Richardson v. White County Jail et al

Filing 9

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 9/20/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JAMES T. RICHARDSON, # Y-21562,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WHITE COUNTY JAIL,
RANDY COBB,
OFFICER KALEENA,
DEPUTY McKENZIE,
and DEPUTY STOKES,
Defendants.

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Case No. 17-cv-811-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Graham Correctional Center (“Graham”), has brought
this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His claims arose while he was
detained at the White County Jail (“the Jail”). Plaintiff claims that Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical conditions, and that he was subjected to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion of the
complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must
cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is
plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true,
see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so
sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v.
Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate
abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At
the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally
construed. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth
Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Applying these standards, the Court finds that some of Plaintiff’s claims survive
threshold review under § 1915A.
The Complaint
Plaintiff was in custody at the White County Jail during April and May 2017, until he
was transferred to Graham on May 10, 2017. (Doc. 1, pp. 6-11). When Plaintiff was booked
into the Jail, he advised the booking officer that he takes anti-epileptic prescription medication
(Gabapentin 800 mg, 4 times daily) to control seizures. (Doc. 1, p. 8). The officer said this

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information would be relayed to the Jail’s medical office. However, Plaintiff did not receive his
seizure medication for the next 5 days. Plaintiff notes that he had previously been in custody in
the White County Jail in 2015, and was prescribed the same 800 mg dosage of Gabapentin at that
time. Medical Officer Kaleena was the medical officer during Plaintiff’s 2015 custody, and was
still in that position during Plaintiff’s 2017 stay at the Jail. (Doc. 1, p. 12).
On the 5th day without medication, Plaintiff suffered a seizure that caused him to urinate
on himself and on his bedding. He notified Jail staff (whom he does not identify by name), but
they took an hour and a half to respond with clean clothes. Plaintiff still received no seizure
medication and did not see a medical provider. Plaintiff submitted approximately 6 medical
requests between April 21 and April 27, 2017, but never received a response. (Doc. 1, p. 8).
On the 8th day without medication, Plaintiff had another seizure while he was in cell #4.
When he “came back” from this seizure, his cellmates warned him not to move, and Plaintiff
immediately felt intense pain in his right hand. Id. Plaintiff notified Deputies McKenzie and
Stokes that his hand appeared swollen, he was in intense pain, and the bone appeared to be
broken. (Doc. 1, p. 6). McKenzie and Stokes took Plaintiff to a medical observation room,
where Plaintiff told Medical Officer Kaleena about his hand injury and pain. (Doc. 1, p. 6).
Kaleena gave him an 800 mg dose of Gabapentin, but gave him no medication for the pain.
(Doc. 1, pp. 6, 9). Plaintiff tried to get her to treat his hand and asked to see a doctor, but
Kaleena said, “Unless it’s a life threatening emergency the Jail wasn’t required to treat [him].”
(Doc. 1, p. 9).
Plaintiff was then placed into a cell that contained nothing but a mat, and was
contaminated with urine and feces on the toilet and floor. Plaintiff asked McKenzie and Stokes
to have the cell cleaned, but they told him to lie down and shut up. Plaintiff asked another

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officer for pain medication. That unidentified officer gave Plaintiff ice, but did not provide
medication for the pain.
Plaintiff asked McKenzie and Stokes for a grievance. McKenzie responded, “We don’t
do grievances here.” (Doc. 1, p. 10). When Plaintiff asked to speak to the jailer or sergeant,
McKenzie told him, “If you don’t want something worse than a broke[n] hand, you better lay the
f**k down and shut up.” Id. Plaintiff complied. Later, Plaintiff obtained a medical request
form, which he submitted to seek treatment for his injured hand.
The next day, Plaintiff still had received no medication for the pain. Kaleena called him
out of the cell and returned him to his previous cell (#4) in general population. She apologized
for the events of the previous day and told him he was scheduled for his hand to be examined.
(Doc. 1, p. 10). However, Plaintiff was never taken to see another medical provider, and he
received no pain medication for his hand over the next 7 days. (Doc. 1, p. 11). He did receive
his regular seizure medications during that time.
On the 8th day after his injury (May 10, 2017), Plaintiff was transferred to Graham, and
he showed his injured hand to officials there. Graham officials prescribed ibuprofen and an ace
bandage for Plaintiff, and an x-ray showed the hand was fractured. (Doc. 1, pp. 13-14). Plaintiff
later saw an orthopedic specialist and learned that the bone had healed but was “crooked.” (Doc.
1, p. 11). He claims that his hand is disfigured and will have to be re-broken so that it can be reset. (Doc. 1, p. 6).
Plaintiff adds that during April 2017, Jailer Randy Cobb “disregarded” Plaintiff’s health
by smoking inside the Jail, with no ventilation other than an open door. (Doc. 1, p. 7). On
several occasions, Plaintiff had to “walk through a cloud of smoke to move through the Jail.” Id.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for his pain and suffering, and to cover future medical

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bills stemming from the hand injury. (Doc. 1, p. 15).
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit. Any other claim that
is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed
without prejudice.
Count 1: Medical Officer Kaleena was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
medical needs for his seizure disorder, by failing to give Plaintiff his prescribed
anti-seizure medication for at least 8 days after Plaintiff entered the White County
Jail;
Count 2: Kaleena was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious hand injury,
when she refused to treat Plaintiff’s hand or provide him with any pain
medication, and failed to refer him to a doctor or nurse for further examination of
the injury;
Count 3: McKenzie and Stokes were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s severe
pain from his hand injury, when they failed to respond to Plaintiff’s requests for
pain medication after he was placed in the single cell;
Count 4: McKenzie and Stokes housed Plaintiff under unconstitutional
conditions when they failed to remedy the contamination with human waste in his
single cell;
Count 5: McKenzie and Stokes refused to allow Plaintiff to file a grievance;
Count 6: Cobb exposed Plaintiff to second-hand smoke on several occasions in
the Jail.
Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 shall proceed for further consideration in this action. Counts 5 and
6 shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Count 1 – Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs – Prescription Medication
It appears that for most of Plaintiff’s confinement at the Jail, he was held as a pretrial
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detainee while criminal charges against him were pending. However, at some point before May
10, 2017 (when Plaintiff was placed in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections and
transferred to Graham to serve a sentence), his status changed to that of a convicted prisoner.
A pretrial detainee’s claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs is considered
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, while the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment governs a claim filed by a convicted prisoner.
Under either standard, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims survive threshold review under
§ 1915A.
Detainees are entitled to the same sort of protection against deliberate indifference as
convicted inmates have under the Eighth Amendment. See Williams v. Romana, 411 F. App’x
900, 901 n.1 (7th Cir. 2011); Miller v. Hertz, 420 F. App’x 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2011). To state a
claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs, a detainee must show that (1) he suffered
from an objectively serious condition which created a substantial risk of harm, and (2) the
defendants were aware of that risk and intentionally disregarded it. Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d
824, 831 (7th Cir. 2010); Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764-65 (7th Cir. 2002). A
medical need is “serious” for deliberate indifference purposes where it is “one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d
1364, 1371 (7th Cir. 1997). “Delaying treatment may constitute deliberate indifference if such
delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain.” Gomez v. Randle,
680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

However,

evidence that a defendant acted negligently does not raise a claim for deliberate indifference.
Jackson, 300 F.3d at 764-65.

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Here, Plaintiff’s seizure disorder is an objectively serious medical condition. He states
that when he was booked into the Jail, he informed the booking officer of his need for his
prescribed medication to control his seizures, and this request should have been conveyed to
Medical Officer Kaleena. Moreover, Kaleena was made aware of Plaintiff’s seizure disorder and
prescription for Gabapentin when he was a prisoner at the Jail in 2015. At the time of Plaintiff’s
2017 imprisonment, if Kaleena knew about Plaintiff’s condition and his daily need for
Gabapentin, yet failed to provide him with this medication during the earlier part of his
imprisonment, she may have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition.
Interestingly, Kaleena gave Plaintiff his Gabapentin, apparently for the first time, when he
sought help from her for his injured hand. He continued to receive this daily medication for the
rest of his time at the Jail.
At this early stage of the litigation, Plaintiff may proceed with the deliberate indifference
claim against Kaleena in Count 1.
Count 2 – Deliberate Indifference – Hand Injury - Kaleena
Plaintiff suffered an objectively serious injury when he fractured his hand during a
seizure. Despite his complaints of swelling and severe pain, Kaleena refused to treat the hand
injury or refer Plaintiff to a doctor or nurse, because she concluded he did not have a “life
threatening emergency.” (Doc. 1, p. 9). She did not give Plaintiff any pain medication. When
Plaintiff saw Kaleena for the second time on the day following his injury, she claimed that he
was scheduled to be seen by another medical professional, but this did not happen. Again, she
gave him no pain medication. As a result of Kaleena’s inaction, Plaintiff continued to suffer
from this untreated, painful fracture for approximately 8 days, until he was sent to Graham.
These events support a claim against Kaleena for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s broken

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hand. Accordingly, the claim in Count 2 shall also proceed for further review.
Count 3 – Deliberate Indifference – Pain Medication – McKenzie & Stokes
McKenzie and Stokes are not medical providers, but they still have a responsibility to
respond appropriately to a prisoner’s need for medical attention. At first, when Plaintiff sought
help for his injured hand, they acted reasonably by taking him to Medical Officer Kaleena for
assistance.
After Plaintiff was dismissed by Kaleena and was taken to the single cell, however,
McKenzie and Stokes did nothing else to help Plaintiff get pain medication, despite their
awareness of his broken hand. They ignored all of Plaintiff’s requests for help, and threatened
him with “something worse than a broke[n] hand” if he did not lie down and shut up. (Doc. 1, p.
10).
At this early stage of the case, the Complaint suggests that McKenzie and Stokes may
have been deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s need for pain medication for his broken hand
after he was placed back in a cell. Plaintiff may therefore proceed with the claim in Count 3.
Count 4 – Unsanitary Cell
This claim also arises from Plaintiff’s confinement in the single cell immediately after he
was seen by Kaleena. Plaintiff discovered that the cell was contaminated with urine and feces on
the toilet and on the floor. The cell was furnished only with a mat. Plaintiff asked McKenzie
and Stokes to have the cell cleaned, but they refused to take any steps to correct the problem, and
instead told Plaintiff to lie down and shut up.
A pretrial detainee’s claims relating to unconstitutional conditions of confinement are
governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d
304 (7th Cir. 2015); Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 2013); Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr.

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Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 664 (7th Cir. 2012); Forest v. Prine, 620 F.3d 739, 744-45 (7th Cir.
2010); Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2008). As the Seventh Circuit
explained:
[A] pretrial detainee is entitled to be free from conditions that amount to
“punishment,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979), while a convicted
prisoner is entitled to be free from conditions that constitute “cruel and unusual
punishment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In both cases,
however, the alleged conditions must be objectively serious enough to amount to
a constitutional deprivation, and the defendant prison official must possess a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.
Smith, 803 F.3d at 309.
The Seventh Circuit has historically applied the same standards to conditions claims
arising under the Fourteenth Amendment (detainees) and Eighth Amendment (convicted
prisoners). See Smith, 803 F.3d at 309-10; Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 771-72, 777-79
(7th Cir. 2008). For ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ claims brought by a detainee, the plaintiff
must show that the jail officials knew that the plaintiff was at risk of serious harm, and that they
disregarded that risk by failing to reasonably discharge the risk. Grieveson v. Anderson, 538
F.3d 763, 771-72, 777-79 (7th Cir. 2008). The objective element of such a claim requires a
showing that the conditions deny the inmate “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities,” creating an excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
The second, subjective element focuses on the defendant’s culpable state of mind, which is
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate from those conditions.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 842. To satisfy this element, a plaintiff must show that “the defendant
‘possess[ed] a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a reckless state of mind’ with respect to the
defendant's actions (or inaction) toward the plaintiff.” Davis v. Wessel, 792 F.3d 793, 801 (7th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, __U.S.__, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015)).

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Here, Plaintiff claims that McKenzie and Stokes kept him in the cell where he was
exposed to contamination with human feces and urine, and refused to take any steps to have the
cell cleaned or possibly to move Plaintiff to another location. It appears that Plaintiff may have
remained in the cell for approximately 24 hours, until Kaleena sent him back to general
population sometime during the following day. Further factual development will be necessary in
order to determine whether these events rose to the level of a constitutional violation. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s claim against McKenzie and Stokes in Count 4 based on the unsanitary cell
conditions shall receive further consideration.
Dismissal of Count 5 – Grievance Procedure
Plaintiff claims that while he was in the dirty cell described in Count 4, McKenzie and
Stokes denied his request to file a grievance, claiming, “We don’t do grievances here,” and
threatening Plaintiff with harm. (Doc. 1, p. 10). While the Court does not condone this
response, denying a prisoner the opportunity to file a grievance over his conditions of
confinement does not violate the Constitution.
Plaintiff’s efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a grievance with Jail
officials may be relevant in the event that a Defendant raises a challenge to Plaintiff’s ability to
maintain a § 1983 suit over the substantive matters raised in the grievances. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a); Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, a Defendant’s
action or inaction in handling a grievance or a request to file one does not support an
independent constitutional claim. “[A] state’s inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430
(7th Cir. 1996). The Constitution requires no procedure at all, and the failure of prison or jail
officials to follow their own procedures does not, of itself, violate the Constitution. Maust v.

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Headley, 959 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1992); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100-01 (7th Cir.
1982). Similarly, if the Jail did not have a grievance procedure available, as McKenzie claimed,
that omission does not amount to a constitutional violation.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claim in Count 5 based on his thwarted attempt to file a
grievance shall be dismissed from the action with prejudice.
Dismissal of Count 6 – Second-Hand Smoke
The standard outlined in Count 4 above also applies to this claim for unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. For Plaintiff to prevail against Cobb based on the exposure to
second-hand smoke, Plaintiff must show that the conditions created an excessive risk to
Plaintiff’s health, and that Cobb was aware of the risk yet failed to correct the problem. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 771-72,
777-79 (7th Cir. 2008).
The Supreme Court has held that a convicted prisoner “states a cause of action under the
Eighth Amendment by alleging that [defendants] have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him
to levels of ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] that pose an unreasonable risk of serious
damage to his future health.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993); see also Alvarado v.
Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). Exposure to second-hand smoke can give rise to
two types of claims – one for present injury and one for future injury. To state a claim based on
present injury, an inmate must allege that prison officials knew of and disregarded “serious
existing health problems” caused by the second-hand smoke. Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d
839, 845 (7th Cir. 1999). If the inmate has a serious respiratory condition that low levels of
second-hand smoke may aggravate, the prison must provide a non-smoking environment. See
Powers v. Snyder, 484 F.3d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 2007); Alvarado, 267 F.3d at 653.

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To state a claim based on future injury, an inmate must allege that prison officials knew
of and disregarded exposure to levels of second-hand smoke that “pose an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to his future health.” Helling, 509 U.S. at 35; see Alvarado, 267 F.3d at 651.
In Plaintiff’s case, he may have an actionable claim against Cobb.

However, the

Complaint does not indicate how often or for how long Plaintiff was exposed to second-hand
smoke. Plaintiff encountered “a cloud of smoke” on “several occasions” during April 2017
while he walked through the Jail. (Doc. 1, p. 7). This ambiguous statement could indicate
merely a momentary exposure while walking past an office, or may suggest a longer-term
condition. Based on this brief allegation, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff was exposed to
smoke with a frequency or duration that posed an unreasonable risk to his health. Furthermore,
the Complaint does not state whether Plaintiff ever notified Cobb of his concern, such that
Cobb’s failure to mitigate the problem would amount to deliberate indifference to a known risk.
For these reasons, Count 6 against Cobb shall be dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that if he seeks to revive this claim in this action through filing an
amended complaint, the claim in Count 6 may be subject to severance into a separate action,
where another filing fee shall be assessed. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007)
(unrelated claims against different defendants belong in separate lawsuits).
Dismissal of Defendant White County Jail
In addition to the individual adverse parties, Plaintiff names the White County Jail as a
Defendant. In order to obtain relief against a municipality such as the Jail, a plaintiff must allege
that the constitutional deprivations were the result of an official policy, custom, or practice of the
municipality. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); see also Pourghoraishi
v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 765 (7th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff includes no such allegations in the

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Complaint, and none of his claims indicate that any individual Defendant acted or failed to act
because of an official policy, custom, or practice promulgated by the Jail.
Furthermore, merely invoking the name of a potential defendant is not sufficient to state a
claim against that individual or entity. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998)
(“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant by including the defendant’s name in the
caption.”).
For these reasons, the White County Jail shall be dismissed without prejudice as a party
to this action.
Pending Motion
Plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3) shall be referred to the United
States Magistrate Judge for further consideration.
Disposition
COUNT 5 is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
COUNT 6 is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
Defendants WHITE COUNTY JAIL and COBB are DISMISSED from this action
without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants KALEENA, McKENZIE, and
STOKES: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and
(2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a
copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of
employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of

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Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the
Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will
require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings, which shall include a determination on the
pending motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3).
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to the United States Magistrate Judge for
disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to
such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

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independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 20, 2017

s/J. Phil Gilbert
United States District Judge

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