exercise is not equivalent to a medically
threatening situation.” Harris, 839 F.2d at 1236; see Delaney v. DeTella, 256
F.3d 679, 683-85 (7th Cir. 2001) (6-month denial states a claim; a strong
likelihood of injury is present after 90 days).

24

In Plaintiff’s case, he does not claim that he was deprived of all exercise, but
only that he was often denied the ability to exercise in the gym or yard. The
Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff was unable to exercise in his cell - even in
a cell, a prisoner may engage in some exercise by, for example, jogging in place or
doing aerobics. See e.g., Harris, 839 F.2d at 1236. Additionally, the Complaint
does not suggest that Plaintiff was denied access to other out-of-cell activities.
Finally, it appears that Plaintiff was housed in North 4 for approximately 4
months (April 2015 through August, 7, 2015). (Doc. 1, pp. 14, 17). During this
time, Plaintiff was allowed access to the yard on 4 occasions and to the gym on 6
occasions. This level of access to yard and gym privileges is nowhere near as
restrictive as conditions that have been found to rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.
As alleged, the restricted access to exercise in the yard and gym does not
state a constitutional claim. Accordingly, Count 5 shall be dismissed without
prejudice.
The Court also notes that, unlike some of the other claims asserted in the
Complaint, Plaintiff does not expressly allege that the restricted access was
retaliatory. Accordingly, the Court does not consider whether the deprivation
alleged in Count 5 states a claim for retaliation.
Count 6
When Plaintiff was in North 4 House, Conrad, Bailey, and Foreman shook
Plaintiff’s cell down almost every day, sometimes multiple times a day – for no

25

reason. (Doc. 1, p. 14). They confiscated his personal property, threatened to hide
contraband in his cell, and threatened him with false disciplinary action. Id.
These individuals also verbally harassed Plaintiff, calling him “every homosexual
name in the book.” Id. On one occasion, Foreman told Plaintiff he looks like he
likes to “suck big cock” and acts like he has “a big dick jammed off in [his] ass.”
Id. Plaintiff contends he was terrified.
Considering these allegations, further development of the record is needed
to determine if the alleged conduct amounts to cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. See analysis with respect to Count 1, supra.
Accordingly, Count 6 shall receive further review as to Bailey, Conrad, and
Foreman.
Count 7
Plaintiff alleges that the conduct at issue in Count 6 was retaliatory. (Doc. 1,
p. 14). Specifically, he alleges he was told “they [Conrad, Bailey, and Foreman]
would stop when [Plaintiff] stopped grieving.” Id. This is sufficient, at the
screening stage, to proceed on a First Amendment claim for retaliation as to these
Defendants. See analysis with respect to Count 2, supra.
Accordingly, Count 7 shall receive further review as to Bailey, Conrad, and
Foreman.
Count 8
Plaintiff contends that he suffers from severe arthritis and gout, causing
severe pain and restricting use of his back, shoulders, and legs. (Doc. 1, p. 16).

26

Nonetheless, Santas and Keeb revoked and/or failed to renew Plaintiff’s
permission for use of a cane, as well as his low bunk/slow walk permits. (Doc. 1,
pp. 15-16). Plaintiff contends this caused excruciating pain and exacerbated his
condition. Id. The Complaint also suggests Plaintiff’s cane and low bunk/slow
walk permits may have been revoked for a nonmedical reason (pressure from
officers and prison administration). Id. These allegations sufficiently state a claim
for deliberate indifference, at least at this stage of the litigation. See Edwards v.
Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830 (7th Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, Count 8 shall receive further review as to Santas and Keeb.
Count 9
On or about August 7, 2015, Bailey and Conrad, with the help of John Doe
# 2 (Centralia’s cell placement officer) transferred Plaintiff to East 4 House where
Plaintiff was housed with Barlow, an inmate known to be dangerous and “sexually
aggressive.” (Doc. 1, p. 16). Bailey and Conrad indicated that Plaintiff was
intentionally being housed with Barlow so Plaintiff would get what he deserved (“a
good ass beating”) for filing grievances. Id. Plaintiff was subsequently assaulted by
Barlow. (Doc. 1, pp. 16-17). This is sufficient, at the screening stage, to proceed
on a First Amendment claim for retaliation as to these Defendants. See analysis
with respect to Count 2, supra.
Accordingly, Count 9 shall receive further review as to Bailey, Conrad, and
John Doe # 2.
Count 10
27

In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court held that
“prison officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of
other prisoners.” Id. at 833 (internal citations omitted). See also Pinkston v.
Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir. 2006).
In order for a plaintiff to succeed on a claim for failure to protect, he must
show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm, and that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” to that danger.
Id.; Pinkston, 440 F.3d at 889. A plaintiff also must prove that prison officials
were aware of a specific, impending, and substantial threat to his safety, often by
showing that he complained to prison officials about a specific threat to his safety.
Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a failure to protect claim against Aaron,
Dose, Delgado, Quarrie, Robinson, Burton, Kauling, and Mueller. (Doc. 1, p. 17).
Plaintiff told these defendants that Barlow was attempting to sexually assault
Plaintiff and had beaten Plaintiff when he refused Barlow’s sexual advances. Id.
The defendants failed to respond to protect Plaintiff from harm, and, according to
the Complaint, Plaintiff was attacked by Barlow on or about August 27, 2015.
Count 10 will therefore be allowed to proceed against Aaron, Dose,
Delgado, Quarrie, Robinson, Burton, Kauling, and Mueller.
Count 11
Plaintiff alleges Delgado, Quarrie, and Robinson placed him in segregation
for 26 days because he insisted on reporting that he had been assaulted by

28

Barlow. (Doc. 1, p. 17). Mueller subjected Plaintiff to additional restrictions for
the same reason. Id. Delgado, Quarrie, Robinson, Johnson, and Burton told
Plaintiff he was being punished for not keeping his mouth shut. Id.
This is sufficient, at the screening stage, to state a claim as to Delgado,
Quarrie, Robinson, and Mueller – the individuals that were directly responsible
for placing Plaintiff in segregation and/or imposing additional retaliatory
restrictions on Plaintiff. Plaintiff, however, has not stated a claim as to Johnson
and Burton. Plaintiff does not allege that Johnson and Burton participated in the
alleged retaliatory punishment. He only alleges that these individuals told him he
was being punished for reporting the assault.
Accordingly, Count 11 shall receive further review as to Delgado, Quarrie,
Robinson, and Mueller. Count 11 shall be dismissed without prejudice as to
Johnson and Burton for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Count 12
Plaintiff contends that his cell was filthy and infested with insects and mice.
(Doc. 1, p. 17). Plaintiff told Krebs and she indicated that an exterminator had
been called.
Although the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” it does
require inmates to be housed under “humane conditions” and provided with
“adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). A claim
for unconstitutional conditions of confinement includes an objective and a

29

subjective component. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Plaintiff must demonstrate (1)
that he suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation (i.e., objective standard), and (2)
the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his conditions of confinement
(i.e., subjective standard). Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 893-94 (7th Cir. 2008)
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Plaintiff’s Complaint falls short of stating a conditions of confinement claim
against Krebs. Assuming that the complained of conditions satisfy the objective
prong, Plaintiff has not alleged that Krebs acted with deliberate indifference. He
alleges that Krebs called an exterminator or indicated that an exterminator had
been called. This single allegation as to Krebs is insufficient.
Accordingly, Count 12 shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Counts 13 and 14
When Plaintiff was housed in segregation, on September 15, 2015, an
unidentified officer escorted Plaintiff to the shower. (Doc. 1, p. 17). According to
the Complaint, this unidentified officer failed to protect Plaintiff from an attack by
another inmate and denied Plaintiff medical care following the attack. Id.
This individual is not identified as a defendant in the caption of the
Complaint or in the section of the Complaint that identifies the parties. Because
this individual is not listed in the caption by name or by Doe designation, he
cannot be treated as a defendant in this case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (noting that
the title of the complaint “must name all the parties”); Myles v. United States,

30

416 F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005) (to be properly considered a party a
defendant must be “specif[ied] in the caption”); Id. at 553 (“[It is] unacceptable for
a court to add litigants on its own motion. Selecting defendants is a task for the
plaintiff, not the judge.”).
Accordingly, Counts 13 and 14, which are directed at an unidentified
officer who is not a party to this action, shall be dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Count 15
Plaintiff contends that Gooden, the correctional officer in charge of the law
library, repeatedly refused to allow Plaintiff access to the law library and/or to his
own legal materials. (Doc. 1, p. 18). Plaintiff also alleges that Gooden often
refused to provide Plaintiff with requested legal research. The Complaint,
however, does not indicate that Gooden’s actions caused him to suffer any actual
or potential detriment to his ability to pursue a meritorious claim in court. Actual
or threatened detriment is an essential element of a § 1983 action for denial of
access to the courts. Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 642–43 (7th Cir.1987);
Hossman v. Sprandlin, 812 F.2d 1019, 1021–22 (7th Cir.1987). An inmate has
no constitutional claim unless he can demonstrate that a non-frivolous legal claim
has been frustrated or impeded. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352–53 (1996).
Accordingly, based on Plaintiff’s failure to allege a detriment, Count 15
shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.

31

Count 16
According to the Complaint, the conduct that is the basis of Plaintiff’s
access to the courts claim in Count 15 was retaliatory. (Doc. 1, p. 18).
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Gooden indicated he is “still a correctional
officer at heart” and stated “if you have any of my partners in your grievance,
you’re shit out of luck from getting help from me.” Id.
This is sufficient to allow Count 16 to proceed as to Gooden. See analysis
with respect to Count 2, supra.
Count 17
Plaintiff alleges that, when he was released from segregation, “officers” told
other inmates that Plaintiff was a snitch and a homosexual. (Doc. 1, p. 18). As a
result, Plaintiff claims he was repeatedly assaulted by other inmates. These
allegations suggest that Plaintiff may have a viable claim against the involved
officers for provoking an attack or attacks on Plaintiff.6 However, Count 17 is not
associated with any particular defendant. Instead, it is directed against generic
“officers.”7
Thus, the current Complaint does not contain sufficient allegations to
support a claim for liability against any individual Defendant. For this reason,
6

As previously noted (Count 3, supra), allegations that a prison officer has provoked or persuaded
other inmates to cause harm to a plaintiff support an inference that the officer attempted to inflict
injury on the plaintiff in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Merritte v. Kessel, 561 Fed.Appx.
546, 548 (7th Cir. 2014).
7
A Section 1983 plaintiff must make allegations that associate specific defendants with specific
claims, so the defendants are put on notice of the claims brought against them and so they can
properly answer the complaint. Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 2003).

32

Count 17 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and it shall be
dismissed without prejudice.
Count 18
Plaintiff contends that when he was released from segregation, Mueller kept
Plaintiff in a receiving cell for more than 30 days and “allowed” Plaintiff to have
multiple new cellmates. Plaintiff contends this resulted in new cellmates sexually
assaulting him and stealing his personal property. Plaintiff claims Mueller knew
this would “break” Plaintiff.
The above allegations fall short of stating a viable claim. It is possible that
Plaintiff is attempting to assert a separate retaliation claim as to Mueller for
Mueller’s conduct after Plaintiff was released from segregation. However, the
Complaint does not indicate that the conduct had a retaliatory motive or connect
it with any protected activity. It is also possible that Plaintiff is attempting to
assert a separate failure to protect claim. However, the Complaint does not
suggest that Plaintiff alerted Mueller to a specific threat to his safety that Mueller
then disregarded. Finally, the fact that Mueller kept Plaintiff in a receiving cell for
more than 30 days – standing alone – states no claim. Ultimately, without
additional information, these allegations state no claim. Accordingly, Count 18
shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.

33

Dismissal of Certain Defendants
Krebs, Phillips, Schwarts, and Mocaby
The only claims directed against Defendants Krebs, Phillips, Schwarts, and
Mocaby have been dismissed without prejudice. Accordingly, these individuals
shall be dismissed without prejudice and the Clerk of the Court shall be directed
to terminate them as parties in CM/ECF.
Macon, Santos, Wilkenson, Loera, and Stolworthy
The Court did not identify any claims directed against Defendants Macon,
Santos, Wilkenson, Loera, or Stolworthy. Accordingly, these individuals shall be
dismissed without prejudice and the Clerk of the Court shall be directed to
terminate them as parties in CM/ECF.
John Doe # 1, PREA Director, and IDOC’s Mental Health Director
At the close of the Complaint (Doc. p. 19), Plaintiff attempts to connect
Defendants John Doe # 1 (psychiatrist), the director of PREA, and the director of
IDOC’s mental health department to one or more claims by alleging that he
communicated with these individuals about abuses he was experiencing at
Centralia.8
“[I]naction following receipt of a complaint about someone else's conduct is
not a source of liability.” Estate of Miller by Chassie v. Marberry, 847 F.3d 425,

8

Plaintiff also suggests that the director of PREA and IDOC’s mental health director are subject to
liability because of their role as supervisory officials. But, “under § 1983 , a plaintiff may not rely
on the doctrine of respondeat superior to hold supervisory officials liable for the misconduct of
their subordinates.” Doyle v. Camelot Care Ctrs., 305 F.3d 603, 614 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation
omitted).

34

428-29 (7th Cir. 2017) (See also Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara, 2017 WL 2784561,
*4 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009)
(the Seventh Circuit has “rejected the notion that ‘everyone who knows about a
prisoner’s problems’ will incur § 1983 liability.”). Nonetheless, under certain
circumstances, a prison official’s knowledge of an underlying constitutional
violation can trigger a duty on the part of that official to exercise his or her
authority to investigate and, if needed, “rectify the offending condition.” Perez v.
Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781-82 (citing Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th
Cir. 1996).
Because these individuals were not direct participants in the alleged
constitutional violations, their liability would be based solely upon their
knowledge of the alleged constitutional violations and failure to act to remedy
those violations – i.e. the standard discussed in Perez. Under this standard,
Plaintiff has not provided sufficient information to implicate John Doe # 1, the
director of PREA, or the director of IDOC’s mental health department. Plaintiff
contends he relayed information to these individuals regarding the alleged
constitutional violations, but his allegations do not sufficiently identify which
violations he complained about.9 Thus, the offending conditions or condition

9

Plaintiff alleges that he wrote “many letters” to the director of PREA but received no response.
Plaintiff does not specify which of his many alleged violations were discussed in those letters.
Plaintiff alleges that he sent many letters to IDOC’s director of mental health regarding Defendant
Aaron’s “wrongs.” This is insufficient, Plaintiff has directed numerous claims against Aaron. The
fact that Plaintiff complained about Aaron’s “wrongs” does not provide sufficient information
suggesting liability as to IDOC’s director of mental health or associating this individual with any
particular claim involving Aaron. Finally, Plaintiff claims he told John Doe # 1 about “all the
sexual abuse, harassment, the filing of false disciplinary reports and the illegal placement in

35

these individuals failed to address are debatable. Without more, Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim as to these individuals. Accordingly, John Doe # 1, the
director of PREA, and the director of IDOC’s mental health department shall be
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Wexford
In the Seventh Circuit, a private corporation, like Wexford, will generally
only be held liable under § 1983 for an unconstitutional policy or custom that
results in the injury at issue. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 780 (7th Cir.
2015). “Respondeat superior liability does not apply to private corporations under
§ 1983.” Shields v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014). Here,
the allegations directed against Wexford amount to a claim for respondeat
superior liability.10 Accordingly, Wexford shall be dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim.
Identification of Unknown Defendants
Plaintiff will be allowed to proceed against two of the unknown defendants,
who are identified in the Complaint as (1) John Doe # 2 (Centralia’s cell
placement officer) and John Doe # 3 (all officers in East 4 House on August 7,
2015 working the 7:00 am to 3:00 pm shift and the 3:00 pm to 11:00 pm shift).
These individuals must be identified with particularity before service of the
Complaint can be made on them. Also, where a prisoner's complaint states

H.C.U. segregation.” These allegations are closer to hitting the mark, but are still insufficient and
do not clearly connect a specific claim with John Doe # 1.
10
Plaintiff alleges Wexford is subject to liability, presumably for the mental healthcare Plaintiff
received, because it is the healthcare provider at Centralia. (Doc. 1, p. 19).

36

specific allegations describing conduct of individual prison staff members
sufficient to raise a constitutional claim, but the names of those defendants are
not known, the prisoner should have the opportunity to engage in limited
discovery to ascertain the identity of those defendants. Rodriguez v. Plymouth
Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 832 (7th Cir. 2009).
For that reason, Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed against Centralia’s
current warden (who is already an individual capacity defendant in the instant
case), in his official capacity, for the purpose of responding to discovery (informal
or formal) aimed at identifying these unknown defendants. Guidelines for
discovery will be set by the United States Magistrate Judge. Once the names of the
unknown defendants are discovered, Plaintiff must file a motion to substitute
each newly identified defendant in place of the generic designation in the case
caption and throughout the Complaint.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) has been
granted. (Doc. 7). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Service of Process at
Government Expense (Doc. 3) shall be denied as unnecessary.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3) shall be REFERRED
to a United States Magistrate Judge for disposition.
Disposition
The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to rename UNKNOWN PARTY # 1
and UNKNOWN PARTY # 2 as follows: (1) JOHN DOE # 1 (Psychiatrist); JOHN

37

DOE # 2 (Centralia’s cell placement officer); and JOHN DOE # 3 (all officers in
East 4 House on August 7, 2015 working the 7:00 am to 3:00 pm shift and the
3:00 pm to 11:00 pm shift).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that MACON, SANTOS, WILKENSON, LOERA,
STOLWORTHY, KREBS, PHILLIPS, SCHWARTS, MOCABY, JOHN DOE # 1,
PREA DIRECTOR, IDOC’S MENTAL HEALTH DIRECTOR, and WEXFORD are
DISMISSED from this action without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to
terminate these individuals as parties in CM/ECF.
IT HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall receive further review as to
QUARRIE, DELGADO, JOHNSON, ROBINSON, AARON, and TOENNIES.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 2 shall receive further review as
to QUARRIE, DELGADO, JOHNSON, ROBINSON, AARON, and TOENNIES.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 3 shall receive further review as
to CONRAD and BAILEY. COUNT 3 shall be dismissed without prejudice as to
MACOBY, PHILLIPS, SCHWARTZ, QUARRIE, JOHNSON, and DELGADO.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 4 shall receive further review as
to CONRAD, BAILEY, KAULING, JOHN DOE # 3, DELGADO, QUARRIE,
BURTON, ROBINSON, CAMPBELL, and AARON.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 5 is DISMISSED without
prejudice.

38

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 6 shall receive further review as
to BAILEY, CONRAD, and FOREMAN.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 7 shall receive further review as
to BAILEY, CONRAD, and FOREMAN.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 8 shall receive further review as
to SANTAS and KEEB.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 9 shall receive further review as
to BAILEY, CONRAD, and JOHN DOE # 2.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 10 shall receive further review as
to AARON, DOSE, DELGADO, QUARRIE, ROBINSON, BURTON, KAULING,
and MUELLER.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 11 shall receive further review as
to DELGADO, QUARRIE, ROBINSON, and MUELLER. COUNT 11 shall be
dismissed without prejudice as to JOHNSON and BURTON for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 12 is DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNTS 13 and 14 which are directed
at an unidentified officer who is not a party to this action, are DISMISSED
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 15 is DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 16 shall receive further review as
to GOODEN.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 17 is DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 18 is DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to COUNTS 1-4, 6-11, and 16 the
Clerk of the Court shall prepare for Defendants GOODEN, JOHN DOE # 2,
JOHN DOE # 3, CONRAD, BAILEY, QUARRIE, DELGADO, JOHNSON, DOSE,
FOREMAN,

KAULING,

CAMPBELL,

BURTON,

AARON,

ROBINSON,

TOENNIES, and MUELLER: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to
Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and
this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as
identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service
of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were
sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that
Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of
formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work
address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the
Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s last-known
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address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed
above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be
retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the
court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Other than notice to be sent to MUELLER, as ordered above, service shall
not be made on the Unknown Defendants (John Doe # 2 and John Doe # 3) until
such time as Plaintiff has identified them by name in a properly filed motion for
substitution of parties. Plaintiff is ADVISED that it is his responsibility to provide
the Court with the names and service addresses for these individuals.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading
to the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United
States Magistrate for further pre-trial proceedings, including Plaintiff’s Motion
for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3). Further, this entire matter shall be
REFERRED to a United States Magistrate for disposition pursuant to Local Rule
72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the
payment of costs under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of
the costs, regardless of the fact that his application to proceed in forma pauperis
has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

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Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to
keep the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his
address; the Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall
be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in
address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in the
transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for
want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Judge Herndon
2017.09.18
07:58:06 -05'00'
United States District Judge

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