Miller v. Rauner et al
Filing
307
ORDER GRANTING 264 and 285 Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's claims against all remaining Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in their favor and close this case on the Court's docket. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 11/30/20. (klh2)
Case 3:17-cv-00859-MAB Document 307 Filed 11/30/20 Page 1 of 50 Page ID #5702
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JIMMIE DALE MILLER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN BALDWIN,
JACQUELINE LASHBROOK,
KAREN JAIMET, LARUE LOVE,
CHRISTOPHER SCOTT THOMPSON,
RHONDA MCWILLIAMS,
ROSE LOOS, DEREK FLATT,
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
DR. LOUIS SHICKER,
DR. STEVE MEEKS, ANGEL RECTOR,
DR. ALBERTO BUTALID,
DR. N. WALLABHANENI,
CHRISTINE BROWN, and
DR. MICHAEL SCOTT,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:17-CV-859-MAB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is currently before the Court on the motions for summary judgment filed by all
Defendants (Docs. 264, 285). For the reasons explained in this Order, the motions will be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jimmie Dale Miller filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his
constitutional rights were violated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center. He is pursuing claims that
a number of medical providers, grievance officials, and prison administrators were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs and took no action to address his concerns regarding his
hepatitis C, diabetes, lost eyeglasses, mental health, and pain near his left kidney (Doc. 183; Doc.
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282, 296).
Defendants Dr. Alberto Butalid, Rose Loos, Angel Rector, Dr. Michael Scott, Dr.
Nageswararao Vallabhaneni, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (the “Wexford Defendants”) filed
their motion for summary judgment on December 23, 2019 (Doc. 264). Plaintiff filed his response
in opposition on May 19, 2020 (Doc. 282). The Wexford Defendants filed a reply brief on June 2,
2020 (Doc. 290).
Defendants John Baldwin, Christine Brown, Derek Flatt, Karen Jaimet, Jacqueline
Lashbrook, Larue Love, Rhonda McWilliams, Dr. Steve Meeks, Dr. Louis Shicker, and
Christopher Scott Thompson (the “IDOC Defendants”) filed their motion for summary judgment
on May 26, 2020 (Docs. 285, 286, 287). Plaintiff filed his response in opposition on July 16, 2020
(Doc. 296). The IDOC Defendants filed a reply brief on July 23, 2020 (Doc. 299).
The materials submitted by the parties are voluminous and daunting—well over 100 pages
of briefing and nearly 3,500 pages of exhibits addressing sixteen separate Defendants, not to
mention the numerous secondary motions, responses, and replies (see Doc. 306). The Court’s
review of the parties' submissions is restricted to the portions of the record they cited, and the legal
arguments they expressly articulated. The Court did not comb through the record to find facts to
support vague allusions in the briefs.
FACTS
Plaintiff Jimmie Dale Miller is an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections. He was
incarcerated in June 2016 and assigned to Pinckneyville, where he arrived on September 1, 2016
(Doc. 265-1, p. 44; Doc. 265-2, pp. 14–15; Doc. 286-15, pp. 10, 11). He remained at Pinckneyville
until February 2019, except for brief furloughs to other facilities (see Doc. 286-15, pp. 2–11). In
February 2019, Plaintiff was transferred to Lawrence Correctional Center (Id. at p. 2). He was
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released from prison in June 2020 (Doc. 296, p. 13). Prior to and during his incarceration,
Plaintiff had a number of physical and mental health issues, including hepatitis C (“HCV”), type
2 diabetes, undiagnosed pain in his left side, and bipolar disorder.
A. HEPATITIS C
Hepatitis C is a virus that spreads through blood-to-blood contact and infects and inflames
the liver.1 While some people infected with the virus are able to naturally clear it from their bodies,
most people develop chronic hepatitis C, which can lead to liver scarring (called fibrosis), cirrhosis
(severe and permanent scarring), liver cancer, liver failure, and even death. HCV can be treated,
and often cured, with antiviral medications. Id. (see also Doc. 282-1, pp. 12–13). Treatment,
however, is complicated and recommendations are constantly evolving (e.g., Doc. 282-1, pp. 35,
92; Doc. 286-2, p. 1). 2 Treatment can take between two to six months and is costly (tens of
thousands of dollars per inmate) but has a success rate of over 90% (Doc. 282-1, pp. 13–14).3
The IDOC has partnered with the University of Illinois Chicago (“UIC”) to treat HCVpositive inmates (Doc. 282-3, p. 2). Together they authored Guidelines for diagnosing, evaluating,
monitoring, and treating inmates with HCV (Doc. 282-3; see also Doc. 282-1, pp. 34, 90–91). The
Guidelines closely track the recommendations of national organizations, such as the American
Association for the Study of Liver Disease and the Infectious Disease Society of America (Doc.
282-3, p. 2; Doc. 282-1, pp. 90–91). Wexford Health Sources, Inc., which is a private corporation
Hepatitis C, NAT’L INST. OF DIABETES AND DIGESTIVE AND KIDNEY DISEASE, https://www.niddk.nih.gov/healthinformation/liver-disease/viral-hepatitis/hepatitis-c (last visited November 27, 2020).
1
2
See also Monica K. Houston, Hepatitis C: There's a Cure, But Who Will Bail Out the Department of Corrections?,
11
HEALTH
LAW
AND
POLICY
BRIEF
27,
33–35
(2017),
available
at
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1145&context=hlp.
3
See also Houston, supra note 2, at pp. 33–35, 36–37.
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the IDOC contracts with to provide medical care to inmates in IDOC facilities, is required to adhere
to the IDOC's Guidelines (Doc. 282-1, p. 47). Wexford employs Dr. Dina Paul as the Chronic
Disease and Case Management Director (Id. at p. 3). In this position, she evaluates three to four
thousand patients with hepatitis C per year (Id.). She is an expert in managing and treating patients
with HCV (Id. at pp. 19–20; see also Doc. 282-4, p. 79).
National guidelines recommend anti-viral treatment for all patients infected with HCV
(Doc. 282-1, pp. 69–70). However, the national guidelines also recognize that due to the cost of
the medication, in some situations, treatment should be prioritized for patients with more advanced
liver disease (Id.). Prioritization is necessary for the IDOC given the high incidence of HCV in
prisons and the cost of treatment (Doc. 282-1, pp. 81–82; see also Doc. 282-3, p. 2).4 Priority goes
to inmates with more advanced liver disease while other inmates are monitored and evaluated
every six months at chronic care clinic visits and considered for HCV treatment as clinically
indicated (Doc. 282-2; Doc. 282-3, p. 2). Dr. Dina Paul agreed that it was appropriate to monitor
inmates whose condition was not advanced (Doc. 282-1, pp. 80–81).
The IDOC’s Hepatitis C Guidelines adopted in May 2014 (“2014 Guidelines”) dictated
that inmates entering IDOC custody were screened for HCV at the receiving and classification
facility (Doc. 282-3, p. 15). If the test was positive and the inmate wanted to be evaluated for
possible treatment, lab tests were then performed to confirm that the inmate had chronic HCV and
to determine the inmate’s APRI score (Doc. 282-3, p. 15). The APRI is a non-invasive, convenient,
and low-cost way to estimate fibrosis of the liver from routine blood tests (Doc. 282-1, pp. 50, 87–
4
Dr. Dina Paul testified that up to 25 to 30% of inmates in the IDOC have HCV (Doc. 282-1, pp. 81–82). See also
Houston, supra note 2, at p. 32.
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88).5 IDOC physicians also evaluated the inmate for “absolute exclusion criteria” that precluded
the inmate from receiving treatment for HCV, which included amongst other things uncontrolled
diabetes (Doc. 282-3, p. 15; Doc. 282-1, p. 70).
Under the 2014 Guidelines, if the inmate’s APRI score was less than 0.5, they were not
eligible for HCV treatment and they were followed in the chronic care clinic every six months
(Doc. 282-3, pp. 10, 17).6 If the inmate’s APRI score was greater than 0.5 and they wished to be
considered for HCV therapy, then they received an “initial work up,” which included baseline
blood work, a FibroSpect/Sure (a specialized blood test used for measuring fibrosis), Hepatitis A
and B vaccinations, and Hepatitis C education and counseling (Doc. 282-3, pp. 10, 15–17; Doc.
282-1, pp. 36–37). And if the FibroSpect/Sure score was a Level 3 or 4, the patient was referred
to UIC (Doc. 282-3, pp. 10, 15–17).
Dr. Dina Paul testified that Defendant Dr. Louis Shicker, the IDOC Medical Director,
revised the HCV guidelines in early 2015, and those changes were discussed at a quarterly meeting
in June 2015 (Doc. 282-1, pp. 37–38). One of the changes was the discontinuation of
FibroSpect/Sure testing because “they didn’t think it was very accurate” (Id. at 37–40; see also
Doc. 282-3, pp. 9, 12–13). According to Dr. Paul, by the time Plaintiff was incarcerated at
Pinckneyville in September 2016, the FibroSpect/Sure testing had been replaced by a liver/spleen
5
APRI stands for AST to Platelet Ratio Index. It is based on the ratio of AST (which stands for aspartate
aminotransferase, an enzyme found primarily in the liver) to platelets in the patient’s body (Doc. 282-1, p. 56; Doc.
282-4, pp. 21–22). High levels of AST and low platelet counts are indicative of liver damage. What is the APRI Score?,
WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/hepatitis/what-is-apri-score (last visited November 27, 2020). The APRI score
will get higher if the individual’s AST level increases or their platelet count decreases (Doc. 282-1, p. 56). The APRI
has good accuracy at predicting fibrosis at the two ends of the spectrum (Id. at pp. 49–50). In other words, a low APRI
score (less than 0.5), is a strong indicator that there is no significant fibrosis or cirrhosis while a high APRI score (over
1.5) is a strong indicator that there is significant fibrosis or cirrhosis. What is the APRI Score?, WEBMD. The midrange values are not as accurate at predicting the amount of fibrosis (Doc. 282-1, pp. 50, 97–98).
6
Dr. Paul testified that she thought the threshold APRI score was something over 1.0 (Doc. 282-1, p. 85).
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ultrasound that was conducted if the APRI score was over 1.0 and the platelet count was under
200,000 (Doc. 282-1, pp. 40–42). Dr. Dina Paul testified that this policy was reasonable (Id.). Dr.
Paul testified that she was unsure whether the Guidelines—as in, the actual printed document—
were formally revised to reflect these changes (Id. at pp. 38–39). Plaintiff indicated that he was
not provided with a written version of the Guidelines as amended in 2015 (Doc. 282, p. 4 n.1).
The Guidelines were revised again in December 2017, and provided that inmates with an
APRI score over 1.0 (or between 0.7 and 1.0 with low platelet count, low albumin, or elevated
INR) were supposed to get a FibroScan (Doc. 282-3, p. 2). A FibroScan is a specialized ultrasound
of the liver that assesses how stiff or how flexible it is as a way to estimate the amount of fibrosis
(Doc. 282-1, pp. 33–34, 48, 88). The Guidelines were revised again in October 2018 to provide
that any inmate with HCV was supposed to get a Fibroscan, regardless of their APRI score, unless
they met one of the absolute exclusion criteria (Id. at pp. 35–36). The guidelines were revised
again in January 2019 (see Doc. 282-1, pp. 35, 53).
Plaintiff was diagnosed with hepatitis C in approximately 2014 (Doc. 265-1, p. 63; Doc.
283-2, p. 1). Plaintiff was subsequently incarcerated and transferred to Pinckneyville in September
2016 (Doc. 265-1, p. 44; Doc. 265-2, pp. 14–15). During his intake screening, Plaintiff informed
the nurse that he had HCV, and he was enrolled in the HCV chronic care clinic (Doc. 265-2, pp.
15, 16). Nurse Practitioner Angel Rector saw Plaintiff for the first and only time on September 21,
2016 at his first chronic care clinic (Doc. 265-2, pp. 99–101; Doc. 265-8).7 Plaintiff’s APRI score
was calculated as 0.71 (Doc. 265-2, pp. 99–101; Doc. 265-8). NP Rector testified via affidavit,
and the medical records indicate, that she spoke with Plaintiff about his hepatitis C status, including
7
Angel Rector was employed by Wexford as a Nurse Practitioner at Pinckneyville from January 2007 until January
2017 (Doc. 265-8).
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discussing whether he would comply with treatment if he became eligible and whether he had any
unstable psychiatric issues (Doc. 265-2, p. 101; Doc. 265-8). Nurse Rector determined that “based
on the IDOC chronic clinic guideline, my assessment based on my education and experience,
[Plaintiff’s] presentation, and [Plaintiff’s] APRI score,” Plaintiff did not qualify for HCV treatment
(Doc. 265-8). She continued him in the HCV chronic clinic to monitor his condition (Doc. 265-8;
see also Doc. 265-2, p. 100).
According to Plaintiff, however, he was never told that the visit pertained to his HCV (Doc.
265-1, pp. 111–12, 115). He testified that he nevertheless told NP Rector about his HCV and asked
for the hepatitis A and B vaccinations. NP Rector told him that he needed to “drop a request slip.”
On November 29, 2016, Plaintiff saw Dr. Michael Scott for the first time (Doc. 265-2, p.
32). Dr. Scott was the Medical Director at Pinckneyville at that time (Doc. 282-4, pp. 10–13, 26).8
Plaintiff complained of ongoing, intermittent pain in his left lower side near his kidneys (Doc. 2652, p. 32; Doc. 282-4, pp. 37–38, 72–73).9 Dr. Scott ordered a chest x-ray and multiple laboratory
tests to try to diagnose the source of the pain. There is nothing in the medical record that indicates
Plaintiff complained about his HCV at the November 29th appointment with Dr. Scott. Plaintiff
testified, however, that he took two binders containing his medical records to this appointment,
and he complained to Dr. Scott not only about his left flank pain, but also about his HCV, amongst
other things (Doc. 265-1, pp. 58–59, 128–132). He claims Dr. Scott refused to review his medical
records and refused to listen to his complaints about problems other than his left flank pain and
simply “brushed [them] aside.”
8
Dr. Michael Scott was employed by Wexford as the Medical Director at Pinckneyville from January 2016 through
February 2017 (Doc. 282-4, p. 10). Prior to working at Pinckneyville, Dr. Scott practiced emergency medicine for the
better part of 30 years (Id. at pp. 10–13, 26).
9
Further details about this visit are provided in the next section regarding Plaintiff’s diabetes and flank pain.
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Plaintiff had additional appointments with Dr. Scott on January 11 and 23, 2017 to follow
up on the tests results and his diabetes (Doc. 265-2, pp. 36, 38; Doc. 282-4, pp. 56–59, 74–76).10
There is no indication in the medical records that Plaintiff’s HCV was discussed. According to
Plaintiff, however, he requested treatment for Hepatitis C and vaccinations for Hepatitis A and B
from Dr. Scott at the January 23rd appointment, but Dr. Scott refused to provide any treatment or
order the “initial work up” outlined in the Guidelines (Doc. 265-1, pp. 131, 141).
Plaintiff’s final visit with Dr. Scott was on January 31st for his first, baseline chronic clinic
visit for diabetes (Doc. 265-2, pp. 105–106; Doc. 282-4, pp. 59–61).11 There is no indication in
the medical records that Plaintiff’s HCV was discussed. Dr. Scott did not ever recommend that
Plaintiff receive the hepatitis A and B vaccines, nor did he administer them to Plaintiff (Doc. 2824, pp. 41–42). He testified that he was “unaware of any recommendations” for HCV patients to
receive hepatitis A and B vaccines.
Plaintiff had chronic clinic visits on April 30, 2017 with Defendant Dr. Alberto Butalid
(Doc. 265-2, pp. 107–110; Doc. 265-14).12 Plaintiff’s APRI score was calculated as 0.8. Plaintiff
did not report any symptoms or complications with his HCV, and on examination he was not
jaundiced, he had no swelling, and he had no palpable liver enlargement. Dr. Butalid marked that
Plaintiff’s HCV was being controlled and was stable. Dr. Butalid testified that Plaintiff was not
referred for any further testing or possible treatment because his APRI score was below the
Further details about the test results and these visits are provided in the next section regarding Plaintiff’s diabetes
and flank pain.
10
11
Further details about this visit are provided in the next section regarding Plaintiff’s diabetes and flank pain.
12
Dr. Alberto Butalid has been employed by Wexford since 2011 (Doc. 265-14). He was assigned as a traveling
physician to Pinckneyville from approximately April 2017 until July 19, 2018, when he was transferred to Vandalia
Correctional Center (Id.).
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threshold number for doing so.
Plaintiff had chronic clinic visits on August 26, 2017 with a non-Defendant medical
provider (Doc. 265-2, pp. 113–116; Doc. 265-14). His APRI score was 0.517. The provider marked
that Plaintiff’s HCV was being controlled and was stable and Plaintiff was not a candidate for
treatment. The provider ordered Plaintiff to return to the HCV clinic in six months. Plaintiff had
chronic clinic visits for diabetes and hypertension on December 9, 2017 with a non-defendant
medical provider (Doc. 265-2, pp. 119–120).13 It does not appear that he was seen for his HCV at
that time (see id.).
Dr. Butalid saw Plaintiff for follow-up appointments regarding his diabetes on December
17, 2017 and January 7, 2018 (Doc. 265-2, pp. 71, 76; Doc. 265-14). There is no indication in the
medical records that Plaintiff’s HCV was discussed at these appointments (see Doc. 265-2, pp. 71,
76). The January 7th appointment was the last time Dr. Butalid saw Plaintiff (Doc. 265-14).
On August 23, 2018, Plaintiff was seen at the HCV chronic care clinic and his APRI was
calculated as 0.4 (Doc. 265-6, pp. 122, 210–11). In December 2018, his APRI was calculated as
0.3 (Id. at pp. 126, 212–13). Both times, the practitioner indicated that Plaintiff was not a candidate
for treatment (Id. at pp. 122, 126). Dr. Dina Paul opined that during the time Plaintiff was at
Pinckneyville, his HCV “was treated as per the IDOC Office of Health Services' Hepatitis C
Guidelines. (Doc. 282-1, pp. 22–23).
Plaintiff was transferred to Lawrence in February 2019. After that, his HCV chronic care
clinic visits were with Dr. Paul herself (Doc. 282-1, pp. 31–35). His first visit with Dr. Paul was
on August 22, 2019 (Doc. 265-6, p. 132). His APRI score was calculated as 0.4 and his albumin,
13
Further details about this visit is provided in the next section.
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platelets, and INR (which are the labs looked at to assess liver function) were all within normal
range (Doc. 265-6, pp. 132, 222–23; Doc. 282-1, p. 45). Dr. Paul ordered lab work to check
whether Plaintiff was immune to hepatitis A and B; if he was not immune, he agreed to being
vaccinated (Doc. 265-6, p. 132; Doc. 282-1, pp. 98–99). She also referred him for a Fibroscan in
accordance with the January 2019 version of the IDOC Guidelines, which were in effect at that
time (Doc. 265-6, p. 132.; see Doc. 282-1, p. 35). Based on the results of the Fibroscan, Plaintiff
was given a METAVIR fibrosis score of F3, which meant he had “significant liver fibrosis” (Doc.
282-1, pp. 44, 63–64). However, Dr. Paul further indicated that his lab work “hasn’t budged at all”
and showed that Plaintiff’s liver was “functioning normally” the entire time he was at
Pinckneyville and up through the time she saw him (Id. at pp. 44–45).
Dr. Paul saw Plaintiff again in December 2019 (Doc. 282-1, pp. 72–76). She informed him
that under the IDOC’s Guidelines, he was not eligible for HCV treatment because his diabetes was
uncontrolled. She also informed him that his lab work showed he was immune to hepatitis A but
not B, and he had never contracted hepatitis B (Id. at pp. 73, 99; see also Doc. 265-6, p. 224). She
ordered the hepatitis B vaccine series (Doc. 282-1, p. 99). She also ordered a liver-spleen
ultrasound in order to get imaging of Plaintiff’s spleen (Id. at p. 75–76). She explained that an
enlarged spleen is “a very sensitive marker of advanced liver disease. . . . But when the spleen is
within normal limits as to its size, it’s reassuring that the liver scarring is not advanced” (Id.). She
testified that Plaintiff’s spleen was normal in size (Id.).
B. DIABETES, DIET, AND LEFT FLANK PAIN
Plaintiff was diagnosed with type II diabetes around February 2013 (Doc. 265-1, p. 42).
He was on medication to control his diabetes, however, it was discontinued in June 2016 when he
entered the IDOC (Doc. 265-2, p. 36; Doc. 282-4, p. 56). Labs drawn at that time show his
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hemoglobin A1C was 5.8% and within normal limits (Doc. 265-3, p. 84).14
In September 2016—the month that Plaintiff was transferred to Pinckneyville—he spent
over $100 on food and drinks at the commissary, including corn chips, potato chips, popcorn,
Lemonheads, Jolly Ranchers, Snickers, Pop Tarts, Little Debbie Honey Buns, chocolate chip
cookies, “tubs” of cheese, sausage sticks, pepperoni, salami, Sweet Sue ham, refried beans, rice,
tortillas, 48 packages of ramen noodles, Gatorade, and 16 packets of Berry Blue Typhoon drink
mix (Doc. 265-9, pp. 15–16). In October 2016, he again spent over $100 on food and drinks at the
commissary, including many of the same chips, candy, cookies, cakes, meats, beans, rice, and
drinks (Id. at pp. 16–17). During the month of November 2016, Plaintiff was in segregation and
was not allowed to buy any food at the commissary (Id. at pp. 17–18; see Doc. 283-1, p. 53).
On November 23, 2016, Plaintiff reported to nurse sick call about pain in his left side that
he claimed had been ongoing for a “long time” (Doc. 265-2, p. 31; see also Doc. 265-1, pp. 126–
27). He rated his pain as a two out of ten but denied was not presently experiencing any discomfort.
The nurse offered him Tylenol, but he declined. The nurse referred him to the physician. Plaintiff
then saw Dr. Michael Scott six days later on November 29th (Doc. 265-2, p. 32; Doc. 282-4, pp.
37–39, 72–73). Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he had been experiencing the pain in the
area of his left kidney since probably 2012 (Doc. 265-1, p. 101). However, the medical records
indicate that he told Dr. Scott he had been having intermittent pain in his left lower side near his
kidneys for five or six months (Doc. 265-2, p. 32; see also id. at p. 35; Doc. 282-4, pp. 37–39, 72–
73). Plaintiff claimed it was an aching discomfort that got worse “with recumbency and at night.”
14
Hemoglobin A1C, also referred to as just A1C or HbA1c, is a blood test that measures the average blood glucose
(sugar) level over the past three months. Understanding A1C, AM. DIABETES ASSC., https://www.diabetes.org/a1c
(last visited Nov. 27, 2020). A simple glucose test only measures the amount of sugar in your blood at the very moment
it is drawn. Id. Consequently, the A1C test is helpful for diagnosing prediabetes and diabetes, and is critical for
monitoring how well the diabetes treatment plan is working over time. Id.
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Plaintiff indicated that he was not presently experiencing any pain. He denied previous trauma,
shortness of breath, cough, urinary symptoms, blood in his urine, fever and chills. Dr. Scott
testified that the location Plaintiff identified was tender but did not seem to involve his kidney;
rather, it seemed to involve a musculoskeletal source. Dr. Scott ordered a chest x-ray to check for
pulmonary disease and multiple laboratory tests, including a urinalysis and other bloodwork, to
check for urinary issues, kidney issues, and Plaintiff’s glycemic control.
The chest x-ray came back normal (Doc. 265-3, p. 78; Doc. 282-4, pp. 38–39). The labs
did not show any urinary or kidney issues (Doc. 282-4, pp. 72–73). But they did show Plaintiff’s
A1C and glucose were both elevated (Doc. 265-3, p. 88). His glucose was 298 mg/dl (normal is
65–110) and his A1C was 9.4% (normal ranges from 4.0–6.0%). Dr. Scott testified that an A1C
level of 9.4% suggests that the patient’s diabetes “has not been well controlled in the prior three
months” (Doc. 282-4, p. 40).
During the month of December, Plaintiff spent over $250 on food and drinks at the
commissary, including corn chips, tortilla chips, “caramel delights,” Twix, Pay Day, M&Ms,
Snickers, Pop Tarts, “cinnamon square cereal,” iced oatmeal cookies, caramel cookies, Little
Debbie Honey Buns, refried beans, rice, 47 packages of ramen noodles, pepperoni, salami, beef
and cheese sticks, a twelve pack of Gatorade, a twelve pack of Sprite drinks, and sixteen packets
of Berry Limeade Blast drink mix (Doc. 265-9, pp. 18–20).
Plaintiff saw Dr. Scott at a follow-up appointment on January 11, 2017 (Doc. 265-1, p.
135–138; Doc. 265-2, p. 36; Doc. 282-4, pp. 56–59, 74–75). Dr. Scott informed Plaintiff that the
previous testing and laboratory work did not show any abnormalities related to his kidneys.
Plaintiff reported increased hunger, thirst, and urination. Dr. Scott noted that Plaintiff’s diabetes
medication, metformin, had been discontinued when he came into IDOC custody and he had been
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off his medication for six months. Dr. Scott restarted Plaintiff on metformin and also prescribed
glipizide. Dr. Scott also enrolled Plaintiff in the diabetes chronic clinic. Inmates in the diabetes
chronic clinic see a practitioner every four months for monitoring (Doc. 282-2, p. 3). There is no
indication that Plaintiff complained about left side pain at this appointment, and Dr. Scott did not
order any further testing or treatment in relation to the pain (see Doc. 265-2, p. 36; Doc. 282-4, p.
55). The medical records reflect that the day after this appointment, at the request of Dr. Scott, a
nurse delivered “education sheets” regarding diabetes to Plaintiff (Doc. 265-2, p. 37).
Plaintiff saw Dr. Scott again on January 23rd on a referral from a nurse practitioner for
reevaluation due to an increase in his A1C (Doc. 265-2, p. 38; Doc. 282-4, pp. 57–58, 75–76). Dr.
Scott adjusted Plaintiff’s medication and ordered repeat A1C testing in three months. The medical
records reflect that Dr. Scott instructed Plaintiff to increase his fluid intake and eat a well-balanced
diet. Dr. Scott testified that he would have discussed with Plaintiff what a “well-balanced diet”
entailed, which likely included “encourage[ing] him to minimize commissary purchases and food
intake and stick with what was provided in the cafeteria since that was food that was designed to
be healthy and containing the right caloric balance” (Doc. 282-4, p. 76). There is no indication that
Plaintiff complained about left side pain at this appointment, and Dr. Scott did not order any further
testing or treatment in relation to the pain (see Doc. 265-2, p. 38).
Dr. Scott then saw Plaintiff for the last time on January 31st for his first, baseline chronic
clinic visit for diabetes (Doc. 265-2, pp. 105–106; Doc. 282-4, pp. 59–61). The medical record
from that visit indicates that Plaintiff’s A1C was elevated at 9.4%. Dr. Scott continued Plaintiff’s
medications and ordered Accu-checks of Plaintiff’s blood sugar twice a month. He marked that
Plaintiff should eat a “regular diet,” which he testified meant “the food that was offered in the
cafeteria” and “did not include junk food or commissary items” (Doc. 282-4, pp. 59–61). There is
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no indication that Plaintiff complained about left side pain at this appointment, and Dr. Scott did
not order any further testing or treatment in relation to the pain (see Doc. 265-2, p. 38).
During the month of January 2017, Plaintiff spent over $100 at the commissary on food
and drinks (Doc. 265-9, pp. 20–21). In February, he spent over $200 (Id. at pp. 21–23). In March,
he spent over $700 (Id. at pp. 23–27). And in April he spent over $400 (Id. at pp. 27–30).
On April 30, 2017, Plaintiff saw Defendant Dr. Alberto Butalid at a chronic clinic visit
(Doc. 265-2, pp. 107–110; Doc. 265-14). Labs drawn prior to the visit showed that his glucose
was measured at 367 mg/dl (normal is 65–110) and his A1C was measured at 16.5% (normal is
4.0–6.0%) (Doc. 265-3, p. 89). Dr. Butalid increased Plaintiff’s glipizide, continued his metformin,
and ordered Accu-checks of Plaintiff’s blood sugar three times a week for two weeks (Doc. 2652, p. 107; Doc. 265-14). Dr. Butalid also discussed with Plaintiff the importance of an appropriate
diet, weight loss, and exercise, in addition to medication compliance.
During the months of May and June 2017, Plaintiff was in segregation and was not allowed
to buy any food at the commissary (Doc. 265-9, p. 31; see Doc. 283-1, p. 64; Doc. 286-15, p. 7).
In early July, he spent approximately $25 on food at the commissary, including tortilla chips,
jalapeno popcorn, Pop Tarts, iced oatmeal cookies, and 24 packages of ramen noodles (Doc. 2659, p. 31). By July 20th and through the month of August, Plaintiff was once again in segregation
and was not allowed to buy any food at the commissary (Id. at p. 32; see Doc. 283-1, p. 98; Doc.
286-15, p. 6).
On August 26, 2017, Plaintiff was seen for his chronic clinic visits by a non-Defendant
practitioner (Doc. 265-2, pp. 113–15; Doc. 265-14). Labs drawn prior to the visit showed that his
A1C had dropped to 8.8% (normal is 4.0–6.0%) (Doc. 265-3, p. 92).
Plaintiff did not purchase any food at the commissary in September, October, or November
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(Doc. 265-9, pp. 32–33). Despite this, when his labs were drawn on November 1st, his A1C was
17.6% (normal is 4.0–6.0%) (Doc. 265-3, p. 94). On December 1st, his A1C was retested and
measured 18.0% (Id. at p. 95). His glucose measured 525 (normal is 65–110) (Id.). On December
9th, Plaintiff was seen for his chronic clinic visits by a non-Defendant physician (Doc. 265-2, pp.
65–66, 119–120; Doc. 265-14). The physicians ordered Plaintiff to be kept in the infirmary for
approximately 24 hours for observation and monitoring because he was hyperglycemic, and he
was given injections of insulin to bring his glucose down (Doc. 265-2, pp. 65–69). The physician
also referred Plaintiff for a psychiatry consultation “ASAP,” noting that a side effect of Abilify
(the psychiatric medication Plaintiff was recently started on, (see Doc. 283-1, pp. 79–85, 95–97,
119–35)), is hyperglycemia and therefore this episode may have been caused by the Abilify.
Plaintiff saw Dr. Butalid on December 17th (Doc. 265-2, p. 71; Doc. 265-14). He
complained of increased urination, dry lips and mouth, and increased thirst. Dr. Butalid
discontinued the glipizide medication, continued the metformin, and increased Plaintiff’s insulin.
Dr. Butalid ordered a follow up appointment in three weeks, which took place on January 7, 2018
(Doc. 265-2, pp. 75, 76, 121; Doc. 265-14). Dr. Butalid performed a physical examination and
found nothing abnormal. He adjusted the amount of insulin Plaintiff would receive in the evenings
and also ordered a low sugar insulin snack. All diabetic inmates on insulin received an evening
snack to help prevent hypoglycemia (the blood sugar dropping too low) during the night. (Doc.
265-14, p. 3; Doc. 282-4, p. 49). The January 7th appointment was the last time Dr. Butalid saw
Plaintiff (Doc. 265-14). Medical records show that Plaintiff’s A1C remained extremely elevated
and his diabetes remained uncontrolled throughout 2018 while he was at Pinckneyville and
throughout 2019 after his transfer to Lawrence (Doc. 265-6, pp. 204–24).
Dr. Scott testified that while he was at Pinckneyville, there was no special diet offered for
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diabetic inmates and he had never ordered one (Doc. 282-4, pp. 46–49, 58). Both Dr. Scott and
Dr. Butalid testified that the menu and dietary offerings were chosen (or at least reviewed) by a
registered dietician in order to ensure the food offered was healthy and appropriate for everyone,
including diabetics (Doc. 265-14; Doc. 282-4, pp. 49, 62, 65, 80; see also Doc. 265-15). Healthcare
Unit Administrator Christine Brown also told Plaintiff that the meals offered at Pinckneyville were
approved by a dietician and “[d]iabetics eat what other offenders eat” (Doc. 265-3, p. 102; see also
id. at p. 119). Both Dr. Scott and Dr. Butalid testified that there were inmates who were able to
control their diabetes through the diet provided by Pinckneyville (Doc. 265-14; Doc. 282-4, pp.
80–81).
For his part, Plaintiff contends that “during his time” at Pinckneyville, the IDOC
implemented a “Therapeutic Diet Manual” (Doc. 282, pp. 8–9; Doc. 282-6). Plaintiff did not,
however, offer any testimony or other evidence as to the specific date that it was written,
implemented, or issued to practitioners (see Doc. 282), and there is no indication on the manual
itself (see Doc. 282-6). The 129-page manual was shown to Dr. Scott during his deposition, and
he testified that he had never seen it, did not know what a therapeutic diet was, and had never
ordered a special diet for a diabetic inmate (Doc. 282-4, pp. 47–49).
C. VISION ISSUES
Plaintiff testified that his glasses fell off during a fight with his cellmate on October 31,
2016 (Doc. 265-1, pp. 200–02). He said that he was examined by a nurse after the altercation, and
she told him that she would get his glasses from his cell, but she never did. He was sent to
segregation without his glasses. When he was released from segregation on November 30, 2016,
his glasses were not in his property box. He ended up going approximately one year without his
glasses (Doc. 265-2, pp. 81–85).
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D. MENTAL HEALTH
Plaintiff has a long history of mental health issues dating back to his teenage years (see,
e.g., Doc. 262-3, pp. 123–29; Doc. 283-1, pp. 22–24). When he entered the IDOC in June 2016,
he reported that he was taking Risperdal (generic name risperidone) and Depakote to treat his
mental health issues (Doc. 262-3, p. 127; Doc. 283-1, p. 5). The IDOC psychiatrist screened
Plaintiff and diagnosed him with unspecified bipolar disorder with psychotic features, and he was
continued on Risperdal (Doc. 283-1, pp. 1–9).15
On September 19, 2016, approximately three weeks after Plaintiff arrived at Pinckneyville,
he met with Defendant Dr. Nageswararao Vallabhaneni for the first and only time (Doc. 283-1,
pp. 38–42; Doc. 265-11).16 The doctor assessed Plaintiff’s mental health status and determined
that he was “mentally stable” and no longer needed anti-psychotic medication. Plaintiff testified
that Dr. Vallabhaneni also told him that the medication could harm him because he had HCV (Doc.
265-1, p. 159). “After proper education” by Dr. Vallabhaneni, Plaintiff consented to
discontinuation of his Risperdal (Doc. 283-1, pp. 38–42; Doc. 262-11; see also Doc. 265-1, p.
160). Dr. Vallabhaneni ordered Plaintiff to return in four weeks for reassessment. He also
instructed Plaintiff to contact him if Plaintiff need to be seen sooner. It is undisputed that Plaintiff
never reached back out to Dr. Vallabhaneni before the doctor left Wexford in November 2016
(Doc. 282, p. 26).
15
Plaintiff testified that when he entered the IDOC, the psychiatrist discontinued his prescription for Depakote
because he was positive for HCV (Doc. 265-1, pp. 79–80). Depakote is known to cause liver damage and people with
liver problems are advised not to take it. Depakote Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.depakote.com/faqs (last
visited Nov. 27, 2020).
16
Dr. Nageswararao Vallabhaneni is a psychiatrist who was employed by Wexford (Doc. 265-11). He was primarily
assigned to Menard Correctional Center and was only assigned to Pinckneyville for a couple months from
approximately August 2016 to approximately late October/early November 2016 (Id.). In November 2016, Dr.
Vallabhaneni permanently retired from his employment with Wexford (Id.).
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Plaintiff saw Rose Loos, a Qualified Mental Health Provider (“QMHP”), for a one-on-one
therapy session one week after his appointment with Dr. Vallabhaneni, on September 26th (Doc.
265-12; Doc. 283-1, pp. 43–48). 17 The records from that appointment indicate that Plaintiff’s
appearance was appropriate, he was oriented and cooperative, his thought process was clear and
coherent, and his affect was unremarkable (Doc. 283-1, p. 43). Ms. Loos suggested a treatment
plan involving one-on-one therapy and group therapy over the next twelve months. Plaintiff agreed
with the plan (Id. at p. 48).
Plaintiff had a follow-up appointment on October 20th with a non-Defendant QMHP, Ms.
Mason (Doc. 283-1, pp. 49–52). He told Ms. Mason that his Risperdal had been discontinued in
September and stated that he “doesn’t want psych meds any longer.” He reported that his mood
was “good.” But eleven days later, on October 31st, Plaintiff got in a fight with his cellmate and
was sent to segregation (Doc. 283-1, p. 53). During his deposition, Plaintiff testified, “I think I
wrote [Rose Loos] a letter” prior to the altercation about the difficulties he was having with his
cellmate and his desire “to do something before I bug out,” but Loos never responded (Doc. 2651, p. 161). Plaintiff did not offer any details about the purported letter, such as the date he wrote
it, how he sent it to her, etc. (see id.). Plaintiff also admitted that he did not know whether Ms.
Loos received the letter. He nevertheless maintained that he told her during one of their “sessions”
prior to the altercation that “I wanted to get back on my medication, because I feel like I’m about
to lose it. I made that clear to her.” (Id. at pp. 162–63). There is no indication in the mental health
records, however, of a conversation of this nature (see Doc. 283-1).
17
Rose Loos is a licensed mental health professional and she has been employed by Wexford as a Qualified Mental
Health Provider (“QMHP”) at Pinckneyville since September 28, 2014 (Doc. 265-12). She provides supportive
therapy to inmates in on-on-one and group settings (Id.). She is not a medical provider and cannot evaluate medical
conditions or prescribe medication (Id.).
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There is also no indication in the mental health records that Plaintiff ever mentioned
resuming his medication the entire time he was in segregation. A QMHP checked in with Plaintiff
on November 1st, the day after the altercation, and every week after that until he was released from
segregation on November 30th (Doc. 283-1, pp. 53–55). The first week, Plaintiff had “no issues
to report.” The second week, Plaintiff stated “I’m okay.” The third week, Plaintiff asked to see
“Ms. Rose [Loos]” and he was referred to mental health services. The fourth and fifth weeks,
Plaintiff had “no issues to report.”
Following his release from segregation, Plaintiff had an appointment with Rose Loos on
December 8th (Doc. 283-1, pp. 56–57; Doc. 265-12). Ms. Loos documented that Plaintiff’s
appearance was appropriate, he was oriented, and his affect was unremarkable, but his thought
process was tangential and his mood was irritable. Plaintiff reported that he “snapped” on his
cellmate and was put in segregation after they got in a fight. Ms. Loos wrote that he felt “he needs
to be placed back on his medications.” This is the first indication in the mental health records that
Plaintiff wanted to resume his medication (see Doc. 283-1). Ms. Loos referred him to the
psychiatrist.
Plaintiff had a follow-up appointment with Ms. Loos on January 10, 2017 (Doc. 283-1, pp.
58–59; Doc. 265-12). Plaintiff had not yet seen the psychiatrist (see Doc. 283-1). Ms. Loos
documented that Plaintiff’s appearance was appropriate, he was oriented, his affect was
unremarkable, but his mood was irritable (Id. at pp. 58–59). Plaintiff reported that he was sick
and “[did] not feel good at all.” He said everything he ate or smelled made him sick to his stomach,
and he was not sure if it was his diabetes or HCV that was causing the problem. Ms. Loos provided
supportive therapy and discussed coping skills with Plaintiff.
Plaintiff was not seen again until April 19th (Doc. 283-1, pp. 60–61). He told Ms. Loos
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that he was doing the best he could to stay out of trouble. Ms. Loos documented that Plaintiff’s
appearance was appropriate, he was oriented, cooperative, and lucid, his affect was unremarkable,
his thought process was clear and relevant, and his speech was normal. She provided supportive
therapy and discussed coping skills with Plaintiff.
On May 2, 2017, Plaintiff was sent back to segregation for two months (see Doc. 283-1, p.
64). A QMHP checked in on him on May 9th, and he indicated that he “need[ed] to see psych and
MHP,” and he was referred to mental health services. Plaintiff saw Ms. Mason on May 13th (Id.
at pp. 62–63). Plaintiff reported that he had been having a hard time managing his mood and had
gotten into several fights and altercations. He said that he was previously seeking help and “they
said they would help me” but “no one ever seemed to follow thru with anything.” He stated that
he thought he might need to go back on psychiatric medication. Ms. Mason referred Plaintiff to
the psychiatrist.
Plaintiff reported that he was “okay” on May 16th, May 23rd, and May 30th (Doc. 283-1,
pp. 64–66). On June 6th, he told the QMHP that he needed to see the psychiatrist and he was
referred to mental health services (Id. at p. 77). On June 13th, he told Rose Loos he wanted “to see
doctor,” but she indicated that no action was required, and she did not make any referral (Id.). Two
days later Plaintiff had a one-on-one appointment with a QMHP (Doc. 283-1, pp. 67–72). It was
noted that his appearance was appropriate, he was oriented and cooperative, his thought process
was clear and coherent, and his affect was unremarkable. The QMHP recommended monthly
individual therapy sessions. The treatment plan did not include any psychiatric medication.
Plaintiff agreed with the plan.
A QMHP checked in with Plaintiff on June 20th and referred him to mental health services
after he said he had been waiting to see the psychiatrist (Doc. 283-1, p. 78). A QMHP checked in
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with him again on June 28th, and Plaintiff reported, in pertinent part, that he still had not seen the
psychiatrist and he needed to (Id. at pp. 75–76). On July 13, 2017—over seven months after he
first requested to see and was referred to the psychiatrist—Plaintiff finally had an appointment
with the psychiatrist (Id. at pp. 79–85). The doctor indicated that Plaintiff was appropriately
groomed, alert, oriented, cooperative, and his thought process was clear/coherent, but he displayed
mild psychomotor agitation, his attention was distractible, his speech was pressured (Id.). The
doctor noted that Plaintiff had been off psychiatric medication for about nine months and “has
become symptomatic with mildly pressured speech, irritability, insomnia, and psychomotor
agitation” (Id.). He started Plaintiff on 2mg of Abilify and ordered a follow-up in two weeks (Id.;
see also Doc. 262-3, p. 69).
At a follow-up appointment with the psychiatrist on August 7th, Plaintiff’s Abilify was
increased to 5mg (Doc. 283-1, pp. 95–97, 103–08; Doc. 262-3, p. 71). He continued taking Abilify
until January 18, 2018, when it was discontinued due his history of diabetes (Doc. 283-1, p. 119–
135, 145–150). He was then started on Haldol and Remeron (Id.).
E. FACTS RE: GRIEVANCES AND LETTERS REGARDING MEDICAL CARE
1. John Baldwin
John Baldwin was the Acting Director of the IDOC from August 2015 until May 23, 2019
(Doc. 286-1). Plaintiff claims his friend, Tanya Nguyen, sent a letter to Director Baldwin, amongst
others, on January 20, 2017 regarding the inadequate medical care he was receiving for his
diabetes, HCV, and vision issues (Doc. 296, p. 4; Doc. 1-2, pg. 29) Plaintiff has no evidence that
Director Baldwin ever received the letter, and he testified that he never got a response from
Baldwin (see Doc. 265-1, pp. 196–98, 209–10; Doc. 296, p. 4). For his part, Baldwin testified that
he has no personal recollection or record of receiving these letters or any other complaint from
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Plaintiff regarding his medical treatment (Doc. 286-1; see also Doc. 225). He further testified that,
as Director, he was not involved in the day-to-day operations at Pinckneyville, including the
medical treatment of particular inmates (Id.).
On August 1, 2017, Plaintiff wrote a letter regarding inadequate medical treatment for his
HCV, diabetes, vision issues, and the pain he had in his left kidney area (Doc. 1-1, pp. 71-82). The
letter was addressed to a number of individuals and entities, including Baldwin (Id.). Plaintiff
testified that he received mail receipts demonstrating that the recipients received the letter, but he
misplaced them (Doc. 296, p. 14; Doc. 265-1, p. 198). There is no other evidence that any of the
recipients actually received the letter.
2. Dr. Louis Shicker
Defendant Louis Shicker was the IDOC’s Chief of Medical Services (also known as the
Medical Director) from November 2009 through June 2016 (Doc. 286-2). His job responsibilities
included overseeing all health-related services for the IDOC, monitoring contracted vendors, and
updating policies and procedures. Although he was a trained physician, he did not directly
participate in patient care in any of the prison settings.
Plaintiff sent Dr. Shicker a letter dated August 13, 2016 (which was before Plaintiff was
transferred to Pinckneyville) and complained about the improper medical care he was receiving
for his diabetes, HCV, mental health, vision, and pain near his left kidney (Doc. 265-1, p. 196;
Doc. 183; Doc. 1-1, pg. 2–4). Plaintiff admitted that he has no proof that Dr. Shicker received this
letter (Doc. 296, p. 15). The August 1, 2017 letter discussed above was also sent to Dr. Shicker
(Doc. 1-1, pp. 71-82).18 There is no evidence that Dr. Shicker ever received it. Notably, both letters
18
Plaintiff also claims he sent a letter to Dr. Shicker on January 23, 2017 (Doc. 296, pp. 4, 15, 16). However, the
document he cited to: Doc. 1-1, pp. 71–82, is the same document he cites to for the August 1, 2017 letter (see Doc.
296, pp. 3, 4, 7, 14, 15, 16). In other words, he claims the same letter was sent on two different dates. In looking at the
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post-dated Dr. Shicker’s tenure as Medical Director.
3. Dr. Steve Meeks
Defendant Steve Meeks was the IDOC Medical Director from November 1, 2016 through
March 27, 2020 (Doc. 286-3). Plaintiff has never personally spoken to Dr. Meeks (Doc. 265-1, p.
210; Doc. 296, p. 18). Rather, the January 20, 2017 letter from Plaintiff’s friend, Tanya Nguyen,
was addressed to Dr. Meeks (Doc. 1-2, pg. 29). Dr. Meeks testified that he has no recollection or
record of receiving any letter in January 2017 (Doc. 286-3). Plaintiff has no evidence that Dr.
Meeks did, in fact, receive it (see Doc. 296).
On June 24, 2017, Plaintiff wrote a twenty-page letter to several individuals, including Dr.
Meeks, regarding his dissatisfaction with the medical care he was receiving (Doc. 1-2, pp. 2–26;
Doc. 265-1, p. 202). Dr. Meeks testified that he was never aware of the letter (Doc. 286-3). Plaintiff
does not have any documentation or evidence that Dr. Meeks received this letter (see Doc. 296).
Plaintiff’s friend, Tanya Nguyen, sent a letter on August 19, 2018 to Dr. Meeks and
Pinckneyville Healthcare Unit Administrator Christine Brown regarding the lack of medical care
for Plaintiff’s HCV and pain near his left kidney (Doc. 1-2, p. 29; Doc. 286-12). Ms. Brown then
wrote Dr. Meeks a memorandum dated September 7th, indicating that she had received a letter
from Ms. Nguyen (Doc. 286-12; see also Doc. 286-3). Ms. Brown said she had Plaintiff sign a
release so she could share his medical information with Ms. Nguyen (Doc. 286-12). Ms. Brown
also summarized Plaintiff’s medical issues and the healthcare he had been receiving (Doc. 28612). Dr. Meeks testified that based on Ms. Brown’s memo, he believed that “Plaintiff was receiving
letter, there is no date at the outset of it (see Doc. 1-1, pp. 71–74). However, a “certificate of service” following the
letter indicates that it was sent out on August 1, 2017 (Doc. 1-1, p. 82). Consequently, the document at Doc. 1-1, pp.
71–82 is viewed as a letter sent out on August 1, 2017. And because there is no other evidence regarding a January
23, 2017 letter (see Doc. 296), Plaintiff’s assertions to this effect are disregarded.
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appropriate medical treatment and monitoring” (Doc. 286-3).
4. Jacqueline Lashbrook
Defendant Jacqueline Lashbrook was the Warden at Pinckneyville from July 2015 through
December 2016 (Doc. 286-4). Plaintiff’s only interaction with Warden Lashbrook was on October
31, 2016, when Plaintiff was taken to the healthcare unit after a fight with his cell mate (Doc. 2651, pp. 200–01; Doc. 296, p. 21). According to Plaintiff, he saw Lashbrook in the healthcare unit
and told her and a nurse that he needed his eye glasses from his cell. Lashbrook said that she would
“look into it.” There is no mention of Plaintiff’s glasses or interaction with Lashbrook in the
medical record from this day (Doc. 265-2, p. 26; Doc. 265-3, pp. 98–101). Lashbrook testified via
affidavit that, as warden, she would not have agreed to personally retrieve any items from a cell
(Doc. 286-4).
5. Karen Jaimet
Karen Jaimet replaced Jacqueline Lashbrook as the Warden at Pinckneyville in January
2017 (Doc. 286-5). She served as the Warden at Pinckneyville from January 2017 to June 2018.
Prior to becoming Warden, she served as the Assistant Warden of Programs from October 2016 to
January 2017.
On February 22, 2017, Warden Jaimet responded to a letter received from Plaintiff’s friend,
Megan Selby, regarding Plaintiff’s health concerns (Doc. 1-2, p. 30). The response indicated the
Warden was unable to communicate with Ms. Selby about Plaintiff’s medical concerns without a
signed release from Plaintiff, however, medical staff members were available and capable of
addressing his medical concerns.
On June 14, 2017, Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance, regarding the inappropriate
medical care he was receiving for his HCV and diabetes, his lost eyeglasses, and an incident where
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Lieutenant Pierce refused to leave the examination room while Plaintiff attended a nurse sick call
(Doc. 265-1, p. 203; Doc. 286-5; Doc. 286-13; Doc. 286-14, pp. 112-117). Warden’s Jaimet’s
designee, Larue Love, deemed the grievance an emergency and it was processed on an expedited
basis (Doc. 286-13). The grievance officer, Derek Flatt, consulted with Healthcare Unit
Administrator Christine Brown, who reviewed and summarized the medical records, essentially
verifying that Plaintiff was receiving regular medical attention for his problems. Based on Brown’s
response, Flatt recommended denying the grievance, which Warden Jaimet concurred with.
The June 24, 2017 and August 1, 2017 letters discussed above were also addressed to
Warden Jaimet (Doc. 1-2, pp. 2–26; Doc. 1-1, pp. 71-82). Plaintiff admitted that he does not have
any documentation or evidence that Warden Jaimet received the June letter (Doc. 296, p. 21).
There is also no evidence that she ever received the August letter (see Doc. 286-5; Doc. 296).
Plaintiff also testified that “a few times while I was in seg” he requested to speak with
Warden Jaimet “on numerous occasions” as she “was making her rounds” but she “basically
brushed me off” (Doc. 265-1, pp. 202–03). He did not provide any further details about these
purported conversations (see id.). However, the cumulative counseling summary indicates that
Warden Jaimet saw Plaintiff in the segregation unit “during rounds” on August 21, 2017 (Doc.
286-15, p. 6). Plaintiff told her that “he has a virus and the HCU is not treating him” and she
advised him that she would “check with the HCU” (Id.). Warden Jaimet testified that she has no
independent recollection of Plaintiff or any specific conversations with him (Doc. 286-5).
6. Larue Love
Defendant Larue Love was Assistant Warden of Programs at Pinckneyville when Plaintiff
arrived there (Doc. 286-6). The following month (in October 2016), he became the Assistant
Warden of Operations and served in that position through January 2020. (Doc. 286-6).
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The June 24, 2017 letter from Plaintiff that is discussed above was addressed to Assistant
Warden Love (Doc. 1-2, pp. 2–26; Doc. 265-1, p. 202). Plaintiff admitted that he does not have
any documentation or evidence that Love received this letter (Doc. 296, p. 24). The August 1, 2017
letter discussed above was also addressed to Assistant Warden Love (Doc. 1-1, pp. 71-82). There
is no evidence that he ever received it (see Doc. 296, Doc. 286-6). Aside from these letters, Plaintiff
testified that he also spoke to Assistant Warden Love about his missing glasses (Doc. 265-1, p.
107). Plaintiff claims that Love told him there was no optometrist available and walked away.
Defendant Love has admitted that he never recommended that Plaintiff see an optometrist outside
Pinckneyville (Doc. 222, pg. 4).
7. Christine Brown
Defendant Christine Brown has been Healthcare Unit Administrator at Pinckneyville
Correctional Center since 2014 (Doc. 286-7). Her job responsibilities are to direct, coordinate, and
review activities of healthcare operations in conjunction with the Medical Director and the Nursing
Director (Id.). She is a registered nurse, but she does not regularly treat patients in her current
administrative role (Id.). The June 24, 2017 letter from Plaintiff that is discussed above was
addressed to Ms. Brown (Doc. 1-2, pp. 2–26; Doc. 265-1, p. 202). Plaintiff admitted that he does
not have any documentation or evidence that Brown received this letter (Doc. 296, p. 25). The
August 19, 2018 letter discussed above was also addressed to Christine Brown (Doc. 286-12). As
recounted above, Ms. Brown received the letter and then wrote a memorandum to Dr. Meeks
indicating that Plaintiff was receiving appropriate medical treatment and monitoring. Ms. Brown
also responded to inquiries pertaining to grievances that Plaintiff filed in December 2016, May
2017, and July 2017 (Doc. 265-3, pp. 100, 102, 103).
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8. Christopher Scott Thompson
Defendant Christopher Scott Thompson was the Clinical Services Supervisor at
Pinckneyville from January 2017 to April 2017 (Doc. 286-10). He was then promoted to Assistant
Warden of Programs after Karen Jaimet became Warden. He served in that position from April
2017 to June 2018. In June 2018, after Jaimet left her position as Warden, Thompson became the
Acting Warden at Pinckneyville. He served in that position from June 2018 until February 2020.
It is undisputed that in February 2017, while Thompson was the Clinical Services
Supervisor, he received a letter from Plaintiff’s fried, Megan Selby (Doc. 227; Doc. 286-10). It is
also undisputed that Thompson forwarded the letter to Plaintiff’s counselor and the healthcare unit
since it was “health related” (Doc. 227). He says he “expected the healthcare unit to appropriately
address the medi[c]al concerns expressed in the correspondence” (Id.). Plaintiff, however, claims
Thompson never followed-up with the healthcare unit to determine whether Plaintiff’s medical
concerns were addressed. (Doc. 296, pp. 11–12). However, it seems this is likely the same letter
that Warden Jaimet responded to on February 22, 2017 (Doc. 1-2, p. 30).
Additionally, the June 24, 2017 letter that is discussed above was addressed to Thompson
(Doc. 1-2, pp. 2–26; Doc. 265-1, pp. 199, 202, 204). Plaintiff, however, admitted he has no
evidence that Thompson received this letter (Doc. 292, p. 30).
9. Derek Flatt
Defendant Derek Flatt was a Grievance Officer at Pinckneyville from August 2014February 2018 (Doc. 286-8). Plaintiff indicates that on June 18, 2017, he sent written
correspondence to Defendant Flatt regarding missing grievances pertaining to his medical care—
specifically, a non-emergency grievance dated November 17, 2016 that disappeared after he sent
it to Flatt’s “office” and a grievance dated May 7, 2017 that was responded to by his counselor on
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May 18, 2017 (Doc. 296, p. 28; Doc. 1-1, p. 60; see also id. at pp. 9–18, 51–56). Plaintiff testified
that Flatt never responded to his letter (Doc. 265-1, p. 208).
Plaintiff indicates that he sent another letter to Defendant Flatt on August 6, 2017,
regarding missing grievances (Doc. 296, p. 28; Doc. 1-1, p. 61). That letter once again mentions
the grievance dated May 7, 2017 regarding “medical treatment etc. etc.” and two other grievances
that were not related to medical care (Doc. 1-1, p. 61). Plaintiff testified that Flatt never responded
to his letter (Doc. 265-1, p. 208).
Finally, as recounted above, Defendant Flatt reviewed and denied Plaintiff’s June 14, 2017
emergency grievance. But Plaintiff argues that Flatt did not address the incident that occurred with
Lieutenant Pierce (Doc. 296, p. 7; see also Doc. 286-13; Doc. 286-14, pp. 112-117).
10. Rhonda McWilliams
Defendant Rhonda McWilliams worked as a Correctional Counselor at Pinckneyville from
April 2016 to February 2018 (Doc. 286-9). She was responsible for initial decisions on grievances
submitted through the normal (non-emergency) process. According to Plaintiff, he submitted a
grievance in November 2016 (Doc. 100-1, p. 1; Doc. 1-1, pp. 9–18). By mid-December, he had
not received any kind of response, so he sent an Inmate Request asking about the status of the
grievance (Doc. 100-1, p. 2; see also Doc. 109). Several days later, McWilliams made an
announcement on the P.A. system advising inmates that she had recently been out on vacation and
they should resubmit any grievances that were originally submitted while she was gone (Doc. 1001, p. 2; Doc. 100-3, p. 2; Doc. 268-9). Plaintiff later spoke with McWilliams and tried to hand her
a copy of the November grievance but she refused to take it and told him to put it in the grievance
box (Doc. 265-1, pp. 205–07; see also Doc. 1-1, p. 23). By January, Plaintiff still had not received
any kind of response to the grievance, so he once again inquired about it but McWilliams did not
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respond to him (Doc. 100-1, p. 2; Doc. 100-3). McWilliams testified that she did not throw away
grievances (Doc. 286-9), which Plaintiff does not dispute (Doc. 265-1, p. 206). She further testified
that she did not ignore any of the grievances she received from Plaintiff (Doc. 286-9).
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper only if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
“Factual disputes are genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a
verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence presented, and they are material only if
their resolution might change the suit’s outcome under the governing law.” Maniscalco v. Simon,
712 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding a
motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to,
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment imposes an
obligation on states “to provide adequate medical care to incarcerated individuals.” Holloway v.
Delaware Cty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1072 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
103 (1976)). “Prison officials violate this proscription when they act with deliberate indifference
to the serious medical needs of an inmate.” Holloway, 700 F.3d at 1072 (citations omitted). To
succeed on a claim for deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate that they suffered from
an “objectively, sufficiently serious” medical condition and that the defendant acted with a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id.
None of the Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s medical conditions were not objectively
serious (see Doc. 265, Doc. 286). Instead, they argue that they were not deliberately indifferent to
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his medical conditions (see Doc. 265, Doc. 286). “A prison official is deliberately indifferent only
if he ‘knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” Whiting v. Wexford
Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837 (1994)). In other words, “[t]he defendant must know of facts from which he could infer
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must actually draw the inference.” Whiting,
839 F.3d at 662 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). This subjective standard “requires more than
negligence or even gross negligence; a plaintiff must show that the defendant was essentially
criminally reckless, that is, ignored a known risk.” Huber v. Anderson, 909 F.3d 201, 208 (7th Cir.
2018) (quoting Figgs v. Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 902 (7th Cir. 2016)).
A.
TREATMENT PROVIDERS
For medical professionals, the deliberate indifference standard has been described as the
“professional judgment” standard. Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2008). Treatment
decisions are “presumptively valid” and entitled to deference so long as they are based on
professional judgment—meaning they are fact-based with respect to the particular inmate, the
severity and stage of his condition, the likelihood and imminence of further harm, and the efficacy
of available treatments—and do not go against accepted professional standards. Johnson v.
Rimmer, 936 F.3d 695, 707 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 476
(7th Cir. 2017); Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 859 (7th Cir. 2011). A medical professional may be
held to have displayed deliberate indifference if the treatment decision was “blatantly
inappropriate” even to a layperson, Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014); see also
Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 2016) (a jury can infer deliberate indifference when
“a risk from a particular course of medical treatment (or lack thereof) is obvious.”), or there is
evidence that the treatment decision was “such a substantial departure from accepted professional
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judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not
base the decision on such a judgment.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 729; see also Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409
(“A medical professional is entitled to deference in treatment decisions unless ‘no minimally
competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances’”) (citation omitted).
1. Nurse Practitioner Angel Rector
Plaintiff alleges that NP Rector was deliberately indifferent to his serious health needs
when she ignored his requests for HCV treatment and vaccinations for Hepatitis A and B (see Doc.
183, p. 9; Doc. 282, pp. 4–8). However, the Court is convinced that no reasonable jury could find
in Plaintiff’s favor.
NP Rector saw Plaintiff on only one occasion on September 21, 2016. His APRI score was
0.71 and NP Rector did not take any further action or order any additional work-up. Plaintiff is
adamant that NP Rector (as well as Dr. Scott and Dr. Butalid, who are both discussed in subsequent
sections of this Order) failed to treat his HCV in accordance with the IDOC Guidelines (Doc. 282).
He apparently believes that at the time he saw NP Rector, the 2014 Guidelines were still governing
HCV treatment for IDOC inmates (see Doc. 282, p. 5). Under the 2014 Guidelines, if an inmate
had an APRI score over 0.5, an additional work-up was supposed to be completed that included
FibroSpect/Sure testing, vaccinations for Hepatitis A and B if the inmate was not already immune,
HCV education and counseling, and a possible referral to UIC for evaluation for treatment (Doc.
282-3, p. 16). However, the evidence in the record plainly contradicts Plaintiff’s assertion that the
2014 Guidelines were still in effect at the time he saw NP Rector.
Dr. Paul testified that the Guidelines were amended in June 2015 before Plaintiff was even
incarcerated in the IDOC. Specifically, the IDOC had stopped using FibroSpect/Sure testing and
the IDOC was instead conducting a liver-spleen ultrasound, but only if the patient’s APRI was 1.0
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or higher. In other words, by the time Plaintiff saw NP Rector, the threshold for ordering any
additional work-up was an APRI score of 1.0. Plaintiff did not set forth any evidence that
contradicted Dr. Paul’s testimony (see Doc. 282). Furthermore, all of the practitioners who saw
Plaintiff in 2016 and 2017, including NP Rector, Dr. Butalid, and Dr. Scott, were no longer
following the May 2014 Guidelines; rather, they were all operating on the understanding that the
threshold APRI score was above 1.0 (Docs. 265-8; Doc. 265-14; Doc. 282-4, pp. 71–72). Because
Plaintiff’s APRI score was under 1.0, the Guidelines did not require any additional work-up.
But even if the Court assumes Plaintiff is correct and the APRI cutoff for additional workup was still 0.5 at the time he saw NP Rector, a purported failure to follow the IDOC’s Guidelines
does not automatically create liability for deliberate indifference. “[P]ublished requirements for
healthcare do not create constitutional rights[.]” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir.
2016). Such protocols can, however, “provide circumstantial evidence that a prison healthcare
gatekeeper knew of a substantial risk of serious harm,” particularly when the protocol is wellestablished and widely known.19
Here, the protocol as to when to refer an HCV-positive inmate for additional work-up was
ever-changing, as opposed to a well-established and widely recognized standard of care (e.g., Doc.
282-3, pp. 2, 3, 15; Doc. 282-1, pp. 35, 92; Doc. 286-2, p. 1). Additionally, there is no evidence
that an APRI score of 0.7 posed a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff. There is also no evidence that
19
Petties, 836 F.3d at 729, 731–32 (finding it reasonable to infer treating physician knew that declining to immobilize
Achilles tendon rupture would impede inmate’s recovery where physician testified that immobilization was essential,
as did two specialists, and Wexford’s own protocol required it); Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 758 (10th Cir. 2005)
(finding it reasonable to infer nurse knew severe chest pain posed a serious risk of harm when DOC protocols state
that chest pains are a symptom of acute cardiac disease and two experts testified “it was an extremely well-known
standard of care” that chest pain should be treated as an emergency until cardiac involvement is ruled out by a doctor).
See also Steele v. Choi, 82 F.3d 175, 179 (7th Cir.1996) (“If the symptoms plainly called for a particular medical
treatment—the leg is broken, so it must be set; the person is not breathing, so CPR must be administered—a doctor's
deliberate decision not to furnish the treatment might be actionable under § 1983.”).
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the decision not to initiate further testing and possible treatment for an inmate with an APRI score
over 0.5 but below 1.0 substantially deviated from accepted medical practices. Rather NP Rector,
Dr. Butalid, and Dr. Scott all testified that when a patient’s APRI score is below 1.5, monitoring
the condition is an appropriate treatment plan (see Doc. 282-4, pp. 71–72; Doc. 265-8; Doc. 26514). And expert witness Dr. Dina Paul also testified that the decision to monitor Plaintiff’s HCV
rather than refer him for additional work-up was in accordance with the IDOC’s Guidelines and
community standards of care (see Doc. 282-1, pp. 23, 26, 96). Plaintiff did not put forth any of his
own expert evidence to the contrary (see Doc. 282). Consequently, there is nothing from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that NP Rector acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s
HCV, and she is entitled to summary judgment.
2. Dr. Michael Scott
Dr. Michael Scott was the Medical Director at Pinckneyville for approximately the first six
months that Plaintiff was incarcerated there. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Scott failed and/or refused
to properly treat his HCV, diabetes, and the pain near his left kidney (Doc. 183, pp. 7; Doc. 282,
pp. 6, 8–9, 10–11). However, the Court is convinced that no reasonable jury could find in
Plaintiff’s favor on his claims.
The evidence shows that Dr. Scott saw Plaintiff on three occasions between November
2016 and the end of January 2017. None of these appointments were scheduled for the purpose of
addressing Plaintiff’s HCV. Plaintiff contends that he nevertheless brought up his HCV and
requested HCV treatment and vaccinations for Hepatitis A and B. But, according to Plaintiff, Dr.
Scott refused to provide any treatment or order the “initial work up” outlined in the Guidelines.
Even if what Plaintiff says is true, there is no basis for finding Dr. Scott liable for deliberate
indifference. As discussed above, the evidence demonstrates that during the time Plaintiff was
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under Dr. Scott’s care, the threshold for initiating further testing and possible treatment for HCV
under the IDOC’s Guidelines was an APRI score of 1.0. There is no evidence Plaintiff’s APRI
score ever reached or exceeded 1.0. And as mentioned above, expert witness Dr. Dina Paul testified
that the decision not to order any further work-up was in accordance with the IDOC’s Guidelines
and accepted medical practices, and Plaintiff did not put forth any evidence to the contrary.
Consequently, Dr. Scott is entitled to summary judgment with regard to Plaintiff’s HCV.
As for Plaintiff’s diabetes, he argues Dr. Scott was deliberately indifferent because he
ignored Plaintiff’s request for a therapeutic diet, and without a therapeutic diet Plaintiff’s diabetes
remained uncontrolled (Doc. 282, pp. 8–10). This argument fails for a number of reasons. First,
there is no definitive evidence that a therapeutic diet for diabetics was available at Pinckneyville.
For his part, Plaintiff submitted a document titled “Illinois Department of Corrections Therapeutic
Diet Manual,” which he claims allowed Dr. Scott to order a diet geared specifically toward
managing diabetes (Doc. 282, pp. 8–9). However, there is no evidence as to when, if ever, this
Manual actually went into effect (see id.). According to Dr. Scott, there was no such thing as a
special diet for diabetic inmates while he was the Medical Director at Pinckneyville. Rather, Dr.
Scott testified that the regular meals were approved by a dietician and were appropriate for diabetic
inmates. Dr. Butalid said the same, as did Healthcare Administrator Christine Brown. Plaintiff did
not argue, let alone submit any evidence, that the regular meals offered at Pinckneyville were
inappropriate for diabetic patients (see Doc. 282).
At any rate, even if the Court assumes that a therapeutic diet was available, Plaintiff is not
entitled to dictate the treatment he is prescribed, nor is he entitled to receive every possible
treatment available. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 754 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n inmate is not
entitled to demand specific care and is not entitled to the best care possible . . . .”); Walker v.
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Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019) (“]M]edical professionals may
choose from a range of acceptable courses based on prevailing standards in the field.”) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts “defer to medical professionals’ treatment decisions
unless there is evidence that no minimally competent professional would have so responded under
those circumstances.” Walker, 940 F.3d at 965 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the medical records demonstrate that once Dr. Scott was made aware that Plaintiff’s diabetes
was not well-controlled, he prescribed medication, enrolled Plaintiff in the diabetes chronic clinic,
educated Plaintiff on managing his diabetes, and continued to closely monitor Plaintiff, adjusting
his medications as necessary. While Plaintiff claims that Dr. Scott should have also ordered a
therapeutic diet, he has not put forth any evidence that it was essentially mandated by accepted
professional standards. Nor was the decision not to order a therapeutic diet obviously wrong even
to a layperson, particularly given the unchallenged evidence that the regular meals offered at
Pinckneyville were appropriate for diabetic inmates. At most, Plaintiff’s evidence shows that a
therapeutic diet was another potential treatment option and perhaps it would have been beneficial.
But Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the prescribed course of treatment is insufficient to create a
genuine question of material fact as to whether Dr. Scott was deliberately indifferent. Pyles, 771
F.3d at 409; Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006)
Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Scott’s failure to prescribe a therapeutic diet is the
reason that his diabetes remained uncontrolled strains credulity. The records demonstrate that at
the same time Dr. Scott was repeatedly counseling Plaintiff on the importance of eating a wellbalanced diet, Plaintiff was spending hundreds of dollars per month at the commissary on foods
that diabetics are counseled to avoid, such as refined, highly processed carbohydrates and those
with added sugar (like soda, juice, rice, noodles, chips, sugary cereal, cakes, cookies, and candy),
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and saturated fats (like cheese, sausage, and other processed meats). For these reasons, no
reasonable jury could find that Dr. Scott was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s diabetes and he
is entitled to summary judgment in this regard.
That leaves Plaintiff’s left flank pain. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Scott was deliberately
indifferent because he did not order any additional testing or complete an additional examination
to determine what was causing the pain (Doc. 282, p. 11). But the decision to forgo additional
diagnostic tests is a “classic example of a matter for medical judgment.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d
403, 411 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). Here, Plaintiff
complained at his first appointment with Dr. Scott about pain near his left kidney that had been
ongoing for several months. But he indicated that he was not in pain during the appointment and
he had previously reported a pain level of only two out of ten. Dr. Scott examined Plaintiff and ran
some tests, which ruled out any infection or problem with Plaintiff’s kidneys. There is no
indication that Plaintiff ever complained about the pain again during his three subsequent
appointments with Dr. Scott. Given the circumstances—the unremarkable results from the
diagnostic testing and Dr. Scott’s own physical examination, the reportedly mild and intermittent
nature of Plaintiff’s pain, the lack of any other symptoms, and the absence of any further
complaints of continuing or worsening pain—it can hardly be said that Dr. Scott’s decision not to
pursue additional diagnostic testing was blatantly inappropriate. Nor did Plaintiff put forth any
evidence showing that it was a significant departure from accepted medical standards (see Doc.
282). Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that Dr. Scott was deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s left side pain and he is entitled to summary judgment in this regard.
3. Dr. Alberto Butalid
Plaintiff claims that Dr. Butalid failed and/or refused to properly treat his diabetes and
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HCV (Doc. 183, pp. 9, 10; see also Doc. 282). However, the Court is convinced that no reasonable
jury could find in Plaintiff’s favor on his claims.
Plaintiff saw Dr. Butalid only once at an HCV chronic clinic visit in April 2017. His APRI
score was 0.8, but as discussed above with respect to NP Rector, during the time Plaintiff was
under Dr. Butalid’s care, the threshold for initiating further testing and possible treatment for HCV
under the IDOC’s Guidelines was an APRI score of 1.0. Additionally, Plaintiff did not report any
symptoms or complications with his HCV and none were apparent on examination. Dr. Butalid
testified that based on his decades of experience as a medical doctor, he was of the opinion that he
provided Plaintiff with appropriate care for his HCV (Doc. 265-14). Expert witness Dr. Dina Paul
agreed (Doc. 282-1, pp. 23, 26, 96). Plaintiff did not put forth any of his own expert evidence to
the contrary (see Doc. 282). Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to establish a material issue of fact
with regard to Dr. Butalid’s treatment of his HCV, and Dr. Butalid is entitled to summary judgment
in that regard.
As for Plaintiff’s diabetes, Plaintiff contends that he asked Dr. Butalid to order a
therapeutic diet for him but Dr. Butalid ignored his request (Doc. 282, pp. 9–10). However, as
explained above with respect to Dr. Scott, the failure to order a therapeutic diet was not obviously
wrong or blatantly inappropriate even to a layperson, nor did Plaintiff put forth any evidence that
it was a substantial deviation from accepted professional practices. Consequently, no reasonable
jury could find that Dr. Butalid was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s diabetes, and Dr. Butalid
is entitled to summary judgment in that regard.
4. Dr. Nageswararao Vallabhaneni
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Vallabhaneni was deliberately indifferent to his serious health
needs when the doctor discontinued his anti-psychotic medication, Risperdal, in September 2016
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(Doc. 183, p. 7; Doc. 282, pp 11–14). However, the Court is once again convinced that no
reasonable jury could find in Plaintiff’s favor.
Dr. Vallabhaneni testified via affidavit that based on his evaluation of Plaintiff and his
“decades of experience as a psychiatrist,” he was of the opinion that the anti-psychotic medication
was not medically necessary for Plaintiff (Doc. 261-11). Plaintiff was “on board with” and
consented to the discontinuation of his medication (Doc. 265-1, p. 160; Doc. 283-1, pp. 39, 42).
Plaintiff did not set forth any expert testimony that Dr. Vallabhaneni’s chosen course of treatment
was a substantial departure from accepted medical judgment (see Doc. 282), and the decision was
not so obviously wrong that a layperson could draw the required inference about the doctor’s state
of mind without expert testimony. Consequently, there is nothing from which a reasonable jury
could find that Dr. Vallabhaneni was deliberately indifferent and his motion for summary
judgment is granted.
5. Rose Loos
Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Loos was deliberately indifferent with respect to his mental health
and HCV (Doc. 183, p. 7; Doc. 282, pp. 6–7, 12–14). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he told
Ms. Loos that he was receiving inappropriate care for his HCV and she assured him that she would
look into the issue but she never referred him to the healthcare unit for an evaluation (Doc. 282,
pp. 6–7; Doc. 265-1, pp. 164-65). The evidence shows that Plaintiff complained to Ms. Loos on
January 10, 2017 that he was not feeling well and thought it was related to his diabetes or HCV.
Ms. Loos was not a medical provider and could not diagnose or prescribe any treatments for HCV.
Nor did she have any control over the medical providers and their treatment decisions. The most
she could do was refer Plaintiff’s complaint to the healthcare unit. But Plaintiff was already
scheduled to see Dr. Scott the very next day and at that appointment, he was enrolled in the diabetes
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chronic care clinic. And he was already enrolled in the HCV chronic care clinic and was being
evaluated and monitored every six months. In other words, Ms. Loos knew that Plaintiff was
actively seeing medical professionals for his medical conditions and she was entitled to rely on
them to provide proper treatment. Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1050 (7th Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 50 (2019). (“If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . . a non-medical
prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.”); Burks
v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009) (“A layperson’s failure to tell the medical staff
how to do its job cannot be called deliberate indifference; it is just a form of failing to supply a
gratuitous rescue service.”) Furthermore, the Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to
show any of the medical providers were deliberately indifferent in treating his diabetes or HCV,
and therefore he cannot show that Ms. Loos violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to
intervene in their care. Thomas v. Wahl, 590 Fed. Appx. 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding because
plaintiff failed to show any medical personnel were deliberately indifferent, prison administrators
could not be held liable for failing to investigate his complaints of inadequate medical care); Reed
v. Indiana Dep't of Corr., 30 Fed. Appx. 616, 619 (7th Cir. 2002) (same).
As for Plaintiff’s mental health, he claims that Ms. Loos “carelessly mismanaged [his]
psychiatric care” (Doc. 282, p. 14). Specifically, Plaintiff told Ms. Loos at an appointment on
December 8, 2016, that he wanted to restart his medications, and it is undisputed that she referred
him to the psychiatrist (Doc. 282, pp. 12–14). However, Plaintiff still had not seen the psychiatrist
by the time he saw Ms. Loos again in January 2017, or even by the time he saw her in April, May,
and June 2017. He finally saw the psychiatrist on July 13, 2017. Plaintiff claims Ms. Loos was
deliberately indifferent when she failed to follow-up on her referral or to make additional referrals
to the psychiatrist (Doc. 282, pp. 12–14). He argues that “[a]s a result of Loos’ complete disregard
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for [his] psychiatric conditions, [he] went approximately seven months without seeing the
psychiatrist while experiencing irritability and aggression.” (Id. at p. 14).
This argument is unpersuasive. There is no evidence that duplicate referrals to the
psychiatrist would have hastened an appointment. In fact, other mental health providers did make
additional referrals in May and June 2017, all to no effect. There is also no evidence, or even a
suggestion, that Ms. Loos could have taken some other action aside from re-referring Plaintiff.
Simply put, the Court acknowledges that there was a long delay in getting Plaintiff in to see a
psychiatrist, but there is a complete dearth of evidence that Ms. Loos had the power or the ability
to do anything about it.20 Consequently, no reasonable jury could find that she was deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff’s mental health and she is entitled to summary judgment.
6. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
A private corporation acting under the color of state law, like Wexford, can be held liable
under § 1983 for constitutional violations based on the Monell theory of municipal liability.
Glisson v. Indiana Dep't of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 378–79 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Under Monell,
a plaintiff must show that his constitutional injury was caused by the corporation’s own actions.
Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409–10 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824,
832 (7th Cir.2010)). A corporate action can take the form of an express policy adopted and
promulgated by the corporation, an informal but widespread and well-settled practice or custom,
or a decision by an official of the corporation with final policymaking authority. Glisson, 849 F.3d
at 379.
Here, the nature of Plaintiff’s argument against Wexford is not entirely clear to the Court.
He states:
20
There is no suggestion that Wexford should be held responsible for this delay (see Doc. 292).
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It is widely known and accepted that Wexford has failed to provide the IDOC and
inmates within the IDOC quality medical care. The evidence uncovered in this
matter establishes that Wexford and its employees have a policy, custom and
practice of disregarding IDOC policies and guidelines. As discussed extensively
above, Wexford and its employees failed to provide Plaintiff with medical care that
meets the standard of practice and complies with IDOC Guidelines. There is more
than sufficient evidence to establish a series of constitutional violations committed
by Wexford.
(Doc. 282, p. 15). He further asserts that Wexford was aware of the deficiencies in the care he was
receiving because he sent them letters about it (Id. at pp. 15, 16).
On the one hand, it seems like Plaintiff is arguing that Wexford is vicariously liable for the
misdeeds of its employees. To the extent that is true, this argument is dead on arrival. Under
controlling precedent, a private corporation, like Wexford, cannot be held vicariously liable in
litigation under § 1983. E.g., Gaston v. Ghosh, 920 F.3d 493, 494 (7th Cir. 2019).
On the other hand, it seems like Plaintiff is arguing that the purportedly inadequate medical
care he received was in accordance with Wexford’s widespread practice or custom of providing
constitutionally subpar medical care or its practice and custom of condoning or turning a blind eye
to deficient medical care. However, the Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to show
an issue of fact as to whether any of the Defendant medical providers were individually liable for
deliberate indifference or provided him with constitutionally inadequate care. Therefore, he did
not suffer an actionable injury from the widespread practice he attributes to Wexford. See, e.g.,
Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 412 (7th Cir. 2014); Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 706 F.3d
864, 866 (7th Cir. 2013).
Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to marshal sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury
could conclude that the medical providers’ treatment decisions were made pursuant to the alleged
widespread practice. His only admissible evidence pertains to the purported deficiencies specific
to his own experience. He did not, for example, provide any admissible evidence of other inmates
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who were harmed by the alleged systemic failings or testimony from prison officials regarding the
existence of the alleged systemic failings (see Doc. 282; see also Doc. 306). Cf. Davis v. Carter,
452 F.3d 686, 695 (7th Cir. 2006). Consequently, no reasonable juror could conclude that there
was a true corporate policy at issue, as opposed to a random event. Grieveson v. Anderson, 538
F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2008).
For these reasons, Wexford is entitled to summary judgment.
B.
GRIEVANCE OFFICIALS
For the following Defendants, Plaintiff claims that he complained to them in some form or
fashion (e.g., written correspondence, grievance, face-to-face) regarding the purportedly
inadequate medical care that he was receiving, but the Defendants ignored his complaints and
failed to take any corrective action (Doc. 183; Doc. 282; Doc. 296).
When it comes to non-medical officials, the Seventh Circuit has “long recognized that the
division of labor within a prison necessitates that non-medical officials may reasonably defer to
the judgment of medical professionals regarding inmate treatment.” Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d
1040, 1050 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 50 (2019). “If a prisoner is under the care of
medical experts . . . a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the
prisoner is in capable hands.” Id. (quoting Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2005)).
However, non-medical officials can be held liable for deliberate indifference if they have “a reason
to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not
treating) a prisoner.” Giles, 914 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir.
2004)). An inmate's correspondence to a prison official may thus establish a basis for personal
liability under § 1983 where that correspondence, “in its content and manner of transmission” gave
the official sufficient notice that the prisoner’s serious medical condition was not being treated by
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prison medical providers, yet the official took no action to assist in obtaining care for the prisoner.
Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); accord Perez v. Fenoglio,
792 F.3d 768, 782 (7th Cir. 2015).
As for medical administrators like Defendants Dr. Shicker, Dr. Meeks, and Healthcare Unit
Administrator Christine Brown, who are not directly responsible for providing medical care, they
can be held liable as supervisors if they know of and facilitate, approve, condone, or turn a blind
eye to medical personnel providing inadequate treatment. Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335,
344 (7th Cir. 2017).
1. John Baldwin
Plaintiff claims, his friend, Tanya Nguyen, sent Director Baldwin a letter on January 20,
2017 and he sent Director Baldwin a second letter on August 1, 2017, regarding the inadequate
treatment he was receiving for his HCV, diabetes, vision issues, and the pain he had in his left side
near his kidney. There is no evidence, however, that Director Baldwin ever received either letter
or otherwise knew about Plaintiff’s issues with his healthcare. There is also no evidence Baldwin
was in any way involved in decisions made regarding Plaintiff’s healthcare. And Baldwin cannot
be held liable solely because he was in charge. E.g., Lennon v. City of Carmel, Indiana, 865 F.3d
503, 507–08 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[T]here is no vicarious liability in a suit under section 1983.”).
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to show
any of the medical providers were deliberately indifferent in treating his diabetes, HCV, or side
pain, and consequently, there was no impermissible conduct for Director Baldwin to turn a blind
eye to and he cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference for failing to intervene in Plaintiff’s
care. Thomas v. Wahl, 590 Fed. Appx. 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2014); Reed v. Indiana Dep't of Corr.,
30 Fed. Appx. 616, 619 (7th Cir. 2002). For these reasons, there is no basis for holding Director
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Baldwin liable, and he is entitled to summary judgment.
2. Dr. Louis Shicker
Plaintiff claims he wrote Dr. Shicker a letter in August 2016 and another in 2017
complaining about his medical care, but Dr. Shicker ignored the letters (Doc. 183; Doc. 265-1, p.
199; Doc. 296, pp. 3–4). Plaintiff admitted, however, that he has no proof that Dr. Shicker received
the August 2016 letter, and there is no competent evidence that Dr. Shicker received the 2017 letter
(see Doc. 306). More importantly, however, Dr. Shicker was no longer the IDOC medical director
by the time either letter was sent. So even if he happened to receive them, he did not have the
authority to take any action or direct any treatment be provided to Plaintiff. Consequently, there is
no basis for holding Dr. Shicker liable, and he is entitled to summary judgment.
3. Dr. Steve Meeks
Plaintiff claims his friend sent Dr. Meeks a letter in January 2017, he wrote Dr. Meeks a
letter in June 2017, and his friend wrote a second letter to Dr. Meeks in August 2018. All the letters
pertained to the purportedly inadequate medical care he was receiving for his diabetes, HCV,
vision issues, and pain in his left side near his left kidney. But Dr. Meeks ignored the letters (Doc.
183; Doc. 296, pp. 4–5). The Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to show any of the
medical providers were deliberately indifferent in treating his diabetes, HCV, or side pain, and
consequently, there was no impermissible conduct for Dr. Meeks to approve of, facilitate, or
condone with respect to these conditions. Dr. Meeks therefore cannot be held liable for deliberate
indifference for not intervening in Plaintiff’s care.
Plaintiff’s vision issues were mentioned in the January 2017 letter and the June 2017 letter
(Doc. 1-2, pg. 29; Doc. 1-2, pp. 2–26). However, Dr. Meeks testified that he has no recollection
or record of receiving these letters (Doc. 286-3), and Plaintiff did not offer any evidence to the
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contrary (see Doc. 296). While it is undisputed that Dr. Meeks received notice of the third letter
sent in August 2018, it does not appear that Plaintiff’s vision issues were mentioned in this letter
(see Doc. 286-12).21 Consequently, there is no evidence that Dr. Meeks was ever made aware of
any issues regarding Plaintiff’s vision. Furthermore, Plaintiff did not point to any evidence
regarding the extent of his visual impairment without glasses or make any argument that his need
for glasses constituted a serious medical need (see Doc. 296, pp. 5–6, 20–21).22 No reasonable
jury could therefore conclude that Dr. Meeks “kn[e]w of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety.” Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.
2016) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Dr. Meeks is entitled to summary
judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s vision issues.
4. Jacqueline Lashbrook
Plaintiff alleges that Warden Lashbrook was deliberately indifferent to his missing glasses
(Doc. 296, pp. 5–6). He claims he saw Lashbrook in the healthcare unit on October 31, 2016 and
told her that he needed his glasses and she said she would “look into it.” Even if things went exactly
as Plaintiff claims, it is not enough to hold Lashbrook liable for deliberate indifference. Plaintiff
did not point to any evidence regarding the extent of his visual impairment without glasses or make
any argument that his need for glasses constituted a serious medical need, nor did he present any
21
The letter itself does not appear to be part of the record. The parties cited only to the memo Christine Brown sent
to Dr. Meeks after she received the letter (see, e.g., Doc. 296, pp. 17, 19).
Hundreds and hundreds of pages of records regarding Plaintiff’s medical treatment and his
grievances/correspondence to prison officials have been submitted to the Court (Docs. 1-1, 1-2, 94-1, 94-2, 94-3, 2652, 265-3, 265-6, 265-7, 286-14). The Court thus suspects there is information in the record about the severity of
Plaintiff’s visual impairment without glasses, but Plaintiff did not point it out. And the Court will not sift through the
voluminous records for the relevant information and make Plaintiff’s argument for him. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3)
(“The court need consider only the cited materials . . . .”); Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.
2017) (approving of district judge’s refusal “to wade through the voluminous record to find evidence on a counseled
plaintiff’s behalf.”)
22
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evidence or argument that Lashbrook was aware of the severity of his vision problems (see Doc.
296, pp. 5–6, 20–21). Consequently, no reasonable jury could conclude that Lashbrook “kn[e]w
of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Whiting, 839 F.3d at 662
(citation omitted). Warden Lashbrook is thus entitled to summary judgment.
5. Karen Jaimet
Plaintiff alleges that Warden Jaimet was deliberately indifferent to his missing glasses and
the medical care he was receiving for his HCV, diabetes, and pain in his left side (Doc. 296, pp.
6–7). However, the Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to show any of the medical
providers were deliberately indifferent in treating his diabetes, HCV, or side pain, and
consequently, there was no impermissible conduct for Warden Jaimet to turn a blind eye to. She
therefore cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference for failing to intervene in Plaintiff’s care.
Jaimet also cannot be found deliberately indifferent with respect to Plaintiff’s eyeglasses because,
as already explained, there is no evidence regarding the extent of his visual impairment without
glasses or that Jaimet was aware of the severity of his vision problems (see Doc. 296).
6. Larue Love
Plaintiff alleges that Assistant Warden Love was deliberately indifferent to his missing
glasses because after he told Love about his missing glasses, Love simply said there was no
optometrist available and walked away (Doc. 296, p. 8). Even if that is true, Assistant Warden
Love cannot be held liable because, as previously mentioned, there is no evidence regarding the
extent of Plaintiff’s visual impairment without glasses or that Love was aware of the severity of
his vision problems (see Doc. 296).
Plaintiff also alleges that Assistant Warden Love was deliberately indifferent regarding his
inability to obtain medical care for his HCV, diabetes, and pain in the left kidney area (Doc. 296,
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p. 8). Specifically, Plaintiff claims he sent letters to Love in June 2017 and August 2017. However,
there is no evidence that Love received either letter or knew about Plaintiff’s issues with his
healthcare. Additionally, the Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish an issue
of fact that any of the medical providers were deliberately indifferent in treating his diabetes, HCV,
or side pain, and therefore Plaintiff cannot show that Love violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by failing to address his complaints about their care. For these reasons, Defendant Love is entitled
to summary judgment.
7. Christine Brown
Plaintiff contends that Healthcare Unit Administrator Christine Brown was deliberately
indifferent to his missing glasses and the medical care he was receiving for his HCV, diabetes, and
pain in his left side (Doc. 296, pp. 8–9). Specifically, he claims Ms. Brown gave false and
misleading information about his medical care when she responded to inquiries pertaining to his
grievances. He also claims that she failed to respond to the letter he sent her in June 2017. The
Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to show any of the medical providers were
deliberately indifferent in treating his medical conditions, and therefore he cannot show that Ms.
Brown violated his Eighth Amendment rights by approving of or failing to intervene in their care.
Ms. Brown is entitled to summary judgment.
8. Christopher Scott Thompson
Plaintiff claims that Thompson “was aware of [his] medical complaints and took no action
to address them” (Doc. 296, pp. 10–11). It is undisputed that when Defendant Thompson was the
Clinical Services Supervisor, he received a February 2017 letter from Plaintiff’s friend, Megan
Selby, and forwarded the letter to the healthcare unit. Plaintiff argues that Thompson is
nevertheless liable for deliberate indifference because he never followed-up with the healthcare
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unit to determine whether his medical concerns had been addressed (Doc. 296, p. 10).23 Plaintiff
further claims that he sent Defendant Thompson a letter about his medical issues in June 2017
when Thompson was the Assistant Warden of Programs. Plaintiff, however, admits that he has no
proof Thompson received the letter. The Court has already concluded that Plaintiff failed to show
any of the medical providers were deliberately indifferent in treating his diabetes, HCV, or side
pain, and consequently, there was no impermissible conduct for Thompson to turn a blind eye to
and he cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference for failing to intervene in Plaintiff’s care.
Thompson also cannot be found deliberately indifferent with respect to Plaintiff’s eyeglasses
because, as already explained, there is no evidence regarding the extent of his visual impairment
without glasses or that Thompson was aware of the severity of his vision problems (see Doc. 296).
9. Derek Flatt
Plaintiff claims that grievance officer Flatt “was aware of [his] medical complaints and
took no action to address them” (Doc. 296, pp. 9–10). Specifically, Plaintiff says he sent letters to
Flatt in June 2017 and August 2017 regarding missing grievances pertaining to medical care but
Flatt never responded. However, neither of these letters contain any information about his
purported medical issues (see Doc. 1-1, pp. 60, 61). There is also no evidence that Flatt ever
received these letters or that he saw the purportedly missing grievances or was responsible for
processing them. Flatt did, however, review and recommend denying Plaintiff’s June 14, 2017
emergency grievance. In doing so, he consulted with Healthcare Unit Administrator Christine
Brown to ensure that Plaintiff’s complaints did not require further action. Flatt did not have to do
23
Plaintiff also states that Thompson never informed him that he had received the letter from Ms. Selby (Doc. 296,
10). Plaintiff does not, however, explain or cite to any authority as to how this purported failure could have possibly
violated his constitutional rights (see id.). As far as the Court knows, this purported failure is of no constitutional
significance whatsoever.
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anything more and he was entitled to rely on Ms. Brown’s professional judgment regarding
Plaintiff’s medical care because there was nothing in her report that made it obvious Plaintiff might
not be receiving adequate care. Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1050 (7th Cir. 2019); Hayes v.
Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, as with the other grievance officials, Flatt
cannot be held liable for failing to intervene in Plaintiff’s medical care because the Court has
already concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish any of the medical providers were deliberately
indifferent in treating him. For these reasons, Defendant Flatt is entitled to summary judgment.
10. Rhonda McWilliams
Plaintiff claims that counselor McWilliams “was aware of [his] medical complaints and
took no action to address them” (Doc. 296, p. 10). Specifically, he claims McWilliams refused to
accept a grievance and failed to respond to his inquiries about the grievance (Id.). To the extent
Plaintiff is claiming that Ms. McWilliams is liable because she mishandled his grievances, this
claim must fail. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he alleged mishandling
of . . . grievances by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct
states no claim.”). To the extent Plaintiff is claiming that Ms. McWilliams was aware of his
medical complaints but took no action to address them (Doc. 296, p. 10), this claim must also fail.
There is no evidence that Ms. McWilliams ever received or reviewed the November 2017
grievance that purportedly went missing. There is also no evidence that Ms. McWilliams received
Plaintiff’s follow-up inquiries, but additionally, neither of those inquiries contain any information
about his purported medical issues (see Doc. 100-2; Doc. 100-3). Consequently, no reasonable
jury could conclude that she had sufficient notice of a constitutional deprivation but declined to
take any action to rectify it. Furthermore, as with the other grievance officials, McWilliams cannot
be held liable for failing to intervene in Plaintiff’s medical care because the Court has already
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concluded that Plaintiff failed to establish any of the medical providers were deliberately
indifferent in treating him. For these reasons, Defendant McWilliams is entitled to summary
judgment.
CONCLUSION
The motions for summary judgment filed by the Wexford Defendants (Doc. 264) and the
IDOC Defendants (Doc. 285) are GRANTED. Summary judgment is GRANTED as to Dr.
Alberto Butalid, Rose Loos, Angel Rector, Dr. Michael Scott, Dr. Nageswararao Vallabhaneni,
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., John Baldwin, Christine Brown, Derek Flatt, Karen Jaimet,
Jacqueline Lashbrook, Larue Love, Rhonda McWilliams, Dr. Steve Meeks, Dr. Louis Shicker, and
Christopher Scott Thompson. Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants are DISMISSED with
prejudice and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in their favor and close this
case on the Court’s docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 30, 2020
s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge
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