Youngblood v. Illinois Department of Corrections et al

Filing 67

ORDER ADOPTING Report 64 and DENYING Motion for Summary Judgment 46 . Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 8/27/2018. (jer)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TIMOTHY LORNE YOUNGBLOOD,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 17-cv-807-DRH-SCW

ILLINOIS DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
I.
Pending

before

the

Introduction

Court

is

an

August

6,

2018

Report

and

Recommendation (“the Report”) issued by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams.
(Doc. 64). The Report recommends the Court deny Defendant Trost’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Doc. 46). The parties were allowed time to file objections
and on August 23, 2018, Dr. Trost filed an objection to the Report. (Doc. 66).
Based on the applicable law, the record and the following, the Court ADOPTS the
Report in its entirety.
II.

Background

On July 28, 2017, Plaintiff Youngblood filed his complaint. (Doc. 1).
Pursuant to the Court’s threshold order, Plaintiff’s Complaint contained one count
that survived review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A: namely, Plaintiff alleges that
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he was provided inadequate medical care for multiple inguinal hernias by the
various Defendants while incarcerated at Sangamon County Jail, Shawnee
Correctional Center, Pontiac Correctional Center, and Menard Correctional
Center. (Doc. 8, pp. 6, 8–13).
On December 29, 2017, Defendant Trost filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies prior to filing suit by failing to properly file and appeal a grievance
concerning any actions of Defendant Trost in accordance with Illinois’
administrative procedures. Specifically, Defendant Trost argues that Plaintiff’s
mere transfer of institutions is not an excuse for failing to comply with applicable
exhaustion requirements.
On August 6, 2018, Magistrate Judge Williams submitted the Report
regarding the pending Motion for Summary Judgment and recommends that the
Court deny said motion. On August 23, Defendant Trost filed an objection to the
Report. (Doc. 66).
III.

Applicable Law

1. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the admissible evidence
considered as a whole shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Archdiocese of Milwaukee v.

Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). The party
seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating – based on

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the pleadings, affidavits and/or information obtained via discovery – the lack of
any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). A genuine issue of material fact remains “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); accord Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr.
Inc., 753 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2014).
In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court normally views
the facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in
favor of, the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir.
2012); Righi v. SMC Corp., 632 F.3d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 2011); Delapaz v.

Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011). As the Seventh Circuit has
explained, as required by Rule 56(a), “we set forth the facts by examining the
evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the
non-moving party, giving [him] the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences and
resolving conflicts in the evidence in [his] favor.” Spaine v. Community Contacts,

Inc., 756 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2014).
2. The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Exhaustion Requirement
The affirmative defense of failure to exhaust depends on whether a plaintiff
has fulfilled the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) exhaustion requirement,
which in turn depends on the prison grievance procedures set forth by the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218
(2007). The PLRA provides that “no action shall be brought [under federal law]

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with respect to prison conditions . . . by a prisoner . . . until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under the PLRA,
exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory, and unexhausted claims
cannot be brought in court. Jones, 549 U.S. at 211. The case may proceed on the
merits only after any contested issue of exhaustion is resolved by the court. Pavey

v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008).
The Seventh Circuit takes a strict compliance approach to exhaustion;
requiring inmates follow all grievance rules established by the correctional
authority. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). A prisoner must
therefore “file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s
administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.
2002). But the PLRA’s plain language makes clear that an inmate is required to
exhaust only those administrative remedies that are available to him. 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a). If the prisoner fails to follow the proper procedure, however, the
grievance will not be considered exhausted. Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903
(7th Cir. 2011). The purpose of exhaustion is to give prison officials an
opportunity to address the inmate’s claims internally, prior to federal litigation.

Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006).
3. Exhaustion Requirement under Illinois Law
IDOC’s process for exhausting administrative remedies is laid out in the
IDOC’s Grievance Procedures for Offenders. 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.810.
Prisoners need not file “multiple, successive grievances raising the same issue . . .

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if the objectionable condition is continuing.” Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645,
650 (7th Cir. 2013). Separate complaints about particular incidents are only
required if the underlying facts or the complaints are different. Id.

IV.

Analysis

The Court's review of the Report is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1),
which provides in part:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions
of
the report or
specified
proposed
findings
or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court
may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may
also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) also directs that the Court must only make a de

novo determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to which
specific written objection has been made. Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d
734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). If no objection or only a partial objection is made, the
Court reviews those unobjected portions for clear error. Id. In addition, failure to
file objections with the district court “waives appellate review of both factual and
legal questions.” Id. Under the clear error standard, the Court can only overturn a
Magistrate Judge's ruling if the Court is left with “the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126
F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997).
As highlighted in the Report, “evidence in the record shows that Plaintiff
submitted grievances in March 2016 and May 2016, and, at least, exhausted the
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May 2016 grievance. (Doc. 47-3, pp. 18–20, 47–51). Plaintiff’s May 2016 grievance
identified and described both of Plaintiff’s hernias, and specifically requested
immediate surgery on both hernias.” (Id. at p. 50). On January 3, 2017, after
IDOC personnel had transferred Plaintiff to Menard Correctional Center
(“Menard”), Menard personnel conducted a physical examination of Plaintiff and
acknowledged the existence of a second hernia which was the same hernia
outlined in Plaintiff’s May 2016 grievance. (Doc. 1-1, p. 5). On January 26, 2017,
the Administrate Review Board (“ARB”) denied as “moot” Plaintiff’s May 16
grievance, noting that “surgery [for Plaintiff’s right hernia] will be scheduled.”
(Doc. 47-3, p. 46). The record further indicates that Defendant Trost and other
Menard medical personnel examined Plaintiff, evaluated Plaintiff’s hernias, and
recommended that Plaintiff receive surgery only on his right inguinal hernia.
Defendant Trost objects to the Report by arguing, among other things, that

Turley is inapplicable to this matter because in Turley, unlike this case, the entire
series of relevant events occurred at Menard. Turley, 729 F.3d at 648. The above
distinction does not make Turley inapplicable because Plaintiff Youngblood’s May
2016 grievance still presents general allegations of inadequate medical care that
continued after his transfer to Menard.
Defendant Trost urges the Court to rely on Abdullah v. Shah, 2018 WL
1833149 (S.D. Ill. February 9, 2018) (Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson)
(adopted on February 28, 2018 by District Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel). As
noted in Defendant Trost’s objection, “In Abdullah, the Court determined that

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when the main treating physician is changed, it allows for re-evaluation by the new
treating physician, and thus there is independent judgment and treatment; these
intervening factors terminate a continuing violation. Id. at *4. In making the above
finding, the Adullah Court clearly placed great significance on the fact that Mr.
Adullah’s grievance was related to a specific doctor rather than treatment as
whole. As stated by the court:
In Plaintiff’s grievances regarding Dr. Shah, he takes great pain to
outline his specific interactions with Dr. Shah and the treatment that
the doctor provided or did not provide—he was not simply
complaining about the treatment from the healthcare unit as a whole
but rather Dr. Shah specifically. See e.g. Owens v. Duncan, 2017 WL
958507 (S.D. Ill. March 13, 2017) (noting that “plaintiff’s suit
involved a continuing problem with the healthcare unit . . . .”). While
such a grievance certainly would place the prison on notice that
Plaintiff was dissatisfied that Dr. Shah’s treatment of his conditions,
it is insufficient to place the prison on notice that he was dissatisfied
with all the treatment provided by the entire healthcare unit into the
future.

Id.
Here, unlike in Abdullah, Plaintiff Youngblood’s May 2016 grievance does
not take great pain to outline his specific interactions with a specific doctor.
(Doc. 1-1, p. 50). Rather, the grievance, without mentioning the attending
doctor by name, takes issue with Plaintiff Youngblood’s treatment as a
whole and requests surgery on both hernias. Id. After IDOC personnel
transferred Plaintiff Youngblood to Menard he notified Menard personnel of
his continuing medical condition that was outlined in his May 2016
grievance. (Doc. 1-1, p. 5). As the Report correctly points out:
Plaintiff submitted grievances requesting surgery for both of his
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hernias—while Plaintiff ultimately received part of his requested
treatment with the surgery on his right hernia, his providers
disagreed with his request for surgery on the left hernia. The ARB,
pointing to the providers’ recommendation and approval of the right
hernia surgery, denied Plaintiff’s grievance. Plaintiff has therefore
properly exhausted his administrative remedies as to both of his
hernias, and Defendant Trost may not rely on the fact that Plaintiff
failed to re-grieve the same, continuing condition while at Menard to
obtain summary judgment.
(Doc. 64, p. 11).
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff Youngblood properly exhausted his
administrative remedies prior to filing the present suit.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report (Doc. 66). The Court DENIES
Defendant Trost’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) for the reasons given
in the Report and Recommendation.

Judge Herndon
2018.08.27
16:03:21 -05'00'

IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge

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