Cripe v. Glidden

Filing 11

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams,. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 2, which is unrelated to COUNT 1, is SEVERED into a new case against UNKNOWN PARTY. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNTS 3 and 4, which are unrelated to COUNT 1, are SEVERED into a new case against UNKNOWN PARTY. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the only claim remaining in this action, is COUNT 1. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 10/18/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TYLER D. CRIPE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRIAN GLIDDENN,
FAYETTE COUNTY JAIL,
DR. FATOKI,
DR. ELYEA, and
MEGAN TRONE,
Defendants.

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Case No. 17-cv-745-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Tyler D. Cripe, presently detained at the Fayette County Jail,1 brings this pro se
action for alleged violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 3). The
constitutional violations allegedly occurred while Plaintiff was detained at the Fayette County
Jail. In connection with these claims, Plaintiff names Brian Glidden (Fayette County Jail
Administrator), Fayette County Jail, Dr. Fatoki, Dr. Elyea, and Megan Trone. (Doc. 3).2 Fatoki,
Elyea, and Trone are described as being the “acting physicians and nurse of the Fayette County
Jail.” (Doc. 3, p. 2). Plaintiff requests monetary compensation. (Doc. 1, p. 5). In addition, he
states he would “like for the procedures at the Fayette County Jail to be corrected and enforced
so no other detainee has to go through this.” (Doc. 3, p. 6). This case is now before the Court for
a preliminary review of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 3) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under
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The Amended Complaint does not specify Plaintiff’s legal status at the time of the alleged constitutional violations.
Public records available at judici.com suggest that, since February 2017, Plaintiff has been a pretrial detainee in
connection with Fayette County Case No. 2017-CF-42.
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Plaintiff also mentions “the Sheriff” in his statement of claim in connection with Count 4 (“After two hours the
Sheriff opened the door and asked if I had enough library time.”). This individual will not be treated as a defendant
in this case. See Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005) (defendants must be “specif[ied] in
the caption”).

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Section 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner complaints to filter out
nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to dismiss any portion of the
Amended Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as
true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so
sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff's claim. Brooks v.
Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate
abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id.
As a part of screening, the Court is also allowed to sever unrelated claims against
different defendants into separate lawsuits. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.
2007). In George, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the practice of severance is important,
“not only to prevent the sort of morass” produced by multi-claim, multi-defendant suits “but also
to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Id.
This practice is encouraged. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recently warned district
courts not to allow inmates “to flout the rules for joining claims and defendants, see FED. R. CIV.
P. 18, 20, or to circumvent the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s fee requirements by combining
multiple lawsuits into a single complaint.” Owens v. Godinez, 860 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2017).
See also Wheeler v. Talbot, -- F. App’x --, 2017 WL 2417889 (7th Cir. 2017) (district court
should have severed unrelated and improperly joined claims or dismissed one of them).
Consistent with George, Owens, and Wheeler, improperly joined parties and/or claims will be
severed into new cases, given new case numbers, and assessed separate filing fees.

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The Amended Complaint
In the Amended Complaint (Doc. 3), Plaintiff makes the following allegations related to
(1) failure to provide Plaintiff, who is Jewish, with a kosher diet; (2) deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s medical needs; and (3) law library access.
A.

Kosher Diet
Plaintiff is Jewish. (Doc. 3, p. 5). Plaintiff requested a religious kosher diet, but his

request was refused. Brian Glidden, the Fayette County Jail administrator, has indicated that
Plaintiff’s request is being denied because when Plaintiff was booked he was intoxicated and
refused to answer questions. Id. Plaintiff also states that he spoke with Glidden and filled out a
request slip directed to him, but nothing was done.
B.

Medical Treatment
Plaintiff is a veteran who suffers from mental illness, including Post Traumatic Stress

Disorder (PTSD). (Doc. 3, p. 5). Prior to being detained at Fayette County Jail, Plaintiff was
taking certain prescription medications to treat his mental illness and PTSD. Plaintiff also suffers
from asthma and uses an albuterol inhaler. Id. Plaintiff has used an albuterol inhaler “since
birth.” Id.
When Plaintiff was booked, he told officials the medications he was taking. Id. Plaintiff
was not given any prescription medications and was told he would see a physician or a nurse in
two weeks. Plaintiff has asked several times to be seen by a physician or a nurse but has not been
seen. At some point, Plaintiff was given medication, but it does not help his mental illness and
officials have not told Plaintiff what the medication or medications are for. Id. Officials have
also refused to give Plaintiff an albuterol inhaler. Id. Without the inhaler, Plaintiff cannot
exercise and sometimes has trouble breathing in the mornings. Id.

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C.

Law Library
Plaintiff claims detainees and/or inmates at the Jail have “no access” or “limited access”

to the law library. (Doc. 3, p. 5). The material that is available is damaged (missing pages) and
outdated. Id. It often takes days to obtain requested information. Id.
On July 12, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding law library inadequacies. Id.
Plaintiff was subsequently removed from his cell and placed in a small library. Id. After two
hours, the Sheriff opened the locked door and asked Plaintiff if he had enough library time. Id.
Plaintiff construes this as punishment for his grievance. Id.
Discussion
Dismissal of Certain Defendants
Fayette County Jail
Section 1983 imposes liability on “any person” who, under color of state law, deprives
another of rights protected by the Constitution. In Monell, the Supreme Court held that Congress
intended municipalities and other local government entities to be included among those persons
to whom § 1983 applies. 436 U.S., at 690, 98 S.Ct., at 2035. However, unlike municipalities, a
jail is not a legal entity that can be sued under § 1983. See Smith v. Knox County Jail, 666 F.3d
1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) (Knox County Jail a “non-suable entity”); Powell v. Cook County
Jail, 814 F.Supp. 757, 578 (N.D.Ill. 1993) (Cook County Jail is not an entity nor a “person”
subject to suit under § 1983). Accordingly, Fayette County Jail shall be dismissed from this
action with prejudice.
Dr. Fatoki, Dr. Elyea, and Megan Trone – “Medical Defendants”
Dr. Fatoki, Dr. Elyea, and Megan Trone are identified as defendants in Plaintiff’s list of

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defendants (but not in the case caption). With the exception of their job descriptions (“acting
physicians and nurse of Fayette County Jail”), no mention of these individuals is made in the
body of the Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff's failure to assert a specific act of wrongdoing as to these individuals does not
suffice to meet the personal involvement requirement necessary for § 1983 liability. See Gentry
v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (“to recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff
must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional
right.”). Therefore, Fatoki, Elyea, and Trone shall be dismissed from this action without
prejudice. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974).
Designation of Counts
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to designate four
counts in this pro se action. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claims not
addressed herein should be considered dismissed without prejudice from this action.

Count 1 –

Brian Glidden denied Plaintiff a religious diet in violation of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)).

Count 2 –

Deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against Unknown Party for
failing to provide Plaintiff with an initial health assessment and failing to
provide Plaintiff with prescribed medication for mental illness and asthma
(albuterol inhaler).

Count 3 –

First Amendment denial of access to the courts claim against Unknown
Party for inadequate law library access and/or inadequate law library
materials.

Count 4 –

First Amendment retaliation claim against Unknown Party for locking
Plaintiff in a small library for two hours as punishment for filing a
grievance about the law library.

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The alleged constitutional violations at issue in Counts 2, 3, and 4 are not associated
with any particular Defendant.3 Accordingly, Counts 2, 3, and 4 have “Unknown Party” as the
defendant. That being said, Plaintiff has brought three distinct sets of claims that appear to be
directed against different individuals. These claims do not belong together in a single action.
Therefore, the Court will exercise its discretion and sever unrelated claims against different
defendants into separate cases. George, 507 F.3d at 607.
Severance
Now, consistent with the George decision and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, the
Court shall sever the claim related to Plaintiff’s medical care, Count 2, into a separate action and
the claims pertaining to the law library, Counts 3 and 4 (which appear, at least tenuously, to stem
from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences), into another
action. These separate actions, for Count 2 and Counts 3 and 4, will have newly assigned case
numbers, and shall be assessed filing fees. The severed cases shall undergo preliminary review
pursuant to § 1915A after the new case numbers and judge assignments have been made.
Count 1, pertaining to Plaintiff’s religious diet, shall remain in this action and shall
receive preliminary review below.
Merits Review - Count 1
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment forbids prison officials from imposing
a substantial burden upon the free exercise of religion, unless the burden is reasonably related to
a legitimate penological interest. Kaufamn v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). The claim
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”)), essentially
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Plaintiff may have intended to direct Count 4 at an individual identified in the statement of claim as “the Sheriff.”
However, this individual is not included in the case caption. Because he was not listed in the case caption or list of
defendants, this individual will not be treated as a defendant in this case. See Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551,
551–52 (7th Cir. 2005) (defendants must be “specif[ied] in the caption”). As such, Count 4 also has “Unknown
Party” as a defendant.

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mirrors the First Amendment free exercise claim. See Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 451 (7th
Cir. 2012). RLUIPA also applies a “substantial burden” standard, but requires that the burden be
the least restrictive means serving a compelling governmental interest. Id. Prison officials are not
the religious police, determining orthodoxy and apostasy. See Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.3d 960,
963 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 68283 (7th Cir. 2013).
The Amended Complaint generally states a colorable First Amendment and RLUIPA
claim as to Glidden, who allegedly participated in denying Plaintiff’s request for a religious diet.
For these reasons, Count 1 shall proceed as to Glidden.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 4), which shall be referred
to a United States Magistrate Judge for disposition.
Plaintiff has filed a letter with the Court (Doc. 10), inquiring if he needs to initiate service
of process by filing a motion. Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this
civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the Court will order service
as a matter of course upon all defendants who remain in this action pursuant to this screening
order. No motion is necessary.
Disposition
Dismissal of Certain Defendants
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant FAYETTE COUNTY JAIL is
DISMISSED from this action with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants FATOKI, ELYEA, and TRONE are
DISMISSED from this action without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.

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Severance
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 2, which is unrelated to COUNT 1, is
SEVERED into a new case against UNKNOWN PARTY.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNTS 3 and 4, which are unrelated to COUNT
1, are SEVERED into a new case against UNKNOWN PARTY.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the only claim remaining in this action, is COUNT
1.
Newly Severed Cases
The claims in the newly severed cases shall be subject to screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A after the new case number and judge assignment is made. In the new cases, the Clerk is
DIRECTED to file the following documents:





This Memorandum and Order;
The Amended Complaint (Doc. 3);
Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 5); and
Plaintiff’s trust fund account statement (Doc. 8).
Plaintiff will be responsible for an additional $350 filing fee in each newly severed

case.4 No service shall be ordered in the severed cases until the § 1915A review is completed.
Merits Review of Count 1 – the Only Claim Remaining in This Case
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall receive further review as to
GLIDDEN.
This case shall now be captioned: TYLER D. CRIPE, Plaintiff vs. BRIAN GLIDDEN
(Fayette County Jail Administrator), Defendant.
With respect to COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for GLIDDEN: (1) Form 5
(Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of
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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914, effective May 1, 2013, an additional $50.00 administrative fee is also to be assessed
in all civil actions, unless pauper status is granted.

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Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the First
Amended Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to Defendant's place of employment as
identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons
(Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take
appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to
pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
With respect to a defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Amended Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings, including a decision on Plaintiff’s Motion for
Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 4). Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to a
United States Magistrate Judge for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, despite the fact
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 18, 2017
s/J. Phil Gilbert
U.S. District Judge

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