Walton v. Scott et al

Filing 45

ORDER: The Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies filed by Defendants Pearce and Chapman (Doc. 32 ) is GRANTED; Defendants Pearce and Chapman are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff shall proceed on Counts One and Three against Defendants Michael D. Scott and Angel Rector. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 7/3/2018. (mah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROBERT WALTON,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
MICHAEL D. SCOTT, ANGEL RECTOR, )
CHARLES PEARCE, and TERRI
)
CHAPMAN,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No.17 -CV-664-SMY-RJD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Robert Walton, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging his constitutional
rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center
(“Pinckneyville”). Specifically, Walton alleges that medical providers at Pinckneyville failed to
adequately treat his inguinal hernia, and correctional officers confiscated his medicallyprescribed hernia belt. Walton is proceeding on the following claims:
Count One:

Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Scott for deliberate indifference to
Walton’s painful hernia condition between April 19 and July 6, 2016.

Count Three: Eighth Amendment claim against Nurse Rector for deliberate indifference
to Walton’s painful hernia condition when she refused to see him on May
13, 2016.
Count Four:

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Lt. Pearce and
C/O Chapman for confiscating Walton’s prescribed hernia belt on May 29,
2016 while he was in segregation.

Now before the Court is Defendants Chapman and Pearce’s Motion for Summary
Judgment in which they argue that Walton failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to
filing suit (Doc. 32). Despite being provided adequate notice explaining the requirements of
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Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (see Doc. 34), Walton did not file a Response.
For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
Background
There is only one grievance in the record concerning Walton’s complaints about his
hernia and treatment for the same. In the grievance dated August 28, 2016 (Doc. 33-1 at 3-4),
Walton complains about the treatment provided by Dr. Scott and the failure of the Nurse
Practitioner (Rector) to respond to his sick call requests for treatment. Walton’s only reference
in the grievance to his hernia belt is that it does not “do shit at all” for him (Id. at 4).
Walton received a response from his counselor, the grievance officer, and warden, who
all denied his requested relief. He appealed to the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”),
which found the grievance was appropriately addressed by the facility administration, and
recommended denying the grievance (Doc. 33-1 at 1). The IDOC Director concurred with the
ARB’s recommendation.
Legal Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also RuffinThompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is
made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact
exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477

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U.S. at 248). When considering a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in
the light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party.
Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), prisoners are required to exhaust available
administrative remedies prior to filing lawsuits in federal court. “[A] prisoner who does not
properly take each step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.”
Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] suit filed by a prisoner before
administrative remedies have been exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks
discretion to resolve the claim on the merits, even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies
before judgment.” Perez v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). “[A]ll
dismissals under § 1997e(a) should be without prejudice.” Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401
(7th Cir. 2004).
An inmate in the custody of the IDOC must first submit a written grievance within 60
days after the discovery of the incident, occurrence or problem, to his or her institutional
counselor, unless certain discrete issues are being grieved. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a).
If the complaint is not resolved through a counselor, the grievance is considered by a Grievance
Officer who must render a written recommendation to the Chief Administrative Officer – usually
the Warden – within 2 months of receipt, “when reasonably feasible under the circumstances.”
Id. §504.830(e). The CAO then advises the inmate of a decision on the grievance. Id.
An inmate may appeal the decision of the Chief Administrative Officer, in writing and
within 30 days to the ARB for a final decision. Id. §_504.850(a); see also Dole v. Chandler, 438
F.3d 804, 806–07 (7th Cir. 2006). The ARB submits a written report of its findings and
recommendations to the Director, who shall review the same and make a final determination
within 6 months of receipt of the appeal. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d) and (e).

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Discussion
Based on the evidence in the record, the Court finds that Walton failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies as to Defendants Pearce and Chapman prior to filing this lawsuit 1. It is
clear that Walton’s August 28, 2016 grievance fully exhausted his administrative remedies with
regard to the claims made in the grievance. However, he failed to name, identify, or describe
Defendants Pearce and Chapman, as required by § 504.810(c) of the Illinois Administrative
Code. In fact, Walton made no mention of the actions at issue in this lawsuit in his grievance
whatsoever, complaining only that his hernia belt was ineffective at relieving his pain. Because
there was no indication that Walton was complaining about the conduct of Defendants Pearce or
Chapman in his August 28, 2016 grievance, it is insufficient to exhaust administrative remedies
as to his Eighth Amendment claim against them.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion
of Administrative Remedies filed by Defendants Pearce and Chapman (Doc. 32) is GRANTED;
Defendants Pearce and Chapman are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff shall
proceed on Counts One and Three against Defendants Michael D. Scott and Angel Rector.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 3, 2018
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

1

Because Walton did not file a response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment disputing the evidence or
arguments presented, despite being provided ample time and opportunity to do so, a hearing to resolve factual
disputes is not necessary. See Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008).

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