Malone v. IDOC

Filing 11

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 10/16/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WILLIAM A. MALONE,
No. B52858,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IDOC, S. MERCIER,
INTERNAL AFFAIRS,
DR. BUTALIO, T. ADESANYA,
NURSE PRACTITIONER BOB,
PINCKNEYVILLE CORRECTIONAL
CENTER, WEXFORD HEALTH
CARE SERVICES, INC.,
CHRISTINE BROWN,
VIPIN SHAW, DR. SCOTT,
ANGEL RECTOR,
1 JOHN/JANE DOE,
2 JOHN/JANE DOE,
3 JOHN/JANE DOE,
1 JOHN DOE,
MR. CLELAND, LT. FRANK,
B. LIND, C/O JUSTICE,
MS. JUSTIC, 4 JOHN/JANE DOE,
1 JANE DOE, 2 JOHN DOE, and
3 JOHN DOE,
Defendants.

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CIVIL NO. 17-cv-952-NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff William A. Malone, an inmate in Pinckneyville Correctional Center
(“Pinckneyville”), brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although the Complaint can be difficult to decipher, the Court was able to
identify the following claims: (1) Pinckneyville is violating the ADA with respect to prisoners in
wheelchairs (such as Plaintiff); (2) Prisoners in wheelchairs are being subjected to
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unconstitutional conditions of confinement; (3) Pinckneyville officials have labeled Plaintiff a
gang-member, snitch, and pedophile—placing his life in danger; (4) a correctional officer
verbally harassed Plaintiff; (5) officials at Pinckneyville negligently failed to maintain an
elevator and, as a result, Plaintiff was injured when the elevator malfunctioned; and (6) officials
at Pinckneyville have been deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical condition
(allegedly defective hip replacement and associated symptoms) and are denying necessary
treatment.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and for consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc. 3).
The IFP Motion will be simultaneously considered with the required preliminary review
of the Complaint because these matters are inextricably intertwined. In conducting its review, the
Court also considers allegations in Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2).
Litigation History
Court documents are public records of which the Court can take judicial notice. See
Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994). Review of documents filed in the
electronic docket of this Court and on the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”)
website (www.pacer.gov) discloses Plaintiff has already had ten cases dismissed as frivolous or
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Malone v. Ardis, No. 13-cv1543 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2013); Malone v. City of Peoria, 13-cv-1559 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2014);
Malone v. Hill et al., No. 16-cv-973 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2013); Malone v. Fritts et al., No. 16-cv200 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2016); Malone v. Unknown Party, No. 16-cv-974 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2016);
Malone v. Duvall, No. 16-cv-977 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2016); Malone v. IDOC et al., No. 16-cv-

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978 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2016); Malone v. Shah et al., No. 16-cv-972 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 2016);
Malone v. Orange Crush, No. 16-cv-975 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 2016); and Malone v. Groves et al.,
No. 16-cv-979 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2017). Thus, Plaintiff has accumulated ten “strikes” for
purposes of § 1915(g).
In this most recent filing, Plaintiff failed to disclose his full litigation history. He
references ten cases filed between 2013 and 2015, but fails to disclose that two of those cases
were dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 1-1). He also fails to disclose
any of his more recent litigation in this district or the eight strikes he recently received in
connection with that litigation. He merely states that he is disclosing the cases he can remember
to ensure that he is not once again sanctioned for failure to disclose his litigation history. 1 Id.
A plaintiff’s failure to disclose his litigation history, particularly when he seeks to
proceed IFP, may be grounds for immediate dismissal of the suit. Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d
724, 725 (7th Cir. 2008) (termination of the suit is an appropriate sanction for struck-out prisoner
who took advantage of court’s oversight and was granted leave to proceed IFP); Sloan v. Lesza,
181 F.3d 857, 858–59 (7th Cir. 1999) (litigant who sought and obtained leave to proceed IFP
without disclosing his three-strike status committed a fraud upon the court); see also Hoskins v.
Dart, 633 F.3d 541, 543 (7th Cir. 2011) (dismissal with prejudice appropriate where court-issued
complaint form clearly warned Plaintiff that failure to provide litigation history would result in
dismissal).
Although dismissal as a sanction is appropriate in this situation, there are additional
considerations that merit discussion. Specifically, as discussed more fully below, Plaintiff’s

1

On August 15, 2017, Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan dismissed one of Plaintiff’s pro se civil rights actions with
prejudice as a sanction for intentionally failing to disclose his litigation history. See Malone v. Lashbrook, No. 15cv-1304 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2017) (Doc. 55).
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medical claims suggest he may be in “imminent danger” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g). Accordingly, the Court proceeds with evaluating Plaintiff’s Complaint and IFP
Motion.
Relevant Legal Standards
Pleading Standard
Section 1915A provides:
(a) Screening.– The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which
a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal.– On review, the court shall identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if
it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the
line between possibility and plausibility. Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Pauper Status
The filing fee has not been paid. Instead, Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (Doc. 3). It appears that Plaintiff is unable to pay the full filing fee at this time. Because
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Plaintiff has accumulated three “strikes” for purposes of § 1915(g) (ten to be exact), however, he
may not proceed IFP in this or any other pending case in federal court unless he is in imminent
danger of serious physical injury. 2
Imminent Danger
In this case, it must be kept in mind that the three-strikes barrier is a prerequisite, in that it
determines which claims, if any, may be considered without payment of the full filing fee. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained that “imminent danger”
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) requires a “real and proximate” threat of serious
physical injury to a prisoner. Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing
Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2002)). In general, courts “deny leave to proceed
[as a pauper] when a prisoner’s claims of imminent danger are conclusory or ridiculous.” Id. at
331 (citing Heimermann v. Litscher, 337 F.3d 781, 782 (7th Cir. 2003)). Additionally,
“[a]llegations of past harm do not suffice” to show imminent danger; rather, “the harm must be
imminent or occurring at the time the complaint is filed,” and when prisoners “allege only a past
injury that has not recurred, courts deny them leave to proceed [as a pauper].” Id. at 330 (citing
Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023 (7th Cir. 1996)).

2

28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides:
[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or
proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the
United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent
danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
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Discussion
As noted above, the Complaint asserts the following claims: (1) Pinckneyville is violating
the ADA with respect to prisoners in wheelchairs (such as the Plaintiff); (2) Prisoners in
wheelchairs are being subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement; (3) Pinckneyville
officials have labeled Plaintiff a gang-member, snitch, and pedophile—placing Plaintiff’s life in
danger; (4) a correctional officer verbally harassed Plaintiff; (5) officials at Pinckneyville
negligently failed to maintain an elevator and, as a result, Plaintiff was injured when the elevator
malfunctioned; and (6) officials at Pinckneyville have been deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
serious medical condition (an allegedly defective hip replacement and associated symptoms) and
are denying necessary treatment.
With the exception of the last claim—pertaining to Plaintiff’s hip replacement—none of
the above claims meets the Seventh Circuit’s standard for finding imminent danger. The claims
pertaining to the housing of disabled prisoners identify possible ADA violations and/or Eighth
Amendment constitutional claims. Unfortunately, however, Plaintiff does not explain what
serious physical injury he faces as a result of the alleged violations. 3 The allegation pertaining to
a verbal altercation and/or harassment by a correctional officer clearly does not suggest
imminent danger in any way. Plaintiff does vaguely allege that his life is in danger because he
has been labeled as a gang member, snitch, and/or pedophile. But these allegations are incredibly
generic and provide no information suggesting that Plaintiff faces a “real and proximate” threat
at this time. 4 Finally, the claim pertaining to being injured when an elevator malfunctioned

3

These claims are also strikingly similar to claims presented by Plaintiff in Malone v. IDOC, 15-cv01304-MJRSCW (dismissed with prejudice on August 15, 2017 for failure to disclose litigation history).
4
These claims are also strikingly similar to claims raised by Plaintiff in Malone v. IDOC, 15-cv01304-MJR-SCW
and Malone v. Heideman, 15-cv-1104 (still pending).
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involves a past injury (for which Plaintiff received treatment) and does not clear the three-strikes
hurdle.
The allegations in the Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction do, however,
present a colorable Eighth Amendment claim regarding deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs. These allegations also suggest that, with respect to this claim, a finding of
imminent danger is appropriate. A summary of these allegations is provided below.
In 2004 (prior to being incarcerated), Plaintiff injured his hip in a work-related accident.
(Doc. 2, p. 4). As a result, Plaintiff had a bilateral total hip replacement for his left and right hip
in 2005. Id. Plaintiff immediately experienced issues with the procedure (his body began
“rejecting” the hip replacement). Id. Plaintiff received several prescription medications including
Vicodin, OxyContin, and Flexoril. Id. Plaintiff also was being treated by a physical therapist and
chiropractor. Id. In 2009, Plaintiff was scheduled for a corrective bilateral hip surgery, but he
was arrested before the surgery took place. Id. In 2010, he was transferred from a county jail to
Dixon Correctional Center (“Dixon”). At the time, Plaintiff was still receiving his previously
prescribed medications. Id. Plaintiff further contends that Dixon officials planned to refer
Plaintiff to an outside specialist for a second hip replacement. (Doc. 2, pp. 4-5).
On June 25, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred to Pinckneyville. (Doc. 2, p. 4). Plaintiff’s
narcotic pain medication was confiscated and replaced with non-narcotic pain medication. Id.
The non-narcotic pain medication does not treat Plaintiff’s pain effectively. Id. As a result,
Plaintiff has been struggling with severe pain since his transfer to Pinckneyville. Id.
In 2017, Plaintiff’s already painful condition began to deteriorate. (Doc. 2, pp. 4-7;
Doc. 1, pp. 4-5; Doc. 1-2, pp. 72-73). Plaintiff contends that he lives in excruciating pain every
day and says that he experiences “symptoms of burning, throbbing, shooting unending pain to

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lower back, spine, and hips with worsening loss of dexterity in the right side of his body, which
has been non-stop since 2008.” (Doc. 2, p. 5).
On July 5, 2017, Plaintiff saw Dr. Bob, a nurse practitioner, regarding his increasingly
severe hip pain and associated symptoms. (Doc. 2, p. 5; Doc. 1-2, pp. 72-73). Dr. Bob examined
Plaintiff and issued a referral for Plaintiff to see an orthopedic specialist. Id. On July 13, 2017,
Brown, the HCU Administrator, overrode Dr. Bob’s referral. (Doc. 2, p. 5, Doc. 1, p. 4).
On July 25, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding his ongoing hip pain, requesting a
referral to an outside specialist and surgery. (Doc. 1-2, p. 72). In the grievance, Plaintiff
describes increasingly severe hip and back pain. Id. Plaintiff stated that, when in certain
positions, the pain is so severe he passes out. Id. The request was denied by Brown and/or
Wexford because they wanted to have x-rays taken and reviewed prior to approving an
orthopedic medical furlough. (Doc. 1-2, pp. 73-4).
At the end of August 2017, Plaintiff met with Dr. Bob to review his x-rays. (Doc. 1, p. 7).
Dr. Bob reported that the person reviewing Plaintiff’s x-rays concluded they look normal (the xrays did not reveal any fractions, slippage, dislocation, or any other problems) and that his
request for an orthopedic medical furlough was being denied. (Doc. 1, p. 7). Plaintiff objected to
this conclusion. Id. Dr. Bob responded by stating “look, I’m just the messenger, don’t blame me,
I tried, HCU administrator Christine Brown gave me my orders on what to say and you aint
getting your hips replaced, that’s it, she over-rided [sic] my recommendation to send you out to
an orthopedic specialist, there is nothing I can do.”). Id. Dr. Bob also allegedly said, “They are
not going to foot the bill, so you are not getting your hips replaced.” (Doc. 2, p. 7).
At some point, Plaintiff also was examined by Dr. Butalio (described as a substitute
physician). (Doc. 2, p. 6). Dr. Butalio indicated that Plaintiff should be referred to an orthopedic

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specialist, but he said he could not make the referral until he had Plaintiff’s x-rays. Id. At the
same visit, Dr. Butalio prescribed gel packs and an air seat cushion for Plaintiff’s wheelchair (to
help alleviate his discomfort). Id. Brown subsequently denied the prescribed treatment. Id.
Since then, Plaintiff has not received any follow-up medical care. (Doc. 2, p. 6). His sick
call requests are ignored, and he has been told that because Pinckneyville does not presently have
a physician on staff, it will be months before he can be seen by a physician. Id.
Plaintiff contends hip replacement studies show that defective implants can shear off into
the patient’s body, causing serious and life threatening issues. (Doc. 2, p. 5). In fact, some hip
replacements have been recalled because of this defect. Id. Plaintiff contends that his worsening
symptoms suggest something is wrong with his hip implant. (Doc. 2, p. 5). Plaintiff states that if
he does not receive appropriate treatment, he is at risk of life-threatening complications and
could even lose his legs. (Doc. 2, pp. 5-7).
These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)
(Prison officials can violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment when their conduct demonstrates “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners.”). The Court also finds, at this early juncture, that the claim involves a real and
proximate threat of serious physical injury, which gets Plaintiff over the three-strikes bar. Thus,
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim regarding deliberate indifference to an allegedly defective
hip replacement and associated symptoms will be allowed to proceed—determining against
whom requires additional analysis.

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Personal Involvement
Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon
fault. “[T]o be liable under [Section] 1983, an individual defendant must have caused or
participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810
(7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). A prison official may be liable “only if he knows that inmates
face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. Proving deliberate indifference requires more
than a showing of negligent or even grossly negligent behavior. Id. at 835. Rather, the
corrections official must have acted with the equivalent of criminal recklessness. Id. at 836–37.
Four named defendants are linked to the alleged denial of medical care: (1) Brown;
(2) Wexford; (3) Dr. Bob; and (4) Dr. Butalio. 5
Plaintiff alleges Wexford, the private corporation that serves as the healthcare provider at
Pinckneyville, has implemented policies that emphasize cost over access to adequate medical
care. (Doc. 1, pp. 5-7; Doc. 2, pp. 6-7). This is sufficient to allow Plaintiff to proceed as to
Wexford. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 780 (7th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff alleges that Brown has denied necessary medical treatment because referring
Plaintiff to an outside specialist for potential hip replacement surgery is too expensive. (Doc. 1,
pp. 5-7;Doc. 2, pp. 6-7). This is sufficient to proceed as to Brown. See Perez, 792 F.3d at 781 (a
delay in treatment may constitute deliberate indifference if it exacerbates the inmate’s injury or
unnecessarily prolongs his pain); Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830 (7th Cir. 2007) (failing
to provide adequate, timely care for a nonmedical reason suggests deliberate indifference).

5

The Complaint often references other Defendants with respect to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. With the
exception of these four Defendants, however, the Complaint does not suggest personal involvement. Rather, other
Defendants are merely referenced in passing and without reference to any specific conduct that would suggest
personal involvement.
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The Complaint does not suggest that Dr. Bob or Dr. Butalio responded to Plaintiff’s
medical needs with deliberate indifference. According to Plaintiff, both Defendants attempted to
provide him with appropriate medical treatment, but each Defendant’s recommended course of
treatment was denied by Brown. Accordingly, the deliberate indifference claim will be dismissed
without prejudice as to Dr. Bob and Dr. Butalio.
In summary, Plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis on a single claim:
Count 1: Defendants Wexford and Brown were deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s serious medical condition (allegedly defective hip
replacement and associated symptoms) in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
Relative to Count 1, for the reasons stated, Defendants Dr. Bob and Dr. Butalio will be
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Although Plaintiff may pay the filing fee and proceed on his other claims, they cannot
proceed in this action. In George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh Circuit
emphasized that unrelated claims against different defendants belong in separate lawsuits, “not
only to prevent the sort of morass” produced by multi-claim, multi-defendant suits “but also to
ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
George, 507 F.3d at 607, (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), (g)). The other five claims asserted in the
Complaint are entirely unconnected to Plaintiff’s medical care claim.
Rather than actually sever the claims into separate cases and await payment of the filing
fee for each case, these other possible claims will be dismissed. Furthermore, the Court has had
to delve into all of the allegations presented only in order to sort out if and how to proceed
relative to the three-strikes problem. Therefore, with the exception of Count 1, all claims against
all defendants will be dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff desires to proceed on any of the

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dismissed claims, he must initiate separate actions and pay the filing fees (or attempt to secure
pauper status as he deems appropriate).
Injunctive Relief
With respect to Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction and any other injunctive
relief that might be granted at the close of the case, the warden is the appropriate party. Gonzales
v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, Karen Jaimet, the current warden
of Pinckneyville, shall be added to the docket—in her official capacity—for purposes of carrying
out any injunctive relief that might be ordered.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) is referred to Magistrate Judge
Donald G. Wilkerson for prompt disposition. Plaintiff’s Motion for Assistance of Counsel
(Doc. 4) is likewise referred to Magistrate Judge Wilkerson for disposition.
Challenging the Imminent Danger Finding
The Court notes that Defendants are free to contest the factual basis for the Court’s
imminent danger determination via motion pursuant to Taylor v. Watkins 623 F.3d 483, 485 (7th
Cir. 2010).
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, in that
Plaintiff may proceed as a pauper on the following claim:
Count 1: Defendants Wexford and Brown were deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s serious medical condition (allegedly defective hip
replacement and associated symptoms) in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
The initial partial filing fee and payment scheme will be set forth in a separate order.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, relative to the Eighth Amendment medical care
claim asserted in Count 1, Defendants DR. BOB and DR. BUTALIO are DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that ALL OTHER CLAIMS AGAINST ALL OTHER
DEFENDANTS are DISMISSED without prejudice.
Consistent with this Order, the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to terminate the
following as defendants: IDOC, S. MERCIER, INTERNAL AFFAIRS, DR. BUTALIO, T.
ADESANYA, NURSE PRACTITIONER BOB, PINCKNEYVILLE CORRECTIONAL
CENTER, VIPIN SHAW, DR. SCOTT, ANGEL RECTOR, MR. CLELAND, LT. FRANK,
B. LIND, C/O JUSTICE, MS. JUSTICE, and ALL UNIDENTIFIED DEFENDANTS
(JOHN/JANE DOE DEFENDANTS).
The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to add KAREN JAIMET, the current warden of
Pinckneyville, as a defendant (official capacity only) for purposes of carrying out any injunctive
relief that might be granted.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants WEXFORD and BROWN, in their
individual capacities, and JAIMET in her official capacity: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and
Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The
Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and
Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff.
If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the
Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to
effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full
costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for further pre-trial proceedings, including disposition of Plaintiff’s
Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Assistance of Counsel
(Doc. 4) .
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to a United States Magistrate for
disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to
such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,

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who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to Plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 16, 2017
___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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