Martin v. J & B Foods of Carbondale Inc et al

Filing 71

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 65 MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint filed by Lateiea S. Martin. Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file the Second Amended Complaint as set forth in the attached Order instanter. Signed by Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly on 6/1/2018. (ely)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LATEIEA S. MARTIN,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
J & B FOODS OF CARBONDALE, INC., et )
al,
)
)
Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-433-MJR-RJD

ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 65). The Motion is GRANTED IN PART.
On April 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed suit alleging Defendants discriminated against her
because of her race and disability (pregnancy). On October 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed a First
Amended Complaint which set forth new facts but maintained the allegations of discrimination
because of pregnancy and race discrimination. Plaintiff, through counsel, now seeks leave to file
a Second Amended Complaint setting forth six counts:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

Race Discrimination – Title VII
Sex Discrimination – Title VII
Retaliation – Title VII
Race Discrimination – Illinois Human Rights Act
Sex Discrimination – Illinois Human Rights Act
Retaliation – Illinois Human Rights Act

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that a party may amend a pleading and that
leave to amend should be freely given "when justice so requires." The Seventh Circuit maintains
a liberal attitude toward the amendment of pleadings "so that cases may be decided on the merits
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and not on the basis of technicalities." Stern v. U.S. Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1334 (7th Cir.
1977). Generally, the decision whether to grant a party leave to amend the pleadings is a matter
left to the discretion of the district court. Orix Credit Alliance v. Taylor Mach. Works, 125 F.3d
468, 480 (7th Cir. 1997); Sanders v. Venture Stores, 56 F.3d 771, 773 (7th Cir. 1995). A court
should allow amendment of a pleading except where there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, or
futility of the amendment. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 562 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing
Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 2007)). An
amendment is futile when it is incapable of surviving a motion to dismiss. See Bower v. Jones,
978 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff is attempting to add four new claims to this case seven months after the deadline to
amend pleadings has passed and one month before the close of discovery. Defendants argue
Plaintiff’s motion is untimely, will cause undue delay in the case, is prejudicial to Defendants, and
that the three counts brought under the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) are futile because they
are time-barred.
The Illinois Human Rights Act requires claims be filed within ninety days after Plaintiff
received a Notice of Right to Commence a Civil Action. 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(C)(4). Plaintiff
received the Notice on March 10, 2017. Plaintiff did not raise state law claims pursuant to the
IHRA in her original Complaint or First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff is filing claims pursuant
to the IHRA for the first time in the proposed Second Amended Complaint. Because more than
90 days has lapsed between when Plaintiff alleges she received her Notice of Right to Sue and
when she first asserted a claim in this Court pursuant to the IHRA, her IHRA claims are untimely.
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The untimely IHRA claims are futile because they are incapable of surviving a motion to dismiss.
The Court denies Plaintiff leave to add claims pursuant to the IHRA.
The Court finds, however, that allowing Plaintiff leave to amend the Title VII claims
would not be prejudicial to Defendants. Defendants argue that Plaintiff was previously only
proceeding on claims of race discrimination and sex discrimination and that the retaliation claim is
a new theory of liability. However, the retaliation claim arises from the same set of facts as the
sex discrimination claim. Defendants were on notice of Plaintiff’s discrimination claims pursuant
to Title VII and will not be unfairly surprised by amendments to those claims. Plaintiff is granted
leave to file the proposed Second Amended Complaint setting forth the following counts:
I.
II.
III.

Race Discrimination – Title VII
Sex Discrimination – Title VII
Retaliation – Title VII

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 65) is GRANTED
IN PART. Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file the Second Amended Complaint as set forth above
instanter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 1, 2018
s/ Reona J. Daly
Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge

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