Young v. State of Illinois et al

Filing 11

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 9/19/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
THOMAS L. YOUNG, # A-66460,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE of ILLINOIS,
OFFICER HUFFMAN,
OFFICER HUNTER,
OFFICER HARJU,
and OFFICER SMILIE,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 17-cv-775-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Sheridan Correctional Center, has brought this pro se
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His claims arose while he was a prisoner at the
Jackson County Jail (“the Jail”).

Plaintiff sues a sheriff’s deputy who assaulted him, and

includes other county officers who witnessed the attack. This case is now before the Court for a
preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion of the
Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers

1

to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must
cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is
plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true,
see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so
sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v.
Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate
abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At
the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally
construed. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth
Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Applying these standards, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against some of the
Defendants survive threshold review under § 1915A.
The Complaint
Plaintiff states that he was incarcerated at the Jail for 3 months. On February 27, 2017,
he was convicted of unlawful use of a debit card, and was sentenced to 3 years in the Department
of Corrections. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Earlier during Plaintiff’s detention, Officer Huffman informed
Plaintiff that the debit card involved in Plaintiff’s case belonged to his mother, and Huffman
would make sure Plaintiff went to prison. Huffman harassed Plaintiff during his 3 months in the

2

Jail.
On March 8, 2017, Plaintiff was handcuffed and shackled in preparation for his transfer
to Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”) along with 2 other convicts. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Huffman
started an argument with Plaintiff, saying that he “hope[d] that [Plaintiff] do[es] every day of
[his] sentence.”

Id. Plaintiff responded that the only thing he regrets was that it wasn’t

Huffman’s card. Huffman then began to beat Plaintiff on the side of his head and in his face.
Plaintiff was unable to protect himself because his hands were cuffed to his waist. Id.
Officer Hunter and a coworker saw Huffman beating Plaintiff but did nothing to stop the
attack. Hunter’s only comment was, “Oh shit! The camera’s on.” Id. On another page of the
Complaint, in Plaintiff’s list of the parties, he states that Officer Harju witnessed the assault.
(Doc. 1, p. 2).
After Plaintiff arrived at Menard, he saw a doctor and had x-rays to document that his
injures did not occur at Menard. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff was told that no bones were broken, but
his eye was injured and he still has trouble with it.
Plaintiff also names the State of Illinois as a Defendant (Doc. 1, p. 1), and lists Officer
Smilie as another party (Doc. 1, p. 2). Regarding Officer Smilie, Plaintiff states that “he is a
witness in that he saw the damage to my face and was told what happen[ed].” (Doc. 1, p. 2).
Plaintiff seeks monetary relief for the violation of his rights. (Doc. 1, p. 6).
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit. Any other claim that

3

is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed
without prejudice.
Count 1: Excessive force claim against Defendant Huffman, for physically
attacking Plaintiff on March 8, 2017;
Count 2: Excessive force claim against Defendants Hunter, Harju, and Smilie,
for taking no action to stop the attack described in Count 1.
Both of the above counts shall proceed for further consideration, but 2 of the Defendants
shall be dismissed.
Count 1 – Excessive Force – Huffman
Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during most of his incarceration at the Jail. However, he
states that by the time Huffman attacked him on March 8, 2017, Plaintiff had been convicted of a
felony and was on his way to prison to serve his sentence. As such, Plaintiff was a convicted
prisoner at the time his claims arose, and the Eighth Amendment applies to his claims.
The intentional use of excessive force by a guard against an inmate without penological
justification constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and
is actionable under § 1983. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010); DeWalt v. Carter, 224
F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 2000). An inmate must show that an assault occurred, and that “it was
carried out ‘maliciously and sadistically’ rather than as part of ‘a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline.’” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 40 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)).
An inmate seeking damages for the use of excessive force need not establish serious bodily
injury to make a claim, but not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal
cause of action.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38 (the question is whether force was de minimis, not
whether the injury suffered was de minimis); see also Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837-38
(7th Cir. 2001).

4

Here, Plaintiff alleges that after his verbal exchange with Huffman over the debit card
sentence, Huffman physically attacked Plaintiff, beating him in the head and face. At the time,
Plaintiff was in handcuffs and shackles and could not block the blows. The fact that Plaintiff
was shackled also strongly suggests that Plaintiff was not offering resistance or otherwise
presenting a situation that called for any use of force. Huffman’s use of force, under the
circumstances described by Plaintiff, appears to have been excessive and not part of any goodfaith effort to maintain discipline. Plaintiff may therefore proceed with his Eighth Amendment
claim against Huffman in Count 1.
Count 2 – Excessive Force – Witnesses
An officer who stands by and watches while another official assaults a prisoner may be
equally liable to the prisoner due to the failure to intervene. The Seventh Circuit has examined
this issue as it pertains to police officers who fail to intervene when a fellow officer exceeds his
authority, stating:
We believe it is clear that one who is given the badge of authority of a police
officer may not ignore the duty imposed by his office and fail to stop other
officers who summarily punish a third person in his presence or otherwise within
his knowledge. That responsibility obviously obtains when the nonfeasor is a
supervisory officer to whose direction misfeasor officers are committed. So, too,
the same responsibility must exist as to nonsupervisory officers who are present at
the scene of such summary punishment, for to hold otherwise would be to insulate
nonsupervisory officers from liability for reasonably foreseeable consequences of
the neglect of their duty to enforce the laws and preserve the peace.
Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1972); see also Lanigan v. Vill. of E. Hazel Crest, 110
F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 1997); Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994) (collected
cases); Archie v. City of Racine, 826 F.2d 480, 491 (7th Cir. 1987).
Applying this standard to the officers who witnessed Huffman’s alleged attack on
Plaintiff, the Complaint states that Hunter “and her coworker” saw the beating as it happened.

5

(Doc. 1, p. 5). Hunter did nothing but remark that the camera was on. The coworker also took
no steps to intervene. Although Plaintiff does not mention Officer Harju in the statement of
claim on Page 5 of the Complaint, he states on Page 2 that Harju witnessed the assault. (Doc. 1,
p. 2). The Court shall therefore assume that Harju was the “coworker” who witnessed the assault
along with Hunter. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff has stated a viable Eighth Amendment
claim against both Hunter and Harju that survives review under § 1915A.
Officer Smilie, however, “saw the damage to [Plaintiff’s] face and was told what
happen[ed], according to the Complaint. (Doc. 1, p. 2). This statement indicates that Smilie was
not present during the attack, but only learned what happened after somebody told him how
Plaintiff was injured. As such, Smilie would not have been in a position to intervene at the time
Huffman hit Plaintiff, and there is no basis for liability under the Eighth Amendment standard set
forth above. Smilie shall therefore be dismissed from the action.
Count 2 shall proceed only against Hunter and Harju.
Dismissal of Defendant State of Illinois
Plaintiff lists the State of Illinois as a Defendant in the caption of his Complaint, but does
not mention the State of Illinois elsewhere in the document. As such, he fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted against the State. Merely invoking the name of a potential
defendant is not sufficient to state a claim against that individual or entity. See Collins v. Kibort,
143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant by
including the defendant’s name in the caption.”).
Even if Plaintiff had included some allegations against the State of Illinois, he cannot
maintain a suit against the state or any of its agencies. The Supreme Court has held that “neither
a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v.

6

Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See also Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588,
592 (7th Cir. 2001) (Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court for money
damages); Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995) (state Department of
Corrections is immune from suit by virtue of Eleventh Amendment); Hughes v. Joliet Corr. Ctr.,
931 F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 219, 220 n. 3 (7th Cir.
1990) (same). Plaintiff seeks only money damages as relief in this action, and this remedy is not
available against the State. The State of Illinois shall therefore be dismissed as a party to this
action.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3) shall be referred to the United
States Magistrate Judge for further consideration.
The motion for service of process at government expense (Doc. 4) is TERMINATED
AS MOOT. No such motion is necessary for a Plaintiff who has been granted leave to proceed
in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The Court shall order service on all defendants who remain in the
action following threshold review under § 1915A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
Disposition
Defendant STATE of ILLINOIS is DISMISSED from this action with prejudice.
Defendant SMILIE is DISMISSED from this action without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants HUFFMAN, HUNTER, and HARJU:
(1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6
(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the
Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as
identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons

7

(Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take
appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that
Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings, which shall include a determination on the
pending motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3).
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to the United States Magistrate Judge for
disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to
such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

8

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 19, 2017

s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief Judge
United States District Court

9