Bell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. et al

Filing 5

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 12/18/2017. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RICKY BELL,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
WEXFORD and
RALPH JOHNNIE,
Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-1301-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Centralia Correctional Center (“Centralia”), brings this
pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff raises claims of deliberate
indifference to medical needs (broken tooth and associated pain). The Complaint is now before
the Court for a preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 102627 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not

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plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint
On Saturday, June 17, 2017, Plaintiff’s tooth “broke off” while Plaintiff was eating ice.
(Doc. 1, p. 7). Plaintiff asked a correctional officer to contact the healthcare unit. Id. After
contacting the healthcare unit and relaying the problem to individuals at the healthcare unit, the
officer advised Plaintiff he could not be seen by a dentist without completing a healthcare
request. Id. Plaintiff immediately submitted the request. Id.
On Sunday, June 18, 2017, when Plaintiff did not receive a response to his healthcare
request, he spoke to another correctional officer. (Doc. 1, p. 8). The officer told Plaintiff that
there was not a dentist on duty over the weekend and Plaintiff would have to wait until Monday.
Id. Plaintiff submitted a second healthcare request slip, labeling it a “dental emergency” on
Wednesday June 21, 2017. (Doc. 1, p. 9).
According to the Complaint, Johnnie, the dentist at Centralia, received Plaintiff’s original
healthcare request on Tuesday, June 20, 2017. (Doc. 1, p. 9). Plaintiff additionally alleges that
Johnnie received the second healthcare request on Thursday, June 22, 2017. Id. Nonetheless,
Johnnie did not respond to the request until Monday, June 26, 2017. Id. It appears that, at that
time, Johnnie extracted Plaintiff’s broken tooth and provided pain medication. (Doc. 1, p. 10).

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Between Saturday, June 17, 2017, and Monday, June 26, 2017, Plaintiff was in
excruciating pain and was unable to eat or sleep properly. (Doc. 1, pp. 8-10). Plaintiff did not
receive any treatment, including pain medication, until Monday June 26, 2017. Id.
Plaintiff contends that Johnnie exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical
need by ignoring his healthcare requests and delaying treatment until Monday, June 26, 2017.
(Doc. 1, pp. 9-10). Plaintiff alleges that Wexford is liable for deliberate indifference because it
maintained a policy or practice of not providing any dental services to inmates Friday through
Sunday, and on holidays. Id.
Discussion

Count 1 –

Deliberate indifference claim against Johnnie for the delayed
treatment of Plaintiff’s broken tooth and associated pain, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Count 3 –

Deliberate indifference claim against Wexford for maintaining a
policy or practice of not providing dental services to inmates
Friday through Sunday, and on holidays, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.

Count 1
To state a claim for deliberate indifference to medical care, a prisoner must show that (1)
he suffered from an objectively serious condition which created a substantial risk of harm, and
(2) the defendants were aware of that risk and intentionally disregarded it. Minix v. Canarecci,
597 F.3d 824, 831 (7th Cir. 2010); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 771-72, 777-79 (7th
Cir. 2008); Jackson v. Ill Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764-65 (7th Cir. 2002).
The Seventh Circuit has observed that there is no “precise metric to assess when a
plaintiff's medical need is sufficiently serious.” Green v. Pollard, 335 F.App’x. 612, *2 (7th Cir.
2009). However, the objective standard typically encompasses conditions that have been

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diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would
recognize the need for a doctor's attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005).
Dental care is recognized as being “one of the most important medical needs of inmates.” Wynn
v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “Objectively serious” dental
needs may include a dental condition that causes the inmate to suffer other health problems, like
extreme pain, bleeding, infection, or problems eating. Id. at 593 (citations omitted). The broken
tooth and associated pain that Plaintiff describes in the Complaint are sufficiently serious to
satisfy the objective component of this claim at screening.
In order to satisfy the subjective component of the claim, the Complaint must also
“demonstrate that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference.” Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653
(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). Deliberate indifference is shown when an
official “know[s] of and disregard[s] an excessive risk to inmate health” by being “ ‘aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists' ” and
by “ ‘draw[ing] the inference.’ ” Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
Negligence, or even gross negligence, does not support a deliberate indifference claim. Id.
Delays in treating a medical condition may amount to deliberate indifference where the
delay causes an inmate to suffer unnecessary pain or causes his health to deteriorate. See Berry v.
Peterman, 604 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2010). The allegations suggest that, despite being aware of
Plaintiff’s condition on June 21, 2017, Johnnie delayed treatment of Plaintiff's broken tooth until
June 26, 2017, resulting in unnecessary pain. In light of these allegations, Count 1 cannot be
dismissed against Johnnie at screening.

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Count 2
To maintain a § 1983 action against a private corporation, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that a constitutional deprivation occurred as the result of a policy or practice of the corporation.
Id. Plaintiff contends that Wexford is liable under § 1983 because his treatment was delayed, in
part, because Wexford maintained a policy or practice of not providing inmates with dental care
on Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. This is sufficient, at the screening stage, to allow
Count 2 proceed as to Wexford.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall receive further review as to
Defendant JOHNNIE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 2 shall receive further review as to
Defendant WEXFORD.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants
JOHNNIE and WEXFORD: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of
a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to
mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s
place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver
of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent,
the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court
will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if

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not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings. Further, this entire matter shall be
REFERRED to a United States Magistrate for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2)
and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, regardless of whether
his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will

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cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 18, 2017
s/J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
United States District Judge

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