Sanders v. Splittorf et al

Filing 52

ORDER GRANTING 48 Motion to Dismiss Monell Claim with prejudice against JOE SPLITTORFF and MICHEAL O'NEILL, in their individual and official capacities, and without prejudice against CITY OF ALTON for failure to state a claim for relief. Defen dant CITY OF ALTON is DISMISSED without prejudice from this action. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to UPDATE the docket sheet in CM/ECF to reflect the correct spelling of "JOE SPLITTORFF" and "MICHAEL O'NEILL" and TERMINATE Defendant CITY OF ALTON as a defendant. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 3/6/2023. (jsy)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ARYION SANDERS,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
JOE SPLITTORF,
CITY OF ALTON,
and MICHAEL McNEAL,1
Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-00864-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Now before the Court for a decision is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Joe
Splittorff, Michael O’Neill, and City of Alton. (Doc. 48). Defendants seek dismissal of the
Monell claim2 set forth in the First Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). As discussed in more detail below, the motion shall be GRANTED, and the
Monell claim shall be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Aryion Sanders filed this civil rights action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
on August 14, 2017.

(Doc. 1).

The original Complaint did not survive screening under

28 U.S.C. § 1915A and was dismissed for violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.
(Doc. 7). However, Sanders was granted leave to file a First Amended Complaint. (Id.).
1

In the Answer, Defendant Joe Splittorf identifies himself as “Joe Splittorff,” and Defendant Michael
McNeal identifies himself as “Michael O’Neill.” (Doc. 50). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
UPDATE the docket sheet in CM/ECF to reflect the correct spelling of each defendant’s name. The
Court and parties shall refer to these individuals as Joe Splittorff and Michael O’Neill henceforth.
2
The Monell claim is referred to as the “Second Cause of Action” in the First Amended Complaint (Doc.
8), “Count 3” in the Court’s Screening Order (Doc. 9) and Order Lifting Stay (Doc. 41), and “Count II” in
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 48) and the Response (Doc. 49). To avoid further confusion, the
Court will simply refer to the claim as the Monell claim herein.

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In the First Amended Complaint filed November 21, 2017, Sanders asserted claims
against Officer Splittorff, Officer O’Neill, and City of Alton for violating his rights under federal
and state law during a criminal interrogation by: (1) repeatedly denying his requests to speak
with an attorney; (2) continuing to question him after he asked to stop the interrogation;
(3) threatening him and/or his family and friends with bodily harm; and (4) physically
intimidating him until he made incriminating statements. (Doc. 8). He requested monetary
relief. (Id.).
The Court recharacterized the claims in the pro se First Amended Complaint, as follows:
Count 1:

Fifth Amendment claim against Splittorff and O’Neill for using coercive
interrogation tactics, denying Sanders access to an attorney, and refusing
to stop questioning Sanders after he asked to cease the interrogations,
causing Sanders to make incriminating statements.

Count 2:

Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim against Splittorff
and O’Neill for using conscience-shocking interrogation tactics, causing
Sanders to make incriminating statements.

Count 3:

Monell claim against City of Alton for failing to train officers regarding
appropriate interrogation techniques.

Count 4:

State law claim against Splittorff and O’Neill for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

(See Doc. 9). At the time, Sanders’ underlying criminal case was pending in state court, so this
Court stayed this action until the underlying state criminal proceedings concluded. (Doc. 9)
(citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007);
Gakuba v. O’Brien, 711 F.3d 751, 753 (7th Cir. 2013)). Sanders retained counsel thereafter.
(Doc. 10).
On April 28, 2022, Sanders filed a status report indicating that the criminal case against
Sanders concluded on April 27, 2022. (Doc. 40). This Court reviewed public records and
confirmed that the criminal case was closed. See People v. Sanders, Madison County Case
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No. 15-CF-1880 (closed April 27, 2022). Therefore, the Court lifted the stay on this case and
allowed Counts 1, 2, and 4 to proceed against Splittorff and O’Neill and Count 3 (i.e., Monell
claim) to proceed against City of Alton pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (Doc. 41).
MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendants filed a joint motion for dismissal of the Monell claim on August 2, 2022.
(Doc. 48). In the motion, Splittorff and O’Neill argue that a Monell claim cannot proceed
against individual officers as a general rule. (Id. at ¶ 2). They further assert that official capacity
claims against them would be redundant, given that the City of Alton is already named in
connection with the claim. (Id. at ¶ 3). In addition, the City of Alton seeks dismissal of the
Monell claim against it because the allegations are inadequate as a matter of law. (Id. at ¶ 4).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) is to decide the adequacy of the complaint. Gibson v. City
of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, the complaint must allege enough factual information to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” and “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A claim is plausible when the plaintiff “pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff need not plead
detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. When considering a motion to
dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept well-pleaded facts as true and

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draw all possible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.,
694 F.3d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 2012).
DISCUSSION
In Monell, the United States Supreme Court held that a local government can only be
liable under § 1983 for injuries caused by its own customs, policies, or practices. Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Municipalities face no liability under § 1983 for
the misdeeds of employees or agents. Id. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in
this context. Id.
Put differently, Sanders can only proceed with his Monell claim if he sets forth
allegations suggesting that the City, itself, caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights. See
also Flores v. City of South Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Dunn v. City of
Elgin, 347 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694)). Monell liability arises
from (a) an express policy calling for a constitutional violation; (b) a widespread practice of
constitutional violations that was so permanent and well settled as to constitute custom or usage
with the force of law; or (c) a constitutional violation caused by a person acting with final
policymaking authority for the body. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; McCormick v. City of Chi., 230
F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 2000).
The Supreme Court has also recognized a related theory of liability premised on a failureto-train. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). Failure-to-train liability is
appropriate only when inadequate training “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the [employees] come into contact.” Id. at 388. By failing to train an
employee whose conduct the municipality knows is deliberately indifferent toward the public,
the municipality demonstrates its own deliberate indifference to the known risk. Id.

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A.

Monell Claim Against Officers
The Monell claim shall be dismissed with prejudice against both officers, in their

individual capacities.3 As a general rule, Monell claims cannot proceed against an officer, in his
or her individual capacity. See Monell v. New York Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978);
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). This is because “personal-capacity suits are
really suits against the official as an individual, not against the government entity, [so] Monell is
always inapplicable.” Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, 839 F.2d 375, 381-82 (7th Cir. 1988).
The Monell claim shall be dismissed with prejudice against Officers Splittorff and O’Neill, in
their individual capacities.
The Monell claim against Splittorff and O’Neill, in their official capacities, shall also be
dismissed with prejudice. Sanders already named the City of Alton in connection with the
Monell claim, so including official capacity claims against the officers adds nothing. A Monell
claim against an officer, in his or her official capacity, is the equivalent of a Monell claim against
the government entity, itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165. Official-capacity suits
“represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
agent.” Id. District courts regularly dismiss official capacity claims against officers where the
government entity is also named in connection with the claim. Herrington v. Bradford, 2022
WL 900661, at *3 (S.D. Ill. March 28, 2022). Sanders did not need to name the officers, in their
official capacities, in order to pursue a Monell claim here.

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Naming the City of Alton in

To be clear, the Court did not allow this claim to proceed past screening against the officers. The Court
only allowed the Monell claim to proceed against the City of Alton. (Doc. 41). In the final sentence of its
discussion in the Order Lifting Stay, the Court states: “Counts 1, 2, and 4 shall proceed against Officers
Splittorf[f] and [O’Neill] and Count 3 shall proceed against City of Alton once these defendants are
served with this lawsuit.” (Id. at 2) (emphasis added). The Monell claim in Count 3 against the officers
did not survive preliminary review under § 1915A, and it does not survive review against them under
Rule 12(b)(6) either.

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connection with the claim was enough. The Monell claim shall be dismissed with prejudice
against both officers, in their official capacities.
B.

Monell Claim Against City of Alton
For its part, the City of Alton argues that the Monell claim should be dismissed because

the allegations are insufficient to support a claim against the City. In the First Amended
Complaint, Sanders specifically alleges that the City had a duty to adequately train, supervise, or
discipline their police officers and investigators, in order to protect members of the public, such
as Sanders, from being harmed by the police and deputies unnecessarily. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 17-18).
Sanders also alleges that the City was deliberately indifferent to such duties and proximately
caused injuries to him. (Id. at ¶ 19).

He adds that one officer testified that his interrogation

tactics were part of the training he received by the City. (Id. at ¶ 13e). On this basis, Sanders
seeks to proceed with his Monell claim against the City.
These allegations do not satisfy the pleading standards described in Twombly or Iqbal.
To do so, the First Amended Complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When making this
determination, the Court assumes the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations. Twombly 550
U.S. at 556. However, the Court is not required to accept as true any threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action that are supported only by conclusory statements. Id. at 555. A
pleading that consists of nothing more than “labels and conclusions” or “recitations of the
elements of a cause of action” does not suffice. Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). A plaintiff
must provide more than an “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A plaintiff bringing a Monell claim based on allegations of a failure to
train must plead facts suggesting a plausible “direct causal link” between the purported policy

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and alleged constitutional deprivation. The policy or custom must be the “ ‘moving force’
behind the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Arlotta v. Bradley Ctr., 349 F.3d 517, 522 (7th
Cir 2003) (citing Gable v. City of Chi., 296 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Sanders’ allegations are vague and conclusory in nature.

The legal conclusions

“contribute nothing to the plausibility analysis under Twombly/Iqbal” and are not entitled to the
same presumption of truth given to other allegations in a pro se complaint. McCauley v. City of
Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 2011). Because Sanders has not set forth allegations
suggesting that the City actually had a policy, custom, or widespread practice of using abusive
interrogation tactics or that it failed to train its officers in proper interrogation techniques, he
cannot establish the necessary nexus between a city policy and his constitutional deprivation.
Accordingly, the Monell claim against the City of Alton shall be dismissed without prejudice
under Rule 12(b)(6).
DISPOSITION
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Monell Claim (Doc. 48) is
GRANTED.

The Monell claim—identified as the “Second Cause of Action” in the First

Amended Complaint (Doc. 8), “COUNT 3” in the Screening Order (Doc. 9) and Order Lifting
Stay (Doc. 41), and “COUNT II” in the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 48) and Response (Doc. 49)—
is DISMISSED with prejudice against JOE SPLITTORFF and MICHEAL O’NEILL, in their
individual and official capacities, and without prejudice against CITY OF ALTON for failure to
state a claim for relief.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant CITY OF ALTON is DISMISSED without prejudice
from this action.

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The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to UPDATE the docket sheet in CM/ECF to reflect
the correct spelling of “JOE SPLITTORFF” and “MICHAEL O’NEILL” and TERMINATE
Defendant CITY OF ALTON as a defendant.
The parties are REMINDED that the below three claims survived screening against
Defendant SPLITTORFF and O’NEILL, in their individual capacities, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, despite the different labels for these claims in the pro se First Amended Complaint:
Count 1:

Fifth Amendment claim against Splittorff and O’Neill for using coercive
interrogation tactics, denying Sanders access to an attorney, and refusing
to stop questioning Sanders after he asked to cease the interrogations,
causing Sanders to make incriminating statements.

Count 2:

Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim against Splittorff
and O’Neill for using conscience-shocking interrogation tactics, causing
Sanders to make incriminating statements.

Count 4:

State law claim against Splittorff and O’Neill for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

(See Docs. 9 and 41). Going forward, the Court and parties shall refer to these claims as Counts
1, 2, and 4.
Because Defendants Splittorff and O’Neill (in their individual capacities) have filed an
Answer to the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 50), the Court will separately enter a Scheduling
and Discovery Order with further instructions and deadlines for litigation of Counts 1, 2, and 4.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 3/6/2023

s/J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
United States District Judge

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