Blaney v. Godinez et al

Filing 12

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 11) is DISMISSED without prejudice for noncompliance with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should he wish to proceed with this case, Plaintiff shall file his Third Amended Complaint within 28 days of the entry of this order. (Amended Pleadings due by 6/12/2018). Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 5/15/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JEFFREY BLANEY,
No. B80790,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 17-cv-1099-DRH

SALVADOR GODINEZ, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Plaintiff Jeffrey Blaney, presently incarcerated at Menard Correctional
Center (“Menard”), brings this pro se action for alleged deprivations of his
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that, since
1997, Menard officials have denied him access to the courts.

Plaintiff also

attempts to bring Eighth Amendment claims pertaining to the soy-based diet
served at Menard (and the medical treatment he received for complications
allegedly related to that diet) and Menard’s provision of clothing and hygiene
items. In connection with these claims, Plaintiff has named 103 defendants. 1

Plaintiff has named the following as defendants: Raymond Allen, K. Allsup, Terri Anderson,
Michael Atchinson, Dr. Baig, John R. Baldwin, Ty Bates, Henry Bayer, Sherry Benton, Joshua
Berner, James Best, Marvin Bochantin, Brad Bramlet, Brinkley, Kent Brookman, Todd Brooks,
James R. Brown, Kimberly Butler, Linda Carter, Jennifer Clendenin, J. Cowan, Jeanette Cowan,
Joseph Cowan, Rebecca Creason, Miss Delong, Robert Dilday, Unidentified John and Jane Does,
Carla Draves, Daniel Dunn, Ellis, Kellie S. Ellis, Eovaldi, Tony Ferranto, Fischer, Fricky, Salvador
Godinez, Sgt. Graw, Miss Greathouse, Shane Gregson, Rick Harrington, Harris, Chad E.
Hasemeyer, Susan Hill, Dr. Hillerman, Kevin Hirsch, James A. Hoppensted, Jeff Huchinson,
Robert Hughs, Hurst, Sara Johnson, Alex Jones, Karuse, Kewlkowsk, Tonya Knust, LaFone,
Jacqueline A. Lashbrook, Donald Lindenberg, Doug Lyerla, Clint Mayer, Sgt. McClure, McDaniels,
McNew, Michael Monjie, Richard D. Moore, Miss New, Lori Oakley, Obucina, Paul Olson, Page,

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Plaintiff was originally one of several plaintiffs in a multi-plaintiff action
filed by David Robert Bentz. See Bentz v. Godinez, No. 17-cv-315-MJR. After
several case management orders, Plaintiff’s claims were severed into a new action.
(Doc. 1).

The severance order directed Plaintiff to file a Second Amended

Complaint on or before November 13, 2017. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Thereafter, Plaintiff
requested and received two extensions to file his Second Amended Complaint.
(Docs. 8 and 10).
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 11) is now before the Court for
a preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Merits Review – Applicable Standards

Section 1915A
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter
out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss
any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a
defendant who by law is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see

Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may
be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff's claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). In addition,
Richard Pautler, Mark Phonix, Kelly Pierce, M. Prange, William Qualls, Rakers, Michael Randle,
Bruce Rauner, William Rees, Dia Rodely, Rodney Roy, Michael Samuel, Roger Shurtz, Simmons,
Simpson, B. Smith, Vergil Smith, Betsy Spiller, Shannis Stock, Donald Stolworthy, Gladyse
Taylor, Morgan Teas, Brad Thomas, Brian Thomas, Torville, Gail Walls, Jamie Welborn, Bill
Westfall, Lt. Whitely, Miss Whiteside, J. Whitley, Anthony Williams, Anthony Wills, and Jay Ziegler.

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the factual allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to raise the possibility of
relief above the “speculative level.” E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496
F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

See also Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th

Cir. 2009) (courts “should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the
elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements”).

Rule 8
In order to state a claim, a complaint must also comply with Rule 8 by
providing “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The primary purpose of these pleading
requirements is to give defendants fair notice of the claims against them and the
grounds supporting the claims. Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d
614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555,
127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). See also United States ex rel. Garst v.

Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 8(a) requires
parties to make their pleadings straightforward, so that judges and adverse
parties need not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.”). Under Rule 8,
Plaintiffs are also required to associate specific defendants with specific claims, so
that defendants are put on notice of the claims brought against them and so they
can properly answer the complaint. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

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544, 555 (2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Merely invoking the name of a potential
defendant is not sufficient to state a claim against that individual. See Collins v.

Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998). Moreover, vague references to a group
of “defendants,” without specific allegations tying the individual defendants to the
alleged unconstitutional conduct, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to those defendants. See Alejo v. Heller, 328 F.3d 930, 936 (7th Cir.
2003) (finding dismissal of named defendant proper where plaintiff failed to allege
defendant's personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoings); Starzenski v. City

of Elkhart, 87 F.3d 872, 879 (7th Cir. 1996).
Severance
As a part of screening, the Court is also allowed to sever unrelated claims
against different defendants into separate lawsuits. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d
605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). In George, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the
practice of severance is important, “not only to prevent the sort of morass”
produced by multi-claim, multi-defendant suits “but also to ensure that prisoners
pay the required filing fees” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Id. This
practice is encouraged. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recently warned
district courts not to allow inmates “to flout the rules for joining claims and
defendants, see FED. R. CIV. P. 18, 20, or to circumvent the Prison Litigation
Reform Act’s fee requirements by combining multiple lawsuits into a single
complaint.”

Owens v. Godinez, 860 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2017). See also

Wheeler v. Talbot, -- F. App’x --, 2017 WL 2417889 (7th Cir. 2017) (district court

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should have severed unrelated and improperly joined claims or dismissed one of
them).
Second Amended Complaint
The Second Amended Complaint includes a number of allegations that are
not associated with any specific defendant.
divided into three sets of claims:

These allegations can be roughly

(1) access to the courts; (2) provision of

clothing, towels, and hygiene items; and (3) soy-based diet.

A ccess to the Courts (Count 1)
Plaintiff claims that, since 1997, Defendants have denied him access to the
courts in a number of ways.

Plaintiff generally alleges that Menard denies

prisoners (including Plaintiff) access to the courts by (1) failing to provide an
adequate law library; (2) confiscating and withholding legal materials; and (3)
failing to provide indigent prisoners with the necessary drafting and mailing
materials (Doc. 11, pp. 11).

Plaintiff also contends that various practices at

Menard have interfered with his ability to access the courts, including but not
limited to the following practices and/or policies: (1) limiting the amount of time
prisoners may spend in the law library; (2) use of “inmate runners” to retrieve
legal research; (3) overuse or improper use of “lockdowns” for excessive periods
of time; (4) requiring prisoners to store excess legal materials in a separate
building (and failing to provide adequate access to that building); (5) allowing
IDOC’s tactical response team to search prisoners’ cells and destroy or displace
legal materials located therein; and (6) failing to provide indigent prisoners with

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sufficient materials at no charge (i.e. paper, pens, and envelopes); (Doc. 11, pp.
11-18).
Plaintiff’s access to the courts claims are directed against generic groups
including: (1) “Defendants;” (2) “Defendants who are ultimately responsible for
the law library;” (3) “the administrative defendants;” (4) “the property room
defendants;” (5) “those ultimately responsible for the policies, practices, and
procedures concerning the administration and safeguarding the personal property
under their control;” (6) “IDOC employees;” and (7) “Menard Defendants.” (Doc.
11, pp. 11, 14-16, 20).
Plaintiff also claims that “Defendants” confiscated his “irreplaceable
intellectual work products (over 1,000 pages of manuscript for a book written by
hand on toilet paper, the back of case laws, and scrap paper, as well as a 60 page
business plan) and properties, legal research materials, legal research, evidence,
law books, legal documents, and other irreplaceable legal records during cell
searches.” (Doc. 11, pp. 17-21).
Plaintiff alleges that, over the years, he has filed (or contemplated filing)
numerous cases challenging his conditions of confinement and/or underlying
convictions.

(Doc. 11, pp. 11-21).

According to Plaintiff, the policies and

practices described above have prevented him from successfully pursuing these
claims or from filing them in the first instance because he is unable to complete
legal research he believes is a prerequisite to pursuing his claims. Id.
Plaintiff also alleges that, because of the above described policies and

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practices, he was unable to file a civil rights lawsuit pertaining to being assaulted
by another inmate in 2014 (and claims related thereto). (Doc. 11, p. 23). 2

Hygiene Items, Clothing, and Towels (Count 2)
Plaintiff also claims that, over the past 15 years, he has been denied access
to adequate hygiene materials and clothing.

(Doc. 11, p. 22).

Specifically,

Plaintiff objects to restrictions on the amount of soap, shampoo, deodorant, and
toothpaste/tooth brushes provided to indigent inmates. Id. He also objects to
how often indigent inmates are permitted to exchange clothing and towels. Id. He
claims that these policies constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. He also
claims that, as a result of these policies, he has suffered numerous skin
infections. Id. Plaintiff does not identify any specific defendant in connection with
these claims.

Soy –Based Diet (Counts 3 and 4)
According to the Complaint, in or around 2012, “the Defendants” started
serving “excessive amounts of soy based food as a substitute for and in place of
meat based protein.” (Doc. 11, p. 24). Plaintiff claims the soy was often not fully
cooked and/or not properly processed. Id. Plaintiff alleges that in 2012, shortly
after starting the soy based diet, he “started having severe abdominal pains,
spastic colon, constant acid reflux, constipation, hemorrhoids, fatigue, intolerance
Plaintiff claims that John Doe Correctional Officers failed to protect him from an assault by his
cellmate. (Doc. 11, p. 23). Plaintiff also claims that he was denied medical care following the
assault and was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement when he was placed in
segregation. Id. The Court does not interpret the Complaint as attempting to assert independent
Eighth Amendment claims for failure to protect and/or deliberate indifference stemming from the
assault. Instead, Plaintiff suggests that he was unable to pursue a civil rights lawsuit pertaining to
these incidents because he was unable to communicate with his attorney. Id.
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of cold temperatures, mental apathy, dementia, physical sluggishness, muscle
aches, dry skin and hair, bleeding from dry skin, total loss of all hair below his
waist, dangerously low blood pressure, coarsening of features, and a general
slowing of normal metabolic functioning, as well as developing myxedema and
incurring a hiatal hernia.” Id. In approximately 2015, “one of the doctors joked
that Plaintiff’s sex life was not good, and he would have to put Plaintiff on
dialysis.” Id. Plaintiff complains that this “John Doe defendant doctor” did not
adequately treat or diagnosis Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Id. Plaintiff also
alleges that “Defendants’” policy or practice of only treating one medical complaint
per sick visit has prevented Plaintiff from obtaining appropriate medical care. Id.
Division of Counts
Based on the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds
it convenient to divide the pro se action into the following counts. The parties and
the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designation of these
counts does not constitute an opinion regarding their merit. Any claims not
addressed in this Order are considered dismissed without prejudice from this
action.
Count 1:

First Amendment denial of access to the courts claim
against Unknown Party.

Count 2:

Eighth Amendment claim against Unknown Party for
providing Plaintiff with inadequate access to hygiene
products, clothing, and towels, causing one or more skin
infections.

.
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Count 3:

Eighth Amendment claim against Unknown Party for
feeding Plaintiff a soy-based diet.

Count 4:

Eighth Amendment claim against Unknown Party for
exhibiting deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical
conditions, which Plaintiff associates with Menard’s soybased diet.
Discussion

The Second Amended Complaint is problematic because it repeatedly states
legal conclusions as if they were facts. Additionally, Plaintiff does not associate
specific defendants with specific actions. Instead, Plaintiff directs claims against
“Defendants” and/or generic groups of defendants.

Plaintiff claims that these

generic groups of defendants are subject to liability for violating his rights, but
fails to describe how each individual was personally involved in the alleged
constitutional violation. In fact, as far as the Court is able to discern, none of the
103 identified defendants is referenced in the body of the Second Amended
Complaint.
Plaintiff’s periodic reference to various John or Jane Does is also
insufficient.

For instance, with respect to Count 4, Plaintiff alleges that an

unidentified “John Doe” doctor was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
However, this individual is not identified as a defendant in the case caption or in
Plaintiff’s list of defendants. Plaintiff has included “Unidentified John and Jane
Does” as a defendant in his list of defendants. But a plaintiff cannot simply place
“Jane and John Does” in the caption and hope that these names will catch all
claims without actors. Instead, Plaintiff must identify the Jane or John Doe as

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much as possible and at least distinguish between different Does (for example,
John Doe #1, physician that treated Plaintiff on x date).
Further, given the length of time covered by the allegations, the Court
suspects that at least some of Plaintiff’s claims are time barred under the relevant
statute of limitations.

The Court also suspects that Plaintiff’s claims are

improperly joined and are subject to severance pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 18 and 20. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).
Given the above pleading deficiencies, the Court cannot discern what claims
are being asserted as to each of the 103 defendants. This significantly interferes
with the Court’s ability to sever parties and claims as is appropriate. Accordingly,
instead of immediately exercising its discretion and severing the unrelated,
potentially deficient claims against different defendants into separate cases,
resulting in a surplus of filing fees and potential strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
for Plaintiff, the Court deems it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint.
Plaintiff shall be allowed an opportunity to submit an amended complaint,
to correct the deficiencies in his pleading. If the amended complaint does not
comply with Rule 8 or with the instructions below, if it fails to state a claim, or if
Plaintiff does not submit an amended complaint, the entire case shall be
dismissed with prejudice. Such a dismissal will count as a strike pursuant to §
1915(g).

Third Amended Complaint

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If Plaintiff chooses to proceed with his claims in this action, he must file a
Third Amended Complaint. However, he should only bring related claims against
one group of defendants. This requires Plaintiff to choose which claims he will
pursue in this action and omit all reference to unrelated claims against other
defendants. See Taylor v. Brown, 787 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 2015).
By omitting reference to improperly joined claims in his Third Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff does not lose the right to pursue those claims.

He may

pursue them by filing a separate suit. See Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843,
846 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that, in the case of misjoinder, courts can require a
prisoner to “file separate complaints, each confined to one group of injuries and
defendants”). If he chooses to go this route, Plaintiff will be required to pay a
filing fee for each new lawsuit he brings. He should also keep in mind matters
pertaining to the statute of limitations.
If Plaintiff instead chooses to bring all of his claims again in the Third
Amended Complaint, this Court will sever unrelated claims against different
defendants into separate actions if it determines that they are improperly joined
in a single action. At that point, Plaintiff will have no say in the matter. The
Court will open a new case for each set of unrelated claims and assess a filing fee
in each case. The newly severed cases will be subject to preliminary review under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A and potentially a strike under § 1915(g).
With regard to severance, it appears that, at a minimum, the Court would
have to sever Count 1, Count 2, and Counts 3-4 into three separate lawsuits.

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Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 11)
is DISMISSED without prejudice for noncompliance with Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should he wish to proceed with this case,
Plaintiff shall file his Third Amended Complaint within 28 days of the entry of
this order. It is strongly recommended that Plaintiff use the form designed for
use in this District for civil rights actions. He should label the pleading “Third
Amended Complaint” and include Case Number 17-cv-1099-DRH. The amended
complaint shall present each claim in a separate count, using the numbers as
designated by the Court above. In each count, Plaintiff shall specify, by name, 3
each Defendant alleged to be liable under the count, as well as the actions alleged
to have been taken by that Defendant. New individual Defendants may be added if
they were personally involved in the constitutional violations.

Plaintiff should

attempt to include the facts of his case in chronological order, inserting
Defendants' names where necessary to identify the actors and the dates of any
material acts or omissions. Plaintiff should i nclude only related claims against
common defendants in his new complaint.

Claims found to be unrelated

against different defendants will be severed into new cases, new case

Plaintiff may designate an unknown Defendant as John or Jane Doe, but should include
descriptive information (such as job title, shift worked, or location) to assist in the person's
eventual identification. Including a catch-all John/Jane Doe defendant in the case caption is not
sufficient.
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numbers will be assigned, and additional filing fees will be assessed.
Should Plaintiff fail to file his Third Amended Complaint within the allotted
time or consistent with the instructions set forth in this Order, the entire case
shall be dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order and/or
for failure to prosecute his claims. FED. R. APP. P. 41(b). See generally Ladien v.

Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466
(7th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Such dismissal shall count as one of
Plaintiff’s three allotted “strikes” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
because he has yet to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original Complaint,
rendering the original Complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of

Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal
amendments to the original Complaint. Thus, the Third Amended Complaint
must contain all the relevant allegations in support of Plaintiffs’ claims and must
stand on its own, without reference to any other pleading.

Should the Third

Amended Complaint not conform to these requirements, it shall be stricken.
Plaintiff must also re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along with
the Third Amended Complaint. No service shall be ordered on any Defendant
until after the Court completes its § 1915A review of the Third Amended
Complaint.
In order to assist Plaintiff in preparing his amended complaint, the Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail him a blank civil rights complaint form.

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Finally, Plaintiff is REMINDED that he is under a continuing obligation to
keep the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his
address; the Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall
be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in
address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in the
transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for
want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P 41(b).

Judge Herndon
2018.05.15 14:00:08
-05'00'

D.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge

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