Davidson v. Baldwin

Filing 10

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff's Motion to Expunge (Doc. 6) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Clerk is DIRECTED to STRIKE the pleading filed at Doc. 5. Plaintiff's Motion to Recei ve Documents via Regular Mail (Doc. 8) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should he wish to proceed with this case, Plaintiff shall file his First Amended Complaint, stating any facts which may exist to support his claims, on or before March 28, 2018. (Amended Pleadings due by 3/28/2018). Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 2/21/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

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LANCE DAVIDSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN BALDWIN,
Defendant.

Case No. 17 cv–1400 NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Lance Davidson, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)
currently housed at Menard Correctional Center, brings this action for deprivations of his
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation and
immediate release from custody.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a)

Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible
or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a
complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from
a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity.

(b)

Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint–

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim
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that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir.
2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line between possibility and
plausibility. “ID. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be
liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds it
appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A; this action is subject to summary dismissal.
The Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that he was sentenced to three years in IDOC custody on June 28, 2016.
(Doc. 1, p. 2). The sentence was to be served at 50% with one year mandatory supervised release. Id.
Plaintiff also was awarded 128 days credit for time served in the Montgomery County Jail. Id.
Plaintiff filed several post-trial motions and, on July 28, 2017, Judge James Roberts signed an
amended judgment which sentenced Plaintiff to two years’ time in the IDOC and one year supervised
release with 128 days’ credit for time served, time to be served at 50%. Id. Plaintiff contends that this
adjustment means that he should have been released on February 25, 2017. Id. Plaintiff believes that
the IDOC should have given him credit for the time period of February 25 through August 4, 2017.
Id.
Discussion
As an initial matter, Plaintiff has asked for immediate release as part of his relief. Plaintiff
cannot seek that relief as part of a § 1983 action. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper
route, “[i]f the prisoner is seeking what can fairly be described as a quantum change in the level of
custody—whether outright freedom, or freedom subject to the limited reporting and financial
constraints of bond or parole or probation.” Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991). If,
however, the prisoner “is seeking a different program or location or environment, then he is
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challenging the conditions rather than the fact of confinement and his remedy is under civil rights
law.” Id.; see also Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1999). Section 1983 jurisdiction is
displaced if the habeas corpus remedy applies. Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff cannot bring a request for habeas relief and a request for relief pursuant to § 1983 in the
same lawsuit. As Plaintiff’s Complaint affirmatively states that he is proceeding under § 1983 and
makes no mention of habeas, the Court will dismiss the habeas request from this action. Plaintiff may
file a separate habeas action, if necessary.
As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Plaintiff alleges that the IDOC refuses to award him credit for the time period between
February 25, 2017 and August 4, 2017, which he is due because a state court judge issued an order
reducing his sentence. The fact that the time at issue has been awarded by a judge after a post-trial
motion suggests that Plaintiff has cleared the bar set by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486
(1994), and the Court will presume that Plaintiff has done so at the pleading stage.
The next question is whether Plaintiff has stated a claim under the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendments. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits government officials from depriving a person of liberty. Obviously, Plaintiff’s
claim that he is being held contrary to his sentence implicates his liberty interest. Toney-El v.
Franzen, 777 F.2d 1224, 1228 (7th Cir. 1985). Due process claims can be procedural or substantive.
Procedural claims challenge the procedure employed prior to the deprivation. Zinermon v. Burch,
494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). Plaintiff has not put any policy or procedure at issue here. The only
defendant he has named is John Baldwin, and the Complaint is silent as to whether Baldwin is named
in his official or individual capacity. There is some suggestion that Plaintiff intended to name

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Baldwin in his official capacity, because the statement of claim only references the IDOC, 1 and
Baldwin is the head of that agency. But as the Complaint does not clearly put a policy or procedure at
issue, Baldwin’s inclusion is insufficient to state a procedural due process claim.
Additionally, there is no violation of the Due Process Clause where the state has adequate
post-deprivation remedies. A plaintiff must show both that a state official committed a “random and
unauthorized” act, and that the state itself has no adequate post-deprivation remedy to address the
negligent or intentional violation of state procedures. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541-44 (1981);
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). It is not clear what remedies the Plaintiff pursued to
secure his release prior to bringing this suit, and Plaintiff has not alleged that there are no adequate
post-deprivation remedies available. Thus, Plaintiff has not adequately stated a procedural due
process claim.
The case law on a substantive due process right suggests that it is improper to consider the
substantive due process clause if the claim is covered by a specific constitutional amendment. County
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989);
Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433, 438 (7th Cir. 2015). Subjecting a prisoner to detention beyond the
end of his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment. Childress, 787 F.3d at 438; Armato v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 721 (7th Cir. 2014);
Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir. 2001). For this reason, Plaintiff’s claim is likely best
analyzed under the Eighth Amendment.
Regardless, Plaintiff has not articulated a claim under either the substantive due process
clause or the Eighth Amendment. Both constitutional provisions require Plaintiff to show that
someone was deliberately indifferent to his plight. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986)

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Failure to include a defendant’s name in the statement of claim, as Plaintiff has done here, is normally grounds for
dismissal.See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant by
including the defendant’s name in the caption.”).

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(due process clause not implicated by negligent act of official causing unintended loss of liberty);
Campbell, 256 F.3d at 700 (“[T]he courts that have recognized this problem have been careful to
note that the extended incarceration must also be the product of deliberate indifference before a
constitutional violation, as opposed to an error of state law, is implicated.”). Deliberate indifference
means that officials knew that a prisoner risked serving or was actually serving unwarranted
punishment and failed to act. Childress, 787 F.3d at 440.
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that Baldwin personally knew that Plaintiff was actually
serving unwarranted punishment, or that Baldwin knew that Plaintiff was at a substantial risk of
serving unwarranted punishment and failed to act. In the absence of such allegations, Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim against Baldwin under the Eighth Amendment. The Court will therefore
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Baldwin without prejudice. Plaintiff may file an amended
complaint if he so desires.
Pending Motions
On February 1, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Expunge Doc. 5, which was filed as
“Exhibits,” and Doc. 4, a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. 6). Plaintiff
states that Docs. 4 and 5 were mistakenly e-filed by Menard’s law library, and that he had only
requested copies. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff appears to be under the impression that the Motion for Leave to
Proceed IFP is a duplicative filing. (Doc. 6, p. 1). But although Plaintiff submitted a trust fund
statement with his Complaint, he did not actually file an IFP motion until January 26, 2018, and Doc.
4 is the only IFP motion on file in this case. Moreover, the trust fund submitted in connection with
Doc. 4 is not identical to the one previously submitted. Thus, Doc. 4 is not duplicative, and the Court
declines to strike it on those grounds. Plaintiff’s other reasons for striking the documents are that (1)
they are attorney-client privileged correspondence; and (2) they are not relevant to this case.(Doc. 6).
Neither of those reasons applies to Doc. 4; it is not an attorney-client privileged communication, and
it is relevant to the issue of whether Plaintiff can proceed IFP. The Court has already granted IFP on
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the basis of Doc. 4. (Doc. 9). Because the Court has already granted the motion, and Plaintiff has not
paid the full filing fee in this action, it would not be appropriate to strike Doc. 4. The Court will,
however, strike Doc. 5 at Plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff’s Motion to Expunge (Doc. 6) is therefore
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff also has filed a motion to receive documents via regular mail, not electronically.
(Doc. 8). While the Court will send Plaintiff file-stamped copies of any copies that he submits in
connection with his filings, inmates do not have the choice of opting out of the Court’s e-filing
program. Plaintiff’s request (Doc. 8) is therefore DENIED.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Expunge (Doc. 6) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Clerk is
DIRECTED to STRIKE the pleading filed at Doc. 5. Plaintiff’s Motion to Receive Documents via
Regular Mail (Doc. 8) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should he wish to proceed with this case, Plaintiff shall
file his First Amended Complaint, stating any facts which may exist to support his claims, on or
before March 28, 2018. An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint,
rendering the original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632,
638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to the original complaint.
Thus, the First Amended Complaint must stand on its own, without reference to any other pleading.
Should the First Amended Complaint not conform to these requirements, it shall be stricken. Plaintiff
also must re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along with the First Amended
Complaint. Failure to file an amended complaint shall result in the dismissal of this action with
prejudice. Such dismissal shall count as one of Plaintiff’s three allotted “strikes” within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

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Plaintiff is warned, however, that the Court takes the issue of perjury seriously, and that any
facts found to be untrue in the Amended Complaint may be grounds for sanctions, including
dismissal and possible criminal prosecution for perjury. Rivera v. Drake, 767 F.3d 685, 686 (7th Cir.
2014) (dismissing a lawsuit as a sanction where an inmate submitted a false affidavit and
subsequently lied on the stand).
No service shall be ordered on any Defendant until after the Court completes its § 1915A
review of the First Amended Complaint.
In order to assist Plaintiff in preparing his amended complaint, the Clerk is DIRECTED to
mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 21, 2018

___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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