Carlyle v. Calhoun County Treasurer et al

Filing 11

ORDER : the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. COUNTS 1 and 2 are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. COUNT 3 is DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff bringing the claim in state court. CALHOUN COUNTY TREASURER, CALHOUN COUNTY COMMISSIONER, CALHOUN COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT, and CALHOUN COUNTY are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relie f may be granted. CALHOUN COUNTY COURTS is DISMISSED with prejudice from this action because it is immune from a suit for money damages. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a First Amended Complaint on or before January 18, 2018. Should Plaintiff fai l to file his First Amended Complaint within the allotted time or consistent with the instructions set forth in this Order, the entire case shall be dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order and/or for failure to prosecute his claims (Amended Pleadings due by 1/18/2018). Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 12/21/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DONALD G. CARLYLE, # N-77711,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
CALHOUN COUNTY TREASURER,
)
CALHOUN COUNTY COMMISSIONER, )
CALHOUN COUNTY COURTS,
)
CALHOUN COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT, )
and CALHOUN COUNTY,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 17-cv-1246-SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Donald Carlyle, currently incarcerated at Robinson Correctional Center, 1 brings
this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights. 2 Plaintiff claims that Defendants caused
him to be wrongfully arrested and incarcerated and defamed his character when they contributed
to or allowed the issuance of a warrant for failure to appear in court that resulted in his arrest and
temporary incarceration. Plaintiff’s Complaint is now before the Court for a preliminary review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion of the
complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief.
1

Plaintiff does not allege that his claims herein have any connection to his current confinement in Robinson
Correctional Center.
2
Plaintiff indicates that he is bringing his claims pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 1 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346,
2671–2680 (Doc. 1, p. 1). However, because Plaintiff is a state prisoner and names no federal entities in connection
with his claims, the Court construes this case as a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must
cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. A Complaint is plausible on its
face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009).
Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters,
631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible
that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574,
581 (7th Cir. 2009). Courts “should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of
a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual
allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d
742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir.
2009).
After fully considering the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court concludes that
this action is subject to summary dismissal.

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The Complaint
Plaintiff was released from prison on September 11, 2015, after serving a sentence at
Pinckneyville Correctional Center. (Doc. 1, p. 5). During his time in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections, Plaintiff was aware that he had an outstanding warrant from Calhoun
County for failure to appear on fines and court costs from a 2006 case for the obstruction of
justice. Id. Plaintiff had filed a motion to quash that warrant, but his motion was denied. Id.
Upon his release, Plaintiff had a “Blue I.D. Card,” indicating that he had an outstanding warrant
from Calhoun County. Id.
After his release, Plaintiff was arrested by Caseyville police on the Calhoun County
warrant for failure to appear. Id. He was taken to St. Clair County Jail, where he posted bond
and was released with a pending court date in Calhoun County. (Doc. 1, pp. 5-6). However,
Plaintiff did not show up for the Calhoun County court hearing because “he called them and
explained to them that the debt was sold and [he did]] not owe them any longer.” (Doc. 1, p. 6).
After missing the court date, Plaintiff was arrested “on that warrant and was held for like
12 days in Jersey County Jail waiting to see a judge.” Id. Plaintiff’s father called and attempted
to “explain they were wrong but they wouldn’t listen.” Id. When Plaintiff saw the judge in his
case, he explained the situation. Id. The judge directed the clerk to look up whether Plaintiff’s
debt had been sold, and determined that it indeed had been. Id. Plaintiff was then released. Id.
Plaintiff asserts that “the person responsible should [have] quashed the warrant upon
selling of the debt.” Id. He alleges that the Calhoun County Treasurer was responsible for
selling the debt to the collection agency and should have informed the Circuit Clerk to quash the
warrant for F.T.A. on fines and court costs.” (Doc. 1, p. 1). He also asserts that the Calhoun

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County Commissioner/Superintendent was responsible for passing the law turning fines and
court costs over to collection agencies and should have appointed someone to throw out or quash
his warrant. (Doc. 1, p. 2). As for Calhoun County, Plaintiff alleges that they sold his debt to a
collection agency but did not thereafter quash his warrant, resulting in his wrongful arrest and
incarceration. Id.
Plaintiff seeks monetary relief for his “mental anguish, wrongful incarceration, loss of
wages, defamation of character, and malicious prosecution.” (Doc. 1, p. 7).
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit. Any other claim that
is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed
without prejudice.
Count 1: Fourth Amendment claim for false/wrongful arrest, where Plaintiff no
longer owed a debt to Calhoun County for fines and court costs, because the
County sold its debt to a collection agency;
Count 2: Fourth Amendment claim for false/wrongful imprisonment, where
Plaintiff was jailed for 12 days based on the Calhoun County warrants that should
not have been issued because Plaintiff no longer owed fines or costs to the
County;
Count 3: State tort claim for defamation of character in connection with
Plaintiff’s wrongful arrest and incarceration;
Counts 1 and 2 will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. The state tort claim in Count 3 will be dismissed without prejudice because no viable
federal claims will remain in the action, and the Court declines to assert supplemental

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jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claim under these circumstances.
Dismissal of Count 1 – False/Wrongful Arrest
False arrest claims are often brought against the police officer who makes an arrest,
which is not the case here. The applicable law provides that in order to prevail on a false arrest
claim, the plaintiff must prove that he was arrested without probable cause. When a judge has
issued a bench warrant for failure to appear, the warrant provides probable cause for the arresting
officers to effectuate the arrest. Thus, a false arrest claim against the officers fails. See United
States v. Mounts, 248 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 2001); Corbett v. White, No. 00 C 4661, 2001 WL
1098054, at *3-5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2001).
Plaintiff contends that the warrants should not have been issued because after Calhoun
County sold his debt to a collection agency, the county gave up its right to collect his fines and
court costs. He maintains that after that transaction, the Calhoun County Circuit Court no longer
had any reason to arrest him or to summon him to court regarding the debt and that the Calhoun
County Treasurer should have informed the Circuit Clerk to quash the warrant and/or the
Calhoun County Commissioner or Superintendent should have appointed someone to quash it.
When Plaintiff finally appeared in court and explained the situation to the judge, the
judge released him. These facts suggest that the warrant lacked probable cause as to Plaintiff’s
obligation to pay Calhoun County for the debt. However, Plaintiff states that the original
outstanding warrant was issued because he failed to appear in court after he had been ordered to
do so. But the failure to appear, in and of itself, provided probable cause to support the issuance
of a warrant, regardless of the status of the underlying criminal matter where Plaintiff had been
ordered to pay fines and costs.
Moreover, the facts supplied in the Complaint do not support the theory that a defendant

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knowingly issued a warrant, or allowed the issuance of Plaintiff’s warrant without any legal basis
to do so. Plaintiff’s description of his in-court exchange with the judge and clerk in the Calhoun
County Court regarding the fines and costs reflects that they made a mistake as to his obligation
to the county, and therefore had to release him. A mistake implicates possible negligence, but
negligence does not amount to a constitutional violation. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
328 (1986); Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff very generally also claims that the Treasurer, Commissioner, and Superintendent
should have somehow acted to ensure that the warrants were quashed based on the Treasurer’s
responsibility to sell the debt and the Commissioner’s and Superintendent’s original passage of
the law directing the debt be sold. (Docs. 1-2). This is an entirely unsupported assertion. Even
if they could be held responsible for these alleged failures, such failures would amount to
negligence at most. There is no indication they failed to seek to have the warrants quashed
maliciously, nor is there any indication that they were aware that Plaintiff had warrants
outstanding or that outstanding warrants were not otherwise being quashed.
Further, in a § 1983 action, liability cannot attach against an individual defendant unless
“the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Vance v.
Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff does not allege that the Treasurer,

Commissioner, or Superintendent personally issued the warrants that led to his arrest or that they
wrongfully arrested or incarcerated him.
With respect to Calhoun County Courts, the Seventh Circuit has expressly held that
neither the State of Illinois nor its agencies is a “person” in the context of Section 1983 that is
subject to liability under Section 1983. See Small v. Chao, 398 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the Illinois Department of Commerce and Community Affairs (IDCCA), as part of

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the State of Illinois, was not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983); Omosegbon v.
Wells, 335 F.3d 668, 672-73 (7th Cir. 2003). Because it is an entity of the State of Illinois,3
Calhoun County Courts is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983. Therefore, it will be
dismissed from this action with prejudice.
Finally, as to Calhoun County, “the Supreme Court has interpreted § 1983 to bar
respondeat superior liability.” Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 733 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95, 707 (1978)). The Court must therefore:
look to see whether [Plaintiff] adequately pleaded a Section 1983 cause of action
under Monell. A municipality, such as [Calhoun] County, may be liable for a
Section 1983 violation: “(1) through an express policy that, when enforced,
causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) through a ‘wide-spread practice’ that
although not authorized by written law and express policy, is so permanent and
well-settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law; or (3)
through an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with
‘final decision policymaking authority.’”
Johnson v. Cook County, 526 F. App’x 692, 695 (7th Cir. May 15, 2013) (citing Calhoun v.
Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing McTigue v. City of Chi., 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th
Cir. 1995))) (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff does not claim that the alleged constitutional deprivations, his arrest and
incarceration, resulted from any unconstitutional policy or practice of Calhoun County, or that
anyone with “final decision policymaking authority” caused them. Instead, his allegations imply
that his arrest and incarceration were based on a simple mistake – one that, if anything, would be
attributed to the judge that issued the warrants and who is immune from suit based on judicial
immunity. See Carlyle v. Birch, No. 17-cv-695-NJR, Doc. 11 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2017) (citing
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225-29 (1988);
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872); Richman v. Sheahan, 270
3

Eighth Judicial Circuit, ILLINOIS COURTS, http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/CircuitCourt/CircuitMap/8th.asp#Calhoun

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F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 2001); Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376, 377 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 956 (1989)). Additionally, because Plaintiff only seeks monetary relief and has failed
to adequately plead a claim against the individual defendants, there can be “no viable Monell
claim based on the same allegations.” Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 775 F.3D 953, 962 (7th Cir.
2015) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)). For these reasons,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Calhoun County, and Count 1 will be dismissed.
Dismissal of Count 2 – False/Wrongful Incarceration
Plaintiff’s 12-day incarceration which followed his second arrest for failure to appear in
court is the heart of this claim. As discussed under Count 1, Plaintiff no longer owed Calhoun
County for the unpaid fines and court costs after his debt was purchased by the collection
agency. However, failure to appear in court, when one has been ordered to appear by a judge, is
in and of itself a valid basis for issuance of a warrant. When Plaintiff was arrested the first time,
he posted bond and was released with instructions to appear in court in Calhoun County on a
certain date. He admits that a second warrant was issued for his arrest when he did not appear as
ordered. Plaintiff could have avoided his 12-day incarceration in Jersey County if he had chosen
to appear. Had he done so, the sale of his debt to the collection agency would likely have been
discovered at that time (as it was when Plaintiff was taken to court after his second arrest).
Plaintiff had it in his power to avoid his second arrest and the incarceration that he now
complains of. Instead, he compounded the problem by missing the court date after he bonded
out.
Plaintiff’s incarceration was a loss of liberty, which implicates Fourteenth Amendment
due process protections. However, he was not deprived of liberty without due process of law.
See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 (1979) (so long as warrant complies with the

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requirements of the Fourth Amendment, detention pursuant to warrant cannot give rise to a
constitutional claim under § 1983). He received the process that he was due when he appeared
before the judge, after which he was released.
Plaintiff also claims that he is owed damages for “malicious prosecution.” (Doc. 1, p. 7).
The Seventh Circuit, however, has determined that because Illinois recognizes a tort claim under
state law for malicious prosecution, the availability of that state tort claim “knocks out any
constitutional theory of malicious prosecution,” because the state law remedy is adequate to
satisfy due process. Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001). See also Brooks v.
City of Chicago, 564 F.3d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A]llegations that criminal proceedings
were . . . based on false evidence or testimony . . . is, in essence, [a claim] for malicious
prosecution, rather than a due process violation.” (internal citation omitted)). This means that a
malicious prosecution claim brought in a federal civil rights case must be dismissed, because the
state court process is sufficient to adjudicate such a claim.
In any event, regardless of whether Plaintiff asserts his claim as one for false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or some other theory, the fact remains that the named
defendants in this action are either immune from a § 1983 suit for damages or did not and could
not actually participate in Plaintiff’s arrest and incarceration, as discussed above under Count 1.
Accordingly, Count 2 will also be dismissed.
Dismissal of Count 3 – Defamation
Under Illinois law, “[d]efamation is the publication of a false statement that “tends to
harm a person's reputation to the extent that it lowers that person in the eyes of the community or
deters others from associating with that person.” Lott v. Levitt, 556 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citing Tuite v. Corbitt, 866 N.E.2d 114, 121 (Ill. 2006)).

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Some statements, such as one

“imputing the commission of a crime” are so obviously harmful to a person’s reputation that they
may be considered per se defamatory. Tuite, 866 N.E.2d at 121.
A federal district court that has original jurisdiction over a § 1983 claim will also have
supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), so long
as the state claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” with the original federal
claims. Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008). “A loose factual
connection is generally sufficient.” Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 495 (7th Cir. 2008)
(citing Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 72 F.3d 1294, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995)). That
connection is present in Plaintiff’s case. However, when all federal claims are dismissed by the
district court, “the usual practice is to dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims[.]”
Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999).
The Court finds no reason to depart from this usual practice. Counts 1 and 2 shall be
dismissed. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s defamation claim in Count 3 well be dismissed without
prejudice to Plaintiff attempting to bring the claim in state court. Nothing herein shall be
construed as a comment on the merits or timeliness of the state-law defamation claim, or on the
applicability of the immunity doctrine in state court.
Federal Tort Claim
Plaintiff used this Court’s standard complaint form when he prepared his pleading, and
on the first page, he checked the box to indicate that he was bringing a claim pursuant to the
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. (Doc. 1, p. 1). The FTCA provides
jurisdiction for suits against the United States regarding torts committed by federal officials, not
state or county officials. The only named defendants herein are state and county officials.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim does not fall within the jurisdiction of the FTCA.

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Any claim

Plaintiff may seek to bring under the FTCA against the named defendants is therefore dismissed
with prejudice.
Leave to Amend
Because each of the claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint shall be dismissed, the Court must
consider whether to allow Plaintiff to submit an amended complaint in an effort to state a viable
claim. Under the facts of this case, the Court finds that any amendment would likely be futile.
The named Defendants are either immune from suit or cannot be implicated for the constitutional
deprivations alleged because they did not participate in them. Additionally, if Plaintiff were to
assert claims against the officers who arrested him or the jailers who detained him pursuant to
the warrants for failure to appear, those officials would have the defense that they acted in
accordance with a lawfully issued warrant, thus defeating Plaintiff’s claim.

See Baker v.

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 (1979) (where warrant conforms to Fourth Amendment
requirements, detention pursuant to warrant cannot support a constitutional claim under § 1983).
Leave to amend a complaint need not be granted when such amendment would be futile.
See Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2013); Garcia v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d
966, 970 (7th Cir. 1994). See also Barry Aviation, Inc. v. Land O'Lakes Municipal Airport
Comm'n, 377 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2004) (leave to amend should be freely given “unless it is
certain from the face of the complaint that any amendment would be futile”). Though the Court
suspects that any amendment would be futile in this case, it will grant Plaintiff leave to amend
once out of an abundance of caution.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed a motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3). There is no constitutional
or statutory right to appointment of counsel in federal civil cases. Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d

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847, 851 (7th Cir. 2010). Federal District Courts have discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) to
request counsel to assist pro se litigants. Id. When presented with a request to appoint counsel,
the Court must consider: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain
counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the
case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself [.]” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647,
654 (7th Cir. 2007).
With regard to the first step of the inquiry, there is no indication whether Plaintiff has
attempted to obtain counsel on his own, or has been effectively precluded from doing so.
Because Plaintiff has not made this showing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not made a
reasonable attempt to find counsel. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel
is DENIED without prejudice.
Plaintiff's Motion for Service of Process at Government Expense (Doc. 4) is also
DENIED as moot. Plaintiff is advised that it is not necessary for a litigant proceeding in forma
pauperis to file a motion requesting service of process by the United States Marshal Service or
other process server. The Clerk will issue summons and the Court will direct service for any
complaint that passes preliminary review.
Disposition
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
COUNTS 1 and 2 are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
COUNT 3 is DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff bringing the claim in state
court.

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CALHOUN COUNTY TREASURER, CALHOUN COUNTY COMMISSIONER,
CALHOUN COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT, and CALHOUN COUNTY are DISMISSED
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
CALHOUN COUNTY COURTS is DISMISSED with prejudice from this action
because it is immune from a suit for money damages.
Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a “First Amended Complaint” on or before January
18, 2018. Should Plaintiff fail to file his First Amended Complaint within the allotted time or
consistent with the instructions set forth in this Order, the entire case shall be dismissed with
prejudice for failure to comply with a court order and/or for failure to prosecute his claims. FED.
R. APP. P. 41(b). See generally Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997); Johnson v.
Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Such dismissal shall count as
one of Plaintiff’s three allotted “strikes” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) as Plaintiff
has thus far failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted with respect to this case.
Should Plaintiff decide to file a First Amended Complaint, it is strongly recommended
that he use the forms designed for use in this District for such actions. He should label the form,
“First Amended Complaint,” and he should use the case number for this action (i.e. 17-cv-1246SMY). The pleading shall present each claim in a separate count, and each count shall specify,
by name, each defendant alleged to be liable under the count, as well as the actions alleged to
have been taken by that defendant. Plaintiff should attempt to include the facts of his case in
chronological order, inserting each defendant’s name where necessary to identify the actors.
Plaintiff should refrain from filing unnecessary exhibits. Plaintiff should include only related
claims in his new complaint.

Claims found to be unrelated to Plaintiff’s false arrest and

imprisonment claims will be severed into new cases, new case numbers will be assigned, and

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additional filing fees will be assessed.

To enable Plaintiff to comply with this order, the

CLERK is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form.
An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering the
original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1
(7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to the original Complaint.
Thus, the First Amended Complaint must stand on its own, without reference to any previous
pleading, and Plaintiff must re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along with the
First Amended Complaint. The First Amended Complaint is subject to review pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was
incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $350.00 remains due and payable,
regardless of whether Plaintiff elects to file a First Amended Complaint.

See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 21, 2017
s/ STACI M. YANDLE
U.S. District Judge

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