Boone v. Wexford Health Sources Inc. et al

Filing 9

MERIT REVIEW OPINION - Entered by Judge Harold A. Baker on 8/14/2017. See written Order. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants E. Pearson and Mary Miller are dismissed. The clerk is directed to terminate Defendants Pearson and Miller. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants E. Pearson and Mary Miller are dismissed. The clerk is directed to terminate Defendants Pearson and Miller. (LN, ilcd) [Transferred from Illinois Central on 8/15/2017.]

E-FILED

Monday, 14 August, 2017 02:05:12 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MICHAEL BOONE,
Plaintiff,
v.
WEXFORD HEALTH
SOURCES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

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17-CV-2158

MERIT REVIEW ORDER
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, and currently incarcerated in
the Shawnee Correctional Center (“Shawnee”), was granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. The case is now before the court for a
merit review of plaintiff’s claims. The court is required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A to “screen” the plaintiff’s complaint, and through such
process to identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the
entire action if warranted. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
In reviewing the complaint, the court accepts the factual
allegations as true, liberally construing them in the plaintiff's favor.
Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However,
conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts
must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(citation
omitted). The court has reviewed the complaint and has also held a
merit review hearing in order to give the plaintiff a chance to
personally explain his claims to the court.
The majority of plaintiff’s allegations relate to medical care he
received at Shawnee. Plaintiff alleges that the medical treatment he
received at Shawnee aggravated the neuropathy disorder in his feet,
and he ended up injuring his knee. For the reasons discussed
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below, the Court offers no opinion on the viability of Plaintiff’s
claims arising out of Shawnee.
In July 2015, plaintiff alleges he was transferred to Danville
Correctional Center (“Danville”) for a court writ for approximately
two weeks. Plaintiff orally stated that during the transport each
way, they made no provisions on the bus for his injured knee and
he was forced to sit with his injured right knee “wedged firmly
against the hard surface” of the seat in front of him. Plaintiff also
stated that he had to go to sick call three times in order to be
issued a low-bunk permit and that he didn’t receive the low-bunk
permit until the day he was being transported back to Shawnee.
Plaintiff was provided access to medical treatment shortly after
his arrival at Danville. The correctional officers transporting him
were not trained medical professionals and could not offer medical
treatment. Plaintiff’s discomfort was relatively short lived, and
nothing in Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that prison officials
intended to punish him. Plaintiff’s allegations as they relate to
Danville do not permit an inference that he suffered the extreme
deprivation necessary to state a constitutional claim. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (prison conditions may be
uncomfortable and harsh without violating the Constitution).
Plaintiff’s claims against Shawnee officials belong in the
Southern District of Illinois. Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may
be brought only in (1) the judicial district where any defendant
resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial
district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or (3) a judicial district in which any
defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action
may otherwise be brought. 28 U.S.C § 1391(b). Shawnee is located
in Johnson County, which is entirely within the Southern District of
Illinois, and the named defendants presumably reside within that
district. Without expressing an opinion as to the merits of
plaintiff’s complaint, the Court finds that venue over these claims
consequently lies in the Southern District of Illinois, and it is in the
interests of justice that this cause be transferred there. See 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a).

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
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Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants E. Pearson and
Mary Miller are dismissed. The clerk is directed to
terminate Defendants Pearson and Miller.

2.

The clerk is directed to transfer this case to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for whatever action(s)
the transferee court deems appropriate.
Entered this 14th day of August, 2017
/s/Harold A. Baker
___________________________________________
HAROLD A. BAKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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