Wells v. Fowler

Filing 12

ORDER DISMISSING CASE with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. IT IS ORDERED that Defendant RALPH FOWLER is DISMISSED with prejudice because no claim for relief has been stated against the defendant. This dis missal does not preclude Plaintiff from pursuing a tort claim in state court or habeas relief in state or federal court. Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal counts as one of his three allotted strikes under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 7/19/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LONNIE T. WELLS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RALPH FOWLER,
Defendant.

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Case No. 18-cv-00082-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
Now before this Court is the First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Lonnie Wells on
May 14, 2018. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
while he was incarcerated at Taylorville Correctional Center (“Taylorville”). (Doc. 1, p. 1).
After being released from custody, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint against Ralph
Fowler, a prosecuting attorney for the State of Illinois who is allegedly responsible for his
conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice. (Docs. 7, 11). Plaintiff alleges that Attorney
Fowler improperly used evidence from an overturned child abuse and neglect case to prove the
State’s case against him. Id. In his request for relief, Plaintiff seeks the “TRUTH!” (Doc. 11, p.
7) (emphasis in original).
This matter is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the First Amended
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in
any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee
of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal – On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
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(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim
that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th
Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577
F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The First Amended Complaint does not survive screening.
First Amended Complaint
In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Attorney Fowler (State of Illinois
Appellate Prosecutor) is guilty of official misconduct. (Doc. 11, p. 6). The allegations offered in
support of this claim are far from clear. Id. The Court has done its best to summarize Plaintiff’s
Statement of Claim. Id.
According to the allegations, the State of Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services (“DCFS”) opened a case against Plaintiff’s ex-wife, Dixon Turner. (Doc. 11, p. 6).
Jeannie Parker (DCFS caseworker) investigated the allegations of child abuse and neglect against
her and concluded that they were substantiated. Id. Despite this conclusion, the case against
Dixon was dropped. Id.
Fowler allegedly used his position to “fabricate evidence towards Dixon’s benefit and
then turn[ ] it towards [Plaintiff’s] demise.” (Doc. 11, p. 6). Plaintiff does not explain what he
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means by this assertion, beyond stating that Fowler “successfully had a case from DCFS that was
against [his] ex-wife, Dixon Turner, dropped, and then proceeded to become a witness for the
prosecution” in Plaintiff’s criminal case. Id. Plaintiff accuses Fowler of engaging in official
misconduct, which he says is a Class 3 felony. Id.
Discussion
Plaintiff cannot use § 1983 as a vehicle for bringing criminal charges against the
defendant. Although he allegedly seeks the “TRUTH,” it appears that Plaintiff is actually
attempting to initiate a criminal prosecution against Fowler for a Class 3 felony. (Doc. 11, pp. 67). An inmate has no right to compel a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Wimberly v. Julius, 606
F. App’x 309, 311 (7th Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 504 (2015) (citing Town of Castle
Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005); Sandage v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Vanderburgh
Cnty., 548 F.3d 595, 597 (7th Cir. 2008)). Further, this Court has no authority to initiate a
criminal prosecution. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1) (“[t]he indictment or information . . . must be
signed by an attorney for the government.”). To the extent he seeks to bring criminal charges
against the defendant, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
Plaintiff also cannot use § 1983 to challenge his state court conviction for conspiracy to
obstruct justice. The proper way to challenge his conviction is by filing a direct appeal, a postconviction petition, or a petition for writ of habeas corpus. It is unclear whether Plaintiff did so,
and this Order does not preclude him from pursuing this relief in state or federal court.
Regardless, Plaintiff cannot seek this relief under § 1983. To the extent he intended to challenge
his conviction or seek release from custody in the First Amended Complaint, it fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.

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Finally, Plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim for money damages against Attorney
Fowler for the allegedly unlawful testimony that was used to secure his conviction in state court.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars Plaintiff from
doing so. According to Heck, a § 1983 plaintiff pursuing a claim for money damages for “an
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” must demonstrate that “the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, [pursuant to] 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck, 512
at 486-87. Plaintiff has made no such showing. He is therefore barred from pursuing a claim
against Attorney Fowler that is clearly intended to undercut his conviction.
Even if Heck posed no impediment, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Attorney Fowler
would fail on immunity grounds. The law is clear that a state prosecutor is immune from a
§ 1983 civil suit for damages “[i]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.”
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). Prosecutorial immunity thus bars Plaintiff claims
against Attorney Fowler for actions taken in furtherance of his prosecutorial duties. Fields v.
Warrie, 672 F.3d 505, 510, 514 (7th Cir. 2012). The allegations, though far from clear, suggest
that Plaintiff is pursuing a claim against the defendant for the actions he took in furtherance of
these duties. The First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted for this reason as well.
In light of the above, this § 1983 action shall be dismissed with prejudice. However, this
dismissal does not preclude Plaintiff from pursuing relief under state tort law or seeking state or
federal habeas relief. Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, n. 18 (1981) (“In addition to possible

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relief under state tort law, an indigent prisoner retains the right to initiate state and federal habeas
corpus proceedings.) The Court takes no position in this Order as to whether Plaintiff’s release
from custody renders a habeas petition moot.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks the Court’s assistance in recruiting counsel on his
behalf, the request is denied. 1 A district court faced with this request must ask two questions:
“(1) [H]as the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively
precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear
competent to litigate it himself?” See Armstrong v. Krupiczowicz, 874 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir.
2017) (citing Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007)). Plaintiff has not demonstrated
sufficient efforts to locate counsel on his own before seeking the Court’s assistance. He has
demonstrated an ability to represent himself in this matter, by preparing and filing timely
pleadings. Further, Plaintiff identifies no impediments to pro se litigation, such as language,
education, medical, or mental health barriers.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 11) and
this action are DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant RALPH FOWLER is DISMISSED with prejudice
because no claim for relief has been stated against the defendant. This dismissal does not
preclude Plaintiff from pursuing a tort claim in state court or habeas relief in state or federal
court.

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In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that he is “attempting to get an attorney to help [him]
with this ordeal. . . .” (Doc. 11, p. 6).

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Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal counts as one of his three allotted “strikes”
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the filing fee for this
action was incurred at the time the action was filed, regardless of subsequent developments in the
case.

Accordingly, the filing fee of $350.00 remains due and payable.

See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he may file a notice of appeal with this Court
within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. 4(A)(4). If Plaintiff does choose to
appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the
appeal. See FED. R. APP. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 72526 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien, 133 F.3d at
467. Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may also incur another
“strike.” A proper and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
may toll the 30-day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed
no more than twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot
be extended.
The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 19, 2018
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief District Judge
United States District Court

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