Goodwin v. True

Filing 21

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Goodwin's Petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241 (Doc. 1 ), is DENIED. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Chief Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 8/27/2019. (beb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANTHONY GOODWIN,
#26208-009,
Petitioner,
vs.
S. KALLIS,
Respondent.

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Case No. 17-cv-0644-NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Petitioner Anthony Goodwin, an inmate in the Bureau of Prisons, filed a Petition for writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Goodwin is currently incarcerated at FCIPekin, Illinois, serving a 120-month sentence after pleading guilty to aiding and abetting
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
18 U.S.C. § 2. 1 United States v. Goodwin, 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 246 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 28, 2011).
Goodwin’s sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) was
enhanced after the sentencing judge determined that he was a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1, based in part on his four Arkansas residential burglary convictions. (Doc. 1, pp. 18–22).

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Goodwin was housed at the United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, at the time his Petition was filed (Doc. 1),
but was transferred to FCI-Pekin during the pendency of this action. (Doc. 19). Because Goodwin was detained within
this District at the time he filed his Petition, this Court retains jurisdiction to resolve this matter even after Goodwin’s
transfer to FCI-Pekin. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 440-41 (2004) (“[W]hen the Government moves a
habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her immediate custodian, the District Court retains
jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the
prisoner’s release.”). The Court’s jurisdiction is “in no way impaired or defeated by the removal of the prisoner from
the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court.” Id. at 441 n. 14; see also United States ex rel Circella v. Sahli, 216
F.2d 33, 37 (7th Cir. 1954).

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Goodwin now invokes Mathis v. United States, – U.S. –, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), to
challenge his sentence and argue that he is entitled to be resentenced without this Guidelines
enhancement. Specifically, Goodwin argues that because the Arkansas residential burglary statutes
under which he was convicted criminalize broader behavior than the generic federal definition of
“burglary,” these convictions were improperly considered to be crimes of violence under the
Guidelines and can no longer support his enhanced sentence under Mathis. (Doc. 1, pp. 11–15).
Respondent opposes issuance of the writ on multiple grounds. Respondent argues that
Goodwin cannot satisfy the requirements of Section 2255(e)’s savings clause because his sentence
fell within the statutory maximum penalty for his crime of conviction notwithstanding his
Guidelines enhancement, so his alleged harm is not a “miscarriage of justice” as required by
Seventh Circuit precedent. (Doc. 10, pp. 23–31). Respondent also argues that Goodwin
procedurally defaulted on his claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. (Id. at pp. 19–23). Finally,
Respondent argues that even if the Court reaches the merits of Goodwin’s Petition, his Petition
must fail because Goodwin’s prior Arkansas residential burglary convictions were properly
considered predicate crimes of violence as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2011). (Id. at
pp. 23–31).
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 24, 2011, Goodwin pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and abetting possession
with intent to distribute less than 50 grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. United States v. Goodwin, No. 10-cr-0270BSM, Doc. 160, p. 1 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 6, 2014). Goodwin entered into a formal Plea Agreement, but
this Agreement did not stipulate, discuss, or contemplate in any way Goodwin’s criminal history,

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criminal history category under the Guidelines, or his potential Guidelines sentencing range. Id. at
pp. 1–12.
Goodwin’s crime of conviction carried a statutory maximum penalty of 20 years’
(240 months’) imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2010). While neither party has provided
the complete Presentence Report (“PSR”) from Goodwin’s underlying criminal case to the Court,
there is no dispute that Goodwin was determined to be a career offender due to his prior Arkansas
residential burglary convictions, which were determined to be qualifying “crimes of violence” by
the sentencing court. (See Doc. 1, pp. 17–22; Doc. 10, pp. 3–4); see also Goodwin, No. 10-cr0270-BSM, Doc. 384, pp. 17–18 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2017). Neither Goodwin nor his counsel
objected to his designation as a career offender after the PSR was released, and Goodwin
specifically did not object to any of the PSR’s findings at his sentencing hearing. Goodwin, No. 10cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 384, p. 7 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2017).
Goodwin asserts that before the career-offender enhancement, his Sentencing Guidelines
range would have been significantly lower than the range resulting from his career offender status.
At Goodwin’s sentencing hearing, his counsel argued for a 48–72 month range of imprisonment.
(Doc. 1, p. 11); Goodwin, No. 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 384, p. 13 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2017). As a
result of the enhancement, however, Goodwin’s advisory range was 210–262 months, limited by
statute to 240 months. Goodwin, No. 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 384, p. 9 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2017).
The sentencing court varied significantly downwards from the advisory range and ultimately
sentenced Goodwin to 120 months’ imprisonment. Goodwin, No. 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 384,
p. 21 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2017).
Goodwin did not file a direct appeal. Since being sentenced, he has filed two motions under
28 U.S.C. § 2255. In the first motion, filed in May 2012, Goodwin argued that his counsel was

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ineffective at his sentencing hearing. This motion was denied on the merits by the sentencing court.
Id. at Doc. 279, pp. 1–5 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 6, 2012). Goodwin’s second Section 2255 motion, filed
in June 2016, made similar arguments to those before the Court here, relying on Johnson v. United
States, 576 U.S. –, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Id.
at Doc. 373. This motion was denied because Goodwin failed to apply for and obtain leave from
the Eighth Circuit to file a second or successive Section 2255 motion. Id. at Doc. 381. Goodwin
did not appeal the denial of either of his Section 2255 motions.
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
Generally, petitions for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may not be used to
raise claims of legal error in conviction or sentencing, but are instead limited to challenges
regarding the execution of a sentence. See Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir.
1998).
Aside from the direct appeal process, a prisoner who has been convicted in federal court is
generally limited to challenging his conviction and sentence by bringing a motion pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court which sentenced him. A Section 2255 motion is ordinarily the
“exclusive means for a federal prisoner to attack his conviction.” Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214,
217 (7th Cir. 2003). And, a prisoner is generally limited to only one challenge of his conviction
and sentence under Section 2255. A prisoner may not file a “second or successive” Section 2255
motion unless a panel of the appropriate court of appeals certifies that such motion contains either
(1) newly discovered evidence “sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense,” or (2) “a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).

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It is possible, however, under very limited circumstances, for a prisoner to challenge his
federal conviction or sentence under Section 2241. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) contains a “savings
clause” which authorizes a federal prisoner to file a Section 2241 petition where the remedy under
Section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e). See United States v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792, 798–99 (7th Cir. 2002). The Seventh
Circuit construed the savings clause in In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998): “A
procedure for postconviction relief can be fairly termed inadequate when it is so configured as to
deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in
his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.”
The Seventh Circuit has explained that, in order to fit within the savings clause following
Davenport, a petitioner must meet three conditions. First, he must show that he relies on a new
statutory interpretation case rather than a constitutional case. Secondly, he must show that he relies
on a decision that he could not have invoked in his first Section 2255 motion and that case must
apply retroactively. Lastly, he must demonstrate that there has been a “fundamental defect” in his
conviction or sentence that is grave enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice. Brown v.
Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013). See also Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir.
2012).
Since Davenport, the Seventh Circuit has made it clear that “there must be some kind of
structural problem with [S]ection 2255 before [S]ection 2241 becomes available. In other words,
something more than a lack of success with a [S]ection 2255 motion must exist before the savings
clause is satisfied.” See Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015).
ANALYSIS
In light of Mathis, Goodwin argues his Guidelines sentencing range was improperly

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enhanced because the statutes of his prior Arkansas residential burglary convictions criminalize
broader behavior than the Guidelines’ definition of “crime of violence.” (Doc. 1, pp. 11–15).
Before reaching the merits of this argument, the Court must first consider whether Goodwin’s
claim can be brought within the narrow scope of Section 2255’s savings clause. The Court agrees
with Respondent that Goodwin cannot demonstrate the existence of a fundamental defect in his
conviction or sentence that is grave enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice, and thus he
cannot satisfy the requirements of Section 2255(e)’s savings clause to bring his Mathis claim in a
Section 2241 petition.
Some errors can be raised on direct appeal but not in a collateral attack by a Section 2255
motion or a Section 2241 petition. A claim that a defendant’s Guidelines sentencing range was
erroneously calculated is one such claim. Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2013),
supplemented on denial of rehearing, 724 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2013); see also United States v.
Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708–09 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e held in Hawkins that the error in
calculating the Guidelines range did not constitute a miscarriage of justice for Section 2255
purposes given the advisory nature of the Guidelines and the district court’s determination that the
sentence was appropriate and that it did not exceed the statutory maximum.”).
The Sentencing Guidelines have been advisory since the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Perry v. United States, 877 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2017).
The Guidelines enhancement and sentencing range that applied to Goodwin was advisory, not
mandatory, because he was sentenced in 2011, well after the Booker decision. United States v.
Goodwin, 10-cr-0270-BSM, Doc. 246 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 28, 2011). The applicable statutory
sentencing range for Goodwin’s drug trafficking conviction at the time of his sentencing was up
to 20 years’ (240 months’) imprisonment pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2010). Goodwin’s

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120-month sentence for his drug offense is well below the statutory maximum sentence for his
conviction. Further, the fact that the sentencing judge imposed a sentence below the 210-month
low point of his Guidelines range itself shows that the judge properly considered the Guidelines to
be advisory, not mandatory.
Goodwin argues that he could not have brought his claim within a year of his final
conviction in 2011 because the argument he raises was foreclosed to him until after Mathis was
decided in 2016. Even assuming, arguendo, that the first and second Davenport criteria have been
met, 2 Hawkins dictates that an erroneous application of the advisory guidelines does not amount
to a “miscarriage of justice” (the third Davenport factor) so long as the sentence is within the
applicable statutory limit. Therefore, Goodwin’s Petition does not meet the criteria to bring his
claim within Section 2255(e)’s savings clause.
In short, there is no meaningful way to distinguish Hawkins from this case. The issue in
Hawkins was the same as the issue raised here by Goodwin: the use of prior convictions that would
allegedly no longer qualify as a predicates for a Guidelines enhancement under current law. In its
supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing in Hawkins, the Seventh Circuit summarized its
holding: “an error in calculating a defendant’s guidelines sentencing range does not justify
postconviction relief unless the defendant had . . . been sentenced in the pre-Booker era, when the
guidelines were mandatory rather than merely advisory.” Hawkins, 724 F.3d at 916 (internal
citations omitted). Hawkins remains binding precedent in this Circuit, and Goodwin’s Petition
must be dismissed for that reason.

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Because Hawkins dictates that Goodwin cannot possibly satisfy Davenport’s “miscarriage of justice” factor, which
is dispositive of his Petition, the Court need not decide whether Goodwin has satisfied the other two Davenport factors.
Likewise, the Court need not reach the merits of Respondent’s argument that Goodwin procedurally defaulted on his
Mathis claim by failing to raise that issue on direct appeal. (Doc. 10, pp. 19–23).

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Even if Hawkins were not dispositive here, Goodwin’s attempt to invalidate his career
offender designation using Mathis fails on the merits. 3 Mathis applied Supreme Court precedent
that began with Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), directing courts to use the
“categorical approach,” looking not to the facts of the prior crime but to the statutory elements of
the prior conviction, when determining whether a prior crime counts as a predicate crime of
violence for purposes of an ACCA sentencing enhancement. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248. A prior
crime qualifies as a predicate only “if its elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the
generic offense.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2247. Mathis clarified that only if a statute is “divisible”
into different elements, each defining a distinct crime, may the court use the “modified categorical
approach” to examine a limited set of state court documents to determine under which element the
predicate crime occurred. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248; see also Van Cannon v. United States, 890
F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2018).
The statutes of Goodwin’s prior Arkansas residential burglary convictions provided that
“[a] person commits residential burglary if he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a residential
occupiable structure of another person with the purpose of committing in the residential occupiable
structure any offense punishable by imprisonment[,]” and defined residential occupiable structure
as “a vehicle, building, or other structure: (i) in which any person lives; or (ii) [t]hat is customarily
used for overnight accommodation of a person whether or not a person is actually present.” ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-39-201(a) (West 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-101 (West 1993). According to
Goodwin, these statutes are not a categorical match to the Supreme Court’s definition of “generic
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Although Mathis was decided in the context of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the
Seventh Circuit interprets the career offender provisions of the Guidelines in the same way due to the substantially
similar language used by both. See, e.g., United States v. Templeton, 543 F.3d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing United
States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 404 (7th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Howze, 343 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 2003));
see also United States v. Lynn, 851 F.3d 786, 795 n.17 (7th Cir. 2017) (“We have held that the Court’s jurisprudence
with respect to . . . 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) applies with equal force to our interpretation of the ‘closely analogous’ career
offender guideline.”).

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burglary” because, unlike generic burglary, they criminalize the unlawful entry and remaining in
vehicles in addition to structures. (Doc. 1, pp. 11–15).
But Goodwin’s argument does not take into account Supreme Court precedent decided
after Mathis. In United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2017), a unanimous court held that generic
burglary “includes burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used
for overnight accommodation.” 139 S. Ct. at 403–04 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals also recently issued its ruling on remand from Stitt, addressing the issue of whether this
same Arkansas statute’s definition of residential burglary (which includes burglary of “vehicle[s]
. . . in which any person lives”) brings the Arkansas statute outside the scope of generic burglary.
The Eighth Circuit held that ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-39-101 and 5-39-201(a) does indeed
categorically match the generic definition of burglary set forth in Stitt. United States v. Sims, –
F.3d –, No. 16-1233, 2019 WL 3789294 (8th Cir. Aug. 13, 2019).
Applying Stitt’s analysis, the Eighth Circuit held that because the Arkansas statute “applies
only to vehicles in which someone lives or that are customarily used for overnight
accommodation,” it addressed precisely the same risk of violence that led to the inclusion of
burglary in the ACCA’s enumerated clause. Sims, 2019 WL 3789294, at *3–4. The Sims panel
also noted the fact that Arkansas separately criminalized unlawful entry into vehicles that were not
specifically being used for residential purposes, id. at *3, in contrast to the Iowa burglary statute
at issue in Mathis that criminalized the burglary of vehicles and structures in the same, indivisible
statute. Cf. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250–51. Because Stitt clarified that the analysis focuses upon
“circumstances where burglary is likely to present a serious risk of violence,” “[a]n intrusion into
a vehicle in which someone is living is necessarily ‘an inherently dangerous crime’” which brings

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Arkansas’ statute, and others like it, into the ambit of the generic definition of burglary in the
ACCA and the Guidelines. 4 See Sims, 2019 WL 3789294, at *3 (citing Stitt, 139 S. Ct. at 406–07).
Because ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-39-101 and 5-39-201(a) (West 1993) categorically match
the Supreme Court’s definition of generic burglary as set out in Taylor, Mathis, and Stitt, Goodwin
was properly designated a career offender under the Guidelines based on his prior convictions
under these statutes. Thus, even if Hawkins were not dispositive here, Goodwin’s argument
pursuant to Mathis fails on the merits.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Goodwin’s Petition for writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) is DENIED. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of
Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
If Goodwin wishes to appeal the dismissal of this action, his notice of appeal must be filed
with this Court within 60 days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1(A). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis (“IFP”) must set forth the issues Goodwin plans to present on
appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Goodwin does choose to appeal and is allowed to
proceed IFP, he will be liable for a portion of the $505.00 appellate filing fee (the amount to be
determined based on his prison trust fund account records for the past six months) irrespective of
the outcome of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger,
547 F.3d 724, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858–59 (7th Cir. 1999);
Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998). A proper and timely motion filed pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 60-day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P.
4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of

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See n.3 above.

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the judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended. Other motions, including a Rule 60
motion for relief from a final judgment, do not toll the deadline for an appeal.
It is not necessary for Goodwin to obtain a certificate of appealability from this disposition
of his Section 2241 Petition. Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2000).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 27, 2019
___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge

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