Casey et al v. Denton et al
Filing
93
ORDER granting 81 Leadership Counsel's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment contained in their 89 90 responses in opposition to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Lead and Liaison Counsel at the conclusion of this litigation. See Order for further details. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 9/3/2018. (ceh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JESSICA CASEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
CASE NO: 3:17-cv-00521
v.
ROGER DENTON, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Herndon, District Judge:
Before the Court, is Lead and Liaison Counsel Defendants’ Rule 12(c)
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (doc. 81). Lead and Liaison Counsel seek
that plaintiffs’ amended class action complaint be dismissed with prejudice for
failing to state a legally cognizable breach of fiduciary duty claim.
Plaintiffs
oppose the motion (docs. 89; 90) and additionally include in their response, a
motion for partial summary judgment, seeking the Court find as a matter of law
that the Lead and Liaison Counsel defendants were acting as fiduciaries to the
named plaintiffs during their time as putative class members of the Yaz MDL.
After careful consideration of the issues as argued by the parties and as
evaluated in the pleadings, the Court determines that Lead and Liaison Counsel
did not breach any fiduciary duty owed to the named plaintiffs and the putative
class they represent. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Lead and
Liaison Counsel defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (doc. 81) and
1
DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment included in their
responses to defendants’ motion (docs 89; 90). Lead and Liaison Counsel are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from the amended complaint.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968 establishes authority for the
creation of an MDL – transfers of civil actions pending in differed federal courts to
a single district (transferee court) for consolidated pretrial proceedings. Once the
transferee court is selected, the transferee judge assumes control over all current
and future cases involving the common questions and common defendants
involved in the litigation.
The enabling act does not authorize that judge to
unitlaterally call up for trial any cases on that docket. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956, 964-65(1998). The purpose of
an MDL is multifold and includes avoidance of repetitive discovery compliance,
elimination of inconsistent pretrial rulings, and conservation of resources of both
the judiciary and the litigants.1
Because of the large number of suits involved in an MDL, the presiding
Judge will often designate “management” roles to help maintain the docket.
These leadership-type roles may include, and are not limited to, special masters,
issue committees, and lead and/or liaison counsel whose job it is to serve as
representatives over the common interests of the plaintiffs and of defendants as
defined and materialized by court order.
1
See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Manual for
Neil B. Nicholson, “Federal Practice and Bankruptcy: Multi-District Case Consolidation Has Pros
and Cons” https://www.nhbar.org/publications/display-news-issue.asp?id=6942 (July 19, 2013).
2
Complex Litigation § 10.222 (4th ed. 2004) (“The functions of lead [and] liaison
[counsel] . . . should be stated in either a court order or a separate document
drafted by counsel for judicial review and approval”).
These common
management positions benefit the running of an MDL by keeping the litigation
organized and efficient.
Here, plaintiffs Jessica Casey, Melody Edwards, and Debbie Foster
(“plaintiffs”) bring their amended class action complaint (doc. 74) for reasons
stemming from the multidistrict litigation centralized in this Court, In re Yasmin
and YAZ (Drospirenone) Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability
Litigation, MDL 2100, No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-CJP (“MDL” or “Yaz MDL”). The
Yaz MDL consolidated personal injury lawsuits relating to various plaintiffs’ use
of Bayer Corporation-manufactured oral birth control, including YAZ, Yasmin,
and the generic equivalent, Gianvi.
More than 11,000 suits were consolidated
into the Yaz MDL. According to Yaz MDL plaintiffs, the contraceptives caused
their varying injuries as a result of thrombotic events triggered by the components
used to make the drugs.
To help manage the Yaz MDL, the undersigned appointed a Plaintiffs’
Steering Committee (“PSC”) on November 11, 2009. See doc. 180, Order No. 22
(included at doc. 74, Am. Compl. Ex. 2). The purpose of the PSC, established in
Order No. 2, was to grant certain responsibilities to a select number of attorneys
chosen to represent the common interests of all plaintiffs in the MDL. Examples
2
Unless otherwise stated, all references to document numbers relate to the ECF entries in the Yaz
MDL master docket, no. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-CJP.
3
of
these
responsibilities
include:
pursuing
common
offensive
strategies,
coordinating generic discovery responses against the Bayer defendants, and
relaying important case developments to the chosen, retained counsel for all the
individual plaintiffs. See doc. 180, included at doc. 74, Am. Compl. Ex. 2; Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 58-62. Fourteen lawyers were appointed to and comprised the PSC.
Of those fourteen, the Court designated two sub-groups: Co-Lead Counsel (“Lead
Counsel”) and Liaison Counsel (together, the “Lead and Liaison Counsel” or the
“Lead and Liaison Counsel Defendants”). Specifically, defendants Michael Burg,
Michel London, and Mark Niemeyer were selected as Lead counsel. Defendant
Roger Denton was appointed as Liaison Counsel.
After years of litigation, the parties successfully negotiated resolution of a
great many of Yaz MDL cases.3 Because of this negotiation, on August 3, 2015,
the Court entered Case Management Order (“CMO”) No. 79, entitled “Non-ATE
Case Resolution CMO,” which placed the remaining, unresolved, cases on
separate litigation tracks and ordered certain plaintiffs to comply with various
deadlines and provide specified documents to Bayer and to healthcare providers.
Doc. 3789; included at doc. 74, Am. Compl. Ex. 3. Notably, CMO No. 79 did not
place any responsibilities on the Lead or Liaison Counsel Defendants with regards
to the deadlines and document submissions.
On December 17, 2015, Bayer moved to dismiss 44 individual plaintiffs for
failure to comply with CMO No. 79. The named plaintiffs bringing this action
3
The settlement was a “global settlement” i.e. all cases within a certain category of injury. In
greater numbers, other settlements were reached via inventory settlements through negotiations
on a case-by-case, law firm by law firm basis, but are not the subject of this litigation.
4
were included in the forty-four individuals Bayer sought to dismiss.
Bayer’s
motions seeking dismissal were filed in each delinquent plaintiffs’ personal case
file, not in the Yaz MDL master docket. See e.g. case no. 3:12-cv-11370-DRHPMF, doc. 25. Plaintiffs allege that neither their retained counsel, nor Lead and
Liaison Counsel, responded to the motions to dismiss and accordingly, the Court
dismissed plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice on January 11, 2016. See e.g. id. at
doc. 26. No motions to reconsider, to alter judgment, or to appeal were filed after
the Clerk’s judgments entering dismissals. Instead, plaintiffs filed a state court
action over one year later on May 8, 2017. The action was removed to this Court
on May 16, 2017.
a. Complaint and Allegations of Breach of Fiduciary Duty
In their Complaint, plaintiffs allege that Lead and Liaison Counsel breached
purported fiduciary duties by failing to address (or failing to delegate) the
directives laid out in CMO No. 79. With regards to the Lead and Liaison Counsel
Defendants, plaintiffs specifically allege that fiduciary duties were breached by
failing to determine plaintiffs’ statuses and obtaining their medical records and
completing their Fact Sheets in accordance with CMO No. 79; failing to submit
certificates of compliance for plaintiffs as determined in CMO No. 79; failing to
provide case-specific expert reports as required by CMO No. 79; and to the crux
of this dispute, failing to respond to Bayer’s motions to dismiss each plaintiffs’
individual case. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 110-118; 121-122.
5
In claiming that Lead and Liaison Counsel owed fiduciary duties to the
plaintiffs and purported class members to “obey” and “comply” with CMO No. 79
(id. at ¶ 121), plaintiffs analogize the duties and responsibilities of mass tort
lawyers and lawyers who represent classes of plaintiffs. See doc. 90 at 11. The
analogy is necessary as plaintiffs point out there is no direct case law on point
with regard to what lead and liaison counsel’s duties are in the MDL context:
“Although there is no case law on point with regard to MDLs, it logically follows
that Lead/Liaison Attorneys are fiduciaries to the putative class members.” Id.
Plaintiffs argue that Lead and Liaison Counsel Defendants’ duties arose from and
were created by this Court’s orders, specifically Order No. 2. Having these duties
bestowed upon them and then failing to act as alleged above, plaintiffs aver Lead
and Liaison Counsel failed to act in the best interests of the class as a whole. Id.
citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g)(2)(A) advisory committee note).
Accordingly, in addition to asking the Court to deny the Lead and Liaison
Counsel Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, plaintiffs also seek
the Court to find as a matter of law, that the specified defendants in their roles as
leadership counsel, were acting as fiduciaries to the named plaintiffs and the Yaz
MDL putative members. Id. at 19.
b. Lead and Liaison Counsel’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Lead and Liaison Counsel Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ position turns
MDL leadership counsel into the “individual attorneys” for all cases comprising an
MDL; here, in the Yaz MDL, some 11,000 lawsuits. Doc. 81 at 8.
6
Lead and
Liaison
Counsel
argue
this
position
is
not
supported
by
the
specific
responsibilities and tasks imposed on them by this Court via Order No. 2 and
further, that plaintiffs have presented no facts that demonstrate Lead and Liaison
Counsel had fiduciary duties relating to plaintiffs’ individual cases as no attorneyclient relationship existed between the Lead and Liaison Counsel Defendants and
plaintiffs. See id. at 9-11. Defendants contend finding that plaintiffs’ proposed
fiduciary duties exist would create an unworkable MDL system, leading to
impossible task load burdens on leadership counsel and interference with the
efficiency multi-district litigation is meant to establish. Id. at 16-18. Accordingly,
Lead and Liaison Counsel pray the Court grant their motion for judgment on the
pleadings (doc. 81) and dismiss all claims against them alleged in the amended
complaint, with prejudice.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court must determine whether plaintiffs’ amended complaint states a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face as a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is analyzed under the same standard as that of a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Gill v. City of Milwaukee,
850 F.3d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
A rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the
sufficiency of the complaint. Thus, to survive, a rule 12(b)(6) motion, and by
extension, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a claim must demonstrate
factual content that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
7
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).
III.
ANALYSIS
COUNT I – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES AGAINST LEAD AND LIASION
COUNSEL
a. Order No. 2
To prevail on a breach of fiduciary duty claim, a plaintiff must prove (1)
that a fiduciary duty exists; (2) that the fiduciary duty was breached; and (3)
damages proximately caused by that breach. Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E. 2d 496,
502-3 (Ill. 2000). It is well established that a “fiduciary” is a person, having a
duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for another’s benefit in matters
connected with such an undertaking.
Terlizzi v. Gustafson (In re Estate of
Gustafson), 268 Ill. App. 3d 404 (1994); citing Black’s Law Dictionary 625 (6th
ed. 1990).
The Court finds the ending of that statement to be the pinnacle
instruction on this entire dispute: One can only act in a fiduciary capacity, and
thus have a fiduciary duty, to the extent his actions comport within the
boundaries set by the agreement initially creating the relationship.
Here, that
agreement is Order No. 2. Any relationship between plaintiffs and the Lead and
Liaison Counsel Defendants is created by that document and is limited to that
document. See Manual for Complex Litigation, § 10.222, “The functions of lead,
liaison, and trial counsel, and of each committee, should be stated in either a
court order or a separate document drafted by counsel for judicial review and
approval. This document will inform other counsel and parties of the scope of
8
designated counsel’s authority and define responsibilities within the group.”
(Emphasis added). Any proposed function and/or responsibility to be imposed on
leadership counsel may only emanate from the document giving rise to that
group’s duties.
It so follows, that any fiduciary duties owed any plaintiff also
expound from the stated descriptions of responsibilities listed in the document
creating leadership counsel.
Here, Order No. 2 very clearly sets out what responsibilities the Lead and
Liaison Counsel Defendants owed to plaintiffs and it is clear from the text that
Order No. 2 only imposed tasks geared towards facilitating general work product
that could be used for the common good of all plaintiffs.4
these specific duties include:
Examples of some of
Coordination of a document depository, real or
virtual, to be available to all participating plaintiffs’ counsel; to prepare agendas
for court conferences; conduct all discovery in a coordinated and consolidated
manner on behalf and for the benefit of all plaintiffs; explore, develop and pursue
all settlement options pertaining to any claim or portion thereof; maintain
adequate files of all pretrial matters. See Order No. 2 at 2-5. Clearly, responding
to the specific directives of CMO No. 79 on behalf of a small section of individual
plaintiffs was never a duty contemplated under Order No. 2. This is made clearer
4
The way Lead and Liaison Counsel were assigned their functions and roles within the Yaz MDL
by Order No. 2 also quashes any argument regarding a traditional attorney-client relationship
between individual plaintiffs and leadership counsel. Individual plaintiffs did not retain lead
counsel nor have communications with them regarding how to best prosecute their unique cases.
See e.g. Formento v. Joyce, 522 N.E.2d 312, 316 (Ill. 1988). To the contrary, leadership
counsel’s tasks and duties were created by the Court for the common good of all plaintiffs without
any input from individual plaintiffs themselves, e.g. management of general discovery; coordinated
procedures to minimize expense to litigants, etc.
9
even further, by the plaintiffs CMO No. 79 applied to being represented by their
own individual attorneys and Bayer’s Orders to dismiss the same group of
plaintiffs being filed in individual dockets.
b. Function and Purpose of MDL Leadership Counsel
It is important to highlight the purposes multi-district litigation leadership
counsel serves and why finding in any other way than the Court finds now would
ultimately unravel the benefits and assistance such lead roles lend. Because of
the complexities and sheer amount of information an MDL presents when
compiling hundreds or even thousands of individual cases, “traditional
procedures in which all papers and documents are served on all attorneys and
each attorney files motions, presents arguments, and examines witnesses, may
waste time and money, confuse and misdirect the litigation, and burden the court
unnecessarily.”
Manual for Complex Litigation, § 10.22.
It is often the case
where, to avoid being bogged down and wasteful of judicial resources, a court will
need to institute procedures “under which one or more attorneys are selected and
authorized to act on behalf of other counsel and their clients with respect to
specified aspects of the litigation.” Id. (emphasis added).
Here, the undersigned selected and appointed Lead and Liaison Counsel
specifically to aid in the fair, efficient, and economical running of the Yaz MDL;
their duties to plaintiffs enumerated in Order No. 2.
These specific duties were
established with the goal of leadership counsel coordinating general pretrial
discovery and related tasks pertinent to all Yaz filings and to avoid duplicate
10
filings from many individually-retained attorneys.
See e.g. Order No. 2 at 4
(leadership counsel tasked with issuing all motions and subpoenas pertaining to
any witnesses and documents needed to properly prepare for the pretrial of
relevant issues found in the pleadings of this litigation.”); see also In re
Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation,
2006 WL 2038650, *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (recognizing appointment of leadership
counsel as “a useful and helpful way to avoid duplication of effort and as a means
to streamline what could otherwise be inefficient and unruly proceedings”). It was
never the intention or spirit of Order No. 2 to supersede the authority or
importance of each plaintiff’s individually-retained counsel when it came to
specific matters unique to each case.
This is undoubtedly shown via the text of Order No. 2 itself. For example,
in directing leadership counsel to be charged with the issuance of all necessary
discovery, the Order tellingly states that “similar requests, notices, and subpoenas
may be caused to be issued by the [leadership counsel] upon written request by
the individual attorney in order to assist him/her in the preparation of the
pretrial stages of his/her client’s particular claims.”
Id.
See also, id.
(Leadership counsel is to “[a]ct as spokesperson for all plaintiffs at pretrial
proceedings and in response to any inquiries by the Court, subject of course to
the right of any plaintiff’s counsel to present non-repetitive individual or different
positions.”)
There can be no confusion based upon the document appointing
Lead and Liaison Counsel that leadership attorneys and individually retained
11
attorneys were each to have distinct and separate roles, each necessary to run an
efficient MDL. See In re Cardinal Health, Inc. ERISA Litigation, 225 F.R.D. 552,
555 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (“Complex litigation often involves numerous parties with
similar interests, such that traditional procedures in which all papers are filed
with every counsel becomes unduly cumbersome.
Courts can effectively help
manage such litigation by appointing lead and liaison counsel.”)
c. Limited Fiduciary Relationship between MDL Plaintiffs and Leadership
Counsel
It is clear that while the Lead and Liaison Counsel Defendants did have
specific duties owed to plaintiffs as a whole in the Yaz MDL as listed in Order No.
2, none of those duties encompass the general breadth plaintiffs would like read
in to it – that is, having lead counsel held responsible to responding to casespecific case management orders or filing responses to defendants’ motions
pertinent only to individual cases. However, this is not to say that no fiduciary
duties potentially arise between the two groups when counsel fills leadership
roles. Indeed, instead of how plaintiffs purport the relationship functions, the
fiduciary duties that may be created and owed by leadership counsel in an MDL
context include obligations to act fairly, efficiently, and economically in the
interests of all parties and parties’ counsel. See Manual for Complex Litigation, §
10.22. Put differently, lead and liaison counsel do not owe a fiduciary duty to
each and every MDL plaintiff in the traditional sense. Rather, lead and liaison
counsel should put the common and collective interests of all plaintiffs first while
12
they carry out their enumerated functions.5
This is a far cry from making
leadership counsel liable to respond to every individual motion and request filed
in each singular case.
A good analogy of what leadership counsel owes all plaintiffs in a multidistrict litigation comes from the law regarding trustees. Academic scholars who
have written in this area have championed that the Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation “suggests that lead attorneys resemble trustees more than
lawyers or other agents. Their responsibility is to ‘pursu[e] the good of all,’ which,
if need be, they may do by making tradeoffs that are reasonably ‘likely to
maximize the value of all claims in the group.’”
Charles Silver, The
Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict Litigations, 79
Fordham L. Rev. 1985, 1989 (2011). The author of the Fordham Law Review
article supports his claim that lead attorneys resemble trustees with several facts,
“including the inability of entrustors to select lead attorneys, fire them, or control
them, and the absence of market mechanisms that ordinarily encourage agents to
perform well.”
Id. n. 23; see also Stephen J. Herman, Duties Owed by
Appointed Counsel to MDL Litigants Whom They Do Not Formally Represent.
Vol. 64 Number 1 Loyola L. Rev. Spring 2018, p. 9, quoting Restatement (Third)
of Agency, § 1.01 (Am. Law Inst. 2018) (explaining that a typical fiduciary
relationship, the kind plaintiffs advocate for, exists “when one person, a principal,
5
For an academic perspective on the proposed fiduciary relationship between MDL leadership
counsel and plaintiffs, see Loyola Law Review: “Duties Owed by Appointed Counsel to MDL
Litigants Whom They Do Not Formally Represent.” Herman, Stephen, J. Vol. 64, Number 1,
Spring 2018.
13
manifests assent to another person, the agent, that the agent shall act on the
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests
assent or otherwise consents so to act”).
It is obvious to this Court that the hallmarks of a traditional fiduciary
relationship are absent from the MDL context in that there is no underlying offer
and acceptance of power of attorney or agency between appointed leadership
counsel and the plaintiffs. “While Lead Counsel clearly has a duty to perform the
functions to which they have been appointed in a fair, honest, competent,
reasonable, and responsible way, it would be inappropriate to describe their
obligations to other plaintiffs as ‘fiduciary’ in the traditional sense of the word.”
Herman, Duties Owed by Appointed Counsel to MDL Litigants Whom They Do
Not Formally Represent, p. 8. Because of the Court’s assessment of the limited
application of the term “fiduciary” as applicable to leadership counsel in a multidistrict litigation, the Court cannot find that Lead and Liaison Counsel Defendants
displaced the duties and responsibilities of plaintiffs’ individually retained
attorneys and can then be held liable for the alleged failures to follow the
directives of CMO No. 79. The Court agrees with academics in this area that have
postulated regarding the same and opined that “to the extent that each plaintiff
has his or her own particular facts, circumstances, and interests (which may be
common in some respects, unique in other respects, and in some ways perhaps
even divergent or potentially adverse to those of other plaintiffs), it is assumed
that such plaintiffs are simultaneously represented and protected by privately
14
retained counsel.” Id. at p. 7. To find otherwise and hold leadership counsel
responsible
in
the
traditional
fiduciary
sense
for
the
full
breadth
of
responsibilities owed to each and every MDL plaintiff, would be to make such
leadership positions unmanageable and unworkable.
d. Plaintiffs’ Interpretation of the Scope of Leadership Counsel Duties
Makes Such Positions Unworkable
Order No. 2 imposed duties on leadership counsel common to all Yaz MDL
plaintiffs and a claim against Lead and Liaison Counsel can only stand if the
alleged breach falls within the scope of the purported duty. See e.g. Brown v.
Brown, 379 N.E.2d 634, 638 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). Were Order No. 2 to make
leadership counsel responsible for all tasks typically created and agreed upon in a
standard attorney-client relationship, like, as alleged here, obtaining medical
authorizations or records or obtaining case-specific experts for every distinct
plaintiff, there would be no need for any of the individually retained attorneys and
reading that interpretation into the Court’s Order makes little sense. Leadership
counsel of a MDL could not fathomably be held responsible for the minute details
of hundreds or in this case, thousands, of individual cases. The proposition is
unworkable.
The role of leadership counsel in a multi-district litigation is to ensure the
expeditious, fair and economical running of a litigation that contains vast and
plentiful information and issues. To aid in its progression, leadership counsel
oversees that general discovery and work product common to all plaintiffs moves
along in a timely – and organized – fashion.
15
This undertaking is large and
consuming as is. Were this Court to hold that MDL leadership counsel also owed
each MDL plaintiff a fiduciary duty to oversee every issue, motion, etc. unique to
his or her case, the position would render itself unmanageable.
No attorney
would seek appointment to the position due to the enormous resources that
would be necessary to dedicate to the cause – time wise and staff wise. Charging
leadership counsel with this nearly endless amount of responsibility would alter
the nature and substance of the position, so much so, that the MDL format would
cease to allow for the efficient handling of large, coordinated litigation.
For all the preceding reasons, the Court finds that Lead and Liaison
Counsel are entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to Count 1 of plaintiffs’
amended class action complaint (doc. 74). Plaintiffs have not stated a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face and thus, Count 1 is legally insufficient as
plaintiffs have not demonstrated the existence of the specific fiduciary duties they
allege were breached by leadership counsel.
COUNT II – RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR CLAIM AGAINST LEAD AND LIAISON
COUNSEL DEFENDANTS’ RESPECTIVE LAW FIRMS
Based on the Court’s analysis finding no breach of fiduciary duty against
the Lead and Liaison Counsel Defendants, the Court also finds, by necessity, that
plaintiffs’ respondeat superior claim fails as it derives from the legally deficient
first count. Accordingly, Lead and Liaison Counsel Defendants are also entitled to
judgment on the pleadings as to Count 2 of the amended complaint (doc. 74).
IV.
16
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Lead and Liaison Counsel’s Rule 12(c)
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (doc. 81), in its entirety.
Additionally,
plaintiffs’ cross-motion for Summary Judgment contained in its responses in
opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings (docs. 89; 90) is DENIED.
Although some fiduciary duties may be me imparted on to leadership counsel in a
MDL context, there are none that conform to the general breadth and scope
plaintiffs hope to impose in the way they seek the Court to find. Thus, the crossmotion is denied. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Lead
and Liaison Counsel at the conclusion of the litigation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Judge Herndon
2018.09.03
13:29:51 -05'00'
United States District Judge
17
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