Knox v. Butler et al

Filing 71

ORDER ADOPTING in part and REJECTING in part REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Doc. 68 ); GRANTING in part and DENYING in part Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 48 ). The Claim against Defendant Dr. Trost is DISMISSED without prejudice. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 3/15/2019. (sgp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TED KNOX,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN TROST, WALTERS, and
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES,
Defendants.

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Case No. 17-CV-494-SMY-RJD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“Report”) of United
States Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly (Doc. 60), recommending that Defendants Trost and
Wexford’s Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Doc.
48) be granted. Plaintiff filed a timely objection (68). For the following reasons, Judge Daly’s
Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED In part and REJECTED in part.
Background
Plaintiff Ted Knox, who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center
(“Menard”), filed suit on May 10, 2017 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, related to an incident that
occurred on April 14, 2014 (Doc. 1). Specifically, Plaintiff claims he was subjected to a
humiliating strip search and excessive force at the hands of the “Orange Crush” tactical team and
that he was subsequently denied medical care for his injuries. The claims related to Orange Crush
were severed and consolidated with Ross v. Gossett, Case No. 15-cv-309-SMY-MAB (Count 1).
The following claim remains in this case:

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Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs,
against Trost, Crain, Walters, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc., for delaying and
denying medical care to Knox after the April 14, 2014, incident of excessive force.
(Doc. 10).
Defendants Trost and Wexford1 moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff failed to
exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that after the incident on April 14, 2014, he
required but was denied urgent medical care because he was dizzy and had pain in his neck and
shoulders (Doc. 7, p. 8). He was seen by Nurse Walters two weeks later, on April 25, 2014 and
April 29, 2014. In response to his complaints of pain, Nurse Walters only took his blood pressure
and told him that no further medical care would be provided until the institution was off lockdown.
Thereafter, on May 28, 2014, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Trost who informed him it was an
administrative policy that inmates would not be removed from their cells for medical examinations
during a lockdown and that medical staff follow this policy. Plaintiff alleges that after his
examination with Dr. Trost, medical permits were extended, he was diagnosed as having
hypertension and he was “placed on ‘outpatient status’” (Id. 7). Plaintiff does not allege in the
Amended Complaint that Dr. Trost failed to provide a front-cuff permit or that he provided
deficient medical care on May 28, 2014 or at any other point. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that medical
care was denied by Nurse Walters and delayed because of a policy of denying medical care or call
passes during a lockdown.

1

The Clerk of Court entered default as to these defendants on November 3, 2017 because they had
failed to file a responsive pleading by the September 5, 2017 deadline (Doc. 25). Default was set
aside on May 8, 2018 (Doc. 35). Plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the Court reconsider that
Order (Doc. 44); that Motion has been denied (Doc. 70).
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These above-referenced events are reflected in Plaintiff’s June 18, 2014 grievance (Doc.
49-1). In the grievance, Plaintiff complains that Nurse Walters failed to provide actual care in the
face of Plaintiff’s complaints of severe pain and that she told Plaintiff that he would not get further
care until the lockdown was lifted. Plaintiff further asserts that this sentiment was repeated by
“the doctor,” (i.e. Dr. Trost) and that Dr. Trost “refused to provide me with a Front-cuff permit
because he claimed institutional security wouldn’t allow it anymore.”
On November 28, 2018, Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly issued a Report setting forth the
evidence presented by the parties on the issue of exhaustion, the applicable law, the requirements
of the administrative process, and her conclusions. Judge Daly identified Plaintiff’s June 18, 2014
grievance as the only relevant grievance for consideration. She concluded that while Plaintiff fully
exhausted the grievance by appealing to the Director of Illinois Department of Corrections, the
grievance was insufficient to exhaust Plaintiff’s claims in this lawsuit against Dr. Trost and
Wexford. As a result, Judge Daly recommends that Plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Trost and Wexford
be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Discussion
Because Plaintiff filed a timely objection, the undersigned will undertake a de novo review
of the Report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); SDIL-LR 73.1(b); see also
Govas v. Chalmers, 965 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1992). De novo review requires the Court to “give
fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objections have been made” and to make a
decision “based on an independent review of the evidence and arguments without giving any
presumptive weight to the magistrate judge’s conclusion.” Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d
651, 661 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court “may accept, reject or modify the magistrate judge’s
recommended decision.” Id.

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As an initial matter, Plaintiff maintains that Judge Daly should have held a hearing pursuant
to Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008). However, upon review of the record, this Court
finds there were no facts in dispute as to the grievance or the grievance process that necessitated
an evidentiary hearing. Next, Plaintiff argues that the grievance clearly implicated his claim
against Dr. Trost and Wexford because the injuries he allegedly sustained in the April 14, 2014
incident are the very reason he asked for a front cuff permit from Dr. Trost.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners to exhaust all available administrative
remedies before filing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Proper exhaustion requires that inmates file
complaints and appeals in the place, at the time, and in the manner the prison’s administrative rules
require. Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). Illinois’ Administrative Code
specifies that a grievance must contain “factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s
complaint, including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the subject
of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint.” 20 Ill.Admin.Code § 504.810 (2015).
Grievances are not meant to mirror Complaints filed in federal court nor is Plaintiff required to set
forth every theory of relief that he may present in a Complaint or identify every defendant later
sued. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). However, grievances should provide the
prison with “a fair opportunity to address his complaint.” Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th
Cir. 2011).
The focus of Plaintiff’s June 18, 2014 grievance was the care he received from Nurse
Walters and it is not clear that he was grieving the denial of medical care by Dr. Trost. Plaintiff
does mention that he was seen and examined by Dr. Trost, but he references primarily what Trost
said about the conduct of Walters. Moreover, as to the requested relief for the grievance, Plaintiff
asserts that he would like Nurse Walters reprimanded for failing to provide medical care, but he

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makes no mention of Dr. Trost by name or reference. Finally, Plaintiff’s statement regarding the
denial of a front-cuff permit is not sufficient to put IDOC on notice that Plaintiff was complaining
about a denial of medical treatment from Dr. Trost. For these reasons, This Court agrees with
Judge Daly’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s June 18, 2014 grievance did not exhaust administrative
remedies as to his claims against Dr. Trost.
However, the Court finds that Plaintiff did exhaust his administrative remedies as to
Wexford. The focus of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is that Nurse Walters failed to provide
adequate care and that there was a delay in care because of the policy that no medical care or call
passes would be provided during a lockdown. These claims are reflected in Plaintiff’s June 18,
2014 grievance and they were repeated by the grievance officer who indicated “lockdown
procedure followed” in addressing Plaintiff’s claims (Doc. 49-1, p. 2). Plaintiff further ties these
policies to Wexford in his Amended Complaint and his grievance by alleging that Dr. Trost (an
employee of Wexford) told him that medical personnel went along with lockdown procedures in
scheduling patients for medical care. Thus, even though Plaintiff did not specifically mention
Wexford in his grievance, the grievance is sufficient to exhaust his policy and practice claim
against it. Judge Daly’s Report is REJECTED in this regard.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts Judge Daly’s Report and Recommendation in
part. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 48) is GRANTED as to
Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Dr. Trost and that claim is DISMISSED without prejudice;
Defendants’ Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Wexford. Plaintiff shall
proceed on the following claim:
Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs,
against Walters and Wexford Health Sources, Inc., for delaying and denying
medical care to Knox after the April 14, 2014, incident of excessive force.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 15, 2019
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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