Kitterman v. Newton et al
ORDER DISMISSING CASE : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNTS 1, 2, and 3, along with this entire action, are DISMISSED without prejudice as Heck-barred. Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of his allotted strikes under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 10/25/2017. (tjk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SHANE A. KITTERMAN,
CITY OF BELLEVILLE, ILLINOIS,
CITY OF O’FALLON, ILLINOIS,
KATHLEEN EFFAN, and
Case No. 17−cv–733−MJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
Plaintiff Shane Kitterman, an inmate in Shawnee Correctional Center, brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights.
Complaint, Plaintiff claims the defendants violated his due process rights and conspired together
to require him to register as a sex offender in contravention with his plea agreement so as to
deprive him of his liberty when he failed to do so. (Doc. 1). This case is now before the Court
for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 102627 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds that
this case is subject to summary dismissal.
In his Complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff makes the following allegations 1:
A. Denial of Due Process – Procedural and Substantive
On January 10, 1996, Plaintiff entered into a fully negotiated plea agreement in St. Clair
County Case No. 95-cf-750 with Steve Sallerson and Robert Haida of the St. Clair County
State’s Attorney’s Office. (Doc. 1, p. 5). The terms of the agreement included that Plaintiff
Plaintiff grouped his claims under certain headings, which the Court will also utilize for the purpose of
would “abandon his right to certain constitutional protections” in exchange for a reduction in his
charged offense and a duty to comply with the Child Sex Offender Registration Act, 730 ILCS
150/1 (West 1994), “with its least restrictive requirements and penalties, as opposed to the
current ‘1996’ version” of the Act “with stricter reporting requirements and elevated penalties.”
(Doc. 1, pp. 5-6). The agreement further included that the Plaintiff would be certified a “‘Child
Sex Offender’ pursuant to the ‘1994’ version of the Act” and “regardless of the duration imposed
under Section 7 of the Act . . . [Plaintiff] would receive a sentence of ‘Four Years Probation’ . . .
[and] would only be subject to register as a sex offender as directed by the probation officer for
the term of probation at the end of which the duty would cease to exist.” (Doc. 1, p. 6). These
terms were memorialized in a court order attached to the Complaint as Exhibit 3 and a court
decree outlining the “Conditions of Intensive Probation Supervision” attached as Exhibit 4.
(Doc. 1, p. 7).
“In the proceedings leading up to the point of the consummation of the plea deal, the
Plaintiff made it clear and the state understood that the Plaintiff would only abandon his rights if
the duty to register ended with the term of probation.” Id. The terms of the agreement were
forwarded to the Department of State Police. (Doc. 1, p. 8). The offense in 95-cf-750 is the only
offense for which Plaintiff has been convicted that would require him to register as a sex
offender. Id. On March 6, 1997, Plaintiff’s term of probation ended. Id. Plaintiff’s duty to
register as a sex offender thereby also ended. Id. Defendants Newton and Schmitz, or their
predecessors, failed to remove Plaintiff from the state registry. (Doc. 1, p. 9). This was
concealed until March 1998 when Plaintiff discovered that his name was still on the state’s
registry. Id. When he made this discovery, he responded to the local law enforcement agency,
which reviewed Plaintiff’s records and determined that he was not required to register, though he
was still listed on the registry. Id. Between March 1998 and March 2005, Plaintiff had no
obligation to register in Illinois.
During this time, Plaintiff did not receive “a non-
forwardable verification letter that the Department of State Police must send to each sex offender
required to register, notifying him of the continuing duty to register. See 730 ILCS 150/4-10
(West 1996).” (Doc. 1, p. 10).
“In a self-serving document drafted by Defendant Newton, memorializing the Plaintiff’s
history of registration, in response to a request by the Attorney General, Defendant Newton
demonstrates that within a ‘10 year’ period following release on probation, the Plaintiff’s duty to
register was not lawfully extended, the Plaintiff never received any notice of an alleged
extension, and no verification letter was sent to Plaintiff.” (Doc. 1, p. 11). On or about March of
2005, Plaintiff “was arrested and falsely imprisoned after a Deputy Sheriff discovered Defendant
Newton failed to remove his name from the State registry and the LEADS (Law Enforcement
Agency Data System) computer system.” Id. Plaintiff contacted the Department of State Police
when he was imprisoned and believed that he would be released immediately. Id.
“After several months and numerous petitions for relief submitted to the Department, the
State, and the Court promised not to extend the period of registration for a conviction in St. Clair
County Case No. 05-cf-376, due to the policy of the State Police Defendants to deny request[s]
for relief, no hearing was provided for the Plaintiff.” Id. Plaintiff was under “legal duress and
legal disability from the continued obligation to register and threats of and several actual arrests
and imprisonments without any available remedy” even while “[t]he law and administrative rules
created a liberty interest and a duty upon defendant Newton and Schmitz.” (Doc. 1, p. 12). “At
trial following arrest for an alleged violation of the duty to register, the trial court refused to hear
evidence or a defense to challenge the legitimacy of the requirement to register.” Id.
Plaintiff experienced “arrest, loss of employment, loss of intimate relations with [his]
wife and child, [and] physical and mental anguish” as a result of Defendants Newton and
Schmitz refusing to provide Plaintiff with a hearing and an opportunity to be heard. (Doc. 1, p.
13). Plaintiff had a mental breakdown and required psychological medication and counseling.
Id. He responded to the Belleville Police Department, where his first registration was conducted,
and it “declared in ‘1998’ that its records memorialized the terms of the negotiated plea and as
such no further registration was required.” Id. “To [Plaintiff’s] utter shock and horror, the
agency declared that Defendant Newton and the State Attorney instructed that every registration
after the March arrest was to include a conviction not for the offense of violation 720 ILCS 5/1216(c)(1), a Class 2 Felony . . . but instead for violation 720 ILCS 5/12-14(b)(1), ‘a Class X
Felony’ of which would subject Plaintiff to lifetime registration.” (Doc. 1, pp. 13-14).
Defendant Newton “instructed the agency to change the date of conviction, age of the
victim, and remove information notifying the Plaintiff of when the period of registration would
expire.” (Doc. 1, p. 14). Between 2005 and 2012, Plaintiff attempted to “obtain relief from the
obligation to register, by contacting Defendant Newton repeatedly” and “all petitions were
ignored.” Id. “The trial court refused to accept evidence regarding the plea agreement; the state
disavowed the terms of the agreement; Defendant Newton altered conviction information and
withheld a final decision that could be reviewed by the trial Court; [and] Defendant Newton’s
self-serving documents demonstrate years of willful and wanton conduct in complete disregard
for the law, the Plaintiff’s rights, and administrative rules.” (Doc. 1, p. 15).
In 2012, Plaintiff was arrested and beaten by detectives of the Belleville Police
Department for alleged failure to register as a sex offender in St. Clair County Case No. 12-cf1204. (Doc. 1, p. 16). The Plaintiff again attempted to contact Defendant Newton to obtain
relief. Id. “The Court granted the Plaintiff’s motions for continuance on several occasions and
instructed the State’s Attorney to contact Defendant Newton and determine why she was not
providing the Plaintiff with the statutorily created hearing.” (Doc. 1, pp. 16-17). Newton
“initially declared that she was arranging a hearing” but “several months later after receiving no
response, the Plaintiff again attempted to petition for a document review.” (Doc. 1, p. 17). “In
response to the request, Defendant Newton memorialized all the extensions of the period of
registration for alleged violations of the Act” as is evidenced by Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7. Id. “In her
response Defendant Newton acknowledges the fact that the State and the Plaintiff pursuant to a
fully negotiated plea in 05-cf-376 agreed that as a consequence of the conviction the period of
registration would not be extended.” (Doc. 1, p. 18). Defendant Newton also attempted to
justify “the unlawful continued subjection of the Plaintiff to the requirement to register by
declaring that as a result of the ‘05’ conviction, wherein the State promised and the trial court
ordered ‘no extension of the duty to register,’ the Plaintiff was now subject to register every ‘90’
days and ‘records’ indicate several failures to comply.” Id.
Defendants Newton and Schmitz “connived and conspired to conceal their arbitrary and
capricious, willful and wanton misconduct, by using their positions of authority to alter legal
documents, change conviction information on a public website, and in excess of said authority,
applying provisions of the ‘Sex Offender Registration Act’ intended by the legislature to apply
only to persons deemed ‘sexually dangerous’ or ‘sexually violent persons’ who, following
proceedings that provide due process, have been designated as such. See 730 ILCS 150/6 (West
2013).” (Doc. 1, p. 19). When Plaintiff contacted Defendants Newton and Schmitz arguing that
the law they were citing did not apply to him and that the extensions were fabricated, they
“altered public records to reflect that the Plaintiff is a ‘Sexual Predator’ and subject to ‘lifetime’
registration.” (Doc. 1, p. 20). As a direct result of these actions, the Plaintiff was denied a
hearing before the administrative judge “because as a ‘lifetime’ registering sex offender, the
Judge refuses to have a hearing.” Id.
Plaintiff has submitted many requests to Newton and Schmitz for an administrative
review hearing, but they continue to deny him to “conceal their unlawful conduct.” (Doc. 1, p.
21). Defendant Newton has also “attempted to apply provisions pursuant to Section 5-7 of the
‘Sex Offender Registration Act,’ see 730 ILCS 150/5-7 (West 2013), a provision the Circuit
Court had declared does not apply to the Plaintiff.” Id. However, neither Newton nor her agents
notified Plaintiff that that provision applied “as required to provide due process.” Id. Newton
and Schmitz have also “used their positions within the Department of State Police to arbitrarily
and capriciously deprive the Plaintiff of his life and liberty by altering public records during trial
to declare the Plaintiff is a ‘sexual predator’ subject to ‘lifetime’ registration; manufacturing
evidence to reflect the Plaintiff has been [twice] convicted of sexual offenses; and knowingly and
willfully instructing ‘all’ law enforcement agencies to record the same manufactured evidence;
or taking no action to correct the same.” (Doc. 1, p. 22).
On September 5, 2013, “Defendant Newton discovered that 10 years after the Plaintiff
was convicted and released no record indicated he was still under a legal and lawful obligation to
register and instead of providing the relief contemplated by law, Defendant Newton
memorialized several fabricated violations of the duty to register” as evidenced by Plaintiff’s
Exhibit 7. (Doc. 1, p. 25). Plaintiff was deprived of due process without a method to challenge
the legitimacy of his requirement to register. (Doc. 1, p. 26). Newton and Schmitz committed
perjury in declaring to the Attorney General that Plaintiff was convicted on January 10, 1996 for
the offense of Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault, 720 ILCS 5/12-14(b)(1), a Class X Felony,
though Plaintiff “has never received” such a conviction “in any state.” (Doc. 1, p. 27). Newton
and Schmitz “continue to designate the Plaintiff as a ‘Sexual Predator’ and ‘Sexually
Violent/Dangerous Person’ to prevent any Court from discovering their unlawful corrupt actions
in violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Id.
Defendants City of Belleville, Beth Ferry, Clayton Greene, Mark Heffemon, and William
Clay have the authority to conduct registrations of sex offenders who are required by law to
register in Belleville consistent with administrative rules and duties.
(Doc. 1, pp. 30-31).
Defendants City of O’Fallon, Chief of Police, Officer Brueggman, and Kathleen Effan have
similar authority to conduct registrations in O’Fallon. Id. Defendant “Bernadette Schremp is
employed with the St. Clair County State’s Attorney, however, at all times relevant to this action,
she abandoned her role as advocate and became an investigator and agent of Defendant Newton
and Schmitz.” Id. “[T]he defendants are required upon initial registration to first, discover
whether or not there is a duty of the registrant pursuant to the law that has not expired or been
removed.” (Doc. 1, p. 31). “The law mandates the defendants to create a file for every
registration completed within the jurisdiction of the municipality and to share the information
with any subsequent jurisdiction upon request.” (Doc. 1, pp. 31-32).
Plaintiff completed his initial registration with Belleville on January 25, 1996. (Doc. 1,
p. 32). The initial registration declares that St. Clair County was the county of conviction, in
Case No. 95-cf-750, for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, with a conviction date of January 10,
1996, a release date of January 10, 1996, and an expiration date of January 10, 2006. Id. “The
defendants have a mandatory duty to keep this and every registration until the duty to register
expires.” (Doc. 1, pp. 32-33). The law also “mandates that the defendants ensure that the
information in every registration is accurate and the defendants must enter the information into
LEADS within 72 hours.” (Doc. 1, p. 33).
Plaintiff was ultimately “arrested because LEADS was not properly maintained and a
rogue officer after reviewing LEADS refused to conduct an inquiry into the court records to
discover the terms of the plea agreement. The officer called Defendant Newton who contacted
the Defendant City of Belleville. Following these events the defendants conspired to unlawfully,
arbitrarily, and capriciously . . . alter records of conviction; manufacture evidence contained in
legal documents; and disseminate false information to ensure that the plaintiff continue[d] to be
denied the right to due process, denied any pre-or-post deprivation proceedings; and to conceal
their unlawful actions.” (Doc. 1, pp. 33-34).
The registrations completed by Ferry, Heffemon, Greene, and Clay “contained intentional
false, manufactured, and manipulated information. . . . Falsifying Plaintiff’s registration became
the policy of ‘all’ defendants.” (Doc. 1, p. 34). Clay “knew of and ignored actions by his
officers.” (Doc. 1, p. 35). “The defendants knowingly and unlawfully destroyed or otherwise
withheld several registrations to effect continued and numerous extensions of the Plaintiff’s
period of registration.” Id. From 1996 to 2017, the defendants have “continue[d] to deprive the
plaintiff of due process by falsifying documents they have a duty to record accurately.” Id.
Defendants City of O’Fallon, Chief of Police, Officer Brueggman, and Kathleen Effan
“recorded manufactured evidence after conspiring with the defendant City of Belleville, Beth
Ferry, Mark Heffemon, Clayton Greene, and William Clay, together and in communication with
defendant Newton and Schmitz” in an “intentional abuse of their duty.” (Doc. 1, p. 36). “The
O’Fallon defendants altered information to defraud the Court. Falsifying legal documents
became the policy of ‘all’ defendants.” Id. The Chief of Police “knew of and ignored the actions
of his 35 officers.” Id.
In “collusion with defendant Newton and Schmitz, the defendant Schremp . . . altered the
plaintiff’s legal status from a ‘Child Sex Offender,’ subject to 10 year registration, to a ‘Sexual
Predator,’ subject to lifetime registration” and sought to deprive Plaintiff of his right to due
process and injure his reputation in the community. (Doc. 1, p. 37). Schremp’s actions “caused
the Plaintiff to be deprived of the right to post-deprivation relief.” (Doc. 1, p. 38).
C. Ex Post Facto Violation
The conduct underlying Plaintiff’s plea agreement occurred prior to the 1996
amendments to the relevant Illinois sex offender law. (Doc. 1, p. 39). Nevertheless, after his
probation was terminated, Newton “began to apply various provisions and penalties that did not
exist or pertain to Plaintiff.” (Doc. 1, pp. 39-40). To conceal her actions, Newton subjected
Plaintiff “to a law that applied to ‘Sexually Violent’ or ‘Sexually Dangerous Persons’ that was
not in effect at the time the conduct in 05-cf-376 occurred.” (Doc. 1, p. 40). “Several years
later, Illinois changed a section of the ‘Sex Offender Registration Act’ that only applied to
‘Sexually Violent or Sexually Dangerous Persons,’ and as to these persons, the law applied
retrospectively to conduct occurring after July 1, 2005.” (Doc. 1, p. 41). That law was not in
effect when the conduct underlying the conviction in Case No. 05-cf-376 occurred.
“Plaintiff was disadvantaged by the unlawful ex post facto effect of defendant Newton’s action
and . . . the Illinois unconstitutional law as applied.” Id.
D. Claim for Relief
As a result of the defendant’s actions, the Plaintiff was “repeatedly subjected to pain and
suffering from loss of employment, loss of freedom of intimate relations with his wife and
children, forced to abandon his home because the duty to register was not applied when the
property was secured, forced to sleep in the street because his family’s home was too close to a
school, subjected to continued deprivation of freedom of movement by being subjected to
unlawful restraint by threats of arrest every 90 days, subjected to deprivation of liberty and then
deprived of ‘all’ due process of law, and the Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer false
imprisonment to conceal corruption and unlawful conduct. The Plaintiff continues to suffer
severe emotional distress.” (Doc. 1, p. 42). “The Plaintiff remains an innocent man sitting in
prison for nine (9) years because of Tracie Newton, and the State of Illinois refuses to correct
errors of manifest proportion to conceal corruption of government employees.” (Doc. 1, p. 45).
Plaintiff therefore seeks declaratory, monetary, and injunctive relief. (Doc. 1, pp. 43-44).
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into 3 counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion regarding their merit.
Count 1 –
Defendants violated Plaintiff’s procedural and substantive due process
rights by manipulating his sex offender registration records and refusing to
provide Plaintiff with a hearing on his duty to register.
Count 2 –
Defendants conspired against Plaintiff to manufacture his sex offender
registration information and repeatedly extend his term of registration.
Count 3 –
Newton violated the Ex Post Facto Clause when she applied laws that
passed after the conduct underlying Plaintiff’s offenses to alter his
As discussed in more detail below, none of these counts will be allowed to proceed past
threshold. Any other intended claim that has not been recognized by the Court is considered
dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pleaded under the Twombly pleading standard.
Heck v. Humphrey
This case must be dismissed because Plaintiff’s claims presently violate the principles the
Supreme Court outlined in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). According to Heck,
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or
sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus,
when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be
dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s
action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding
criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed,
in the absence of some other bar to the suit.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (emphasis in original). “We do not engraft an
exhaustion requirement upon § 1983, but rather deny the existence of a cause of action. Even a
prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983
unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by
the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 489.
Plaintiff presently has a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 pending in this
District. See Kitterman v. Dennison, 16-cv-1134-DRH (S.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2017). In his habeas
action, he challenges the validity of his present convictions for failure to register as a sex
offender, see St. Clair County, Illinois Case Nos. 12-cf-1204, 15-cf-373, 14-cf-1422, claiming
that he should not have had a duty to register because the terms of the plea deal he discusses at
length in this case absolved him of this duty long ago. Id. Plaintiff’s habeas petition on this
subject is still pending. Further, he does not allege that his convictions have otherwise been set
aside. Thus, Heck stands in the way of any § 1983 action concerning Plaintiff’s duty to register
as a sex offender because, as noted above, “[i]t is well established that a § 1983 plaintiff may not
raise claims that, if correct, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a state conviction or
sentence unless and until that conviction or sentence has been set aside.” Williams v. Maroney,
153 F. App’x 709, 711 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)
and Case v. Milewski, 327 F.3d 564, 568-69 (7th Cir. 2003)).
A ruling that the defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights based on his
allegations that they falsified his sex offender registration records, required him to register as a
sex offender when he had no obligation to do so, refused to give him a hearing to resolve the
issue, and applied inapplicable laws to his situation in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of
the Constitution and his original plea agreement, allegedly resulting in his false imprisonment,
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his present convictions for failure to register as a sex
offender. In the Complaint, Plaintiff insists that he is an “innocent man” who should not have
been required to register as a sex offender after his initial term of probation ended in 1997. (Doc.
1, pp. 8, 45). If true, Plaintiff’s subsequent convictions for failure to register as a sex offender
would necessarily appear invalid. Plaintiff, as “the master of his ground,” has made “allegations
that are inconsistent with [his] convictions having been valid.” Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d
488, 490 (7th Cir. 2003). Because of this, “Heck kicks in and bars his civil suit.” Id. (citing
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646–48, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997); Ryan v.
DuPage County Jury Commission, 105 F.3d 329, 330–31 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNTS 1, 2, and 3, along with this entire action, are
DISMISSED without prejudice as Heck-barred.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of his allotted “strikes” under
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A dismissal without prejudice may count as a strike, so
long as the dismissal is made because the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim.
See Paul v. Marberry, 658 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 2011); Evans v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 150 F.3d
810, 811 (7th Cir. 1998). A complaint that is barred by Heck is considered legally frivolous and
counts as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Moore v. Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 24 (7th Cir.
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was
incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $350.00 remains due and payable.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he may file a notice of appeal with this Court
within thirty (30) days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(A)(4). If Plaintiff does
choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome
of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d
724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien, 133
F.3d at 467. Finally, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may also incur another
“strike.” A proper and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
may toll the 30-day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed
no more than twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of the judgment, and this 28-day deadline
cannot be extended.
The Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 25, 2017
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
U.S. Chief District Judge
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