Harrington v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
24
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. The final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff's application for disability benefits is AFFIRMED.The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant. Signed by Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud on 8/15/2018. (jmt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CHARLES H, 1
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil No. 17-cv-1117-CJP 2
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), plaintiff seeks judicial review of the
final agency decision denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB)
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423.
Procedural History
Plaintiff applied for benefits In June 2013, alleging disability beginning on
February 15, 2011.
After holding an evidentiary hearing, ALJ Stephen M.
Hanekamp denied the application in a written decision dated June 29, 2016. (Tr.
16-27). The Appeals Council denied review, and the decision of the ALJ became
the final agency decision. (Tr. 1). Administrative remedies have been exhausted
and a timely complaint was filed in this Court.
Issue Raised by Plaintiff
1
In keeping with the court’s recently adopted practice, plaintiff’s full name will not be used in this
Memorandum and Order due to privacy concerns. See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(c) and the Advisory
Committee Notes thereto.
2
This case was assigned to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). See, Doc. 23.
1
Plaintiff raises the following point:
1.
The ALJ erred in giving too little weight to part of the opinion of his
treating psychiatrist, Dr. Chalfant.
Applicable Legal Standards
To qualify for DIB, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the
applicable statutes. For these purposes, “disabled” means the “inability to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
A “physical or mental impairment” is an impairment resulting from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(3).
“Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that involves doing
significant physical or mental activities, and that is done for pay or profit. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1572.
Social Security regulations set forth a sequential five-step inquiry to
determine whether a claimant is disabled. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has explained this process as follows:
The first step considers whether the applicant is engaging in
substantial gainful activity. The second step evaluates whether an
alleged physical or mental impairment is severe, medically
determinable, and meets a durational requirement. The third step
compares the impairment to a list of impairments that are considered
conclusively disabling. If the impairment meets or equals one of the
listed impairments, then the applicant is considered disabled; if the
2
impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then the
evaluation continues. The fourth step assesses an applicant's residual
functional capacity (RFC) and ability to engage in past relevant work. If
an applicant can engage in past relevant work, he is not disabled. The
fifth step assesses the applicant's RFC, as well as his age, education,
and work experience to determine whether the applicant can engage in
other work. If the applicant can engage in other work, he is not
disabled.
Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565, 568-569 (7th Cir. 2011).
Stated another way, it must be determined: (1) whether the claimant is
presently unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has an impairment or combination
of impairments that is serious; (3) whether the impairments meet or equal one of
the listed impairments acknowledged to be conclusively disabling; (4) whether the
claimant can perform past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of
performing any work within the economy, given his or her age, education and work
experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 512-513 (7th
Cir. 2009).
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to ensure that the decision
is supported by substantial evidence and that no mistakes of law were made. It is
important to recognize that the scope of judicial review is limited. “The findings of
the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, this Court must
determine not whether plaintiff was, in fact, disabled at the relevant time, but
whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether
any errors of law were made. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539
(7th Cir. 2003). This Court uses the Supreme Court’s definition of substantial
3
evidence, i.e., “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971).
In reviewing for “substantial evidence,” the entire administrative record is
taken into consideration, but this Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve
conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of
the ALJ. Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003); Moore v. Colvin,
743 F.3d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 2014).
However, while judicial review is
deferential, it is not abject; this Court does not act as a rubber stamp for the
Commissioner. See, Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010), and
cases cited therein.
The Decision of the ALJ
ALJ Hanekamp followed the five-step analytical framework described above.
He determined that plaintiff had not worked at the level of substantial gainful
activity since the alleged onset date. He was insured for DIB through December
31, 2016. He found that plaintiff had severe impairments of major depressive
disorder, single episode; mild panic disorder without agoraphobia; and alcohol
dependence, uncomplicated. 3 These impairments did not meet or equal a listed
impairment.
The ALJ found that plaintiff had the following residual functional capacity
“An individual shall not be considered to be disabled for purposes of this subchapter if alcoholism
or drug addiction would (but for this subparagraph) be a contributing factor material to the
Commissioner's determination that the individual is disabled.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(2)(C).
Because the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled, he was not required to determine whether
plaintiff’s alcohol dependence was “material.” See, SSR 13-2p, 2013 WL 1569623.
3
4
(RFC):
to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following
nonexertional limitations: He can do simple routine tasks that can be
performed independently and that involve working primarily with things
rather than other people. Beyond that, any social interaction needs to be
occasional and superficial with co-workers and supervisors, and no direct
interaction with the general public. Superficial is defined as no negotiation,
arbitration, mediation, confrontation of others or supervision of others.
Work must be in a non-public setting. No dangerous unprotected heights, no
dangerous unprotected moving machinery.
Based on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that plaintiff
could not do his past relevant work, but he was not disabled because he was able to
do other jobs which exist in significant numbers in the local and national
economies.
The Evidentiary Record
The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in
formulating this Memorandum and Order. The following summary of the record
is directed to the point raised by plaintiff and is confined to the relevant time
period.
1.
Agency Forms
Plaintiff was born in 1975 and was almost 36 years old on the alleged onset
date. (Tr. 155). He had worked as a journeyman insulator from 1997 through
2011, and as a professional skydiver from 2008 through 2011. (Tr. 158).
In July 2013, plaintiff submitted a report stating that he was unable to work
because of PTSD and manic depression, and because he did not work well with
others. (Tr. 164).
2.
Evidentiary Hearing
5
Plaintiff was represented by an attorney at the evidentiary hearing in March
2016. (Tr. 34).
Plaintiff testified that his job as an insulator ended when he was told to work
in a high area that he thought was unsafe. He lost control of his anger. He had
also worked as a skydiving instructor, doing tandem dives, on the weekends. He
said he last went skydiving in January 2011 because “everything became hard to
do” and it did not feel safe for him anymore. He said he lost his nerve. (Tr. 3739).
Plaintiff said he was unable to work because he had panic attacks, mood
swings, and crying spells. He had a couple of panic attacks per day. When he was
under stress, a panic attack might last for an hour. For about the first 18 months
after he became disabled, he hardly left the house because of panic attacks and
anxiety attacks. It was more manageable at the time of the hearing. He avoided
some of the places that were stressors. He had been seeing a psychiatrist and a
counselor for about four years. (Tr. 40-43).
Plaintiff testified that he had “issues” with alcohol in the past. He stopped
drinking two weeks before the hearing. (Tr. 48).
A vocational expert (VE) also testified. The ALJ asked the VE a hypothetical
question which comported with the ultimate RFC assessment. The VE testified
that this person could do the jobs of cleaner II, laundry worker II, and washer
(vehicles and equipment). (Tr. 53-54).
3.
Medical Treatment
Plaintiff was treated at Psychiatric Services of Southern Illinois from March
6
2011 through February 2016. He saw Dr. Jeffrey Chalfant, a psychiatrist, about
once a month. Plaintiff also saw counselors at that office on a regular basis. (Tr.
314-487). Dr. Chalfant diagnosed him with panic disorder without agoraphobia
and major depressive disorder, recurrent, mild.
He prescribed various
medications for him, including Prozac, Wellbutrin, and Risperidone.
(Tr.
423-424).
At the first visit with Dr. Chalfant, plaintiff said he “had a meltdown” at work
in mid-March when he became angry because “it was raining and they had not
called it a rain day.” Plaintiff left work and “when he was leaving MF’ed everyone
on the way out.” A few days later, there were lay-offs at work and he was included.
He said that he had felt depressed his whole life. He had been a heavy drinker in
the past but had been sober for 8 years. He was prescribed Celexa and Prazosin
because of nightmares. (Tr. 314-315). He was switched to Wellbutrin the next
month because of side effects with Celexa. (Tr. 316).
In May 2011, plaintiff told a counselor that he had relapsed on alcohol when
his mother died. He said that people at his skydiving job remarked that he had
changed since he started drinking again. The counselor advised him to “either tell
Dr. Chalfant his true drinking behavior or stop drinking altogether.” (Tr. 318).
In June 2011, plaintiff told a counselor that he was working more at the
skydiving job to bring more income into the household. (Tr. 320). In July, he
said he had relapsed in the past month on his drinking and gambling. His anxiety
was high. The counselor recommended that he stop drinking and return to taking
the medications that Dr. Chalfant prescribed. (Tr. 322-323). He was still doing
7
skydiving in July, but could not pay the bills on it because there was more
competition. The counselor again advised him to stop drinking and to return to
taking his medication. (Tr. 324).
In August 2011, plaintiff told Dr. Chalfant that he had been doing well but
drank alcohol and because very irritable and stopped taking his medication. Dr.
Chalfant told him to abstain from alcohol and restart Zoloft. (Tr. 326).
In September 2011, plaintiff told his counselor that he was in the process of
creating a skydiving business and was planning on training another guy to work
with him. He agreed that his thinking was much clearer when he was sober. (Tr.
330). The next month, he was considering giving skydiving lessons in Florida over
the winter. (Tr. 333).
Dr. Chalfant prescribed Prozac in February 2012 because of side effects from
Zoloft. (Tr. 335). In July, plaintiff told the doctor that thing were going better and
he had been less irritable and more controllable. (Tr. 345). In October, he was
doing okay but was having problems sleeping.
The skydiving company was
opening up another jump site, so he might have more work.
(Tr. 351).
In
November he said he was not going to be working at skydiving because “the partner
wanted to[o] much.” He was doing okay but was gaining weight. (Tr. 353). He
was doing well in December and had lost weight since a medication change. (Tr.
355).
In February 2013, plaintiff told Dr. Chalfant that he was more stressed and
anxious and was drinking more. The doctor recommended AA, but he refused.
His Prozac was increased. (Tr. 357). In May 2013, plaintiff told Dr. Chalfant that
8
“his business has not been doing too well at the flea market.” (Tr. 366).
In November 2013, plaintiff told Dr. Chalfant that he had stopped drinking in
September 2013, after having gone on a “bender.” He felt less agitated. He had no
problems with his medication and felt his anxiety was manageable. (Tr. 409-410).
In January 2014, he reported that he had felt more depressed and had problems
with energy and motivation, as well as anxiety.
increased.
(Tr. 412-414).
His dosage of Prozac was
Seroquel was added in February 2014, and he
reported that he was doing better the next month. (Tr. 417-418).
Plaintiff apparently did not see Dr. Chalfant between February 2014 and
March 2015. Plaintiff reported that he was doing okay, although he was stressed.
(Tr. 434).
In May 2015, his dosage of Risperidone was increased because of
continued irritability.
(Tr. 431).
In July and October 2015, plaintiff told Dr.
Chalfant that he was doing all right and he had no problems with his medication.
(Tr. 425, 428). In January 2016, he was doing okay but had some stress. He had
gained weight because he had been going out to eat a lot with his son before his son
went into the military. (Tr. 422).
4.
Dr. Chalfant’s opinion
Dr. Chalfant assessed plaintiff’s ability to do mental work-related activities by
filling out a form at the request of plaintiff’s counsel on July 8, 2013.
(Tr.
285-296). The doctor indicated that plaintiff had marked and extreme limitations
in a number of areas. He indicated that plaintiff had moderate imitations in ability
to remember locations and work-like procedures; understand and remember very
short and simple instructions; make simple work-related decisions; ask simple
9
questions or request assistance; and be aware of normal hazards and take
appropriate precautions.
Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in weighing Dr. Chalfant’s opinion because
he did not explain why he discounted the moderate limitations he assessed.
Plaintiff acknowledges that the ALJ explained why he discounted the marked
and extreme limitations assessed by Dr. Chalfant. He does not argue that the ALJ
erred in discounting those marked and extreme limitations. Rather, he argues
that “nowhere in his analysis did the ALJ discount the moderate limitations in Dr.
Chalfant’s opinion.” Doc. 14, p. 12.
Plaintiff’s argument overlooks the ALJ’s very clear explanation of why he
discounted the moderate limitations assigned by Dr. Chalfant. The ALJ explained:
The claimant’s activities doing tandem skydiving with customers, selling
items at a flea market, and gambling in casinos are not consistent with
moderate limitations in understanding, remembering and carrying out even
short and simple instructions, remembering locations and work-like
procedures, being aware of normal hazards and taking precautions.
Tr. 24.
Obviously, the ALJ was not required to credit Dr. Chalfant’s opinion even
though he was a treating doctor; “while the treating physician’s opinion is
important, it is not the final word on a claimant’s disability.” Books v. Chater, 91
F.3d 972, 979 (7th Cir. 1996)(internal citation omitted).
A treating doctor’s
medical opinion is entitled to controlling weight only where it is supported by
medical findings and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the
record. Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 2016), citing Clifford v.
10
Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000).
The ALJ is required to consider a number of factors in deciding how much
weight to give to a treating doctor’s opinion. The regulations refer to a treating
healthcare provider as a “treating source.” The applicable regulation, 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2), provides:
Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your treating sources,
since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able
to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical
evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings
alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative
examinations or brief hospitalizations. If we find that a treating
source's opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of your
impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in your case record, we will give it controlling
weight. [Emphasis added]
If the ALJ decides not to give the opinion controlling weight, he is to weigh it
applying the factors set forth in § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6).
Supportability and
consistency are two important factors to be considered in weighing medical
opinions. In a nutshell, “[t]he regulations state that an ALJ must give a treating
physician's opinion controlling weight if two conditions are met: (1) the opinion is
supported by ‘medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques[,]’
and (2) it is ‘not inconsistent’ with substantial evidence in the record.” Schaaf v.
Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff does not take issue with the ALJ’s weighing of the marked and
extreme limitations assigned by Dr. Chalfant. He tacitly admits that the ALJ had
good reason to discount those limitations. The ALJ explained in detail why he
11
rejected the moderate limitations as well as the marked and extreme limitations.
Plaintiff ignores the explanation with regard to the moderate limitations.
In fact, the ALJ’s explanation of why he rejected the moderate limitations was
sufficient. As he pointed out, plaintiff engaged in activities after his alleged onset
date that were inconsistent with those moderate limitations. His ability to give
skydiving lessons, sell items at a flea market, and gamble in casinos undercuts the
validity of the moderate limitations assigned by Dr. Chalfant. Plaintiff does not
dispute that proposition or deny that he engaged in those activities.
In light of the deferential standard of judicial review, the ALJ is required only
to “minimally articulate” his reasons for accepting or rejecting evidence, a standard
which the Seventh Circuit has characterized as “lax.” Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d
539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008); Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2008). The
Court finds that ALJ Hanekamp easily met the minimal articulation standard here.
This is not a case in which the ALJ failed to discuss evidence favorable to the
plaintiff or misconstrued the medical evidence.
Rather, after reviewing the
evidence in detail, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Chalfant’s opinion was contrary to
the evidence regarding plaintiff’s activities. Plaintiff has not identified a sufficient
reason to overturn that conclusion.
Even if reasonable minds could differ as to whether plaintiff was disabled at
the relevant time, the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed if it is supported by
substantial evidence, and the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the
ALJ in reviewing for substantial evidence. Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310
(7th Cir. 2012); Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d at 413.
12
Conclusion
After careful review of the record as a whole, the Court is convinced that ALJ
Hanekamp committed no errors of law, and that his findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Accordingly, the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying plaintiff’s application for disability benefits is AFFIRMED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE:
August 15, 2018.
s/Clifford J. Proud
CLIFFORD J. PROUD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?