Franklin v. Shah et al
Filing
61
ORDER denying 55 Motion for Reconsideration. For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum & Order, Defendant's motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Gilbert C. Sison on 5/19/20. (kll)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PATRICK FRANKLIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VIPIN SHAH,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 3:17-cv-960-GCS
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Patrick Franklin filed suit in September 2017 alleging that Defendant
Vipin Shah was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. On February 28,
2020, the Court ruled on Defendant Shah’s motion for summary judgment, and a single
claim related to the denial of a low-bunk permit remains pending. At all times relevant
to his complaint, Franklin was incarcerated at Robinson Correctional Center, and
Defendant Shah, a doctor, was the medical director. Franklin submitted several requests
for a low-bunk permit, but Dr. Shah denies involvement in the responses to the requests.
He also denies having any actual or constructive knowledge of Franklin’s requests.
In denying in part Dr. Shah’s motion for summary judgment, the Court found that
there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to Dr. Shah’s involvement and knowledge
and denied summary judgment. By motion dated March 3, 2020, Dr. Shah asks the Court
to reconsider its ruling and enter judgment in his favor on all claims. (Doc. 55). Franklin
Page 1 of 6
responded in opposition on May 12, 2020. (Doc. 60). The matter is fully briefed and ripe
for ruling.
Dr. Shah seeks reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b)
and 59(e). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly recognize motions to
reconsider. Rule 54(b) allows district courts to revisit “any order or other decision . . . that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims” in an action and to revise it at any point before the
entry of judgment as justice requires. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 54(b). See also Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983)(noting that any “order short
of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge.”). The denial
of summary judgment clearly falls within the reach of Rule 54(b).
Motions to reconsider interlocutory orders under this rule “serve a limited
function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir.
1996)(internal quotations and citations omitted). “A manifest error is not demonstrated
by the disappointment of the losing party. It is the wholesale disregard, misapplication,
or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606
(7th Cir. 2000)(internal quotations and citation omitted). Because the standards for
reconsideration are exacting, the Seventh Circuit has stressed that appropriate issues for
reconsideration “rarely arise.” Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d
1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990)(internal quotations and citation omitted).
Rule 59(e) permits the Court to alter or amend judgments upon motion filed no
later than 28 days after the date of entry. The purpose of Rule 59(e) is to provide the
Page 2 of 6
district court with a means for correcting errors that may have “crept into the proceeding”
while the district court still holds jurisdiction over the case. Sosebee v. Astrue, 494 F.3d 583,
589 (7th Cir. 2007). A Rule 59(e) motion “is only proper when the movant presents newly
discovered evidence . . . or if the movant points to evidence in the record that clearly
establishes a manifest error of law or fact.” Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 252-253 (7th
Cir. 2015) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The motion is not an invitation to
rehash previously considered and rejected arguments. See Bordelon v. Chicago School
Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000).
Here, Dr. Shah raises a single point for reconsideration. He argues that there is no
genuine issue of material fact that Dr. Shah had any actual or constructive knowledge of
Franklin’s requests for a low-bunk permit. The Court, having carefully and thoroughly
considered and reviewed Dr. Shah’s argument and the record, disagrees.
As to his denial of a low-bunk permit claim, Franklin submitted at least two
offender request forms to the healthcare unit asking for a low-bunk permit due to his
weight. In a request addressed to Dr. Shah dated April 4, 2017, Franklin wrote: “I am
overweight[,] and I would like to be moved to a bottom bunk. I have problems going up
and down. Please and thank you.” (Doc. 1, p. 10). An unsigned staff response advised
him instead to attend the gym and reduce food intake. (Doc. 1, p. 10).
In a second request addressed to Dr. Shah and dated April 6, 2017, Franklin wrote:
“I’m overweight and I would like to be moved to a bottom bunk. I have fell trying to go
up and down the bunk. I’m 5’6”/360 pounds. Please and thank you.” (Doc. 41-1, p. 2).
The April 7, 2017 response stated, “Sign up for sick call to discuss low bunk and to be
Page 3 of 6
weighed.” (Doc. 41-1, p. 2). The signature on the second response is difficult to read.
Franklin testified that he believed it was Dr. Shah’s signature and that he believed Dr.
Shah was involved in formulating the responses. (Doc. 41-2, p. 8). Dr. Shah, in an
affidavit, stated that he has no recollection of being consulted about the requests and that
he did not sign the second request form. (Doc. 41-3, p. 2).
In addition to the written requests, Franklin testified that he also spoke with Dr.
Shah in passing about his desire to have a low-bunk permit. (Doc. 41-2, p. 7). Dr. Shah
does not recall hearing any verbal requests from Franklin prior to April 13, 2017. (Doc.
41-3, p. 3). Dr. Shah maintains that his practice is to direct patients to submit formal sick
call requests when they make oral requests, but his recollection is lacking as to his
interactions, or lack thereof, with Franklin specifically. (Doc. 41-3, p. 3). Allegedly due to
the lack of a low bunk permit, Franklin fell in the middle of the night on April 12, 2017,
and injured his elbow and arm. (Doc. 41-2, p. 8).
Franklin submitted a grievance about the denial of a low-bunk permit on April 14,
2017. (Doc. 1, p. 12). In the grievance, Franklin complained that he requested a low bunk
permit verbally and in writing because he kept injuring himself getting up and down the
ladder to his bed. (Doc. 1, p. 12). He explained that he fell and injured his elbow and arm
because of the refusal of a permit. (Doc. 1, p. 13). A counselor responded to the grievance
on April 17, 2017: “Per HCUA P Martin: After reviewing this offender’s medical
record/speaking to Dr. Shah, Offender is 26 years old w/out any medical issues.
Offender does not meet the medical needs for a low bunk permit.” (Doc. 1, p. 12). The
grievance response is somewhat confusing, as medical records and Dr. Shah’s affidavit
Page 4 of 6
state that Dr. Shah prescribed a low-bunk permit on April 13, 2017, after Franklin’s fall.
(Doc. 41-3). It is also unclear why Franklin would grieve the denial of a low bunk permit
on April 14, 2017, if he was prescribed a permit a day earlier.
At summary judgment, a genuine issue of material fact remains “if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Accord Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr., Inc., 753 F.3d
676, 681-682 (7th Cir. 2014). In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court
views the facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor
of, the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 699 F.3d at 994; Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d
895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011). With this in mind, the Court finds that there are genuine disputes
as to Dr. Shah’s actual or constructive knowledge of Franklin’s permit requests.
Franklin maintains that, in addition to submitting the request forms, he spoke with
Dr. Shah personally. Dr. Shah does not recall the conversation or conversations, but
lacking recollection is different than affirmatively denying that they took place. Dr. Shah
similarly lacks recollection of all of the events surrounding Franklin specifically. While
understandable given the number of patients and the time that has passed since
Franklin’s claims occurred, the record suggests that Dr. Shah had the ability to prescribe
a low bunk permit and that he may have been asked to do so by Franklin.
There is insufficient evidence to conclude to the level of certainty required at
summary judgment that, as a matter of law, there are no genuine disputes as to the role
Dr. Shah played, if any, in the denial of Franklin’s request. While he cannot be held liable
for actions of those he supervises, disputes remain as to Dr. Shah’s actual or constructive
Page 5 of 6
knowledge. These questions should be resolved by a trier of fact. As such, the Court finds
that there has not been a manifest error of law or fact that merits reconsideration of its
previous ruling. For all these reasons, Dr. Shah’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Digitally signed
by Judge Sison
Date: 2020.05.19
12:27:20 -05'00'
Dated: May 19, 2020.
______________________________
GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge
Page 6 of 6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?