Coleman et al v. United States Marshal Service et al

Filing 24

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following plaintiffs are TERMINATED as parties in this action: ANDREW DUNK and RANDALL A. MILLER. The Clerk is DIRECTED to open a new case for both of these plaintiffs. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1), which includes Counts 1 through 3, is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in this case and in each newly-severed case. Each plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a First Amended Complaint in the case opened in his name on or before April 23, 2018. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 3/26/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JEFFREY COLEMAN, No. 13853-028,
RANDALL A. MILLER, and
ANDREW DUNK,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
U.S. MARSHAL SERVICE, and
RANDY COBB
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 17-cv-1282-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court for case management and for preliminary review of the
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff Jeffrey Coleman filed the instant action
naming himself and five other individuals as plaintiffs. At the time of filing, all of the Plaintiffs
were incarcerated at White County Jail (“Jail”). Initially, with the exception of Coleman, none
of the Plaintiffs signed the Complaint or submitted an IFP motion.
On December 18, 2017, the Court entered a preliminary order pursuant to Boriboune v.
Berge, 391 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Boriboune Order”). (Doc. 5). In it, each plaintiff, aside
from the lead plaintiff Coleman, was ordered to advise the Court in writing, no later than January
15, 2018, whether he wished to pursue his claims in group litigation. The Court also ordered
each non-lead plaintiff who wanted to continue in this group action to submit a signed copy of
the Complaint on or before the January 15, 2018 deadline.
The deadline passed with varying responses. Accordingly, on February 1, 2018, the
Court entered a second case management order. (Doc. 16). In it, Plaintiffs Edwards and Rander

1

were dismissed from the action based on their failure to timely respond to the Boriboune Order.
Plaintiff Jones was also dismissed, after responding to the Boriboune Order and indicating that
he did not wish to proceed with this group litigation. Plaintiffs Miller and Dunk submitted
incomplete responses. Therefore, the Court allowed Miller and Dunk a brief extension, until
February 15, 2018, in which to comply with the Boriboune Order. To date, both Miller and
Dunk have asked to remain parties to this group action, have submitted signed complaints, and
have filed IFP motions. (See Docs. 7, 9, 17, 18, and 21).
Despite the above, as an initial matter, the Court concludes that joinder is not appropriate.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)-(b), 21; Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 632 (7th Cir.
2001). Therefore, each remaining plaintiff will be required to pursue his claims in a separate
action. But before doing so, each remaining plaintiff must file an amended complaint in his
separate case because the Complaint (Doc. 1) does not survive screening under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A.
Background
Only three plaintiffs remain in this action: (1) lead plaintiff Coleman; (2) non-lead
plaintiff Miller; and (3) non-lead plaintiff Dunk.

The Complaint was filed by Coleman,

purportedly on behalf of himself and 5 other individuals who, at that time of filing, were in
custody at the Jail. (Doc. 1). It appears that Miller and Dunk are still in custody at the Jail.
Coleman, however, is presently in custody at FCI McDowell in the Southern District of West
Virginia. (Doc. 22).
The

Complaint

includes

three

sets

of

claims:

(1)

claims

pertaining

to

recreational/exercise opportunities and cell conditions; (2) claims pertaining to food served at the
Jail; and (3) claims pertaining to law library access. For the most part, the allegations in the first

2

set of claims are associated with a single plaintiff, presumably Coleman, the apparent author of
the Complaint (e.g., “plaintiff has been incarcerated at White County Jail for numerous months”
and “plaintiff is forced to breathe in recycled air”).

However, these claims occasionally

reference a group of individuals (e.g., “we have not been permitted to engage in recreational
activities”). The allegations in the second set of claims are primarily associated with Coleman.
The allegations in the third set of claims are associated with “plaintiffs” in general.
Cell Conditions
According to the Complaint, Coleman was housed in a cell with eight other inmates that
was approximately the size of a single car garage. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Coleman claims that it was
difficult to exercise or stretch in his cell and that, as a result, he suffered from neck, back, and leg
pain. Id. Coleman also claims that the cell lacked fresh air and that the lack of fresh air
exacerbated his asthma. Id. Finally, Coleman alleges that, during his time at the Jail, he and
other federal inmates were not allowed to engage in out of cell recreational activities. Id. When
Coleman inquired about participating in recreational activities, Cobb (the Jail Administrator) told
him the head of the United States Marshal Service said that federal inmates were not allowed to
participate in recreational activities. Id. It is unclear whether Miller and Dunk were subjected to
the same complained of conditions.
Diet at the Jail
Coleman complains that the Jail diet consists of overly processed foods and is devoid of
fresh food such as fruit. (Doc. 1, p. 7). According to the Complaint, the lack of variety in the
Jail diet violates state rules that require county jails to rotate the menu every ninety days. Id.
Coleman filed grievances with Cobb regarding the diet, but did not receive a response. Id.
Coleman also blames the United States Marshal Service for the allegedly inadequate diet because

3

this agency is supposed to provide county jails with funds to ensure that the needs of federal
prisoners are met. (Doc. 1, p. 8).
Law Library Access
Coleman generally claims that the rights of “plaintiffs” are being violated because the Jail
does not have a law library. (Doc. 1, p. 9). Coleman states that, even though referenced
plaintiffs are represented by counsel, they need access to a law library because their attorneys are
often overworked and/or make mistakes. Id. Coleman claims the United States Marshals are
aware of the law library issues but have not done anything to correct the problem. Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A
The Complaint is now subject to preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as
soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim
that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th
Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the

4

pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Dismissal of Improper Defendant
Coleman has named the United States Marshals Service a defendant. The United States
Marshals Service is an agency of the United States. Gary v. Gardner, 445 F.App’x. 465, 466 (3d
Cir. 2011). Because the United States Marshal Service is a federal agency, it is not amenable to
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides a remedy for violations of federal rights only when
the violation is committed by a person operating under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Although an individual federal agent may be held liable for damages for his unconstitutional
conduct, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), federal agencies are not liable for damages for unconstitutional conduct. See FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 483–486 (1994). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against the United States
Marshal Service must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Division of Counts
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to designate the
following counts in this pro se action. The parties and the Court will use these designations in
all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court.
Count 1 –

Unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim against Cobb for
depriving federal inmates of recreational activities, housing Coleman in
small cells with no room for meaningful exercise and limited access to
fresh air, which aggravated Coleman’s preexisting asthma.

Count 2 –

Unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim against Cobb for
providing an inadequate prison diet, devoid of fresh food, including fruit.

Count 3 –

Access to the courts claim for failing to provide plaintiffs with access to a
law library.

The Complaint does not survive review under § 1915A, and it shall be dismissed. Any
5

other intended claim that has not been recognized by the Court is considered dismissed as
inadequately pleaded under the Twombly pleading standard.
Discussion
Legal Standard - Conditions of Confinement Claims
Before screening Counts 1 and 2, the Court must consider what legal standard applies.
The applicable standard depends on Plaintiffs’ legal status on the date of the alleged
constitutional deprivations. Collins v. Al-Shami, 851 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2017). The Fourth
Amendment applies to the period of confinement between a warrantless arrest and the probablecause determination; the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs after the
probable-cause determination has been made; and the Eighth Amendment applies after a
conviction.” Id. (citations omitted). The Complaint does not disclose which status applies to
Plaintiffs. However, the Court need not resolve the matter at this time. This is because,
regardless of which standard applies, Counts 1 and 2 fail to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
Count 1
In Count 1, Plaintiff challenges the following conditions of confinement at the Jail: (1)
inability to exercise in a small and crowded cell (specific to Coleman); (2) denial of access to
recreational activities (as to all federal inmates at the Jail); and (3) lack of fresh air (specific to
Coleman), which exacerbated Coleman’s asthma.

Coleman also alleges that the lack of

recreational activities and in-cell exercise caused him to suffer from leg, neck, and back pain. It
is possible that the alleged conditions could state a viable constitutional claim as to Coleman (it
is unclear whether Dunk and Miller were exposed to the same conditions). See e.g., Turley v.
Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2013) (plaintiff stated Eighth Amendment claim where

6

cumulative effect of repeated lockdowns deprived him of yard privileges, and cell was too small
for physical activity); Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Some conditions ...
may establish an Eighth Amendment violation in combination when each alone would not do so
... when the deprivations have a mutually enforcing effect which produces the deprivation of a
single, identifiable human need, such as food or warmth, for example ‘a low temperature at night
combined with a failure to issue blankets.’ ”) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304
(1991)); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1236 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Lack of exercise could rise to
a constitutional violation where movement is denied and muscles are allowed to atrophy, and the
health of the individual is threatened.”).
The Complaint, however, does not sufficiently allege personal involvement as to Cobb,
the only remaining defendant. It is well established that for constitutional violations under §
1983 a government official is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Locke v. Haessig, 788
F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2015). “This means that to recover damages against a prison official
acting in a supervisory role, a § 1983 plaintiff may not rely on a theory of respondeat superior
and must instead allege that the defendant, through his or her own conduct, has violated the
Constitution.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)). Here, Coleman merely alleges that he asked Cobb about why federal
inmates were being denied access to recreational privileges. This allegation, standing alone,
states no claim. There is no indication that Coleman complained to Cobb about or that Cobb was
otherwise personally responsible for any of the other allegedly unconstitutional conditions
described in Count 1. Accordingly, Count 1 shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

7

Count 2
Coleman claims that the prison diet contains too much processed food and not enough
fresh food, including fresh fruit. This claim is similar to the soy diet claims that have been
rejected by numerous courts. See Solano v. Bailey, 2017 WL 1077052, *2 (S.D. Ill. 2017)
(summarizing cases). Here, as with the claim rejected in Solano Coleman does not allege any
specific medical condition for which the subject diet is contraindicated. Id. Thus, as pled,
Coleman’s allegations fall short of stating a constitutional claim.
Additionally, Coleman has not alleged that Cobb was personally involved in the alleged
constitutional deprivation. He alleges that Cobb failed to respond to one or more grievances
pertaining to the jail diet. But the fact that Cobb did not respond to a grievance, standing alone,
states no claim. “Prison grievance procedures are not mandated by the First Amendment and do
not by their very existence create interests protected by the Due Process Clause” of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir.2011) (citations omitted).
The Constitution requires no procedure at all, and the failure of state prison officials to follow
their own procedures does not, standing alone, violate the Constitution. Maust v. Headley, 959
F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir.1992); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100–01 (7th Cir. 1982).
Therefore, the alleged mishandling of grievances does not state a claim for relief.
The Court acknowledges that, under certain conditions, an official may be subject to
liability if he or she “knows about unconstitutional conduct and facilitates, approves, condones,
or ‘turn[s] a blind eye’ to it.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Vance
v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1996). However, the minimal allegations pertaining to
Cobb ignoring a grievance fall short of stating a claim under the standard articulated in Perez or
related authority.

8

Finally, Coleman’s allegations pertaining to the Jail’s failure to rotate the menu, as is
allegedly required under state law, states no claim. See Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d
444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006) (violation of department procedure or state law is immaterial to whether
actions violated federal constitutional right); Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir.
2003) (Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations, not violations of state
statutes or regulations); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (7th Cir. 1988) (a
violation of state law does not give rise to a Section 1983 claim unless it independently violates
the Constitution or federal law).
Accordingly, Count 2 shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
Count 3
In Count 3, Coleman alleges that the Jail does not provide inmates with access to a law
library, thereby hindering inmates’ abilities to act as meaningful advocates in criminal
proceedings where they are represented by counsel. The due process clause provides inmates
with a right of “meaningful access to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824 (1977)
overruled in part on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). This requires prison
authorities to provide inmates with the tools they need “to attack their sentences, directly or
collaterally, [or] ... to challenge the conditions of their confinement.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355.
This right applies to pre-trial detainees and not just convicts. Johnson by Johnson v. Brelje, 701
F.2d 1201, 1207 (7th Cir. 1983). To recover, an inmate must suffer an “actual injury” as a result
of the denial. Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 671 (7th Cir.2009) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350,
116 S.Ct. 2174). “To establish an ‘actual injury,’ an inmate must show that an attempt to pursue
nonfrivolous litigation was hindered by unjustified acts or conditions caused by the defendants.”

9

Purkey v. Marberry, 385 F.App’x. 575, 578 (7th Cir. 2010); see Campbell v. Clarke, 481 F.3d
967, 968 (7th Cir. 2007) (the plaintiff must allege that “a lack of access to legal materials has
undermined,” or caused to founder, “a concrete piece of litigation”).
Coleman has failed to adequately plead such a claim here. Coleman does not describe
how the alleged lack of access to a law library undermined a specific piece of litigation for
himself, Dunk, or Miller. Additionally, the Complaint suggests that lack of law library access
was problematic for inmates who were represented by counsel in an underlying criminal matter.
However, access to legal materials is required only for unrepresented litigants. See Campbell v.
Clarke, 481 F.3d 967, 968 (7th Cir.2007) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 830–32 (1977)).
Accordingly, Count 3 shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
Summary
Counts 1 through 3 do not survive screening under § 1915A and shall be dismissed
without prejudice. Each remaining plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint
in his case, according to the instructions and deadlines set forth in the disposition.
Joinder of Parties
Before this matter proceeds, the Court must determine whether joinder of the parties is
appropriate going forward. Pursuant to Rule 20, district courts can accept joint complaints filed
by multiple plaintiffs if the criteria for permissive joinder are satisfied. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20;
Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 855. Rule 20 authorizes individuals to join as plaintiffs in bringing a
single action, if: (A) they “assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with
respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the

10

action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1)(A)-(B) (emphasis added).
District courts are given “wide discretion . . . concerning the joinder of parties.” See
Chavez, 251 F.3d at 632 (citing Intercon Research Assoc., Ltd. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 696 F.2d
53, 56 (7th Cir. 1982)). The Seventh Circuit has held that “this discretion allows a trial court to
consider, in addition to the requirements of Rule 20, ‘other relevant factors in a case in order to
determine whether the permissive joinder of a party will comport with the principles of
fundamental fairness.’” Chavez, 251 F.3d at 632 (quoting Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980)). And if joinder would create “prejudice, expense, or
delay” the court may deny a request for joinder. Id. (citation omitted).
The Court finds that joinder of the parties in a single action going forward is not
appropriate. How the alleged facts apply to each individual plaintiff is bound to differ, so each
plaintiff’s particular situation likely involves a unique “transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences.” FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1)(A).

The Complaint lacks specific

allegations pertaining to Miller and Dunk. Without specific allegations pertaining to these
individuals, it is unclear whether Miller and Dunk were exposed to the same conditions Coleman
was exposed to. For example, it is unclear whether Miller and Dunk were (1) federal prisoners
and as such were also denied access to recreational activities; (2) housed in small or overly
crowded cells; (3) unable to exercise in their cells; and/or (4) were subject to the same diet as
Coleman (Coleman notes that some inmates are allowed fresh food in accord with special dietary
restrictions). The Complaint is also silent as to the legal status of Miller, Dunk, and Coleman at
the time of the alleged constitutional violations.
Even if Rule 20 is satisfied, the Court can still require the plaintiffs to proceed separately
with their claims if joinder would cause “prejudice, expense, or delay.” See Chavez, 251 F.3d at

11

632; FED. R. CIV. P. 20(b). Allowing the plaintiffs to proceed together will foreseeably delay,
complicate, and increase the costs of litigating otherwise straightforward claims, resulting in
prejudice to the plaintiffs and defendants. At the time of filing this lawsuit, the plaintiffs were in
the Jail. Soon after commencing the action, Coleman was transferred to a federal facility in West
Virginia. The difficulties associated with group litigation are compounded by the fact that, of the
three remaining plaintiffs, at least one, acting as the lead plaintiff, is now incarcerated out of
state, hindering their ability to communicate, make decisions regarding litigation, prepare group
pleadings, or respond to deadlines. Given these considerations, the Court finds that joinder is not
appropriate going forward.
The Court looks to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance on how
to proceed. Rule 21 provides that “[m]isjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an
action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.
The Court may also sever any claim against a party.” FED. R. CIV. P. 21. Consistent with Rule
21, the Court shall enter an order in the disposition below that allows each remaining plaintiff to
proceed in a separate action, as follows:
A. Jeffery Coleman, who has been identified as the “lead plaintiff” in this case, shall
proceed as the only plaintiff in this action going forward, and he shall be obligated to
pay a filing fee in accord with the Court’s prior order granting Coleman’s IFP Motion
(Doc. 4).
B. Andrew Dunk and Randall A. Miller shall be terminated as plaintiffs in this action,
and no filing fee for this action shall be assessed. New cases shall be opened for both
of them. Each shall separately proceed in his newly-opened case, and each shall pay
a filing fee in that case, or proceed in forma pauperis if his respective Motion for
Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is granted, whether or not he chooses to pursue
his claims any further.

Pending Motions
Plaintiff Andrew Dunk has filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Docs.
12

7 and 21), which will be addressed in a separate order of the Court in his respective case.
Plaintiff Randall A. Miller has filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis
(Doc. 9), which will be addressed in a separate order of the Court in his respective case.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons set forth above, the following
plaintiffs are TERMINATED as parties in this action: ANDREW DUNK and RANDALL A.
MILLER. The Clerk is DIRECTED to open a new case for both of these plaintiffs, captioning
them as follows and filing the following documents in each case (and any others listed below):
(1) this memorandum and order; (2) the Complaint (Doc. 1); and (3) the preliminary orders
(Docs. 5 and 16):
A. ANDREW DUNK, Plaintiff v. RANDY COBB, Defendant;1 and
B. RANDALL A. MILLER, Plaintiff v. RANDY COBB, Defendant;2

The Clerk is DIRECTED to change the caption of this case to: JEFFREY COLEMAN,
Plaintiff v. RANDY COBB, Defendant. Only Plaintiff Coleman will proceed in this action.
Each case shall be tracked so that it undergoes any further preliminary review under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A that is deemed necessary (including review of any amended complaints), if only
to allow for the entry of the orders addressing each plaintiff’s pauper status, appointment of
counsel, and other preliminary matters.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1), which includes Counts 1
through 3, is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
1

In addition to those documents already listed, the Clerk is DIRECTED to file the following document in
this case: (1) IFP Motion (Doc. 7); (2) IFP Motion (Doc. 21); (3) Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statement
(Doc. 11); (4) Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statement (Doc. 15); and (5) Response (Doc. 17).

2

In addition to those documents already listed, the Clerk is DIRECTED to file the following documents
in this case: (1) IFP Motion (Doc. 9); (2) Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statement (Doc. 8); and (3)
Response (Doc. 18).

13

be granted in this case and in each newly-severed case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant UNITED STATES MARSHAL
SERVICE is DISMISSED with prejudice from this action.
Each plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a “First Amended Complaint” in the case
opened in his name on or before April 23, 2018. Should a plaintiff fail to file a First Amended
Complaint within the allotted time or consistent with the instructions set forth in this Order, his
entire case shall be dismissed with prejudice and he may incur a “strike.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
See generally Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Kamminga, 34
F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994). The First Amended Complaint is subject to preliminary review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
When each plaintiff prepares his First Amended Complaint, it is strongly recommended
that he use the forms designed for use in this District for such actions. He should label the form,
“First Amended Complaint,” and he should use the case number for the action opened in his
name. Only Plaintiff Jeffrey Coleman should use this case number.
The pleading shall present each claim in a separate count, and each count shall specify,
by name, each defendant alleged to be liable under the count, as well as the actions alleged to
have been taken by that defendant. Each plaintiff should attempt to include the facts of his case
in chronological order, inserting any defendant’s name where necessary to identify the actors.
Plaintiffs should refrain from filing unnecessary exhibits. Each plaintiff should include only
related claims in his new complaint. Claims found to be unrelated to one another will be severed
into new cases, new case numbers will be assigned, and additional filing fees will be assessed.
To enable each plaintiff to comply with this order, the CLERK is DIRECTED to mail each
remaining plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form.

14

An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering the
original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1
(7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to the original complaint.
Thus, the First Amended Complaint must stand on its own, without reference to any previous
pleading, and each plaintiff must re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along with
the First Amended Complaint. The First Amended Complaint is subject to review pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A.
Each plaintiff is further ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee was incurred
at the time this action was filed, thus the filing fee remains due and payable, regardless of
whether each plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint in his case.

See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
Finally, each plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his or her whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later
than 7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order
will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this
action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 26, 2018
s/J. Phil Gilbert
United States District Judge

15