Adams v. Fairless et al

Filing 7

ORDER DISMISSING CASE: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 2) and this action are DISMISSED with prejudice as being frivolous. This includes COUNTS 10, 11, and 12, which are the only claims at issue in this severed case and are all factually and/or legally frivolous. Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of his three allotted strikes under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 10/13/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MAURECUS ADAMS,
#R41506,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LUKE FAIRLESS,
JACK YEN,
L. HARTLEROAD,
TRAVIS JAMES,
HALEY BASNETTE,
H. O’BRIEN,
JESSIE SMITH,
D. D. BROOKHART,
GOINS,
DUNCAN,
DR. SHAH,
A. DEE-HOUT,
H. LOCKHARD, and
WARDEN of LAWRENCE
CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
Defendants.

–
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HERNDON

Judge:

Plaintiff Maurecus Adams, an inmate who is currently incarcerated in
Lawrence Correctional Center, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against officials at Menard, Stateville, and Lawrence Correctional Centers.

See Adams v. Harrington, No. 17-cv-715-DRH (S.D. Ill.) (“original action”).
Pursuant to George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007), this Court severed the
claims in the original action into two additional cases. (Doc. 1, instant action).
1

The instant case addresses the claims that arose at Lawrence (i.e., “Counts 1012”).

(Doc. 1, pp. 9, 12-13).

In connection with these claims, Plaintiff seeks

declaratory judgment, monetary damages, injunctive relief, 1 and a pardon. 2
Counts 10-12 are now subject to preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, which provides:
(a)
– The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in
any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

Frivolousness is an

objective standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable person would find
meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross
“the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the

1

Plaintiff specifically requests a lie detector test, a drug test, and a test to determine
whether he was given an electronic transmission device. (Doc. 2, p. 17). He also asks
that the defendants be ordered to pay for “all medical treatment . . . indefinitely.” Id.
2
This relief is not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

2

factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed.

See

Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). All
of the claims in this severed case are frivolous and shall therefore be dismissed.
Complaint
Before transferring to Lawrence in 2015, Plaintiff was housed at Menard
and Stateville. (Doc. 2). Pertinent to Counts 10-12, Plaintiff alleges that Menard
officials attempted to torture and kill him in 2014. (Doc. 2, pp. 8-10). They
allegedly injected Plaintiff with Drug S6K and HIV, in an effort to infect him with
the virus and cause a deadly allergic reaction. (Doc. 2, pp. 8-9). Menard officials
also fed Plaintiff juice boxes full of urine. (Doc. 2, p. 10). One of these juice
boxes allegedly contained an electronic transmitter that became lodged between
Plaintiff’s throat and chest when he drank the contents of the box. Id. Plaintiff
claims that the transmitter allows the prison to monitor and control his thoughts.

Id.

Although Plaintiff complained about the device to Menard officials, they

refused to document his complaints. Id.
After transferring to Lawrence, Plaintiff met with Doctor Luke Fairless, a
member of Lawrence’s psychiatric team, on August 7, 2015, August 14, 2015,
September 22, 2015, August 12, 2016, November 14, 2016, and November 15,
2016. (Doc. 2, p. 13). Plaintiff told Doctor Fairless about “everything that took
place . . . in Menard,” including his suspected poisoning and the “human
electronic transmission device” he was fed. Id. Doctor Fairless offered Plaintiff
medication for delusions “without [re]search.” Id. The doctor also indicated that

3

he would deny all requests for transfers. (Doc. 2, p. 14).
Plaintiff received psychiatric treatment from Doctor Jack Yen via
telemedicine on August 14, 2015, September 18, 2015, November 20, 2015,
December 18, 2015, January 8, 2016, January 29, 2016, and March 4, 2016.
(Doc. 2, p. 14). When Plaintiff told the doctor about his problems, Doctor Yen did
not seem to understand.

Id.

He offered Plaintiff medication “without

[re]searching” his condition. Id.
Plaintiff spoke with LPC Hartleroad between August 26, 2016 and October
21, 2016. (Doc. 2, p. 14). He told Hartleroad about “everything that [was] going
on” but claims that nothing was done. Id.
Plaintiff spoke with PA-C Travis James on October 13, 2016, November 9,
2016, and November 16, 2016.

(Doc. 2, p. 14).

Plaintiff also told James

“everything that [was] going on,” including what happened to him at Menard. Id.
James agreed that Plaintiff was “going through some s***” but said there was
nothing he could do to help. Id.
Plaintiff spoke with LPC Haley Basnette about “everything that happened” to
him on October 16, 2016, November 13, 2016, November 21, 2016, December
12, 2016, and January 10, 2017. (Doc. 2, p. 14). She offered Plaintiff medication
“without an[y] research.” Id.
On November 8, 2016, LCSW O’Brien spoke with Plaintiff about the device
he was given. (Doc. 2, pp. 14-15). She wrote down the name of the device and
then diagnosed him as being delusional “without research.” (Doc. 2, p. 15).

4

Plaintiff also spoke with Jessie Smith on May 22, 2015, June 8, 2015, and
October 17, 2016. (Doc. 2, p. 15). When he told her “what was going on,” she
offered Plaintiff medication but did not document anything he said. Id.
Plaintiff received the same response from LCPC Dee-Hout on November 12,
2016. (Doc. 2, p. 15).
Plaintiff reported his problems to Doctor Lockhard, while also complaining
of constipation, on September 4, 2016, September 8, 2016, and October 1, 2016.
(Doc. 2, p. 15). The doctor provided Plaintiff with Mag Citrate, 3 which he has
continued taking “to this day.” Id.
When Plaintiff told Doctor Shah what “was going on with [him]” and “about
[his] problems” on November 21, 2016, January 16, 2017, February 6, 2017,
March 2, 2017, and March 7, 2017, the doctor agreed to refer Plaintiff to a
“specialist.”

(Doc. 2, p. 15).

Plaintiff was never referred.

Id. When Plaintiff

asked Doctor Shah about the referral on March 2, 2017, the doctor indicated that
“Psych” told him that he lacked the necessary authority to refer Plaintiff to a
specialist. Id.
Plaintiff wrote to Warden Brookhart on August 8, 2016, August 11, 2016,
and August 15, 2016, and she sent him to see Doctor Fairless. (Doc. 2, p. 16).
Plaintiff asked Warden Duncan to investigate his claims of poisoning
against Menard officials in letters dated August 3, 2015 and August 26, 2015.
(Doc. 2, p. 16). However, Plaintiff received no response from the warden. Id.
3

Magnesium citrate is a naturally occurring mineral that is used as a laxative to treat
occasional constipation. See https://www.drugs.com/mtm/magnesium-citrate.html (last
visited Oct. 12, 2017).

5

Warden Goins promised to respond to letters Plaintiff wrote between
August 3, 2015 and October 20, 2015. (Doc. 2, p. 16). However, the warden
never did so. Id.

This case focuses on the following three claims that arose at Lawrence:
Count 10 - Fairless, Yen, Hartleroad, James, Basnette, O’Brien, Smith,
Dee-Hout, and Shah were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
serious medical needs when they diagnosed him with
delusional disorder in lieu of treating him for poison and
insertion of an electronic transmittal device in violation of
Plaintiff’s Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Count 11 - Lockhard was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious
medical needs when he provided Plaintiff with Mag Citrate in
violation of Plaintiff’s Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
Count 12 - Brookhart, Duncan, and Goins failed to adequately respond to
Plaintiff’s letters regarding his treatment and/or the events at
Menard in violation of Plaintiff’s Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
(See Doc. 2, p. 9).

The parties and the Court will continue to use these

designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a
judicial officer of this Court.
District courts are required to screen prisoner complaints and dismiss a
“complaint, or any portion of the complaint . . . [that] is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
Counts 10, 11, and 12 are subject to dismissal under this standard. All of the
claims in this case are frivolous.

6

Allegations are “factually frivolous” when they are “clearly baseless,”
“fanciful,” “fantastic,” “delusional,” “irrational,” or “wholly incredible.” Felton v.

City of Chicago, 827 F.3d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)).

Allegations that are “unlikely,” improbable,” or

“strange” do not satisfy this standard. Id. A claim is considered legally frivolous
when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Felton, 827 F.3d at
635 (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28). All of Plaintiff’s legal claims fit into these
categories.
Count 10 arises from allegations that are factually frivolous.

The claim

hinges on Plaintiff’s belief that he was poisoned with HIV, drugged, and given juice
boxes full of urine and as well as an electronic transmitter device. (Doc. 2). His
claims against Menard officials in the original action were dismissed as being
factually frivolous. (Doc. 8, original action). In the Order Dismissing Case, this
Court pointed out that a chest x-ray report submitted with the Complaint
indicated that no foreign objects were visible in Plaintiff’s chest. (Doc. 8, p. 7,
original action). Plaintiff conceded in another exhibit that he tested negative for
HIV.

Id.

Finally, numerous medical professionals diagnosed him as being

delusional. Id.
Plaintiff’s claims against Lawrence officials in this case arise from the same
beliefs and Plaintiff’s resulting diagnosis with delusions.

(Doc. 2, pp. 13-16).

Plaintiff disagrees with this diagnosis and the treatment he was offered at

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Lawrence. Id. However, his diagnosis and decision to forego treatment does not
give rise to a colorable constitutional claim against the Lawrence defendants.
This claim is not unlike claims asserted by a prisoner in Gladney v.

Pendleton Corr. Facility, 302 F.3d 773, 774-75 (7th Cir. 2002).

There, the

prisoner-plaintiff alleged that he was drugged and raped by fellow inmates, after
guards at three different prisons unlocked his cell door at night and allowed the
inmates to enter.

Gladney, 302 F.3d at 774.

Plaintiff only realized he was

drugged and raped when he discovered a lone needle mark under his lip. Id. The
suit was dismissed with prejudice at screening as being factually frivolous, and
the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s decision. Id. The Court indicated
that “no evidentiary hearing is required in a prisoner’s case when the factual
allegations are incredible.”

Id.

Like the claims in Gladney, Plaintiff’s claim

against Lawrence officials in Count 10 is factually frivolous because the claim
arises from purely delusional beliefs, fantastic allegations, and baseless assertions
of deliberate indifference against the defendants.
Count 11 is legally and factually frivolous.

Plaintiff claims that he

complained of constipation to Doctor Lockhard while also describing what
happened at Menard, and he was given “Mag Citrate.” (Doc. 2, p. 15). Plaintiff
admits that he continues to take it “to this day.”

Id.

Magnesium citrate is

commonly used to treat constipation. Plaintiff offers no indication that it was
ineffective or that he returned to Lockhard with additional complaints regarding

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constipation.

Instead, Plaintiff baldly asserts that the defendant violated his

constitutional rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
To the extent this claim arises from Plaintiff’s disagreement with the
doctor’s treatment decision regarding constipation, Count 11 is legally frivolous.
Mere disagreement with a physician’s chosen course of an inmate’s medical
treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference under the Eighth
Amendment. See Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003); Garvin

v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) (courts will not take sides in
disagreements about medical personnel’s judgments or techniques); Snipes v.

DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Amendment does not give
prisoners entitlement to “demand specific care” or “the best care possible,” but
only requires “reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm.”

Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).
To the extent the claim arises from Plaintiff’s disagreement with Lockhard’s
decision to ignore his complaints about Menard, Count 11 is factually frivolous
for the same reasons Count 10 is frivolous. Either way, Count 11 against Doctor
Lockhard shall be dismissed with prejudice because it is frivolous.
Finally, Count 12 is also factually and legally frivolous. Plaintiff complains
that several high-ranking officials at Lawrence failed to appropriately respond to
his written complaints about Menard.

Warden Brookhart responded to his

complaints by sending him to the psychiatrist, and Wardens Duncan and Goins
did not respond to his complaints. (Doc. 2, p. 16).

9

The fact that a supervisor, such as a warden, received a complaint about
the actions of another individual does not create liability.

Prison grievance

procedures are not constitutionally mandated and thus do not implicate the Due
Process Clause per se.

As such, the alleged mishandling of grievances “by

persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct
states no claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). See also

Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2008); George v. Smith,
507 F.3d at 609; Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). In
order to be held individually liable, a defendant must be “personally responsible
for the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d
724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651
(7th Cir. 2001)). See also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Although involvement in the grievance process sometimes establishes personal
involvement in a constitutional violation, there is no underlying constitutional
violation here to support this claim against the wardens. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792
F.3d 768, 781-82 (7th Cir. 2015). The Complaint offers no basis for finding that
any of these individuals was personally responsible for a violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. Count 12 shall also be dismissed with prejudice because it
is both factually and legally frivolous.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 2) and this action are
DISMISSED with prejudice as being frivolous. This includes COUNTS 10, 11,

10

and 12, which are the only claims at issue in this severed case and are all
factually and/or legally frivolous.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of his three
allotted “strikes” under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Plaintiff’s

obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was incurred at the time the action
was filed, thus the filing fee of $350.00 remains due and payable. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he may file a notice of appeal with
this Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. 4(A)(4). If
Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee
irrespective of the outcome of the appeal.

See FED. R. APP. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v.

Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien, 133 F.3d at 467. Moreover,
if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may also incur another
“strike.”

A proper and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A
Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than twenty-eight (28) days after the
entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.
The Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE and enter judgment accordingly.

Digitally signed by Judge David
R. Herndon
Date: 2017.10.13 12:16:00 -05'00'

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

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