Edwards v. Jaimet et al
Filing
88
ORDER GRANTING 74 MOTION for Summary Judgment On The Merits filed by Michael Scott, Wexford Health Sources, Inc. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Dr. Michael Scott and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. and against Plaintiff Celester Edwards and close this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly on 12/3/2020. (nmf)
Case 3:17-cv-01344-RJD Document 88 Filed 12/03/20 Page 1 of 15 Page ID #717
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CELESTER EDWARDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
DR. MICHAEL SCOTT and WEXFORD
HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 17-cv-1344-RJD
ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Celester Edwards, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his constitutional
rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center
(“Pinckneyville”). Plaintiff complains he was provided inadequate treatment for his sleep apnea
and hammertoe in 2017. Plaintiff is currently proceeding in this action on the following claims:
Count One:
Defendants Scott and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”)
showed deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s sleep apnea and issues
associated therewith, including chest pain and shortness of breath,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Count Two:
Defendants Scott and Wexford showed deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s hammertoe and issues associated therewith in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.
This matter is now before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Merits (Doc. 74). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED.
Medical Records
Both Plaintiff and Defendants submitted Plaintiff’s medical records in support of their
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summary judgment briefing. Normally, to demonstrate trustworthiness and reliability of such
documents at the summary judgment stage, the party seeking to offer the business record must
attach an affidavit sworn to by a person who would be qualified to introduce the record as evidence
at trial, for example, a custodian or anyone qualified to speak from personal knowledge that the
documents were admissible business records. Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 988 (7th
Cir. 2000). Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants provided such an affidavit. Defendants only
provided the declaration of Dr. Scott, which is only sufficient to address the accuracy of medical
records he created as he only states that his care and treatment “is accurately reflected in [his] notes
in Mr. Edward’s chart, that [he] penned with [his] own hand, contemporaneously with the
treatment that was being provided” (Doc. 75-3 at ¶ 6). However, in this instance, there has been
no objection to the consideration or use of the medical records at this stage in the proceedings.
Because there have been no objections to the use of Plaintiff’s medical records and both parties
have submitted records in support of their positions, the Court will consider the medical records
without the required authenticating testimony. See Medina v. City of Chicago, No. 01-C-9490,
2002 WL 31027965, *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2002) (wherein the court considered documents
offered by both sides without the required authenticating testimony because the authenticity of the
documents were not disputed, the documents were business records produced during discovery,
and some documents had been offered by both the plaintiff and defendant).
Factual Background
Sleep Apnea
Plaintiff first started experiencing sleep apnea symptoms when he was incarcerated at the
Cook County Jail in 2014 (Deposition of Celester Edwards, Doc. 75-1 at 2). Plaintiff was
transferred to Pinckneyville on March 21, 2016 (Doc. 77 at 4, ¶ 1; see Doc. 75-2 at 1). Plaintiff
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attests that upon his transfer to Pinckneyville he informed a nurse about his pre-existing
conditions, including asthma, bronchitis, sleep apnea, breathing problems, and hammertoe (Doc.
77 at 4, ¶ 2). Plaintiff asked the nurse if he could speak to a doctor, but she refused (Id. at ¶ 3).
Plaintiff attests that he submitted a medical request slip on March 22, 2016 to bring his medical
conditions, including sleep apnea and hammertoe, to a doctor’s attention (Id. at ¶ 4).
According to Plaintiff’s medical records, Plaintiff was seen by nurses during nurse sick call
on March 30 and March 31, 2016, wherein Plaintiff’s complaints of asthma and sleep apnea were
documented (see Doc. 75-2 at 2 and Doc. 77 at 21). On April 4, 2016, Plaintiff was seen by a
nurse practitioner and requested a sleep study for his sleep apnea (Doc. 75-2 at 3; Doc. 77 at 23).
On April 18, 2016, Plaintiff was first seen by Defendant Dr. Scott (Doc. 75-2 at 4; Doc. 77 at 24).
Plaintiff discussed his sleep apnea with Dr. Scott and requested a sleep study (Id.). Plaintiff
asserts he attempted to discuss both his sleep apnea and hammertoe with Dr. Scott, but Dr. Scott
told Plaintiff he could only address one problem (Doc. 77 at 4, ¶ 5). Dr. Scott submitted a request
to collegial for Plaintiff to undergo a sleep study (Declaration of Dr. Michael Scott, Doc. 75-3 at ¶
7; Doc. 75-2 at 4; Doc. 77 at 24; Doc. 77 at 48). On April 25, 2016, Dr. Scott discussed the
request for a sleep study during collegial review with Dr. Ritz, and it was determined that Dr. Scott
would obtain Plaintiff’s Epworth Sleepiness Score on or before May 23, 2016, and report back to
collegial (Doc. 75-2 at 35, 37). Plaintiff’s Sleepiness Score was obtained on May 2, 2016, and Dr.
Scott received approval from collegial for an on-site sleep study (Id. at 6, 36). Plaintiff’s sleep
study was performed on June 5, 2016 (Id. at 7-8; Doc. 77 at 69-70). A report was completed by
Dr. Thomas Lehman off-site and indicated that Plaintiff had mild, non-positional obstructive sleep
apnea (Doc. 75-3 at ¶ 8; Doc. 75-2 at 38-39). Treatment considerations included the use of a nasal
continuous positive airway pressure (“CPAP”) machine, mandibular advancement splint (MAS),
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or “referral to an ENT surgeon for modification to the airway … if the patient prefers an alternative
therapy or the CPAP trial is unsuccessful” (Doc. 75-2 at 38; Doc. 77 at 69-70).
Dr. Scott met with Plaintiff on June 15, 2016 to discuss the sleep study report (Doc. 75-3 at
¶ 10; Doc. 75-2 at 9; Doc. 77 at 30). Plaintiff testified that he told Dr. Scott he wanted the CPAP
machine, but did not want surgery (Doc. 75-1 at 9). Plaintiff also testified that he was never
presented with a mouthpiece as an option (Id.). Following this meeting with Plaintiff, Dr. Scott
submitted a request to collegial for Plaintiff to get a nasal CPAP machine (Doc. 75-3 at ¶ 10; Doc.
75-2 at 40). Following a discussion in collegial by Dr. Fisher and Dr. Scott, an approval was
made for Plaintiff to obtain a Pro Adjustable Night Guard Bruxism Mouthpiece Aid, a type of
MAS (Doc. 75-3 at ¶ 11; Doc. 75-2 at 41). Dr. Scott attests that an MAS was a reasonable first
step for Plaintiff’s mild sleep apnea and, given the mild nature of his condition, it would also have
been appropriate to simply recommend lifestyle changes and continue to monitor Plaintiff (Doc.
75-3 at ¶ 12).
Plaintiff was called to see the dentist concerning his mouthpiece, but Plaintiff refused
because he had not been told about the mouthpiece by Dr. Scott and the dentist was unable to
explain the purpose of the same (Doc. 77 at 5, ¶ 11). Plaintiff met with Dr. Scott on July 5, 2016
to discuss the need for dental impressions and measurements for the MAS (Doc. 75-2 at 11).
Plaintiff subsequently received the MAS (Doc. 77 at 6, ¶ 13).
Plaintiff attests he was seen by a nurse practitioner on January 8, 2017 wherein he
explained he was still having serious issues with his sleep apnea and was having trouble breathing
(Doc. 77 at 6, ¶ 15). Plaintiff also told the nurse practitioner that the mouthpiece he had been
issued was cutting the inside of his lower lip and was causing injury to his mouth (Id.). Plaintiff
asserts the nurse told him he should be on a CPAP machine and she referred Plaintiff to Dr. Scott
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for evaluation (Id. at ¶ 17). According to Plaintiff’s medical records, Plaintiff was seen on
January 5, 2017 in nurse sick call with complaints that his mouthpiece was not working and he
requested a CPAP machine instead (Doc. 75-2 at 12; Doc. 77 at 33). The next day, however,
when again seen on sick call, Plaintiff indicated he was “good with all the sleep apnea stuff” and
just requested a new inhaler (Doc. 75-2 at 13; Doc. 77 at 34). Plaintiff was next seen by Dr. Scott
on January 23, 2017 to again discuss his sleep study results (Doc. 75-2 at 16; Doc. 77 at 37).
According to Plaintiff, he told Dr. Scott he was suffering restless days and nights more so than
usual and he was experiencing chest pain and difficulty breathing during the night (Doc. 77 at 7, ¶
19). Plaintiff asserts Dr. Scott told Plaintiff “they [were] not going to do shit” for him and did not
provide him pain medication (Id.). Plaintiff told Dr. Scott the MAS was hurting his mouth and
Dr. Scott told Plaintiff he would put him in to see the dentist (Doc. 75-2 at 16; Doc. 77 at 37).
According to Dr. Scott’s notes from this examination, he issued Nasacort for Plaintiff and
discussed weight loss (Doc. 75-2 at 16; Doc. 77 at 37).
Dr. Scott resigned from his position on February 23, 2017, and his responsibility for
Plaintiff’s care ended on that date (Doc. 75-3 at ¶ 16). Plaintiff contends his mouthpiece was
never fixed and a nurse told him that Dr. Scott never referred him to see the dentist (Doc. 77 at 8,
¶¶ 26, 28). Plaintiff asserts Dr. Scott never disclosed to Wexford that his mouthpiece had broken
(Doc. 77 at 8, ¶ 30). Plaintiff’s dental records, however, indicate he was seen by the dentist on
February 22, 2017, and his mouthpiece was adjusted (Doc. 75-2 at 45).
Plaintiff wrote an emergency grievance on March 10, 2017 requesting that he be referred to
a sleep study specialist for a CPAP machine and treatment for chest pain and asthma (Doc. 77 at 9,
¶ 32). Plaintiff asserts he wrote a follow-up letter to the warden on March 30, 2017, but never
received any response to his letter or grievance (Id. at ¶¶ 33-34). Plaintiff was seen by a physician
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on April 7, 2017 who submitted a request for a CPAP machine, which he received on April 28,
2017 (Id. at 10, ¶¶ 38-39).
Hammertoe
Plaintiff’s medical records first document Plaintiff’s complaints concerning his hammertoe
on January 30, 2017 (Doc. 75-2 at 17; Doc. 77 at 126). Plaintiff was provided Tylenol and
referred to a physician (Id.).
Plaintiff saw Dr. Scott on February 9, 2017 to address his
hammertoe (Doc. 77 at 11, ¶ 43; Doc. 75-2 at 18). Plaintiff advised Dr. Scott that he was
supposed to have hammertoe surgery while he was incarcerated at Cook County Jail and that he
was sent to Stronger Hospital for a consultation for the same (Id.). Dr. Scott documented
Plaintiff’s request for surgery and requested medical records from Cook County Jail and Stronger
Hospital (Doc. 75-3 at ¶ 14; see Doc. 75-2 at 18). Plaintiff asserts he advised Dr. Scott that he was
experiencing pain in his right foot related to his hammertoe that was affecting his daily activities,
such as his job assignment and ability to walk and stand (Doc. 77 at 11, ¶ 44). Plaintiff asserts Dr.
Scott was very negative and unprofessional during this encounter, stating “these people won’t do
shit for you down here” and telling Plaintiff “you all people are always whinnying [sic]” (Id. at ¶
45). Plaintiff asserts Dr. Scott refused to examine his hammertoe (Id. at ¶ 46). Plaintiff did not
see Dr. Scott again for his hammertoe complaints prior to Dr. Scott’s resignation on February 23,
2017, and Dr. Scott does not believe Plaintiff’s medical records arrived prior to his resignation
(Doc. 75-3 at ¶ 14; see Doc. 75-2 and Doc. 77). These records indicate that Plaintiff’s hammertoe
surgery would be an elective procedure that he could pursue upon his release (Doc. 75-2 at 48-49).
Plaintiff refused nurse sick call to address complaints of foot pain on April 12, 2017
because he would not pay another co-pay (Doc. 75-2 at 31; Doc. 77 at 128). Plaintiff was seen on
April 14, 2017 by a nurse and was referred to a physician and issued pain medication (Doc. 77 at
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129). Plaintiff was seen on May 27, 2017 by a physician, who noted he would be referred to a
podiatrist (Id. at 130). There is no indication in the record before the Court that Plaintiff was
referred to a podiatrist.
Plaintiff asserts he was told it was recommended that he wait until his release in 2034 to
undergo surgery for his hammertoe (Doc. 77 at 15, ¶ 68). Plaintiff also asserts he was seen by Dr.
Lochhead in 2017 and she indicated she would order him special shoes, but he has not received the
same (Doc. 77 at 15, ¶ 73). Plaintiff asserts he still suffers from pain caused by his hammertoe
(Id. at 16 ¶ 80).
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also
Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary
judgment is made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of
material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the
facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving
party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
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Discussion
Plaintiff is proceeding in this action on Eighth Amendment claims of deliberate
indifference against Dr. Scott and Wexford for delaying and/or failing to adequately treat
Plaintiff’s sleep apnea and hammertoe.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
of prisoners” may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In order to prevail on such a claim, Plaintiff must show first
that his condition was “objectively, sufficiently serious” and second, that the “prison officials
acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir.
2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
With regard to the first showing, the following circumstances could constitute a serious
medical need: “[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important
and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects
an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Hayes v. Snyder,
546 F.3d 516, 522-23 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir.
1997)); see also Foelker v. Outagamie Cnty., 394 F.3d 510, 512-13 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A serious
medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”).
A prisoner must also show that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind, namely, deliberate indifference. “Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). “The infliction of suffering on prisoners
can be found to violate the Eighth Amendment only if that infliction is either deliberate, or reckless
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in the criminal law sense.” Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 1985).
Negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness as that term is used in tort cases, is not enough.
Id. at 653; Shockley v. Jones, 823, F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987). Put another way, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the officials were “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and that the officials actually drew that inference.
Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. A factfinder may also conclude that a prison official knew of a
substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Serious Medical Need
Defendants assert Plaintiff failed to demonstrate his sleep apnea or hammertoe constitute
serious medical needs.
First, with regards to Plaintiff’s sleep apnea, Defendants assert the results of the sleep study
Plaintiff underwent in June 2016 showed he only suffers from mild sleep apnea. Defendants
reference an article attached to Plaintiff’s complaint from the Mayo Clinic indicating that mild
sleep apnea does not require intervention, which corroborates Dr. Scott’s attestation that treatment
of Plaintiff’s sleep apnea could have been limited to lifestyle changes given the mild nature of his
condition. While the Court is mindful of the fact that Plaintiff’s sleep apnea was deemed to be
mild, it is not satisfied that his condition did not constitute a serious medical need. Although
lifestyle changes may have been appropriate, Plaintiff was given further medical treatment
including the issuance and use of a CPAP machine. Moreover, Plaintiff’s condition required
physician intervention and follow-up. As such, at this stage in the proceedings, the Court cannot
find as a matter of law that Plaintiff’s sleep apnea did not constitute a serious medical need.
Next, the Court considers whether Plaintiff’s hammertoe constitutes a serious medical
need under the Eighth Amendment. Defendants’ argument is not well-developed, and not
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supported by evidence in the record. Indeed, Defendants fail to point to any evidentiary support
for their position. The Court notes that Dr. Scott’s declaration indicates that not all hammertoe
deformities require surgical repair and some patients are able to get relief by wearing larger, looser
shoes; however, this does not establish that Plaintiff’s hammertoe condition was not a serious
medical need. The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and,
under this standard, finds that a reasonable jury may determine that his condition constituted a
serious medical need insofar as it caused him pain and required a doctor’s attention.
Dr. Michael Scott
Defendant Dr. Scott asserts he was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s sleep apnea as
his treatment was timely and appropriate in light of the nature of Plaintiff’s condition. The Court
agrees.
The evidence reflects Plaintiff first complained of sleep apnea to Dr. Scott on April 18,
2016. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Scott submitted a request for a sleep study to collegial review. It
was determined Plaintiff’s “sleepiness score” would need to be obtained prior to the approval of a
sleep study. After obtaining Plaintiff’s sleep score on May 2, 2016, Plaintiff underwent a sleep
study on June 5, 2016 and a report was prepared by an outside physician. The physician reported
that Plaintiff had mild sleep apnea and treatment could include the use of a CPAP machine,
mouthpiece (MAS), or referral to an ENT surgeon for modification of the airway. Dr. Scott
discussed the report with Plaintiff on June 15, 2016. There is a dispute as to what options were
presented, but it is undisputed that Dr. Scott submitted a request to collegial review for a CPAP
machine, but it was decided Plaintiff would receive a mouthpiece aid, a type of MAS. Plaintiff
saw Dr. Scott on July 5, 2016 to discuss the need for dental impressions and measurements for the
MAS. Plaintiff did not see Dr. Scott again to address this condition until January 23, 2017.
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Plaintiff contends Dr. Scott ignored his complaints of pain and refused to provide him pain
medication when Plaintiff told Dr. Scott his mouthpiece was causing him pain. However, Dr.
Scott did refer Plaintiff to the dentist (though Plaintiff asserts he never saw the dentist, which is
contradicted by Plaintiff’s dental records). Dr. Scott also issued Nasacort for Plaintiff and
discussed weight loss for management of his sleep apnea. Dr. Scott did not see Plaintiff again for
concerns related to sleep apnea prior to Dr. Scott’s resignation on February 23, 2017.
Based on a review of the record, it appears Plaintiff may not have agreed with Dr. Scott’s
treatment regimen or decisions, but it is well-established that “[a] prisoner’s dissatisfaction with a
doctor’s prescribed course of treatment does not give rise to a constitutional claim unless the
medical treatment was “blatantly inappropriate.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir.
2014) (citing Greeno, 414 F.3d at 654 (quoting Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir.
1996)). Making such a showing is not easy as “[a] medical professional is entitled to deference in
treatment decisions unless ‘no minimally competent professional would have so responded under
those circumstances.’” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409 (quoting Sain v Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894-95 (7th
Cir. 2008) (other quotation omitted)). In other words, federal courts will not interfere with a
doctor’s decision to pursue a particular course of treatment unless that decision represents so
significant a departure from accepted professional standards or practices that it calls into question
whether the doctor actually was exercising his professional judgment. Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409
(citations omitted).
There is no evidence that Dr. Scott’s prescribed course of treatment was “blatantly
inappropriate.” Rather, the evidence demonstrates that Dr. Scott examined Plaintiff, promptly
referred him to specialists for additional treatment, including a sleep study and fitting for a
mouthpiece when his request for a CPAP was not granted, and provided medication, including
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Nasacort. The record fails to demonstrate that Dr. Scott delayed or failed to provide Plaintiff with
needed treatment. Further, Plaintiff may have preferred that he be issued a CPAP as an initial
course of treatment, but the record before the Court does not indicate that the issuance of
mouthpiece was “blatantly inappropriate.” Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant Dr.
Scott’s treatment of Plaintiff was grounded in professional judgment and was reasonable. See
Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 698 (7th Cir. 2008).
For the above-mentioned reasons,
Defendant Dr. Scott is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Count One.
Dr. Scott also contends he is entitled to summary judgment on Count Two, asserting there
is no evidence he acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s hammertoe condition in the two
weeks from when the condition was brought to his attention and when his tenure ended and
Plaintiff was no longer his patient. The evidence, when viewed in Plaintiff’s favor, indicates that
Plaintiff attempted to bring his hammertoe condition to Dr. Scott’s attention on April 18, 2016, but
Dr. Scott informed him he could only address one condition and, on that date, he was addressing
Plaintiff’s sleep apnea. This interaction, and Dr. Scott’s refusal to address Plaintiff’s hammertoe
issue, is not sufficient to establish deliberate indifference. There is no indication Dr. Scott
ignored a substantial risk to Plaintiff’s health or that Plaintiff was suffering any significant pain.
Plaintiff also could have put in for nurse sick call to address this issue soon after, but there is no
indication he took such action.
Plaintiff next saw Dr. Scott to address his hammertoe condition on February 9, 2017, and
Dr. Scott requested medical records from Cook County Jail and Stroger Hospital, where Plaintiff
indicated he had been evaluated previously. Dr. Scott was no longer working at Pinckneyville
when the records arrived and, thus, he never had an occasion to follow-up with Plaintiff. The
Court cannot find that Dr. Scott’s actions taken on February 9, 2017 were a violation of the Eighth
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Amendment. Dr. Scott requested records, but did not issue any pain medication to Plaintiff. It
appears that Plaintiff was not provided pain medication until April 14, 2017. In consideration of
the totality of the circumstances, including the relatively short length in the delay in receiving the
pain medication and the nature of Plaintiff’s pain and condition, the Court does not find Dr. Scott
acted with deliberate indifference on February 9, 2017. Indeed, there is no indication Plaintiff
was suffering from extreme pain or advised Dr. Scott of the same. The Court also notes Plaintiff
had suffered from this condition for many years prior without any notable medical intervention.
See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir. 2011) (“A delay in treating non-life-threatening
but painful conditions may constitute deliberate indifference if the delay exacerbated the injury or
unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain. The length of delay that is tolerable depends on the
seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing treatment.”) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
For these reasons, Defendant Dr. Scott is entitled to summary judgment on Counts One and
Two.
Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
Wexford asserts it is entitled to summary judgment on Counts One and Two because
Plaintiff fails to assert there was any Wexford policy or procedure that resulted in a constitutional
deprivation.
Where a private corporation has contracted to provide essential government services, such
as health care for prisoners, the private corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the
constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation
itself. Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Monell
v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Accordingly, in order
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for Plaintiff to recover from Wexford, he must offer evidence that an injury was caused by a
Wexford policy, custom, or practice of deliberate indifference to medical needs, or a series of bad
acts that together raise the inference of such a policy. Shields, 746 F.3d at 796. Plaintiff must
also show that policymakers were aware of the risk created by the custom or practice and must
have failed to take appropriate steps to protect him. Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., 604
F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2009). Finally, a policy or practice “must be the ‘direct cause’ or ‘moving
force’ behind the constitutional violation.” Woodward v. Correctional Medical Services of
Illinois, Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
In response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff indicates that Wexford denied any relief from
medical decisions being made by Dr. Scott and other medical personnel. Plaintiff also asserts that
Dr. Scott and Christine Brown did not follow Wexford’s policy when they denied and delayed his
medical care and treatment, and that Wexford failed to take steps to ensure Plaintiff received
needed treatment. Despite these broad statements, Plaintiff has failed to articulate or point to any
particular policy or practice attributable to Wexford that caused him injury, and the Court can find
none. Plaintiff was seen on numerous occasions for his complaints of sleep apnea while at
Pinckneyville and was ultimately issued a CPAP machine. Further, although Plaintiff contends
he has not received special shoes to address his hammertoe condition, the Court cannot find any
policy or practice of Wexford attributable to such a delay. For these reasons, Defendant Wexford
Health Sources, Inc. is entitled to summary judgment as to Counts One and Two.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the Merits (Doc.
74) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Dr.
Michael Scott and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. and against Plaintiff Celester Edwards and close
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this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 3, 2020
s/ Reona J. Daly
Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge
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