Augusta v. Vandalia Correctional Center

Filing 14

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 12) is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. IT IS ORDERED that COUNTS 1, 2, and 4 are DISMISSED without prejudice and COUNT 3 is DISMI SSED with prejudice, all for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. IT IS ORDERED that Defendants EMPLOYEES OF V.C.C. and EMPLOYEES OF I.D.O.C. are DISMISSED with prejudice because they are not suable defendants, but rather nebulo us designations for large groups of unknown defendants.IT IS ORDERED that Defendants WAGGONER, BALDWIN, and RAUNER are DISMISSED without prejudice because the First Amended Complaint states no claim for relief against them. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED tha t Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a Second Amended Complaint in this case on or before February 28, 2018. Should Plaintiff fail to file his Second Amended Complaint within the allotted time, dismissal of this action will become with prejudice. (Amended Pleadings due by 2/28/2018). Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 1/31/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
QUENNEL T. AUGUSTA,
#K-81797,
Plaintiff,
vs.
EMPLOYEES OF V.C.C.,
EMPLOYEES OF I.D.O.C.,
STEPHANIE WAGGONER,
BRUCE RAUNER, and
JOHN BALDWIN,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
) Case No. 17−cv–00919−MJR
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
This matter is now before the Court for preliminary review of the First Amended
Complaint filed by Plaintiff Quennel Augusta on October 24, 2017. (Doc. 12). Plaintiff brings
this civil rights action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his
constitutional rights at Vandalia Correctional Center (“Vandalia”).

Id.

According to the

allegations, Plaintiff injured his leg when he slipped and fell while moving property boxes onto a
trailer. (Doc. 12, p. 5). He sustained a leg injury that resulted in significant blood loss and ten
stitches. Id. In connection with this incident, Plaintiff now asserts claims against the defendants
for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, for involuntary servitude under
the Thirteenth Amendment, and for the denial of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. He seeks monetary damages against all defendants. (Doc. 12, p. 6).
The First Amended Complaint is now subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
which provides:

1

(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in
any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee
of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
Id. An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a
claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27
(7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations in the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint does not survive screening
under this standard and shall be dismissed.
First Amended Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that he was ordered to load heavy boxes onto a trailer at Vandalia on an
undisclosed date. (Doc. 12, p. 5). He did not volunteer for the job, and he did not sign an
employment contract before doing so. Id. In the process, he slipped, fell, and injured his leg. Id.
Plaintiff allegedly lost significant amounts of blood and a “chunk of meat” from his leg that
necessitated ten stitches. Id. He complains of no delay in medical treatment and no permanent
injuries.

Id.

However, Plaintiff maintains that “Employees of V.C.C.,” “Employees of

2

I.D.O.C.,” Warden Stephanie Waggoner, IDOC Director John Baldwin, and Governor Bruce
Rauner are responsible for violating his rights under the Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. (Doc. 12, pp. 1-5). He seeks monetary damages against them. (Doc. 12, p. 6).
Discussion
To facilitate the orderly management of future proceedings in this case and in accordance
with the objectives of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(e) and 10(b), the Court deems it
appropriate to organize the claims in this pro se First Amended Complaint into the following
enumerated counts:
Count 1 -

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendants for subjecting Plaintiff to dangerous conditions of
confinement at Vandalia.

Count 2 -

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim
against Defendants for delaying or denying Plaintiff adequate
medical treatment for the injuries he sustained to his leg when he
slipped and fell while loading heavy boxes onto a trailer at
Vandalia.

Count 3 -

Thirteenth Amendment claim against Defendants for ordering
Plaintiff to load a trailer at Vandalia while he was under no
contract for employment at the prison.

Count 4 -

Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against Defendants
for ordering Plaintiff to load a trailer at Vandalia while he was
under no contract for employment at the prison.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designation of these claims does not
constitute an opinion regarding their merits.

Any other claims in the First Amended

Complaint that are not identified above are inadequately pled under Twombly and are
considered dismissed without prejudice from this action.

3

Count 1
The allegations in the First Amended Complaint do not support a colorable Eighth
Amendment claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement against the defendants. The
Eighth Amendment prohibits the cruel and unusual punishment of prisoners. U.S. CONST.,
amend. VIII.

In conditions cases, Eighth Amendment liability hinges on exposure to an

objectively serious condition, which is generally defined as one that deprives an inmate of the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745
(7th Cir. 2017) (citing Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016); Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant acted
with deliberate indifference to his health or safety. Id. See also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
302-03 (1991).
The allegations in the First Amended Complaint do not support a claim for
unconstitutional conditions of confinement under these standards. The hazards that Plaintiff
describes are not sufficiently serious to invoke the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 12, p. 5). Plaintiff
simply states that he slipped and fell while loading a trailer. Id. He offers no information about
the conditions he faced at the time, such as any slippery surfaces he encountered or safety gear
that he was denied. Id. The Seventh Circuit has made it clear that slip-and-fall accidents almost
never give rise to constitutional claims. Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 410 at n. 25 (7th Cir.
2014). More broadly, federal courts have consistently adopted the view that slip-and-fall cases,
resulting from exposure to slippery surfaces and nothing more, do not constitute hazardous
conditions of confinement. Id. (citing Coleman v. Sweetin, 745 F.3d 756, 764 (5th Cir. 2014)
(per curiam) (agreeing with district court that, as a matter of law, “prisoner slip-and-fall claims
almost never serve as the predicate for constitutional violations,” thus upholding sua sponte

4

dismissal of deliberate-indifference claim brought by inmate who slipped and fell in shower);
Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1031 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding dismissal at summary
judgment of Eighth Amendment claim brought by inmate who attributed slip-and-fall to standing
water in shower, since “slippery floors constitute a daily risk faced by members of the public at
large.”); LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993) (even if shackled inmate might
fall on wet floor while showering, allegations of “slippery prison floors” do not state “even an
arguable claim for cruel and unusual punishment”) (quoting Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639,
641 (9th Cir. 1989)).
In addition, Plaintiff identifies no particular defendant who exhibited deliberate
indifference to any hazardous conditions he faced.

(Doc. 12, p. 5).

To show deliberate

indifference, Plaintiff must allege that each official, “through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Personal
involvement is established in this context when the official acts or fails to act with deliberate or
reckless disregard to Plaintiff’s health or safety, or the conduct causing the deprivation occurred
at the official’s direction or with his or her knowledge or consent. Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395,
1401 (7th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff points to no particular person who knew about the conditions he
faced or who disregarded a serious risk of harm to his health or safety.
Having failed to demonstrate that he faced an objectively serious condition or that any
defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his health or safety, Count 1 fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. This claim shall therefore be dismissed. However, the
dismissal shall be without prejudice and with leave to re-plead the claim in an amended
complaint in this case or in a separate action.

5

Count 2
The First Amended Complaint also fails to state a claim against any defendants for the
denial of adequate medical care for Plaintiff’s leg injury. The Supreme Court has recognized
that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” may constitute cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; Farmer, 511 U.S. at
837; see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2006) (per curiam). A claim for the denial of
medical care consists of an objective and a subjective component. To state a claim, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that: (1) he suffered from a sufficiently serious medical condition (i.e., an
objective requirement); and (2) state officials acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s
medical

condition

(i.e.,

a

subjective

requirement).

Farmer,

511

U.S.

at

834;

Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001).
The Seventh Circuit has held that a serious medical condition is one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that would be obvious to a layperson.
Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409; Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff alleges
that he lost a large “chunk of meat” from his leg that necessitated ten stitches. (Doc. 12, p. 5).
He also lost significant amounts of blood. Id. For screening purposes, Plaintiff describes a
medical condition that could be considered objectively serious.
In order to proceed with this claim, Plaintiff must also demonstrate that each defendant
responded to his serious condition with deliberate indifference.

This standard is satisfied by

allegations which suggest that the defendant was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to
the plaintiff and disregarded that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Negligence, or even gross
negligence, will not support a constitutional claim. McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th
Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).

6

The allegations offer no indication that a defendant disregarded Plaintiff’s serious
medical condition. He received stitches following the injury, and no allegations suggest that this
treatment was inappropriate.

He does not allege that he suffered from any permanent or

untreated injuries. Although a delay in treatment may amount to deliberate indifference if it
results in unnecessary pain or exacerbates an existing condition, Plaintiff does not indicate that
his treatment was delayed or that his pain was prolonged unnecessarily. Lewis v. McLean, 864
F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2017); McGowan, 612 F.3d at 640; Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763,
779 (7th Cir. 2008). Having failed to demonstrate that any defendant responded to his serious
medical condition with deliberate indifference, Count 2 also fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted and shall therefore be dismissed without prejudice.
Count 3
The allegations do not support a claim against the defendants for involuntary servitude
under the Thirteenth Amendment. For one thing, the Thirteenth Amendment does not provide
protection to prisoners in this context. It states that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST. XIII, § 1
(emphasis added). In other words, it does not make prison work per se unconstitutional.
Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The Thirteenth Amendment excludes
convicted criminals from the prohibition of involuntary servitude, so prisoners may be required
to do work.”), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1303 (1993). See also See Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d
497, 500 (7th Cir 1999); Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Putting prisoners to
work against their will . . . is hard to describe as a violation of the Constitution.”).

7

It is the Eighth Amendment that protects prisoners from punishment that is considered
cruel and unusual.

U.S. CONST., amend. VIII.

As discussed above, this extends to

unconstitutional conditions of confinement, as well as the denial of medical care. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s claim challenging adverse working conditions, if at all, arises under the Eighth
Amendment and not the Thirteenth Amendment. Count 3 shall be dismissed with prejudice
against all of the defendants.
Count 4
Finally, the First Amended Complaint articulates no colorable equal protection claim
against the defendants. The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause protects individuals
from government discrimination. Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 783-84 (7th Cir.
2013). The typical case involves a claim of discrimination by race, national origin, or sex. Id. at
783-84. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must show that he “is a member of a protected class,” that he
“is otherwise similarly situated to members of the unprotected class,” and that he “was treated
differently from members of the unprotected class.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 916 (7th Cir.
2005) (quoting McNabola v. Chicago Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing
McMillian v. Svetanoff, 878 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff makes no such claim.
The Clause also prohibits the singling out of an individual for different treatment for no
rational reason. Swanson, 719 F.3d at 783-84. Such claims have been referred to as “class-ofone” equal protection claims. Id. To state a class-of-one claim, an individual must allege that he
was “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational
basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
Plaintiff sets forth no allegations to this effect either.

8

In conclusory fashion, Plaintiff invokes the Fourteenth Amendment and asserts that he
was denied equal protection. (Doc. 12, p. 5). He offers no factual support for the claim. Id.
Even at this early stage in litigation, Plaintiff cannot rely on threadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action or conclusory statements. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555). Having relied entirely on conclusory assertions, Count 4 fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted and shall also be dismissed without prejudice against the defendants.
Suable Defendants
On a closing note, the Court deems it necessary to emphasize that Plaintiff must name
suable defendants, if he wishes to proceed with any of his claims against them. In his First
Amended Complaint, he has named groups of individuals, such as “Employees of V.C.C.” and
“Employees of I.D.O.C.” (Doc. 12, p. 1). Plaintiff cannot proceed with his claims against large,
poorly defined groups of defendants. He must name the individuals who were responsible for
the deprivation of his constitutional rights and briefly explain what each person did, or failed to
do, that resulted in the deprivation. If he does not know the names of particular individuals,
Plaintiff is not precluded from bringing a claim. He should simply refer to each individual, in
the case caption and throughout the statement of his claim, in generic terms (e.g., “John Doe” or
“Jane Doe”). Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 832 (7th Cir. 2009). The
Court will then establish a plan and deadlines for identifying the unknown defendants with
specificity during the course of litigation.
Plaintiff has also named high-ranking officials who appear to have no personal
involvement in the deprivation of any constitutional right, such as the prison warden, the
department of corrections director, and the governor. (Doc. 12, p. 1). However, he cannot
proceed against these defendants based only on their supervisory role over those individuals who

9

caused the alleged constitutional deprivations because respondeat superior liability is not
recognized in § 1983 actions. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001);
Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). He must name those defendants
who were responsible for the constitutional deprivations at issue, instead of those individuals
who served as their supervisors and otherwise lacked any personal involvement in a
constitutional deprivation.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 12) is
DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS ORDERED that COUNTS 1, 2, and 4 are DISMISSED without prejudice and
COUNT 3 is DISMISSED with prejudice, all for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants EMPLOYEES OF V.C.C. and EMPLOYEES OF
I.D.O.C. are DISMISSED with prejudice because they are not suable defendants, but rather
nebulous designations for large groups of unknown defendants.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants WAGGONER, BALDWIN, and RAUNER are
DISMISSED without prejudice because the First Amended Complaint states no claim for relief
against them.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a “Second
Amended Complaint” in this case on or before February 28, 2018. Should Plaintiff fail to file
his Second Amended Complaint within the allotted time, dismissal of this action will become
with prejudice. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). See generally Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th

10

Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994). Further, a “strike” will be
assessed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Should Plaintiff decide to file an amended complaint, it is strongly recommended that he
use the forms designed for use in this District for such actions. He should be careful to label the
pleading, “Second Amended Complaint,” and he must list this case number (Case No. 17-00919MJR) on the first page. To enable Plaintiff to comply with this Order, the Clerk is DIRECTED
to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form.
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff must, at a minimum, describe the actions taken by
each defendant that resulted in the deprivation of his federal constitutional rights. He should
attempt to include the facts of his case in chronological order, inserting each defendant’s name
where necessary to identify the actors. Plaintiff should refrain from filing unnecessary exhibits
or including any other unrelated claims in his amended complaint.

Claims found to be

unrelated will be further severed into new cases, new case numbers will be assigned, and
additional filing fees will be assessed.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall not count as one of his allotted “strikes”
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original Complaint, rendering the
original void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n. 1 (7th Cir.
2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to the original Complaint or the First
Amended Complaint. Thus, the Second Amended Complaint must stand on its own without
reference to any previous pleading, and Plaintiff must re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to
consider along with the Second Amended Complaint. Finally, the Second Amended Complaint
is subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

11

Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 31, 2018
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief Judge,
United States District Court

12