Medford v. Unknown Party

Filing 13

ORDER DISMISSING CASE with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. IT IS ORDERED that Defendants SGT. BONJACK and JANE OR JOHN DOE (NURSE) are dismissed with prejudice for the same reason. Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal counts as one of his three allotted strikes under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 2/27/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SCOTT A. MEDFORD,
#Y22728,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SGT. BONJACK and
NURSE JANE or JOHN DOE,
Defendants.

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Case No. 17-cv-1014-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
This matter is now before the Court for consideration of the Second Amended Complaint
(Doc. 12) filed by Plaintiff Scott Medford on February 15, 2018. The instant case was severed
from a civil rights action that Plaintiff filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations
of his constitutional rights at St. Clair County Jail (“Jail”). See Medford v. McLaurin, Case No.
17-cv-243-JPG (S.D. Ill.). This case addresses a single claim against Sergeant Bonjack and
Nurse John or Jane Doe for exposing Plaintiff to staph infection. (“Count 8,” original action).
The Court screened the claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A in the original Complaint and First
Amended Complaint, but it did not survive preliminary review either time. (Docs. 5, 11).
Plaintiff now reasserts the claim in a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 12).
Count 8 is once again subject to preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as
soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify cognizable
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claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective
standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton,
209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief
must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the
factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v.
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Second Amended Complaint
According to the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was exposed to
an inmate, named Arthur Hunsicker, who suffered from staph infection. (Doc. 12, p. 10).
Inmate Hunsicker complained of a rapidly spreading infection for a week before receiving
antibiotic treatment from a nurse. Id. He remained in Plaintiff’s cell block for two weeks before
being transferred to the infirmary. Id.
During this time period, Plaintiff frequently encountered Inmate Hunsicker in the chow
hall and dayroom. (Doc. 12, p. 10). Plaintiff was housed in cell #9, and Inmate Hunsicker was
housed in cell #11. Id. The two inmates often sat near one another at meals. Id. Their clothing
and skin frequently touched. Id. Inmate Hunsicker’s staph infection was visible to Plaintiff and
caused him to fear infection. Id. After each encounter with Inmate Hunsicker, Plaintiff routinely
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returned to his cell and washed his body with cold water. Id.
The conditions at the Jail were generally unclean. (Doc. 12, p. 10). These conditions
included moldy showers, cold showers, and weekly clothing changes. Id. Although Plaintiff is
pursuing a separate suit to challenge the conditions, he maintains that the same conditions
increased his risk of contracting staph infection from Inmate Hunsicker.

See Medford v.

Unknown Party, No. 17-cv-01012-JPG (S.D. Ill.). However, the Second Amended Complaint
does not indicate that Plaintiff or any other inmates were diagnosed with staph following their
exposure to Inmate Hunsicker or that they exhibited any symptoms of infection. (Doc. 12, pp.
10-11).
On April 26, 2017, the entire block wrote a Captain Complaint to an unnamed
administrator and supervisor, asking them to send Inmate Hunsicker out for treatment. (Doc. 12,
p. 10).

Even after the inmates complained, Inmate Hunsicker refused to lock down.

Id.

Sergeant Bonjack inspected him and sent him back to his cell. Id.
An unknown nurse, identified herein as Nurse John or Jane Doe, examined Inmate
Hunsicker approximately one week into the relevant time period. (Doc. 12, p. 10). The nurse
bandaged his “huge boils” and gave him antibiotics before telling Inmate Hunsicker to return to
his cell block. (Doc. 12, p. 11). A week later on May 11, 2017, Inmate Hunsicker was moved
into the infirmary. Id. It is not clear when Inmate Hunsicker was actually diagnosed with staph
infection. (Doc. 12, pp. 10-11).
Plaintiff maintains that the defendants unnecessarily and recklessly exposed inmates to
staph for two weeks. (Doc. 12, p. 11). He asserts that this should not have happened. Id. As a
result of the exposure, Plaintiff suffered from psychological harm. Id. He seeks an injunction
requiring Jail officials to address grievances and monetary damages. (Doc. 12, p. 12).

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Discussion
In its Severance Order, the Court characterized Count 8 as follows:
Count 8 –

Unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim for failing to move an
inmate with a staph infection out of the general population and allowing
Plaintiff to be exposed to the infection.

(Doc. 1, p. 7). The parties and the Court will continue to use this designation in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court.
The applicable legal standard for this claim depends on Plaintiff’s status as a pretrial
detainee or a prisoner during the relevant time period. Claims brought by pretrial detainees are
governed by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, which prohibits conditions of
confinement that constitute “punishment.” See Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015)
(citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, -- U.S. --, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 2013)). Claims brought by
prisoners are governed by the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits conditions that amount to
cruel and unusual punishment. Smith, 803 F.3d at 309 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
832 (1994)).

Although pretrial detainees are afforded “at least as much protection as the

constitution provides convicted prisoners,” the Seventh Circuit has “found it convenient and
entirely appropriate to apply the same standard to claims arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment (detainees) and Eighth Amendment (convicted prisoners) ‘without differentiation.’”
Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (quoting Henderson
v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 845 n.2 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616,
620 (7th Cir. 2003)). The Seventh Circuit has explained that there is little practical difference
between conditions of confinement claims brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and

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claims asserted under the Eighth Amendment. Smith, 803 F.3d at 310 (citing Smego v. Mitchell,
723 F.3d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 2013)).
In both contexts, the alleged conditions must be objectively serious enough to amount to
a constitutional deprivation, and the prison official must possess a sufficiently culpable state of
mind. Smith, 803 F.3d at 309. To satisfy the objective element of this claim in the Eighth
Amendment context, the plaintiff must show that the conditions denied him “the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities” and created an excessive risk to the inmate’s health or
safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The subjective element requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference. Smith, 803 F.3d at 309 (citing Sain v.
Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 893-94 (7th Cir. 2008); Board, 394 F.3d at 478; Cavalieri, 321 F.3d at
620). The state of mind requirement is satisfied, where an inmate sets forth allegations which
suggest that “the defendant ‘possess[ed] a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a reckless state of
mind’ with respect to the defendant’s actions (or inaction) toward the plaintiff.” Smith, 803 F.3d
at 309, n. 2 (citing Davis v. Wessel, 792 F.3d 793, 801 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Kingsley, -- U.S.
--, 135 S. Ct. at 2472)). Allegations that a prison official knowingly exposed inmates to a
serious, communicable disease can support an Eighth Amendment claim for screening purposes.
See, e.g., Tedrick v. Fayette Cnty. Jail, No. 17-cv-1031-JPG, 2017 WL 5613008, at *3-5 (S.D.
Ill. Nov. 21, 2017) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993); Forbes v. Edgar, 112
F.3d 262, 266 (7th Cir. 1997); Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 614-15 (7th Cir. 2012)
(depending on severity, duration, nature of the risk, and susceptibility of the inmate, conditions
of confinement may violate the Eighth Amendment if they caused either physical, psychological,
or probabilistic harm)).

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However, the Second Amended Complaint does not satisfy the objective element of this
claim. Plaintiff describes an isolated case of staph infection at the Jail. (Doc. 12, pp. 10-11). He
alleges that the generally unclean conditions of the Jail increased his risk of infection. Id.
However, Plaintiff does not allege that he ever developed staph infection as a result of his
exposure to the infected inmate. Id. Plaintiff does not claim that he suffered from any symptoms
of infection. Id. He also does not indicate that anyone else suffered from staph infection or
symptoms of infection. Id. Plaintiff is no longer housed at that Jail. (Doc. 12, p. 1).
Although he suffered no actual harm to his physical health, Plaintiff also complains of the
psychological harm caused by his exposure to the potential health hazard. (Doc. 12, p. 10-11).
He describes instances of fear and anxiety following his encounters with the infected inmate. Id.
The lack of physical harm does not doom his claim. Depending upon the severity, frequency,
and duration of his exposure to infection at the Jail, Plaintiff’s psychological harm alone could
support an Eighth Amendment claim. See, e.g., Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d at 616. But
Plaintiff does not describe a severe, frequent, or prolonged exposure to staph infection at the Jail.
He describes a single infected inmate, who lived in a different cell. (Doc. 12, pp. 10-11).
A single case of infection in another inmate does not establish constitutionally inadequate
conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Striblin v. Buncich, 2015 WL 4724899, at *6–7 (N.D. Ind.
Aug. 7, 2015) (citing Shepherd v. Dallas County, 591 F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[I]solated
examples of illness . . . standing alone, cannot prove that the conditions of confinement are
constitutionally inadequate. Nor can the incidence of diseases or infection, standing alone, imply
unconstitutional confinement conditions, since any densely populated residence may be
subjected to outbreaks. . . . Rather, a detainee challenging jail conditions must demonstrate a
pervasive pattern of serious deficiencies in providing for his basic human needs.”)). An outbreak

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of staph infection among detainees following their exposure to Inmate Hunsicker or a pervasive
pattern of deficiencies in sanitation or medical care leading to infection might satisfy the
objective element of this claim. Id. at *6-7 (citing Duvall v. Dallas County, Texas, 631 F.3d 203,
208 (5th Cir.2011) (finding evidence sufficient to establish conditions were cruel and unusual
where there “had been serious outbreaks of MRSA in the Jail for at least three years before [the
plaintiff’s] arrival.”). However, the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint describe no
such thing.
Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff’s psychological harm was sufficiently serious to
satisfy the objective component of this claim, Plaintiff does not establish that either defendant
exhibited deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff.

The allegations describe no encounters

between Sergeant Bonjack or Nurse Doe and Plaintiff. (Doc. 12, p. 10). It mentions only one
encounter between Sergeant Bonjack and Inmate Hunsicker. Id. The sergeant “inspected” the
inmate and ordered him to return to his cell. Id. The “inspection” occurred early in the twoweek period, and no allegations suggest that the sergeant observed or ignored signs of infection
when sending Inmate Hunsicker back to his cell.

Id.

It is not even clear whether the

“inspection” of Inmate Hunsicker had anything to do with the inmate’s medical condition. Id.
Sergeant Bonjack was described as a nonmedical staff member. Id. Certainly, the allegations
offer no suggestion that the sergeant acted knowingly or with reckless disregard with respect to
Plaintiff. No claim of deliberate indifference is stated against Sergeant Bonjack.
Likewise, the allegations fail to support a deliberate indifference claim against the
unknown nurse. Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Doe bandaged Inmate Hunsicker’s “huge boils” and
treated him with antibiotics in early May 2017. (Doc. 12, pp. 10-11). Plaintiff does not allege
that the nurse knew that Inmate Hunsicker suffered from staph infection at the time. Id. It is

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unclear when or if Inmate Hunsicker received a formal diagnosis of staph infection or what type
of staph infection he had. Id. Plaintiff also does not describe any complaints or conversations he
had with Nurse Doe about his own exposure to infection. Id. He did not ask the nurse to move
him to a different cell or express concern to the nurse about his frequent casual contact with the
inmate.

Id.

Given the allegations, the Court cannot find any suggestion that Nurse Doe

exhibited deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff and the conditions of his confinement.
Plaintiff again states no claim against Sergeant Bonjack or Nurse John or Jane Doe for
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the Jail. Count 8 does not survive preliminary
review and shall be dismissed. In addition, the Second Amended Complaint and this action shall
be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Second Amended Complaint (consisting only of
COUNT 8) and this action are DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants SGT. BONJACK and JANE OR JOHN DOE
(NURSE) are dismissed with prejudice for the same reason.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal counts as one of his three allotted “strikes”
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Further, because two of Plaintiff’s other lawsuits1
have also been dismissed pursuant to § 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, the dismissal of this case gives Plaintiff his third “strike.” Accordingly, if Plaintiff
seeks to file any future civil action while he is a prisoner, he will no longer be eligible to pay a
filing fee in installments using the in forma pauperis provisions of § 1915(a) and (b), unless he
1

Medford v. Unknown Party, No. 17-cv-01013-JPG (S.D. Ill. dismissed Oct. 30, 2017) (failure to state a
claim); Medford v. Unknown Party, No. 17-cv-01016-JPG (S.D. Ill. dismissed Jan. 31, 2018) (failure to
state a claim).

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can establish that he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
If Plaintiff cannot make the necessary showing of imminent physical danger, he shall be required
to prepay the full filing fee for any future lawsuit he may file while incarcerated, or face
dismissal of the suit. Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was incurred at the
time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $350.00 remains due and payable. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal the dismissal of this case, he may file a notice of appeal with
this Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment.

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).

If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee
irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2);
Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 85859 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien, 133 F.3d at 467. If the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious,
Plaintiff may also incur another “strike.” A timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline.2 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4).
The Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 27, 2018
s/J. Phil Gilbert
U.S. District Judge

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A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of
the judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e).

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