Ragsdale v. Allen et al
Filing
118
ORDER GRANTING 108 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Allen and Dellinger are DISMISSED with prejudice and judgment will be entered in Defendants' favor. There being no claims or Defendants remaining in this action, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close this case on the Courts docket. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 3/29/2021. (klh2)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROSS RAGSDALE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SHAY ALLEN and
TARRAH DELLINGER,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:18-CV-117-MAB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by
Defendants Shay Allen and Tarrah Dellinger (Doc. 108). For the reasons outlined below,
the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Ross Ragsdale filed this pro se civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging his constitutional rights were violated at Lawrence Correctional Center. More
specifically, Plaintiff alleged that correctional officers failed to protect him from another
inmate who had threatened him, and after he was attacked by that inmate, the prison
doctor failed to adequately treat him (Doc. 10). The only claim remaining in this case is
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendants Shay Allen and
Tarrah Dellinger (see Doc. 75).
Defendants Allen and Dellinger filed a motion for summary judgment on the
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merits of Plaintiff’s claim on August 10, 2020 (Doc. 108). Plaintiff filed a response in
opposition on October 27, 2020 (Doc. 113). Defendants did not file a reply brief.
FACTS
Plaintiff Ross Ragsdale has been incarcerated in the Illinois Department of
Corrections since March 2011 (Doc. 109-1, p. 9). He was transferred to Lawrence
Correctional Center that same year (Id.). Plaintiff testified that he worked as a porter in
his cell house at Lawrence, which entailed cleaning the dayroom and showers and doing
other inmates’ laundry (Id. at pp. 12–13). He would also do favors for other inmates while
he was working, by getting them food and doing other tasks (Id. at p. 14). An inmate
named Ray-Ray requested too many favors from Plaintiff, which began to interfere with
Plaintiff’s duties as a porter, and on May 24, 2016, Plaintiff told Ray-Ray that he would
not do anymore favors for him (Id. at pp. 12, 15). Ray-Ray called Plaintiff a “bitch,” and
told Plaintiff to get out of his face (Id. at pp. 15–16). Plaintiff testified that he walked away
from Ray-Ray (Id. at p. 16). Approximately an hour later, Ray-Ray told Plaintiff, “I’m
going to beat your bitch ass. I’ll get you soon enough” (Id.).
Plaintiff said he took Ray-Ray’s statement as a threat and told his wing officer on
the 3:00 to 11:00 shift, Shay Allen, about it (Doc. 109-1, pp 16–17, 20–22, 24, 56–57). Officer
Allen told Plaintiff “to give it a day or two, and it will die out” (Id. at pp. 20–21). She also
told him that “if I were to do something right now, nothing going to be done because its
3:00 to 11:00 shift, and . . . you know as well as I do 3:00 to 11:00 shift’s not going to do
nothing. It’s mainly day shift that does stuff like that. But I’ll see what I can do.” (Id.).
According to Plaintiff, nothing happened (Id. at p. 24, 27, 60). And Plaintiff therefore
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believes that Officer Shay did not take any action (Id. at p. 24, 25–28). He explained that
Officer Shay had no authority to move him, so she would have to report the incident to
her commanding officer, and then the commanding officer would speak to him to see
what was going on and decide whether to have him moved (Id.). But none of Officer
Shay’s superiors ever came and spoke to Plaintiff (Id.).
Plaintiff then told an officer on the day shift, but no action was taken (Doc. 109-1,
pp. 17, 61). A day or two later, Plaintiff talked to Officer Allen again (Id.). She said “That’s
still going on,” and Plaintiff said, “yes.” (Id. at p. 61). She then said “I don’t know what
to tell you. It’s out of my hands.” (Id.).
At some point, Plaintiff had a conversation with Officer Tarrah Dellinger. He
asked Officer Dellinger what he needed to do to get moved because another inmate had
threatened him (Doc. 109-1, pp. 64, 66–68). She told him to speak to his wing officer and
added, “I don’t know what to tell you. Just beat his ass because you’re not going to get
moved” (Doc. 109-1, p. 21; see also id. at pp. 64–65, 67, 90).
Plaintiff then spoke to Officer Allen a third time on June 3, 2016 (Doc. 109-1, pp.
63, 90). By that point, Ray-Ray had not done anything or said anything more to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff had continued working as a porter after Ray-Ray’s initial threat, but Plaintiff
testified that he ignored Ray-Ray while he was working, and Ray-Ray ignored him (Id. at
pp. 33–34). Plaintiff also testified, however, that he had not been going to chow in order
to avoid any face-to-face, out-of-cell interactions with Ray-Ray (Id. at pp. 17, 33). Plaintiff
asked Officer Allen what he was supposed to do, and he explained that he was hungry
and asked her if she could bring him back a meal tray from the chow hall (Id. at p. 63).
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Officer Allen told him to go to chow because there did not appear to be a legitimate threat
(Id. at pp. 17, 63, 90).
So Plaintiff went to chow. He testified that when he finished eating, he went to the
dish room window to return his tray (Doc. 109-1, pp. 36–37). As he stood at the window,
Ray-Ray walked up beside Plaintiff and poured beans on Plaintiff (Id.). Plaintiff asked
Ray-Ray why he did it, and Ray-Ray said because “I can, bitch. . . . You’re a porter. You
can wash them.” or something to that effect (Id. at pp. 34, 35, 37, 38, 44–45). Plaintiff
walked away from Ray-Ray (Id. at pp. 37, 38). Plaintiff took it as an act of
gamesmanship—“a sign of disrespect in front of everybody” and “trying to make a scene
to stir up attention with his gang members” (Id. at pp. 38–39, 44).
The inmates lined up and left the chow hall (Doc. 109-1, pp. 46–47, 49–51). Plaintiff
was asked to step out of line to adjust his identification badge, and in order to return to
his to initial place in the line, Plaintiff had to pass Ray-Ray (Id. at pp. 49–51). Ray-Ray
made an unspecified disrespectful comment to Plaintiff as Plaintiff passed him And
Plaintiff told Ray-Ray, “Go eat a dick” (or “go suck a dick”) (Id. at pp. 18, 35, 48, 49–51,
95–96). Plaintiff got back in his spot in line and a few seconds later, Ray-Ray ran up and
struck him (Id. at pp. 35–36, 49–51). Correctional officers ran up and restrained Plaintiff
and Ray-Ray (Id.).
Plaintiff testified that his face was fractured in multiple places and he had to have
reconstructive surgery (Doc. 109-1, pp. 31, 36, 54).
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper when the moving party “shows that there is no
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genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “Factual disputes are genuine only if there is sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the
evidence presented, and they are material only if their resolution might change the suit’s
outcome under the governing law.” Maniscalco v. Simon, 712 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir.
2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding a motion for summary
judgment, the court’s role is not to determine the truth of the matter, and the court may
not “choose between competing inferences or balance the relative weight of conflicting
evidence.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Hansen v. Fincantieri
Marine Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); Doe v. R.R. Donnelley
& Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994). Instead, “it must view all the evidence in the
record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all factual disputes
in favor of the non-moving party.” Hansen, 763 F.3d at 836.
“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments’
obligates prison officials to ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of . . .
inmates.’” Sinn v. Lemmon, 911 F.3d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). In particular, prison officials are required “to protect prisoners
from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. In order to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on a failure to protect, an inmate must
show that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to “an excessive risk” to their
health or safety. Sinn, 911 F.3d at 419 (quoting Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 480 (7th
Cir. 2015)). Like all deliberate indifference claims, there is both an objective and subjective
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component. Gevas, 798 F.3d at 480. First, the prisoner must show that the harm to which
they were exposed was objectively serious. Id. Second, the prisoner must show that the
prison official knew of and disregarded the excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety.
Balsewicz v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2020). This requires “actual, and not merely
constructive, knowledge” of the risk of harm, meaning the official “must both be aware
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw that inference.” Gevas, 798 F.3d at 480 (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 837). In deciding whether the prison official was aware of the risk, “the
circumstances as a whole must be considered.” LaBrec v. Walker, 948 F.3d 836, 843 (7th
Cir. 2020).
Defendants do not dispute that the threat of which Plaintiff complained—being
beaten by another inmate—was objectively serious (see Doc. 109). Instead, they argue that
they did not have “actual knowledge of the realized threat” (Doc. 109, pp. 6). They
contend that Ray-Ray’s threat to beat up Plaintiff was an empty threat or a threat that had
gone stale. And Ray-Ray attacked Plaintiff only after Plaintiff created a new and different
risk, of which Defendants had no knowledge, by making an incendiary comment to RayRay.
The Court agrees Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Ray-Ray made
his initial threat to harm Plaintiff on May 24, 2016. Ray-Ray did not say anything more to
Plaintiff over the ensuing nine days while Plaintiff worked as a porter. By June 3rd,
Officer Allen apparently thought that the threat of a physical assault had subsided and
Plaintiff decided to go to chow. However, at chow, it became clear that Ray-Ray’s ill-will
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toward Plaintiff remained, and he had not dropped the matter. He made it a point to
antagonize and intimidate Plaintiff, but he never physically harmed Plaintiff. In line after
chow, Plaintiff walked by Ray-Ray and Ray-Ray once again said something antagonistic
but made no attempt to touch or physically harm Plaintiff. Simply put, the evidence
before the Court is that while the situation between Plaintiff and Ray-Ray was tense and
hostile, it was not physical, and Ray-Ray was not going to make good on his threat to beat
up Plaintiff during dinner that day.
Plaintiff could have returned to the cell house and filed an emergency grievance
or alerted his wing officer (or another appropriate officer) that he believed the threat to
his safety had not abated based on Ray-Ray’s hostile comments and actions during chow.
Instead, Plaintiff’s impulses got the best of him and he told Ray-Ray to “eat a dick.”
Plaintiff, without a doubt, knew that he was pouring gas on the fire with his comment,
and his comment would very likely push Ray-Ray over the edge. He was consciously
bringing the threatened beating to fruition with his own actions. Plaintiff through own
his words to Ray-Ray, took an affirmative step to escalate the feud with Ray-Ray to a
whole new level. He was responding to Ray-Ray in kind and this comment certainly
changed the dynamic. There is no evidence to suggest that Defendants knew or had any
reason to know, that Plaintiff would affirmatively escalate the feud with Ray-Ray and act
in manner that virtually guaranteed the beating that he claims Defendants should have
protected him from. No reasonable juror could find Defendants liable under these
circumstances.
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CONCLUSION
The motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Shay Allen and Tarrah
Dellinger (Doc. 108) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Allen and
Dellinger are DISMISSED with prejudice and judgment will be entered in Defendants’
favor. There being no claims or Defendants remaining in this action, the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to enter judgment and close this case on the Court’s docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 29, 2021
s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge
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