Maiden v. Harris

Filing 6

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 9/28/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JUAN MAIDEN, # N-60674,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM P. HARRIS,
Defendant.

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Case No. 17-cv-874-NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”),
has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that
Harris, the Dietary Manager, allowed a hazardous condition to remain in the kitchen, which
caused Plaintiff to fall and sustain a serious burn. The Complaint is now before the Court for a
preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion of the
complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if

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it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the
line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its
face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith
v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or
implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578
F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate abstract
recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same
time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See
Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.,
577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Applying these standards, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims survive threshold review
under § 1915A.
The Complaint
At the time Plaintiff was injured on September 24, 2016, he was employed as a cook in
the kitchen at Pinckneyville, where he is still an inmate worker. (Doc. 1, pp. 1, 3). Plaintiff’s
assigned duty that morning was to clean up, and cook chicken in a kettle. In the floor in front of
the 4 kettles is an 18-foot-long floor drain, which is 18 inches deep. The drain is covered by
grates made of 14-inch-long rods welded to strips of flat iron. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Several of the welds
were broken and had been in that condition for some years. Inmate workers must step on the
grates when cooking or cleaning.

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Plaintiff stepped on the grate and his foot went through it where a weld was broken. He
put out his left arm to break his fall, and that arm came in contact with the hot kettle where
chicken was cooking. (Doc. 1, p. 3). He sustained a painful burn approximately 5” by 2” in size
on his arm. Plaintiff was taken to the Health Care Unit and given treatment. A large area of
burned skin was removed. The wound was so painful that Plaintiff did not go for follow-up
treatment on several days because the slightest touch was painful. Ten months later, the burned
area has “impaired skin integrity” and is permanently discolored. (Doc. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff’s arm
movement above his head, behind his back, and forward is “not normal.” Id. Plaintiff’s
Complaint does not contest the adequacy of his medical treatment.
Plaintiff asserts that Dietary Manager Harris knew about the broken welds on the floor
grates for more than a year, yet refused to have the rods re-welded, creating an unreasonably
hazardous condition in the kitchen for Plaintiff and other inmate workers. (Doc. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff
learned that several days before his injury, another cook had suffered a similar fall through the
floor grate and severely burned his arm. Id. Later on, in May 2017, Harris had the rods on the
floor grates repaired. (Doc. 1, p. 5).
Based on these facts, Plaintiff brings an Eighth Amendment claim against Harris for
deliberate indifference to the hazard posed by the broken floor grates. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5). He also
alleges that Harris was negligent in failing to have the grates repaired, despite knowing that the
welds were broken. (Doc. 1, p. 5).
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and damages. (Doc. 1, p. 6). He also requests an
injunction against Harris and his subordinates, enjoining them from retaliating against him for
bringing this suit. Id.

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Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit. Any other claim that
is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed
without prejudice.
Count 1:

Eighth Amendment claim against Harris, for deliberate
indifference to the risk of injury to Plaintiff posed by the hazardous
condition of the kitchen floor grate;

Count 2:

State law negligence claim against Harris, for failing to repair the
hazardous floor grate despite his knowledge that injury could result
and that another inmate had in fact been hurt by falling through the
grate.

As explained below, both counts above shall proceed in this action for further review.
Count 1 – Deliberate Indifference
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment forbids
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and punishment grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). Two elements are required to establish a violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause with regards to any conditions of
confinement in prison. First, an objective element requires a showing that the conditions deny the
inmate “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” creating an excessive risk to the
inmate’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective
conditions must have resulted in an unquestioned and serious deprivation of basic human needs
such as food, medical care, sanitation, or physical safety. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
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(1981). The second requirement is a subjective element – establishing a defendant’s culpable
state of mind, which is deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate
from those conditions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 842. The deliberate indifference standard is
satisfied if the plaintiff shows that the prison official acted or failed to act despite the official’s
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm from the conditions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. It
is well-settled that mere negligence does not amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g.,
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986).
Courts have consistently held that the fall hazard posed by a surface such as a wet shower
or kitchen floor does not implicate Eighth Amendment concerns. See Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d
586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996) (“an inch or two” of accumulated water in the shower was not “an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety”); Bell v. Ward, 88 F. App’x 125 (7th Cir. 2004)
(affirming the dismissal of a slip-and-fall claim on § 1915A review because accumulation of
water on prison floor did not present a risk of serious injury). See also Carroll v. DeTella, 255
F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[F]ailing to provide a maximally safe environment, one
completely free from . . . safety hazards, is not [a constitutional violation].”). Similarly, an
uneven surface on a prison softball field did not create an excessive risk to the safety of the
inmates who played ball there. Christopher v. Buss, 384 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2004) (plaintiff’s
eye was injured when a softball bounced off a “protrusive lip” on the field and struck him; court
held that the risk of being hit by a softball as a result of a hazardous field condition is not one
that “today’s society chooses not to tolerate.”).
In contrast, a significant hazard that is out of the ordinary may violate the Eighth
Amendment, if prison officials knew of the danger and unreasonably subjected an inmate to a
serious risk of harm. For instance, the Seventh Circuit held that a prisoner stated a cognizable

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claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement where he alleged that he was forced to walk
down a staircase strewn with garbage and milk while he was handcuffed, and then fell after the
guards refused to help him navigate the obstacles. Anderson v. Morrison, 835 F.3d 681, 682-83
(7th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 410-11 (7th Cir. 2014), which held
that “slippery surfaces and shower floors in prison, without more, cannot constitute a hazardous
condition of confinement” that violates the Eighth Amendment). Prisons are not required to
provide a “maximally safe environment.” Carroll v. DeTella, 255 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2001).
However, they must act to prevent “unreasonable peril” or address “preventable, observed
hazards that pose a significant risk of severe harm to inmates.” Anderson, 835 F.3d at 683; see
also Withers v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 710 F.3d 688, 689 (7th Cir. 2013); Smith v. Peters,
631 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2011).
In this case, Plaintiff’s work area in the kitchen presented more than just the common
danger of a slippery floor. The broken grate that covered an 18-inch-deep floor drain arguably
posed a significant risk of severe physical harm to the inmate kitchen workers. Further, it appears
to have been a “preventable, observed hazard.” Plaintiff alleges that Harris knew about the
condition for some time, and the danger was underscored when another cook was hurt by falling
through the grate just days before Plaintiff suffered the same injury.
At this stage, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Harris
survives review under § 1915A. Count 1 shall proceed for further consideration.
Count 2 – Negligence
Where a district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action such as a § 1983 claim,
it also has supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a), so long as the state claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” with the

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original federal claims. Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008). “A
loose factual connection is generally sufficient.” Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 495 (7th
Cir. 2008) (citing Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 72 F.3d 1294, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff’s claim that Harris was negligent in failing to correct the dangerous condition of
the grate is such a state law claim. It is based on the identical facts that underlie the deliberate
indifference claim in Count 1.
In Illinois, in order to state a claim for negligence, a complaint must allege facts to
establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, breached that duty, and that the
breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Thompson v. Gordon, 948 N.E.2d 39, 45
(Ill. 2011) (citing Iseberg v. Gross, 879 N.E.2d 278 (2007)). “Whether a duty is owed presents a
question of law for the court to decide, while breach of duty and proximate cause present
questions of fact for the jury to decide.” Id.
Because Plaintiff’s constitutional claim in Count 1 shall proceed in this action, the Court
shall also give further consideration to his related negligence claim against Harris in Count 2.
Pending Motion
Plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3) shall be referred to United States
Magistrate Judge Wilkerson for further consideration.
Disposition
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for HARRIS: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and
Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The
Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and
Order to Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign
and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date

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the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant,
and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the Defendant cannot be found at the address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall
furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s
last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above
or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the
Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for further pre-trial proceedings, which shall include a
determination on the pending motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3).
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
Wilkerson for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all
parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will

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cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 28, 2017

___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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