Monroe et al v. Rauner et al

Filing 97

AMENDED Memorandum and ORDER granting 41 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; finding as moot 80 Motion to Stay; and adopting Report and Recommendations 91 . The Court DISMISSES with prejudice defendant Rauner. The Court DIRECTS the C lerk of the Court to enter judgment reflecting the same at the close of the case. See Memorandum and Order for details. Further, the Court VACATES the November 29, 2018 96 Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Order on Motion to Stay, and Order on Report and Recommendations. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 11/30/2018. (klh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JANIAH MONROE, MARILYN MELENDEZ
EBONY STAMPS, LYDIA HELENA VISION,
SORA KUYKENDALL, and SASHA REED,
Plaintiffs,
v.

No. 18-0156-DRH

BRUCE RAUNER, JOHN BALDWIN,
STEVE MEEKS, and MELVIN HINTON,
Defendants.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM and ORDER

HERNDON, District Judge:
Introduction and Background
Pending

before

the

Court

is

a

November

9,

2018

Report

and

Recommendation (“the Report”) recommending that the Court grant defendant
Bruce Rauner’s motion to dismiss and deny as moot a motion to stay discovery
(Doc. 91).

Specifically, the Report recommends that the Court grant the motion to

dismiss, that Governor Rauner be dismissed with prejudice and the motion to stay
discovery be denied as moot. On November 20, 2018, plaintiffs filed objections to
the Report (Doc. 95). Based on the following, the Court rules as follows.
On January 31, 2018, Janiah Monroe, Marilyn Melndez, Ebony Stamps,
Lydia Helena Vision, Sora Kuykendall, and Sasha Reed filed suit against Bruce
Rauner, John Baldwin, Steve Meeks and Melvin Hinton (Doc. 1). Ruaner is the
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current governor of Illinois, Meeks is the medical director for the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), Hinton is the Chief of Mental Health Services
for IDOC and Baldwin is the Acting Director of the IDOC.

Plaintiffs are prisoners

in the custody of the IDOC. Represented by counsel, they bring this civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on behalf of themselves and other similarly
situated inmates. Plaintiffs are currently in various institutions both within and
outside the Southern District of Illinois; those located in this District are
Kuykendall (Menard Correctional Center), and Reed (Lawrence Correctional
Center). Plaintiffs identify themselves as transgender women, and have sought
evaluation and/or treatment for gender dysphoria during their IDOC custody. They
allege that the IDOC has denied and/or delayed evaluation and medically necessary
treatment and accommodations for their gender dysphoria, causing them to suffer
physical and psychological distress, including self-harm and suicide attempts. They
contend that incarceration under these conditions violates their Eighth Amendment
rights. They seek class action certification, and declaratory and injunctive relief.
On February 1, 2018, the undersigned conducted its review of the complaint under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A and referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Donald G.
Wilkerson (Doc. 4).
Thereafter on March 27, 2018, defendant Bruce Rauner filed a motion to
dismiss (Doc. 41). In the motion, Rauner argues that he should be dismissed from
this case as he is not the proper party for carrying out any of plaintiffs’ requested
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injunctive relief (Doc. 41). Raunder maintains that the proper defendants are the
named IDOC officials who would have the responsibility for complying with any
injunction that the Court may enter in this case. Plaintiffs filed an opposition to
the motion countering that Governor Rauner is a proper defendant because he has
the constitutional authority as the executive of the State of Illinois and plaintiffs
allege that he bears responsibility for ensuring the provision of constitutionally
adequate medical care for IDOC prisons (Doc. 55).

On November 9, 2018,

Magistrate Judge Wilkerson issued the Report finding:
However, the person with authority to effect change already has been
named in this suit, namely the Director of the IDOC. As such, the
Complaint fails to set forth what the Governor could conceivably do to
remedy the alleged constitutional violations above and beyond the other
named parties. His inclusion in the lawsuit appears superfluous.
(Doc. 91, p. 4).
Legal Standards
The Court’s review of the Report is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), which
provides in part:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions
of
the report or
specified
proposed
findings
or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the
court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may
also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate
judge with instructions.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) also directs that the Court must only make a de
novo determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to
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which specific written objection has been made. Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp.,
170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). If no objection or only a partial objection is
made, the Court reviews those unobjected portions for clear error.

Id.

In

addition, failure to file objections with the district court “waives appellate review
of both factual and legal questions.” Id. Under the clear error standard, the Court
can only overturn a Magistrate Judge's ruling if the Court is left with “the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Weeks v. Samsung Heavy
Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997).
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order
to “ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.’ ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) ); see also Windy City Metal Fabricators
& Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2008).
When considering whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, the Court assumes all factual allegations in the
complaint to be true, viewing all facts—as well as any inferences reasonably drawn
therefrom—in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S.
at 563 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) ); Parish v.
City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2010). A well-pleaded complaint may

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proceed even if it appears “that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a
recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556.
Nevertheless, the factual allegations in the complaint must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. at 555. While a complaint does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of
his entitlement to relief requires more than mere labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Id. (citations
omitted). The Court “need not accept as true legal conclusions, or threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ). “The complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bonte
v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 463 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678).
To assess whether a complaint states a plausible claim of relief, the Supreme
Court articulated a two-pronged approach in which a court (1) first identifies the
well-pleaded factual allegations by discarding the pleadings that are “no more than
conclusions” and (2) then determines whether the remaining well-pleaded factual
allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A
plaintiff is not required to plead facts in the complaint to anticipate and defeat
affirmative defenses. Independent Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Serv. Corp., 665
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F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). However, a plaintiff can plead himself or herself out
of court by pleading facts that undermine the allegations set forth in the complaint.
See, e.g., Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 412 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted)
(“A judicial admission trumps evidence. This is the basis of the principle that a
plaintiff can plead himself out of court.”).
Analysis
Here, plaintiffs object to the Report’s recommendation that the motion to
dismiss be granted and to the extent that it is granted that dismissal should be
without prejudice; object to the Report’s finding of fact that characterizes plaintiffs’
opposition as “Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that he is the very person who
can provide the full relief they seek” and object to the Report’s conclusion of law
that “Plaintiff[s]’ allegations against the Governor are not robust or detailed enough
to push them over the line from possibility to plausibility,” and that ”Plaintiffs allege
systemic problems with delivery of care to transgender inmates but do not tie such
relief to the Governor’s office,” and that “the Complaint fails to set forth what the
Governor could conceivably do to remedy the alleged constitutional violations
above and beyond the other named parties,” such that “[h]is inclusion in this
lawsuit appears superfluous.”

In addition, plaintiffs reiterate their prior

arguments countering the motion to dismiss.
objections and arguments.

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The Court rejects plaintiffs’

The Eighth Amendment “imposes a duty on government officials to provide
medical care to prisoners.” Townsend v. Cooper, 759 F.3d 678, 689 (7th Cir.
2014) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)). Prison officials
violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s
serious medical needs. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). To state a claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that his
medical condition is sufficiently serious (i.e., the objective standard). Greeno v.
Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834 (1970)). He also must demonstrate that each defendant responded to his
serious medical need with deliberate indifference (i.e., the subjective standard). Id.
A medical condition is considered objectively serious if it has been diagnosed
by a physician as requiring treatment or would be obvious to a layperson. See Pyles
v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d
458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009)). The allegations must also suggest that each defendant
responded to plaintiffs’ serious medical needs with deliberate indifference. A prison
official acts with deliberate indifference when he “know[s] of and disregard[s] an
excessive risk to inmate health.” Greeno, 411 F.3d at 653.
In order to seek injunctive relief on a claim that a policy/practice/custom led
to a constitutional violation, plaintiffs are required to name the proper party in
their official capacity. Thus, no personal involvement is required to be subjected
to the equitable jurisdiction of the Court (for prospective injunctive relief).
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See Ex

Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908); Ogden v. United States, 758 F.2d 1168,
1177 (7th Cir. 1985). A proper party for injunctive relief is the person who “would
be responsible for ensuring that any injunctive relief is carried out.”

Gonzalez v.

Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011).
As to the specific allegations against Rauner, plaintiffs’ compliant contains
the following:
46. Defendant Bruce Rauner is the Governor of the State of Illinois. He
is sued in his official capacity. The Governor is the Chief Executive
Office of the State of Illinois. He is responsible for ensuring the
provision of constitutionally adequate medical care for all prisoners in
the custody of IDOC, including those who have requested evaluation or
treatment for gender dysphoria. In all his actions described in this
Complaint, Defendant Governor Rauner is acting under color of state law
and in the course of his employment.
(Doc. 1, p. 12, ¶ 46).
There are no allegations suggesting that Governor Rauner personally
participated in any decision to deny plaintiffs medical care or, for that matter,
implemented any policy or custom, or practice that resulted in a constitutional
deprivation. Plaintiffs offer nothing more than conclusory allegations that Ruaner
has been aware and are aware of all the deprivations complained of and have
condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct. (See Doc. 1, ¶ 121).
Such allegations do not satisfy the Twombly standard.

Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 680 (citing Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (2007)(courts are
not required to assume that conclusory allegations are true, even early in
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litigation)).

Plaintiffs offer no other allegations suggesting that Rauner was on

notice that a particular policy, custom, or widespread practice resulted in plaintiffs’
denial of care or that Rauner exhibited deliberate indifference toward them.
Further, the Court finds that the complaint does not establish that Rauner would
have any involvement in carrying out any injunctive relief that is ultimately ordered.
See Gonzalez, 663 F.3d at 315. Put simply, plaintiffs have not “nudged [their]
claims…across the line from conceivable to plausible.”

Id. at 680.

Thus, the

Court grants the motion to dismiss.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report (Doc. 91), GRANTS defendant
Rauner’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 41), and DENIES as moot the motion to stay
discovery (Doc. 80).

The Court DISMISSES with prejudice defendant Bruce

Rauner. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment reflecting
the same at the end of the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Judge Herndon
2018.11.30
16:03:27 -06'00'
United States District Judge

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