Carter v. Benton et al

Filing 10

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 1/31/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JONATHAN T. CARTER,
#R17412,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SHERRY BENTON,
JOHN BALDWIN, and
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 17−cv–1397−SMY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Jonathan Carter, an inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center, brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights that allegedly occurred
while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”).

In his Complaint,

Plaintiff claims that the defendants failed to protect him from violence at the hands of other
inmates, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 1). This case is now before the Court for
a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
1

An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 102627 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds that
one of Plaintiff’s claims merits referral past the threshold stage.
The Complaint
In his Complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff makes the following allegations:

Plaintiff was

approved for protective custody by the Administrative Review Board on March 4, 2013. (Doc.
1, p. 7). On December 20, 2013, Plaintiff “signed out of protective custody because [he] was
sexually harassed by male employees and denied equal opportunities as the other inmates.” Id.
Defendant Benton’s statement that Plaintiff “was in and out of protective custody would be false.
The only time [he] left protective custody was for disciplinary actions which has nothing to do
with signing out.” Id.
On January 10, 2017, Benton conducted a hearing. Id. The hearing form attached to
Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates that the hearing was held to address the denial of Plaintiff’s
request for placement in protective custody. (Doc. 1-1, p. 8). The form further states that
Plaintiff claimed that upon his arrival at Menard, he “was confronted about old issues that
2

transpired [at Menard] in 2012,” that on the day he requested protective custody, October 25,
2016, he “was threatened to be moved so to avoid nonsense,” and that he feared for his life. Id.
Plaintiff’s statement to the ARB was summarized, in relevant part, as follows:
When I got down here, I thought things were over. Guys approached me telling
me to check back into PC. Four inmates approached me and . . . I reached for my
stomach, as I have medical issues, and they reached for a weapon. I mean, I
assumed they did. Due to my relationship with 1A, the last time I was here, and
allegedly owing money, I need PC. I/M Boyd was the one who threatened me. I
spoke to multiple staff at Intel and said the 4CH’s and VL’s don’t want me
around.
The form also indicates that Plaintiff was housed at Menard from January 2006 to April
2013, and returned to Menard on October 12, 2016 – less than two weeks before he requested
protective custody. Id. On the day of the hearing, January 10, 2017, Benton and Baldwin agreed
that Plaintiff did not need protective custody. (Doc. 1, p. 7); (Doc. 1-1, p. 8).
Plaintiff was assaulted by three inmates on February 4, 2017. Id. His face, eyes, lips,
fingers, buttocks, hand, hip, and back were injured. “His middle finger will forever be deformed
because the bone and tendon [are] damaged.” Id. Plaintiff’s back was reinjured, and he “will be
forever in pain.” Id. Plaintiff spent 34 days in segregation after this, which could have caused
Plaintiff “more injury to [an] illness [he] was suffering from that [Benton] was already aware
of.” 1 Id. Plaintiff attached the Adjustment Committee Final Summary Report from the incident,
which included charges against Plaintiff for fighting and disobeying a direct order. (Doc. 1-1, p.
10).
Kent Brookman and Jason Hart were the hearing committee members, and they signed
off on the final punishment, which included one month in segregation. Id. Plaintiff “tried to
explain to her why [he] signed out but [she] cut [him] off and said that issue was not important

1

The Court notes that this injury may be the “medical issues” with his stomach Plaintiff referred to in his
statement to the administrative review board. See (Doc. 1-1, p. 8).

3

but in all actuality if the harassment never took place this would have never happened and if she
was more professional in making decisions [Plaintiff] would have never got hurt.” (Doc. 1, p. 7).
Plaintiff asserts that “John Baldwin is just as guilty.” Id.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from the defendants for the injuries he sustained in the
attack and his placement in segregation after that incident. Id.
Discussion
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into 3 Counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion regarding their merit.
Count 1 –

Benton and Baldwin failed to protect Plaintiff by failing to grant him
protective custody in January 2017, resulting in Plaintiff being attacked by
fellow inmates in February 2017, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Count 2 –

Benton and Baldwin violated Plaintiff’s due process rights in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment by issuing him a ticket and/or placing him in
segregation after he was attacked by other inmates.

Count 3 –

Benton and Baldwin showed deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious
medical need involving a stomach issue while he was in segregation in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.

As discussed in more detail below, Count 1 will be allowed to proceed past threshold.
Any other intended claim that has not been recognized by the Court is considered dismissed
without prejudice as inadequately pleaded under the Twombly pleading standard.
Count 1 – Failure to Protect
“Prison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (internal citations omitted); see also
Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir. 2006). However, not every harm caused by

4

another inmate translates into constitutional liability for the corrections officers responsible for
the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In order for a plaintiff to succeed on a claim for
failure to protect, he must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk
of serious harm, and that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” to that danger. Id.;
Pinkston, 440 F.3d at 889.
A plaintiff also must prove that prison officials were aware of a specific, impending, and
substantial threat to his safety, often by showing that he complained to prison officials about a
specific threat to his safety. Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996). “A generalized risk
of violence is not enough, for prisons are inherently dangerous places.” Wilson v. Ryker, 451 F.
App’x 588, 589 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 909, 913 (7th Cir. 2005);
Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 2004). Conduct that amounts to negligence or
inadvertence is also not enough to state a claim. Pinkston, 440 F.3d at 889 (discussing Watts v.
Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 172 (7th Cir. 1985)).
Here, a liberal construction of the Complaint and the supporting exhibits supports an
Eighth Amendment claim against Benton and Baldwin because they allegedly denied Plaintiff’s
request to be returned to protective custody after learning of the threats he received from other
inmates, and less than a month after Plaintiff’s request was denied, he was attacked. Therefore,
Count 1 will proceed against Benton and Baldwin.
Count 2 – Due Process
It is unclear whether Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that he was given a ticket, placed
in segregation, or both, after he was allegedly attacked. Under either interpretation of his
Complaint, however, he has failed to implicate Benton and/or Baldwin for the ticket and
punishment he received. It is well established that “[f]or constitutional violations under § 1983

5

... a government official is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” E.g., Locke v. Haessig,
788 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. June 5, 2015). “This means that to recover damages against a prison
official acting in a supervisory role, a § 1983 plaintiff may not rely on a theory of respondeat
superior and must instead allege that the defendant, through his or her own conduct, has violated
the Constitution.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)).
Plaintiff has not alleged that Benton or Baldwin were aware of the attack when Plaintiff
was issued the ticket – much less that they issued him the ticket and chose to punish him with
segregation. In fact, the Disciplinary Hearing Report Plaintiff attached to the Complaint shows
that Kent Brookman and Jason Hart doled out Plaintiff’s punishment, and Justin Dilday wrote his
ticket. (Doc. 1-1, p. 10). Because Benton and Baldwin do not appear to have been personally
involved in the alleged due process violations, Count 2 will be dismissed without prejudice.
Count 3 – Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of inmates may constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2006) (per curiam). In order to state a claim, an inmate must show that: (1) he
suffered from an objectively serious medical need; and (2) state officials acted with deliberate
indifference to the prisoner’s medical need, which is a subjective standard. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Regardless of whether Plaintiff was suffering from a serious medical issue during his
time in segregation, he has not pleaded sufficient facts to implicate Benton or Baldwin for being
deliberately indifferent to his needs related thereto. As previously noted, it is unclear whether
these defendants were even aware that Plaintiff was attacked or placed in segregation before he

6

had already completed his segregation time and been transferred from Menard. Because Benton
and Baldwin do not appear to have been personally involved in denying Plaintiff medical care,
Count 3 will be dismissed without prejudice.
Illinois Department of Corrections
Plaintiff has named the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) as a defendant.
However, Plaintiff’s claims against IDOC are barred because it, as a state agency, is not a
“person” that may be sued under § 1983. Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012)
(citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70–71 (1989)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”). the Illinois
Department of Corrections will therefore be dismissed from this case with prejudice.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3) which is hereby
REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly for a decision.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall PROCEED against BENTON and
BALDWIN.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNTS 2 and 3 are DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED

that

7

the

ILLINOIS

DEPARTMENT

OF

CORRECTIONS is DISMISSED with prejudice for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for
BENTON and BALDWIN: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a
Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail
these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each defendant’s
place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If any defendant fails to sign and return the
Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms
were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and
the Court will require that defendant pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Reona J. Daly for further pre-trial proceedings.

Further, this entire matter shall be

REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly for disposition, pursuant to
Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs

8

under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, despite the fact
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 31, 2018
s/ STACI M. YANDLE
U.S. District Judge

9