Teen v. St. Clair County Jail

Filing 5

ORDER DISMISSING CASE without prejudice. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 10/2/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANTRELL TEEN,
No. 461504,
Petitioner,

No. 3:

v.

–00713-DRH

ST. CLAIR COUNTY JAIL,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

In June 2016, after a jury trial in St. Clair County, Illinois (Case No. 2014cf-914) (“criminal case”), pro se Petitioner Antrell Teen was convicted on charges
of aggravated battery with a weapon and first degree murder. Petitioner now
stands convicted but not sentenced and seeks to challenge the constitutionality of
his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the petition
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States
District Courts. Rule 4 provides that upon preliminary consideration by the
district court judge, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached
exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge
must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” After

carefully reviewing the petition, the Court concludes that this action must be
dismissed.
CRIMINAL CASE 1
On December 23, 2015, Petitioner was arraigned in St. Clair County Circuit
Court on a felony indictment. A jury convicted Petitioner of aggravated battery
with a weapon and first degree murder in June 2016. 2 (Doc. 1, p. 1; Doc. 1, p.
19). To date, Petitioner has not been sentenced.
In January 2016, Petitioner filed a post-conviction motion with the circuit
court. (Doc. 1, pp. 3, 20-37). The motion raised a number of issues, including due
process, ineffective assistance of counsel, speedy trial, juror bias, inequitable
tolling, and improper jury instructions. (Doc. 1, pp. 4, 20-37). The motion was
dismissed as premature because Plaintiff had not yet been sentenced. (Doc. 1, pp.
4, 19). Petitioner filed a second post-conviction motion with the circuit court in
July 2016, raising the same issues. (Doc. 1, p. 4). That motion appears to be
pending. Id.
THE PETITION
At the outset, Petitioner indicates that he has been without counsel for six
months and has been waiting for sentencing for over a year. (Doc. 1, p. 7). He
indicates that he has been writing letters to the circuit court and filing motions, to

1

The following information is taken from the Petition and attached exhibits, as well as from the St.
Clair County electronic docket sheet for Petitioner’s criminal case.
2

According to the Petition, the date of “trial or plea” was June 23, 2016 and the date of the
judgment of conviction was June 25, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 1). The electronic docket sheet indicates
that a finding of guilty was entered on June 20, 2016.

no avail. Id. The referenced motions appear to be the motions discussed above,
challenging various aspects of Petitioner’s conviction. Petitioner provides no
information regarding the letters he has written to the circuit court and does not
claim that his sentencing is being delayed for any improper reason.
Petitioner raises four matters as potential grounds for relief: (1) Speedy
trial (Doc. 1, p. 8); (2) ineffective assistance of counsel (Doc. 1, p. 10); (3) juror
bias (Doc. 1, p. 12); and (4) violation of due process (described as including
claims for speedy trial, inequitable tolling, ineffective assistance of counsel, juror
bias, and improper jury instructions) (Doc. 1, p. 14).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
There are two significant problems with allowing Petitioner to challenge the
validity of his criminal conviction at this time. First, Petitioner has not yet
exhausted his state court remedies and the record does not reflect any special
circumstances that would warrant an exception to the exhaustion requirement.
Second, the underlying criminal action is still pending and, absent special
circumstances, this Court should not interfere. These issues are discussed more
fully below.

Exhaustion
Absent exceptional circumstances, a petitioner may not file a federal habeas
petition until he has exhausted all means of available relief under state law. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, (2004); O'Sullivan v.

Boerkel, 526 U.S. 838, 839 (1999). Ordinarily, this will involve raising every issue

in the trial court, and appealing any adverse decisions to the Illinois Appellate
Court and the Illinois Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); O'Sullivan, 526
U.S. 838, 845 (1999); Byers v. Basinger, 610 F.3d 980, 985 (7th Cir. 2010).
In this case, Petitioner has been convicted and is awaiting sentencing.
Although Petitioner has filed two post-conviction pleadings with the circuit court,
he has not yet “invoked one complete round of the State’s established appellate
review process.” O’sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Thus, absent exceptional
circumstances (which do not appear to be present), the instant habeas petition is
premature.

A bstention
Aside from the issue of exhaustion, the abstention doctrine outlined in

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), directs that, absent special circumstances,
this Court should abstain from interjecting itself into pending state judicial
proceedings. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484
(1973); Sweeney v. Bartow, 612 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 2010); Brunken v. Lance, 807
F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden

State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982)); Neville v. Cavanaugh, 611 F.2d 673,
675 (7th Cir. 1979). In fact, federal courts are required to abstain from enjoining
such proceedings when they are “(1) judicial in nature, (2) implicate important
state interests, and (3) offer an adequate opportunity for review of constitutional
claims, (4) so long as no extraordinary circumstances exist which would make
abstention inappropriate.” Green v. Benden, 281 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2002)

(citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423,
432, 436-37 (1982) and Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 711 (7th Cir.
1998)).
Special circumstances are generally limited to issues of double jeopardy
and speedy trial. Braden, 410 U.S. at 489-92; Sweeney, 612 F.3d at 573.
However, even where a petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies, the

Younger doctrine permits federal habeas relief only where “immediate federal
intervention is necessary to prevent the challenge [to the legality of the petitioner’s
custody] from becoming moot.” Sweeney, 612 F.3d at 573
Because Petitioner has not yet been sentenced, the Court is satisfied that
his criminal case is “pending” as it pertains to the Younger doctrine. Further, the
Court finds no special circumstances that would warrant federal interference in
Petitioner’s pending criminal case. Here, although Plaintiff asserts a speedy trial
violation, if one occurred, it is in the past. Petitioner has been tried and convicted.
Thus, immediate federal intervention is not necessary to prevent this claim from
becoming moot. It is subject to review but must first be reviewed by the state
courts.

Sentencing Delay
The Court is cognizant of Petitioner’s comment regarding a delay in
sentencing - approximately 15 months as of the filing of this Order. Such a delay
could occur for any number of reasons and Petitioner does not allege any
impropriety in connection with the delay. Moreover, the electronic docket in

Petitioner’s criminal case indicates that motions have been taken under
advisement, hearings have been scheduled and continued, and a hearing is
currently scheduled for October 9, 2017. New counsel has been appointed. Thus,
the criminal case appears to be progressing. Nonetheless, a 15 month delay is not
insignificant. Thus, the Court pauses to consider whether such a delay might
warrant an exception to the abstention doctrine or the exhaustion requirement.
At first glance, it seems a “speedy sentencing” claim (to the extent one is
even being asserted) is similar to a speedy trial claim and might constitute a
special circumstance warranting an exception to the Younger abstention doctrine.
Last year, however, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Sixth
Amendment provides no guarantee of speedy sentencing. “[T]he [speedy trial]
guarantee protects the accused from arrest or indictment through trial, but does
not apply once a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has pleaded guilty to
criminal charges.” Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2016). “As a
measure protecting the presumptively innocent, the speedy trial right—like other
similarly aimed measures—loses force upon conviction.” Id. at 1614. Absent such
a right, it is difficult to see how a speedy sentencing claim could warrant
immediate federal intervention. 3

The Court notes that dicta in Betterman left open the possibility that due process may protect
against improper sentencing delays. See Betterman, 136 S. Ct. at 1619 (“For inordinate delay in
sentencing, although the Speedy Trial Clause does not govern, a defendant may have other
recourse, including, in appropriate circumstances, tailored relief under the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). However, even in recognizing this possibility, the single
justice advocating for this position stated such a “speedy sentencing” violation must have resulted
in prejudice. Id. (Sotomayor, J. concurring).
3

A separate consideration is whether a delay in sentencing might warrant an
exception to the exhaustion requirement. An exception to the exhaustion
requirement is possible where circumstances exist that render the state corrective
process ineffective to protect the prisoner's rights. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii).
One circumstance which might render state processes ineffective is “[i]nordinate,
unjustifiable delay in a state-court collateral proceeding.” Jackson v. Duckworth,
112 F.3d 878, 881 (7th Cir. 1997). For example, where a petition for postconviction relief “had lain dormant for nearly three and one-half years,” the
Seventh Circuit found a basis to excuse the exhaustion requirement, unless the
state could show that the delay was justified. Lowe v. Duckworth, 663 F.2d 42, 43
(7th Cir.1981). See also Dozie v. Cady, 430 F.2d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 1970) (17
months' delay inordinate); Jackson, 112 F.3d at 878–79 (stating in dicta that the
state's failure to take any action on a post-conviction petition for more than five
years could provide grounds for excusing the exhaustion requirement).
A delay in sentencing necessarily delays an individual’s ability to pursue the
state corrective process. Thus, an inordinate and unjustifiable delay in sentencing
could conceivably implicate the above exception. However, in the instant case, the
record does not suggest that the 15-month delay is excessive or unjustifiable.
Thus, at this time, the Court finds no exceptional circumstances warranting an
exception to the exhaustion requirement.

Summary

For the reasons described herein, the Petition shall be dismissed without
prejudice to the claims being refiled, if necessary, after Petitioner has fully
exhausted his claims in the state courts.
DISPOSITION
For all the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.
1) is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner has not yet exhausted his state court remedies,
and the ongoing adjudication of Petitioner’s criminal case leads the Court to
conclude that it should abstain from intervening in this pending matter.
Should Petitioner desire to appeal this Court's ruling, he must first secure a
certificate of appealability, either from this Court or from the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. See FED. R. APP. P. 22(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, a certificate of appealability may issue “only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
This requirement has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that
an applicant must show that “reasonable jurists would find the district court's
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While a Petitioner need not show that his appeal will
succeed, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003), he must show
“something more than the absence of frivolity” or the existence of mere “good
faith” on his part. Id. at 338 (citation omitted). If the district court denies the

request, a petitioner may request that a circuit judge issue the certificate. See FED.
R. APP. P. 22(b)(1)-(3).
For the reasons detailed above, the Court has determined that Petitioner is
not entitled to relief at this time because he has yet to exhaust his state court
remedies, and because Petitioner’s criminal case is ongoing, the Court should
abstain from intervening. Furthermore, the Court finds no basis for a
determination that its decision is debatable or incorrect. Thus, Petitioner has not
made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that a certificate of appealability shall NOT
be issued. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and close this
case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Digitally signed by
Judge David R. Herndon
Date: 2017.10.02
11:17:31 -05'00'
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE