Monroe et al v. Rauner et al

Filing 215

ORDER: The Court finds that Defendants are taking steps to comply with certain aspects of the Court's preliminary injunction. The Court emphasizes, however, that Defendants were ordered to immediately cease the practice of allowing the TCRC to m ake medical decisions and recommendations regarding gender dysphoria. Furthermore, the Court finds that the appointment of an expert is not warranted at this time. To the extent the parties have further issues regarding compliance with the preliminary injunction, a proper motion should be filed. Signed by Chief Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 3/20/2020. (jrj)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JANIAH MONROE,
MARILYN MELENDEZ,
LYDIA HELÉNA VISION,
SORA KUYKENDALL, and
SASHA REED,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 18-cv-00156-NJR

STEVE MEEKS,
MELVIN HINTON, and
ROB JEFFREYS,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
On February 11, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a response to Defendants’ report on
compliance with the Court’s preliminary injunction order. (Doc. 207). Plaintiffs argue that
Defendants have not taken meaningful steps to comply with the order and the proposed
steps offered by Defendants are insufficient and vague. (Id. at p. 2). They also ask the
Court to order the parties to meet and confer on a list of potential experts, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 706, to oversee the changes being implemented and to ensure
that transgender prisoners are receiving adequate care for their gender dysphoria. (Id. at
p. 14). The Court ordered Defendants to file a reply, specifically directing them to address
Plaintiffs’ request for a court-appointed medical expert to oversee the implementation of
the preliminary injunction. (Doc. 209).
After reviewing Defendants’ report on compliance (Doc. 202) and the reply brief
(Doc. 210), the Court finds that Defendants are taking steps to comply with certain aspects
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of the Court’s Order. 1 Specifically, Defendants are making satisfactory progress toward
developing various policies and procedures regarding medical care provided to
transgender inmates and have contracted with a consultant, Dr. Anderson, who is on the
WPATH Board of Directors. (Doc. 210, pp. 5, 7). They also have advised the Court on the
training provided to correctional staff on transgender issues, which has been developed
with the input from Howard Brown Health Center and Planned Parenthood and been
reviewed and approved by Dr. Anderson. (Id. at p. 5). As the Court previously
acknowledged, “these changes will take time,” and the purpose of the injunction was to
require Defendants to provide assurances that progress is underway, which they have.
(Doc. 186, p. 38.).
The Court is not entirely convinced, however, that Defendants are complying with
the directive to “cease the policy and practice of allowing the Transgender Committee to
make the medical decisions regarding gender dysphoria.” (Doc. 212, p. 1). Defendants’
report states that the Transgender Care Review Committee (“TCRC”) is still being
consulted regarding “placement, security, and gender-related accommodation issues[,]”
(Doc. 202, p. 2), and their reply states that “the responsibility of decisions regarding
gender-affirming surgery are being modified and the responsibility will stand with the
IDOC Medical Department, not IDOC Mental Health.” (Doc. 210, p. 4) (emphasis added).
The Court recognizes that decisions of medical treatment within a prison environment
may have medical as well as security components (Doc. 210, p. 2), and the “need for
deference to experienced and expert prison administrators faced with the difficult and
dangerous task of housing large numbers of convicted criminals.” Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S.
The Court’s preliminary injunction order was issued on December 19, 2019 (Docs. 186, 187). Thereafter,
on March 4, 2020, the Court amended the preliminary injunction order. (See Docs. 211, 212).

1

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493, 511 (2011). And thus the Court finds that the consultation with TCRC for genderrelated accommodation issues does not violate the order at this time. Nevertheless, the
Court emphasizes that Defendants were ordered to immediately cease the practice of
allowing the TCRC to make medical decisions and recommendations regarding gender
dysphoria, and this includes decisions regarding gender-affirming surgery and medically
necessary social transition.
Despite having some reservations about Defendants’ compliance with the above
directive, the Court finds that the appointment of an expert is not warranted at this time.
Federal Rule of Evidence 706(a) gives the Court discretion to appoint a neutral expert to
assist the Court in evaluating complex information. See Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354,
357 (7th Cir. 1997) (whether to appoint such an expert is a discretionary decision); DeJesus
v. Godinez, 720 F. App’x 766, 772 (7th Cir. 2017) (purpose of such an appointment is to aid
the Court in evaluating complex matters); Elcock v. Davidson, 561 F. App’x 519, 524 (7th
Cir.) (a court may appoint an expert “if scientific or specialized knowledge will help the
court to understand the evidence or decide a disputed fact.”). After evaluating the
evidence presented during the two day preliminary injunction hearing, including
testimony from expert witnesses, the Court determined that Plaintiffs demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits regarding IDOC’s failure to provide constitutionally
adequate treatment and awarded the preliminary injunction. (Doc. 186). Thus, at this
stage, appointing a neutral expert would not add to “the understanding of the case” or
“help sort through conflicting evidence[.]” Turner v. Cox, 569 F. App’x 436, 468 (7th Cir.
2014). Furthermore, as previously discussed, the Court finds that Defendants have
properly reported to the Court actions taken to implement the directives in the Order.

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For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ request to order the parties to meet
and confer on an acceptable list of experts to oversee compliance. To the extent the parties
have further issues regarding compliance with the preliminary injunction order, a proper
motion should be filed, and the issue will be referred to a magistrate judge for further
determination under 28 U.S.C. § 636. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1) advisory committee’s note
to 2003 (“There is no apparent reason to appoint a magistrate judge to perform as master
duties that could be performed in the role of magistrate judge.”).
This order does not prohibit the parties from seeking a special master under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 in the future or as a part of settlement negotiations.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 20, 2020
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge

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