Wyma v. State of Illinois et al

Filing 16

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 8/30/2018. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CHRISTOPHER WYMA, #Y-20504,
Plaintiff,
vs.

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DR. SIDDIQUI,
HOLLY HAWKINS,
WEXFORD MEDICAL PROVIDER,
and
WARDEN OF MENARD,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
HERNDON
Plaintiff Christopher Wyma, an inmate in Menard Correctional Center
(“Menard”), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
deprivations of his constitutional rights.

In his Third Amended Complaint,

Plaintiff claims the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
issues in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 15). This case is now before
the Court for a preliminary review of the Third Amended Complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter
out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of a complaint
that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune
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from such relief, must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). An action or claim is
frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
At this juncture, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally
construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th
Cir. 2009).
The Third Amended Complaint
In his Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 15), Plaintiff makes the following
allegations: Wexford, which provides health care at Menard, “has a policy of not
having their staff and doctors see patients in a timely manner.” (Doc. 15, pp. 67).

On April 19, 2017, Plaintiff arrived at Menard.

(Doc. 15, p. 7).

During

intake, Plaintiff explained his problems to several nurses, including that he was
not receiving psych medication. Id. “None of the nurses referred Plaintiff to see
Psych or Medical.” Id. Holly Hawkins is the Director of Nursing at Menard. Id.
Dr. Siddiqui is the Medical Director and “should have had personal knowledge of
[Plaintiff] not being treated after [he] saw sick call several times for the same
reasons.” Id. Plaintiff wrote grievances at both Stateville and Menard about his
medications, but he never received a response. Id. This further delayed Plaintiff
seeing a doctor. Id.
Plaintiff received Dicyclomine and Famotidine at Menard, but they expired

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May 10, 2017.

(Doc. 15, p. 8).

“Instead of renewing or seeing the doctor,

[Plaintiff] was taken off. Medical staff knew they were about to expire but delayed
[Plaintiff] in seeing a doctor for several months.” Id. Holly Hawkins neglected to
refer Plaintiff to see a doctor before his medication expired, and Dr. Siddiqui
refused to see Plaintiff in a timely manner to prescribe his medication.

Id.

Plaintiff takes medication for severe pain caused by IBS and acid reflux. Id.
Because of the delays, Plaintiff experienced severe pain in his stomach and
he was unable to keep food down. Id. Plaintiff went several months before he
received his medication or saw a doctor.

(Doc. 15, p. 11).

Plaintiff filed an

emergency grievance because he was in severe pain, but it was deemed a nonemergency, and he was told to refile it. (Doc. 15, p. 10). Plaintiff believes this is
indicative of an inadequate grievance procedure, for which the Warden of Menard
should be liable.

Id.

This situation caused Plaintiff severe pain, stress,

depression, and anxiety, and forced him to experience withdrawal symptoms.
(Doc. 15, pp. 10-11).
Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from the defendants. (Doc. 15, p. 15).

Based on the allegations of the Third Amended Complaint, the Court finds
it convenient to designate two counts in this pro se action. The parties and the
Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designation of these
counts does not constitute an opinion regarding their merit.

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While Plaintiff was incarcerated at Menard in 2017, Defendants
showed deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical
needs by delaying and/or failing to provide him with needed
medications and treatment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.

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The Warden of Menard subjected Plaintiff to an inadequate
grievance procedure at Menard, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Any other intended claim that has not been recognized by the Court is considered
dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pleaded under the Twombly pleading
standard.
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The Supreme Court has recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners” may constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To state a claim, a prisoner must
show that: (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical need; and (2) state
officials acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s medical need, which is
a subjective standard. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim under this standard, if only
just, against Hawkins and Siddiqui for failing to refer Plaintiff to see a doctor and
refusing to see Plaintiff in a timely manner so as to prescribe him his needed
medications. (Doc. 15, p. 8). As to Wexford, a corporation can be held liable for
deliberate indifference if it had a policy or practice that caused the alleged
violation of a constitutional right. Woodward v. Corr. Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 368
F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff alleges that Wexford maintains a policy

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under which its staff delays medical treatment for inmates, and this policy caused
Wexford’s medical staff to delay his treatment. At this early stage, this is enough
to state a deliberate indifference claim against Wexford.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring a deliberate indifference claim against
the Warden of Menard, this claim must fail. The Complaint is devoid of
allegations suggesting the Warden of Menard’s personal involvement in Plaintiff’s
medical care. See Locke v. Haessig, 788 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2015); Owens v.

Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Prison officials who simply processed
or reviewed inmate grievances lack personal involvement in the conduct forming
the basis of the grievance.”) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, Count 1 will proceed against Hawkins, Siddiqui, and Wexford
and will be dismissed without prejudice against the Warden of Menard.
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The Seventh Circuit has “specifically denounc[ed] a Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process right to an inmate grievance procedure.” Grieveson v.

Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 2008). As explained in Antonelli v.
Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430-31 (7th Cir. 1996), “any right to a grievance
procedure is a procedural right, not a substantive one. Accordingly, a state’s
inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause.” Id. at 1430-31(internal citations omitted).
For this reason, Plaintiff’s claim against the Warden of Menard based on the
allegedly inadequate grievance procedure at Menard will be dismissed with

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prejudice.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall PROCEED against
SIDDIQUI, HAWKINS, and WEXFORD and is dismissed without prejudice
against WARDEN OF MENARD for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 2 is DISMISSED with prejudice
for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that WARDEN OF MENARD is DISMISSED
from this action without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall
prepare for SIDDIQUI, HAWKINS, and WEXFORD: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a
Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of
Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the
Third Amended Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to the defendants’
place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If one of the defendants fails to sign
and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30
days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to
effect formal service on that defendant, and the Court will require the defendant
pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.

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With respect to a defendant who no longer can be found at the work
address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the
defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the defendant’s last-known
address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed
above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be
retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the
court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading
to the Third Amended Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United
States Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.

Further, this entire

matter shall be REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for disposition,
pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to

such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the
payment of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full
amount of the costs, despite the fact that his application to proceed in forma

pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to
keep the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his
address; the Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall

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be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in
address occurs.

Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in the

transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for
want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Judge Herndon
2018.08.30 14:16:03
-05'00'
United States

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