Watford v. Newbold et al

Filing 44

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum & Order, Watford's objections to the report & recommendation (Doc. 28 ) are OVERRULED. The Court ADOPTS the report & recommendation in its entirety and DENIES the motion for preliminary injunction. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 9/17/2018. (rah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MARLON WATFORD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STEVEN NEWBOLD, DR. KAJA, and
WARDEN OF MENARD
CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
Defendants.

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Case No. 17-cv-1252-MJR-SCW

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
REAGAN, Chief Judge:
On November 17, 2017, Plaintiff Marlon Watford filed suit against Defendants
Steven Newbold and Dr. Kaja alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his
need for dental care. Specifically, Watford alleges that he has a cavity that Defendants
refuse to treat. The warden of Menard Correctional Center was added to this case for
purposes of implementing any injunctive relief granted by the Court.
Before the Court is Watford’s request for injunctive relief (Doc. 6), through which
he seeks a Court order mandating treatment of his cavity. Magistrate Judge Stephen C.
Williams held an evidentiary hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction on May
22, 2018, and issued a report & recommendation (Doc. 28) recommending that the
undersigned deny Watford’s motion. According to the report & recommendation,
Watford cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that he
has a cavity that Defendants refuse to fill.

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Watford filed objections to the report and recommendation (Doc. 35), and
Defendants followed with a response to the motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 37).
Timely objections having been filed, the Court undertakes de novo review of the portions
to the Report to which Plaintiff specifically objected. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b); SDIL-LR 73.1(b). The undersigned can accept, reject, or modify Magistrate
Judge Williams’ recommendations, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter
with instructions. Id. For the reasons stated below, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate
Judge Williams’ recommendations and DENIES the motion for preliminary injunction.
BACKGROUND
Watford alleges that he was diagnosed with a cavity in 2014 but that Defendants
concealed the cavity from him before eventually placing him on the waiting list for a
filling in May 2016. During the evidentiary hearing, Watford testified that he wants a
permanent filling because Defendant Newbold, a dentist, told him in May 2016 that he
has a cavity in tooth #31. On November 3, 2016, Dr. Kaja, a dentist, examined Watford
and ordered an x-ray. According to Watford, Dr. Kaja told him that Dr. Newbold
instructed her not to fill the cavity that day. The next day, Watford sent a request slip to
Dr. Newbold inquiring why he could not have his cavity filled, but he alleges that Dr.
Newbold did not respond.
Dr. Newbold testified that Watford was added to the filling waiting list for tooth
#31 during his two-year exam on May 23, 2016. The November 3, 2017 x-ray taken by
Dr. Kaja showed that tooth #31 showed no signs of decay or cavity. Dr. Newbold
testified that Watford does not have a cavity on tooth #31 but, rather, has a defect on the
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tooth caused a groove on the tooth that turns dark. Because the x-ray showed no sign of
a cavity, the tooth was not filled that day.
Following the first June 2017 x-ray of Watford’s tooth, Dr. Newbold explained to
him that tooth #32 was impacted and pressing against tooth #31, likely causing
Watford’s discomfort. Watford was given antibiotics and pain medication, and a
panoramic x-ray was ordered. That x-ray was reviewed on June 30, 2017. It showed that
tooth #32 had an area of inflammation called pericoronitis but that tooth #31 showed no
pathology. Other than the minor defect, there were no issues with tooth #31. Despite
the procedure being elective, Watford has been added to the list to fix the defect on
tooth #31. Dr. Newbold testified that the pericoronitis was resolved by the antibiotics.
Watford seeks injunctive relief requiring that the alleged cavity be filled immediately.
LEGAL STANDARDS
As the review of the motion for preliminary injunction is de novo, the Court
conducts an “independent review of the evidence and arguments without giving any
presumptive weight to the magistrate judge’s conclusion,” and “is free, and
encouraged, to consider all of the available information about the case when making
this independent decision.” Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2013).
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)(emphasis in original).
Accord Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (“A preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right”)(citation omitted).
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To secure a preliminary injunction, the movant must show (1) that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm without the
injunction, (3) that the harm he would suffer is greater than the harm a preliminary
injunction would inflict on defendants, and (4) that the injunction is in the public
interest. Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 2010)(citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20).
The “considerations are interdependent: the greater the likelihood of success on the
merits, the less net harm the injunction must prevent in order for preliminary relief to
be warranted.” Judge, 612 F.3d at 546. (citation omitted)
In the context of prisoner litigation, there are further restrictions on the Court’s
remedial power.

The scope of the court’s authority to enter an injunction in the

corrections context is circumscribed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the PLRA, preliminary
injunction relief “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct
the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means
necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. §3626(a)(2). See also Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683
(“[T]he PLRA enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases
challenging prison conditions: prison officials have broad administrative and
discretionary authority over the institutions they manage.”)(internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
The Seventh Circuit has described injunctions like the one sought here, where an
injunction would require an affirmative act by the defendant, as a mandatory
preliminary injunction. Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1997).
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Mandatory injunctions are “cautiously viewed and sparingly issued,” since they require
the court to command a defendant to take a particular action. Id. (citing Jordan v.
Wolke, 593 F.2d 772, 774 (7th Cir. 1978); and W.A. Mack, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 260
F.2d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1958)).
ANALYSIS
Watford objects to a number of factual findings made by Judge Williams in his
analysis of Watford’s likelihood of success on the merits, so the undersigned considers
that portion of the report & recommendation de novo. To show that he has a likelihood
of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim, Watford must show that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Greeno v. Daley,
414 F.3d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). “Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
of a prisoner constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain forbidden by the
Constitution.” Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th Cir.
2009). A prisoner is entitled to “reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of
serious harm”—not to demand specific care. Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir.
1997).
In order to prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference, a prisoner who brings an
Eighth Amendment challenge of constitutionally-deficient medical care must satisfy a
two-part test. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson v.
Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2006)). The first consideration is whether the prisoner
has an “objectively serious medical condition.” Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750. Accord Greeno,
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414 F.3d at 653. “A medical condition is objectively serious if a physician has diagnosed
it as requiring treatment, or the need for treatment would be obvious to a layperson.”
Hammond v. Rector, 123 F. Supp. 3d 1076, 1084 (S.D. Ill. 2015) (citing Pyles v. Fahim,
771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir.2014)). It is not necessary for such a medical condition to “be
life-threatening to be serious; rather, it could be a condition that would result in further
significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not treated.” Gayton v.
McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). Accord Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828
(1994) (violating the Eighth Amendment requires “deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm”) ((internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added).
Prevailing on the subjective prong requires a prisoner to show that a prison
official has subjective knowledge of—and then disregards—an excessive risk to inmate
health. Id. at 653. The plaintiff need not show the individual “literally ignored” his
complaint, but that the individual was aware of the condition and either knowingly or
recklessly disregarded it. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008). “Something
more than negligence or even malpractice is required” to prove deliberate indifference.
Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Hammond v. Rector, 123 F.
Supp. 3d 1076, 1086 (S.D. Ill. 2015) (“isolated occurrences of deficient medical
treatment are generally insufficient to establish . . . deliberate indifference”).
Here, other than his own conjecture, there is no evidence that Watford has a
cavity in tooth #31. While his dental records do contain marks on tooth #31, x-rays of
the tooth showed no cavity. Dr. Newbold’s testimony makes clear that the spot on tooth
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#31 is a defect, which is not a serious medical need, and that Watford is on a list to have
the defect filled, a procedure that is described as elective. Watford presents no
convincing evidence to refute that testimony.
While Watford suggests that his records have been falsified to cover up the
existence of a cavity since 2014, there is nothing beyond mere speculation to support
that claim. Instead, the record strongly supports the finding that Watford has a defect,
not a cavity, on tooth #31. There is no evidence that an untreated defect on a tooth
presents a risk of significant injury or of the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if
not treated. Accordingly, the Court FINDS that Watford’s tooth defect does not rise to
the level of being a serious medical need. As Watford fails to show that he has a serious
medical need, he cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, he
has not carried his burden of showing that he is entitled to injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION
For

the

above-stated

reasons,

Watford’s

objections

to

the

report

&

recommendation (Doc. 28) are OVERRULED. The Court ADOPTS the report &
recommendation in its entirety and DENIES the motion for preliminary injunction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 17, 2018

s/ Michael J. Reagan
MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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