Martin v. Werlich

Filing 16

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Martin's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241 (Doc. 1 ) is DENIED and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 6/18/2019. (beb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TROY MARTIN, #21567-424,
Petitioner,
vs.
T. G. WERLICH,
Respondent.

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Case No. 17-cv-0842-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Petitioner Troy Martin, an inmate in the Bureau of Prisons, filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on August 7, 2017. (Doc. 1). Martin was sentenced to
life imprisonment in 2007 after a jury found him guilty of a large-scale drug distribution
conspiracy. United States v. Troy Martin, et al., No. 04-cr-0495-1, Doc. 1791-1 (N.D. Ill. May 4,
2007). Martin’s sentence was based in part on the jury’s finding that he was responsible for
distribution of more than 50 grams of crack cocaine and more than 5 kilograms of powder cocaine,
but was also driven by factors unrelated to the specific quantity of drugs, including his prior murder
conviction and subsequent role in organizing and leading a Chicago gang. Id. at Doc. 2483, pp.
2–3. Martin’s Sentencing Guidelines range was also enhanced pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.5(1)
and (2)(A) after the sentencing court found that Martin’s offense conduct involved the use of body
armor. Id. at Doc. 1752, p. 2; (Doc. 12, pp. 6–7). Martin’s life sentence was later reduced to 360
months’ imprisonment. Martin, No. 04-cr-0495-1, Doc. 2818 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2016).
Martin now invokes Mathis v. United States, – U.S. –, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) to challenge
the enhancement for the use of body armor in drug trafficking crimes. Specifically, he argues that

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the sentencing court erred in finding that he qualified for the body armor enhancement and that his
actual conduct “f[ell] outside the scope of [the body armor enhancement].” (Doc. 1, p. 4).
Respondent opposes issuance of the Writ on two grounds: (1) Martin’s allegedly incorrectlycalculated Guidelines range based on the body armor enhancement cannot satisfy the requirements
of § 2255(e)’s savings clause because his sentence fell within the statutory maximum penalty for
his crimes of conviction notwithstanding the body armor enhancement (Doc. 12, pp. 3–5); and (2)
Mathis’ rationale is wholly inapplicable to Martin’s body armor enhancement and cannot be the
basis for his requested relief. (Id. at pp. 5–6). Martin replied to Respondent’s Response. (Doc.
14).
This matter is now ripe for resolution. For the reasons discussed below, Martin’s § 2241
Petition (Doc. 1) will be DENIED.
Procedural History and Relevant Facts
On October 12, 2006, a jury found Martin guilty of one Count of Conspiracy to Possess
with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 21 U.S.C.
§ 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and sixteen Counts of Use of a Communication Facility to Facilitate the
commission of the Distribution of a Controlled Substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
United States v. Troy Martin, et al., 04-cr-0495-1, Doc. 1484 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2006). The jury
specifically found that “Troy Martin was responsible for distribution of more than 50 grams of
crack cocaine [also referred to as “cocaine base”] and more than 5 kilograms of powder cocaine.”
Id. at Doc. 2483, p. 2. As a result, Martin’s statutory sentencing range included a maximum of life
imprisonment.

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii).

The Presentence Report (“PSR”) applied the

Guidelines’ body armor enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.5(1) and (2)(A), which added

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two offense levels to Martin’s Guidelines calculation. Id. at Doc. 1752, p. 2; 1 (Doc. 12, pp. 6–7).
Martin was ultimately sentenced to life imprisonment on May 4, 2007, id. at Doc. 1791-1.
Martin filed a direct appeal relating to the district court’s pretrial and trial rulings and also
challenged aspects of his sentencing. His conviction and sentence was affirmed in all respects
except for a “limited remand[] for reconsideration” of Martin’s sentences in light of 2007
amendments to the Guidelines regarding the disparity between sentencing ranges for crack and
powder cocaine. United States v. Martin, et al., 618 F.3d 705, 739 (7th Cir. 2010). On remand,
the sentencing court declined to modify Martin’s life sentence, United States v. Martin, et al., No.
04-cr-0495, Doc. 2483, pp. 2–3, 7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2011); this decision was affirmed on appeal.
United States v. Martin, et al., No. 07-2272, 2011 WL 5519811, at **1–3 (7th Cir. Nov. 14, 2011).
Martin has also sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. His first motion, filed in March
2013, argued that his trial counsel was “constitutionally ineffective with respect to the plea
bargaining process.” It was denied by the district court and the denial was affirmed by the Seventh
Circuit on appeal. Martin v. United States, No. 13-3826, Doc. 33 (7th Cir. June 12, 2015).
In 2016, Martin sought a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on
a Guidelines amendment that lowered the base offense levels for certain drug offenses. The district
court recalculated his Guidelines range at 360 months to life, which included the 2-level
enhancement for use of body armor, and granted the motion, thereby reducing Martin’s life
sentence to 360 months’ imprisonment. United States v. Troy Martin, et al., No. 04-cr-0495-1,
Doc. 2818 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2016).
Martin filed an application for leave to file a second § 2255 motion on June 26, 2017,

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The Presentence Report is filed under seal at Doc. 1825 in Martin’s criminal case, United States v. Martin,
et al., Case No. 04-cr-0495-1 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2007). Because it is sealed, this Court was unable to access
it, and Respondent has not provided a copy to the Court. However, Martin’s objection to the report (Doc.
1752) references the 2-level enhancement based on the body armor finding in the PSR.

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arguing Mathis v. United States, – U.S. –, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) invalidated his body armor
Guidelines enhancement and sentence. Martin v. United States, No. 17-2317, Doc. 1 (7th Cir.
June 26, 2017). The Seventh Circuit summarily denied Martin’s application. Id. at Doc. 2.
Applicable Legal Standards
Generally, petitions for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may not be used to
raise claims of legal error in conviction or sentencing, but are instead limited to challenges
regarding the execution of a sentence. See Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir.
1998). Aside from the direct appeal process, a § 2255 motion is ordinarily the “exclusive means
for a federal prisoner to attack his conviction.” Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir.
2003). A prisoner is generally limited to one challenge of his conviction and sentence under
§ 2255. A prisoner may not file a “second or successive” § 2255 motion unless a panel of the
appropriate court of appeals certifies that such motion either 1) contains newly discovered
evidence “sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder
would have found the movant guilty of the offense,” or 2) invokes “a new rule of constitutional
law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
Under very limited circumstances, however, it is possible for a prisoner to challenge his
federal conviction or sentence under § 2241. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) contains a “savings clause”
under which a federal prisoner can file a § 2241 petition when the remedy under § 2255 is
“inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). See United
States v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792, 798-99 (7th Cir. 2002). The Seventh Circuit construed the savings
clause in In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998): “A procedure for postconviction
relief can be fairly termed inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a convicted defendant

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any opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having
been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.”
Following Davenport, a petitioner must meet three conditions to trigger the savings clause.
First, he must show that he relies on a new statutory interpretation case rather than a constitutional
case. Secondly, he must show that he relies on a decision that he could not have invoked in his
first § 2255 motion and that case must apply retroactively. Lastly, he must demonstrate that there
has been a “fundamental defect” in his conviction or sentence that is grave enough to be deemed
a miscarriage of justice. Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013). See also Brown
v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012). In other words, something more than a lack of success
with a § 2255 motion must exist before the savings clause is satisfied.” See Webster v. Daniels,
784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015).
Analysis
In light of Mathis, Martin argues the body armor enhancement was improperly applied to
his Guidelines range. (Doc. 1, pp. 3–6). Before reaching the merits of this argument, the Court
must first consider whether Martin’s claim can be brought within the narrow scope of § 2255’s
savings clause. The Court agrees with Respondent that Martin cannot demonstrate the existence
of a fundamental defect in his conviction or sentence that is grave enough to be deemed a
miscarriage of justice, and thus he cannot satisfy the requirements of § 2255(e)’s savings clause to
bring his Mathis claim in a § 2241 petition.
Some errors can be raised on direct appeal but not in a collateral attack by a § 2255 motion
or a § 2241 petition. A claim that a defendant’s Guidelines sentencing range was erroneously
calculated is one such claim.

Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2013),

supplemented on denial of rehearing, 724 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2013); see also United States v.

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Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708–09 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e held in Hawkins that the error in
calculating the Guidelines range did not constitute a miscarriage of justice for § 2255 purposes
given the advisory nature of the Guidelines and the district court’s determination that the sentence
was appropriate and that it did not exceed the statutory maximum.”).
The Sentencing Guidelines have been advisory since the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Perry v. United States, 877 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2017).
Despite Martin’s conclusory statement to the contrary, (Doc. 14, p. 3), he was sentenced in 2007,
after the Booker decision. United States v. Martin, No. 04-cr-0495-1, Doc. 1791-1 (N.D. Ill. May
4, 2007). The applicable statutory sentencing range for Martin’s conviction was 10 years to life
imprisonment, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii). Thus, both Martin’s
original life sentence and its subsequent reduction to 360 months imprisonment fell within the
statutory maximum sentence for his conviction.
Martin argues that he could not have brought his claim within a year of his final conviction
in 2007 because the argument he raises was foreclosed to him until after Mathis was decided in
2016. Even assuming, arguendo, that the first and second Davenport criteria have been met, 2
Hawkins dictates that an erroneous application of the advisory guidelines does not amount to a
“miscarriage of justice” (the third Davenport factor) so long as the sentence is within the applicable
statutory limit. Therefore, Martin’s Petition does not meet the criteria to bring his claim within
§ 2255(e)’s savings clause.
The issue in Hawkins was analogous to the issue raised by Martin: the alleged
miscalculation of an advisory Guideline range, based on an enhancement factor (here, the body

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Because Hawkins dictates that Martin cannot possibly satisfy Davenport’s “miscarriage
of justice” factor, which is dispositive of his Petition, the Court need not decide whether
Martin has satisfied the other two Davenport factors.

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armor) which Martin argues is impermissible under current law. In its supplemental opinion on
denial of rehearing in Hawkins, the Seventh Circuit summarized its holding: “an error in
calculating a defendant’s guidelines sentencing range does not justify postconviction relief unless
the defendant had . . . been sentenced in the pre-Booker era, when the guidelines were mandatory
rather than merely advisory.” Hawkins, 724 F.3d at 916 (internal citations omitted). Thus,
Hawkins remains binding precedent in this Circuit and Martin’s Petition must be dismissed.
Conclusion
For the above reasons, Martin’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (Doc. 1) is DENIED and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court
is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
If Petitioner wishes to appeal the dismissal of this action, his notice of appeal must be filed
with this Court within 60 days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1(A). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis (“IFP”) must set forth the issues Petitioner plans to present on
appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Petitioner does choose to appeal and is allowed to
proceed IFP, he will be liable for a portion of the $505.00 appellate filing fee (the amount to be
determined based on his prison trust fund account records for the past six months) irrespective of
the outcome of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger,
547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien
v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998). A proper and timely motion filed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 60-day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4).
A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of the
judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended. Other motions, including a Rule 60
motion for relief from a final judgment, do not toll the deadline for an appeal.

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It is not necessary for Petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability from this disposition
of his § 2241 petition. Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2000).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 18, 2019

s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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