Grigalanz v. Sheriff
Filing
8
ORDER DISMISSING CASE without prejudice. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 1/2/2018. (tjk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PHILLIP GRIGALANZ,
Petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL NO. 17-cv-1373-DRH
SHERIFF JERSEY COUNTY JAIL,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Petitioner, currently incarcerated in Graham Correctional Center, brings
this action to challenge certain aspects of his state criminal proceedings.
Petitioner originally brought this action in the Northern District of Indiana on
November 24, 2017. (Doc. 1). On December 18, 2017, the case was transferred
into this district because Petitioner raised issues related to his criminal
proceedings in Jersey County Illinois, part of this District. (Doc. 3).
The Petition
The first document in this case is a “Motion for Writ of Certiorari,” filed on
November 24, 2017. (Doc. 1). In that document, Petitioner describes himself as
“Appellant” and states he is making an interlocutory appeal from the Jersey
County Circuit Court. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Specifically, Petitioner raises the issues of 1)
whether the investigation leading to his arrest was reasonable; and 2) whether
being charged with the highest offense level constitutes cruel and unusual
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punishment. Id. Petitioner requests that the Court enter an order to stay further
criminal proceedings and assume the mantel of trier of fact. (Doc. 1, pp. 1-2).
Contemporaneously with Doc. 1, Petitioner also filed an “Emergency Motion
for Order to Abey [sic] trial.” (Doc. 2). That document requests that the Court
“issue an ex parte order upon the Jersey County Circuit Court to belay all further
adjudication during the course of matters before this Court.”
(Doc. 2, p. 1).
Petitioner goes on to state that without an order from this court, the trial court
will issue an “unjust” and unconstitutional order on matters outside of the trial
court’s jurisdiction. Id. Petitioner also vaguely alludes to a related civil matter
with related civil parties. Id. He repeats his request that this Court issue an
order staying state court proceedings. Id.
The Court will also take judicial notice of certain facts from Jersey County
Records, Case No. 15-cf-188. Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284
(7th Cir. 1994); Bova v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 446 F.Supp.2d 926, 960 n.2 (S.D. Ill.
2006) (a court may judicially notice public records available on government
websites) (collecting cases). After the Petition was filed, but before this case was
transferred to this district, Petitioner entered a guilty plea in his state court case
on November 27, 2017. It appears that Petitioner was sentenced on December 4,
2017; he is currently in the Illinois Department of Correction’s custody at Graham
Correctional Center.
On December 14, 2017, Petitioner filed a motion to
withdraw guilty plea. A hearing is set in the state court on January 9, 2018.
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On December 26, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Emergency Injunction
in this case.
(Doc. 7). In that document, Petitioner concedes that he initiated
this federal action in order to get a retrial of his Jersey County, Illinois case.
(Doc. 7, p. 1). Petitioner also stated that the state court judge declined to stay his
criminal proceedings on the basis of this action. Id. Petitioner alleges that Jersey
County Sheriff’s deputy Jason Huitt told Petitioner that legal files containing
exculpatory evidence and evidence of wrongdoing on behalf of Jersey County
officials would be destroyed on January 3, 2018. Id. Petitioner states that he has
a right to federal proceedings because he is an Indiana resident and he is being
tried in the State of Illinois. Id. Petitioner requests that 1) the Jersey County
Sheriff’s office be enjoined from destroying any documents and/or effects in its
possession; 2) that the order of the Jersey County Court be rescinded; 3) that the
Illinois Department of Corrections release Petitioner back into the custody of the
Jersey County Sheriff’s office; and 4) Jersey County accept the orders of the
federal district courts. Id.
Discussion
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in United States District Courts
provides that upon preliminary consideration by the district court judge, “[i]f it
plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is
not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and
direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.”
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Petitioner has not specified whether he brought this suit pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 or 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
His initial document describes these
proceedings as sounding in habeas corpus, but he also sometimes refers to
himself as a “plaintiff” and his most recent request for relief seeks equitable relief
against a specific member of the Jersey County Sheriff’s Office.
However,
Petitioner consistently asks for the Court to stay his state court proceedings, and
his most recent request is that he be released from IDOC custody. For these
reasons, the Court will continue to consider this a habeas action. But the Court
must dismiss this action at this time, as Petitioner is not entitled to relief under
either § 2241 or § 2254.
When Petitioner filed this action, he had not yet entered a guilty plea or
been sentenced.
However, since filing, Petitioner has become a convicted
prisoner. That renders any relief under § 2241 unavailable to him and to the
extent that the Petition is based on that statute, it will be dismissed as moot.
Jackson v. Clements, 796 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 2015).
Even construing Petitioner’s pleadings broadly and as arising under § 2254,
the case still must be dismissed at this time.
Although Petitioner has been
sentenced, he currently has a motion to set his guilty plea aside, and a hearing
date on said motion. If the trial court were to grant that motion and set aside
Petitioner’s guilty plea, the criminal matter would clearly be ongoing, and this case
would be barred by the Younger abstention, which prohibits federal interference,
and specifically prohibits granting injunctive relief to halt state proceedings.
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Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); State v. Haws, 131 F.3d 1205, 1210 (7th
Cir. 1997).
That is precisely the relief Petitioner requests.
Even Petitioner’s
request regarding the documents in his criminal case implicates Younger because
Petitioner has not alleged that injunctive relief regarding the documents is
unavailable in the state court, and the documents clearly relate to the investigation
and prosecution of his case. See Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 575
(7th Cir. 1985) (finding that Younger would be implicated by plaintiffs’ request for
allegedly exculpatory documents where the plaintiffs had ongoing criminal
matters). As the Court cannot enjoin the state court proceedings without running
afoul of Younger, this case must be dismissed at this time.
Even assuming that Petitioner’s sentencing concludes the state court
proceedings despite his pending motion, the case would still be dismissed. Before
a habeas action may be heard in federal court, a petitioner is required to exhaust
his available remedies in state court, or else show cause and prejudice for the
failure to exhaust. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); McAtee v. Cowan, 250 F.3d 506, 50809 (7th Cir. 2001). To exhaust his remedies, a state prisoner must fairly present
his claim in each appropriate state court including a state supreme court with
powers of discretionary review. Byers v. Basinger, 610 F.3d 980, 985 (7th Cir.
2010); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); see also O'Sullivan v. Boerckel,
526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (holding that state prisoners “must give the state courts
one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete
round of the State's established appellate review process”); Spreitzer v. Schomig,
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219 F.3d 639, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2000). A prisoner need not pursue all separate
state remedies that are available to him but must give “the state courts one fair
opportunity to pass upon and correct the alleged violations.” McAtee, 250 F.3d at
509.
Further, “[i]f a prisoner fails to present his claims in a petition for
discretionary review to a state court of last resort, those claims are procedurally
defaulted.”
Rodriguez v. Scillia, 193 F.3d 913, 917 (7th Cir. 1999); see also
O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848.
Petitioner has not exhausted his state court remedies. In fact, the relief he
wants is for the state court to cease acting on his case. Petitioner must litigate his
criminal matter in the state courts, and if he believes that his state criminal
proceedings violated the Constitution in some way, he must fully present that
claim through a complete round of state court review before bringing it in this
court.
The Court notes that it is doubtful that Petitioner could proceed in any
event. The Petition only vaguely states in a conclusory fashion that there is some
sort of constitutional problem with the state court proceeding, but it never
identifies the specific problem. Merely concluding that a proceeding is unjust or
unconstitutional does not adequately alert the court to a constitutional problem.
Petitioner does state that being charged with the highest level crime is cruel and
unusual punishment, but that formulation is clearly false because the cruel and
unusual punishment clause is concerned with punishment, i.e. the sentence
imposed, not the potential sentence.
At one point, Petitioner states that he
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believes he is entitled to a federal court proceeding because he is an Indiana
citizen subjected to an Illinois proceeding. While it is true that in civil matters,
citizens of different states may qualify for diversity jurisdiction, there is no
corresponding diversity jurisdiction in criminal matters, and criminal defendants
have no rights to remove state criminal proceedings to federal court.
Disposition
The Petition is DISMISSED without prejudice.
(Doc. 1).
Petitioner’s
Motions seeking an injunction against his state criminal proceedings are DENIED.
(Doc. 2) (Doc. 7). Any claims brought pursuant to § 2241 are MOOT. Any claims
brought pursuant to § 2254 are barred by either the Younger abstention doctrine
or the failure to exhaust state court remedies. Should Petitioner fail to secure
relief in his ongoing criminal proceedings or through state court review of those
proceedings, it is possible that he may have a viable federal habeas claim at a
later date, so this Order does not bar any future habeas relief Petitioner may be
entitled to seek.
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts, this Court must “issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” A certificate of
appealability should be issued only where the petitioner “has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Where a habeas petition is dismissed on procedural grounds without
reaching the underlying constitutional issue, the petitioner must show that
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reasonable jurists would “find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484–85 (2000). Both components must be established
for a certificate to issue.
Here, the Court finds that no reasonable jurist would find its conclusion on
the procedural matter debatable. It also finds that Petitioner failed to articulate a
viable constitutional claim. Therefore, the Court DENIES a certificate of
appealability.
Judge Herndon
2018.01.02
15:07:20 -06'00'
IT IS SO ORDERED
United States District Judge
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